Battlefield Promotions

[Raellus]

After the TDM, the number of academy and ROTC grads and "90 Day Wonders" making their way to Europe would slow to a relative trickle. Meanwhile, casualties amongst junior officers already in theater would be pretty high. There simply wouldn't be adequate numbers of new officers to keep up with losses. The difference, then, would need to be made up of soldiers who'd received battlefield commisions, no?

How would this work? At what level (Division, Brigade/Regiment, Battalion, Company) would the decision be made? Would a seniority system develop? -i.e. the unit's senior NCO would receive the officership, the next highest ranking NCO would take the senior NCO's slot, etc.

I'm just wondering what percentage of lieutenants in 2000 would be academy/ROTC/OCS grads and what percentage would be former NCOs and enlisted.

[jester]

However,

There would also be a severe reduction in troops to look which would reduce the high number of officers needed.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by jester

However, There would also be a severe reduction in troops to look which would reduce the high number of officers needed.

True. So would an NCO be in charge of a c.2000 platoon (which would likely be seriously understrength)?

Since pretty much most units of any size would be operating at around 1/3 of(or less) than its authorized strength, would that eliminate the need for 1/3 of the regular complement of officers? Or would units be top-heavy?

[Legbreaker]

It depends a lot on the nationality involved I would think.

Soviet style armies for example place very little authority with NCOs leaving most of the more technical and administrative tasks up to Officers (so I believe). Pushing NCOs up to fill these roles may not be a particularly good idea since they're likely to need almost as much training as a civilian trainee.

In many western militaries (speaking specifically about the British model here), NCOs are the backbone of the army - without them nothing can happen. It's relatively common even without a war going on for Sergeants and Warrant Officers to receive a direct commission (Corporals still need training). While not an everyday occurance, I've personally seen it happen on several occasions when either the officer pool got a bit low, or as a way to hold on to highly experienced and valuable SNCOs.

As Jester has pointed out, the number of enlisted soliders is also likely to reduce, thereby reducing the need for some many officers. However, historically, the proportional casualty rate for Officers and junior NCOs (the senior NCOs usually being employed in plattoon, Company and Battalion HQs rather than on the front line) has been higher than for enlisted. This is most commonly due to the risks a commander must take to remain in control of the situation - they have to put their heads up out of cover to see what's going on.

[Webstral]

Speaking structly for the US Army, I see team leaders and squad leaders being made second lieutenants. As has been mentioned, platoon sergeants are simply too valuable to be turned into officers. By the same token, a senior NCO is more-or-less set in his ways. He can learn new tricks, but he is unlikely to adapt to the officer's way of viewing the world. A promising team leader or squad leader understands the way the Army works and has a good grasp of his personal soldering skills. He also is not so senor that he can't make the leap from the NCO mentality to the officer mentality. This matters.

USAEUR will push the authority to bestow battlefield commissions down to whatever level SACEUR feels is necessary. I'd guess battalion commanders would receive the authority. Perhaps company commanders would have the authhority to grant a warrant, although this authority might be retained at the battalion level, too.

Webstral

[Adm.Lee]

My WW2 & VN War reading leads me to think that platoon-leader slots will probably be left empty or handed over to the platoon sergeants as a matter of course. By 2000, commissions will probably be only done for "important" jobs. A staff spot or company CO would seem appropriate to me.

[Raellus]

So, I see two different theories.

Junior NCOs or senior enlisted men (not the senior NCO) leapfrog the senior NCO to become platoon leaders and receive battlefield commisions.

OR

Senior NCOs take over the platoon, keeping their rank and title.

I know that units are smaller and contain less soldiers in 2000, but I think the consensus here is that there will be roughly the same number of units. In other words, for example, a division would keep its three brigades but each brigade would be smaller. It would be this way on down the line. A battalion would still have three companies, just smaller.

With the same number of units, wouldn't folks need the same number of officers to lead each of them? (Unless, that is, smaller units are commanded by NCOs).

[jester]

I can also see units being merged and combined with units becoming composite. Regiments of a Division may merge along with surplus support personel being added to the mix. So, maybe a Division would have a understrengthed Brigade in reality, and surplus officers in the HQ units and such would be turned into platoon and company commanders. Same with companies and platoons mustering a few men, they would be merged to fill the ranks of other platoons and companies and the surplus officers as well will be used to fill vacant slots in companies as platoon and company commanders.

Maybe a Company would end up with three platoons or even 2 platoons and a HQ element with a company comander and 2 Lts or even a Warrant OFficers of Senior or Staff NCO commander the platoons, heck I have been in such units where our platoon comander was a master Sgt, a Gunny or even a Warrant Officer. Hell I as a Lance Cpl was acting platoon comander for a month.

I am thinking the amount of officers a unit would get would also be determined on the size. An example, maybe a company would have one or two officers and doing away with the platoons having maybe four squad sized elements each comanded by a Sgt.

[Legbreaker]

I tend to agree that the larger units would exist in name only as the war dragged on. An infantry battalion with a prewar paper strength of say 750 men (four infantry companies, support company consisting or mortars, assault pioneers/engineers, antiarmour, etc, and all the supply, intel, motorpool, HQ elements) is likely to have barely a third of that by 2000 - maybe 250 men.

An infantry company (Australian model) has a paper strength of approximately 110 men in three plattoons plus heavy weapons section and HQ. With only a third of that strength the unit is almost totally combat non-effective (as a Company organisation). I have personal experience of this level of strength and confirm that 3 man sections (normally 9 or 10) do not work even for a short period of time (such as a single attack).

Therefore, it makes much more sense to consolidate the available personnel into pre-existing command structures - Company becomes Plattoon, Battalion becomes Company, Brigade becomes Battalion and so forth. Obviously the Battalion commander (for example) would likely remain in that position rather than effectively be demoted (and loose all that valuable experience and skill) with the possible surplus of officers being shifted into other roles.

I doubt however that there would be a surplus of officers - just because a HQ is not on the front lines, doesn't mean it hasn't been mortared, bombed, nuked, etc. Also, soliders are suceptible to disease possibly even more than the average civilian (although they do have access to better medical attention on the whole), so the rear eschelons are likely to have suffered significantly during the course of the war with correspondingly high casualties in the aftermath of the nukes.

[Targan]

I agree with Leggy. I can imagine the commander of a battalion that is operating as a company holding out hope that eventually he will gain sufficient reinforcements that he will command a battalion again and his now company sized element would act as a cadre, ready to be bulked back up like dehydrated rations having water added.

[chico20854]

That's the model we've been working off of too. With Operation Omega, Milgov reorganizes the units retained in service at the next lower size (divisions become brigades, brigades become battalions, etc.) but with the lineage of the former size. The units are brought up to full strength (a squad back to 9-11 infantrymen, etc.) and the training organization oriented towards gradually bringing the units back to their former size over a period of years.

[Raellus]

The reason I posted this topic is that I'm trying to figure out what a division, regiment, battalion, company, platoon would look like c. 2000, before Omega.

It seems like the consensus here is that, instead of significantly smaller units, units are merged to keep them near their nominal full strength.

In other words, instead of a battalion having three badly understrength companies, it may have only two slightly understrength ones. Is this right?

The problem I see with regiments becoming battalions and divisions becoming regiments, etc. is that canon seems to refute this. It doesn't look like the U.S. Army, at least, has "lost" any divisions by 2000 (quite the opposite, actually). Division strengths are way down but it seems rather unlikely that a division in 2000 will have only one or two regiments or a single brigade, each made up of one or two battalions or two companies, and so on. It makes more sense to me that the division would keep its basic early war structure (albeit without a lot of the dedicated support units listed in its pre-war TOEs) but with much smaller units. Otherwise, why not redesignate the divisions as Brigades or whatever?

What am I missing here.

[pmulcahy11b]

It just seems that the paper designations are being held onto -- most "divisions" in T2K are big if they are at brigade strength. Maybe its nostalgia...

[Webstral]

Raellus, I agree with you canon has its own idea of what is going on in USAEUR in 2000. Escape from Kalisz offers us some useful clues as to where the cuts might be made.

"...the remaining 10 M1E2s of 3-70 armor turned south off the road... and advanced overland to take the Soviet column in flank. 2-21 Field Artillery pulled it six howitzers off the road behind them and set up to deliver supporting fires." (Escape from Kalisz, "Death of a Division")

Both of these formations are operating at company strength. Throughout the handout, battalions are referred to by name. I submit that this is evidence that the battalion remains a functional but reduced level of command but that its strength has been reduced to company level. Ergo, either the platoon or the company has been eliminated. If I had to say which one the US Army would get rid of, I'd say the Army has done away with the platoon. New lieutenants probably take over a company formation that has been effectively reduced to a collection of squads or sections led by NCOs.

Legbreaker also has an excellent point about attrition among the officers. If we think about the nature of the tactical nuclear exchanges in 1997, the most senior officers and their staffs are going to be hard-hit. Command posts are among the most attractive targets. At every echelon, the enemy will make a concerted effort to hit the unit headquarters. I think an awful lot of field grade officers have met their respective makers. Light colonels might be commanding the brigade-sized formation calling itself a division in Twilight: 2000. Battalions might be commanded by first lieutenants. The latter happened often enough to the Germans in the Eastern Front in WW2.

Paul has a good point about nostalgia. The Army does love its tradition. I know I've given my opinion on kampfgruppen before, so I won't go into it at any length here. Suffice to say that Targan is right on the money: the Army is thinking that when things get better, formations will be brought up to their authorized strength.

Webstral

[Raellus]

That's what I was talking about Web. I was thinking about the units mentioned in "Escape from Kalisz" when I wrote my last post but I was too lazy to look it up and cite it. Thanks.

It makes sense that the platoon would go. Or perhaps a reinforced rifle squad would be called a platoon. Whatever.

I too am a fan of the Kampfgruppe concept. Seems like a neat way to create a mixed unit made up of various NATO nationalities. A lot of PbP games, at least, seem to include player parties made up of many different nationalities of PC and sometimes it seems a stretch to explain how they all got together (or ran into each other in the same AO). Multinational Kamfgruppen would take care of that.

[Legbreaker]

Over a long period of history, units have merged and some even seperated years, even decades later. 5/7 RAR (Australian mechanised battalion) is a prime example having previously been two seperate battalions (5 & 7 obviously) but merging due to military cutbacks and personnel shortages. There are many more examples of similar mergings.

The military are very hesitant to simply throw away unit histories, and so merge instead of eliminate.

While it is stated in cannon that certain units had limited vehicles, etc (the 10 M1E2s of 3-70 armor for example), this state of affairs was at the end of an offensive that had kicked off some time before. It is conceivable that some weapon systems and vehicles had been lost in the precceeding weeks but not enough time for a reorganisation of remaining personnel and equipment (especcialy so in the last few days of the 5th).

Therefore we are not necessarily required to see the 5th as the template for US divisions in the latter stages of the war - the US 8th ID as described in the Eastern European Sourcebook might actually be a better unit to look at with all heavy armour concentrated into one company sized unit, infantry reorganised, artillery concentrated, etc.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Over a long period of history, units have merged and some even seperated years, even decades later. 5/7 RAR (Australian mechanised battalion) is a prime example having previously been two seperate battalions (5 & 7 obviously) but merging due to military cutbacks and personnel shortages. There are many more examples of similar mergings.

That was exactly the case with the Army Reserve unit I served in, 11/28 RWAR, an infantry battalion which had been created from the merging of two World War One era regular army battalions.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

While it is stated in cannon that certain units had limited vehicles, etc (the 10 M1E2s of 3-70 armor for example), this state of affairs was at the end of an offensive that had kicked off some time before. It is conceivable that some weapon systems and vehicles had been lost in the precceeding weeks but not enough time for a reorganisation of remaining personnel and equipment (especcialy so in the last few days of the 5th).

Therefore we are not necessarily required to see the 5th as the template for US divisions in the latter stages of the war - the US 8th ID as described in the Eastern European Sourcebook might actually be a better unit to look at with all heavy armour concentrated into one company sized unit, infantry reorganised, artillery concentrated, etc.

I agree that there will be many models for organization, regardless of one's interpretation of the meaning of the given strengths of battalions in Escape from Kalisz. The Soviet 10th Tank Division (Ruins of Warsaw) has been dramatically reorganized. How different models of reorganization emerge would be an interesting thread. I do believe that divisions reduced to approximately brigade strength might well cope with the situation by eliminating the platoon level of command. In the case of 5th ID, eliminating the platoon makes sense of the remaining command structure, since both brigade and battalion levels of command are nominally intact.

Before continuing with the idea of more radical restructure, I’d like to have a look at the US Army Vehicle Guide's numbers for surviving MBT in the 5th ID. As of July 1, 2000 the division has 9 M1, 21 M1A1, and 12 M1A2. Taken together, these 42 tanks represent approximately the pre-war TO&E of a US Army armored battalion. The armored battalions of 5th ID named in Escape from Kalisz are 3-77 AR, 1-40 AR, and 3-70 AR. Dividing the available tanks (42) among the three battalions gives them a starting strength of 13 tanks apiece: about one company. Real combat operations did not commence until after July 9, so we should expect approximately the number of tanks given in the US Army Vehicle Guide to enter combat in Poland.

I acknowledge that there is room for interpretation in the numbers given and that not all interpretations will match mine. For starters, one might ask about non-US tanks. The game is all about the hodge-podge amalgamation of forces that are in the field in 2000. Perhaps there are Soviet or other NATO tanks that are not included in the roster given in the US Army Vehicle Guide. This is possible, but I think it’s unlikely. To try to count Pact or other NATO tanks in the tank park of 5th ID because they aren’t listed is to throw the entire accounting system of the US Army Vehicle Guide into question. If one wants to add to the diversity of the tank park of 5th ID, I think it’s acceptable to swap out a Pact or NATO tank for an M1. I don’t think it is in keeping with the intent of the established material to count tanks that aren’t listed, even though the US Army Vehicle Guide lists only US AFV at a time when there must be non-US AFV serving in US Army formations. As a rule, we should not be counting phantom tanks.

It is US Army doctrine to create mixed tank and mechanized infantry battalions called task forces, thereby creating combined arms formations out of what are nominally infantry or armored battalions. One might argue that 3-70 AR has only 10 tanks because its other tanks have been swapped to an infantry battalion within 1st Brigade. This may be so, in which case we might see 3-70 AR as a two-company battalion; but we run up against the numbers given in the US Army Vehicle Guide. If 3-70 AR has the equivalent of two companies of tanks, which would be in excess of 20 tanks, then only twenty tanks are left for 1-40 AR and 3-77 AR. These two battalions definitely have been reduced to company-level formations. There are other ways to juggle the numbers, but in the end the fact remains that there are 42 tanks given for 5th ID and three armored battalions listed in the lineup. Swapping a few tanks here and there does little to mitigate the fact that the battalions are operating with about 13 tanks apiece when 5th ID makes contact with Fourth Guards Tank Army.

Having said all of this, clearly not every division or brigade is going to operate this way or be able to operate this way. As Legbreaker mentions, the 8th ID is not a good candidate for simple elimination of the platoon level of command. Wholesale restructuring of the division is a more workable solution. There are plenty of divisions that simply don’t have the numbers to support a platoon-elimination organization. 28th ID, for instance, has 1000 men and 4 M60A4. This division may have been reorganized into two small battalions backed by division troops that may or may not include all four operational tanks operating as a single platoon.

Everything I’ve said should be taken in context. Thunder Empire is, after all, nothing but violations of the official source material. Poseidon’s Rim (the name I’m giving my work on the US Coast Guard in northern New England) is more-or-less the same. It would be hypocritical for me to claim that numbers could not be crunched to support a specific theory about TO&E in the 5th ID or in USAEUR organization in Europe of 2000 as a whole. Exceptions to the rule are what Twilight: 2000 is all about. All I can do is offer my interpretation of the evidence available in an effort to form general patterns. Clearly, by 2000 US Army divisions in Europe and elsewhere in the world are going to reorganize their existing strength to suit the resources at hand, their expected mode of operation, and the thinking of the commanding officer.


Webstral

[Raellus]

Nice analysis, Web. Thanks.

As per Leg's suggestion, I took a look at the TOE for the 8th MID as presented in the EESB. I know that a lot of folks don't like the EESB (some don't even consider it v1.0 canon) but it does gives some hints as to how a US division, c. 2000, might be organized.

The 8th divisions' given strength prior to jumping off on its attack into Latvia is 1000 men. The 8th is organized thusly:

An HQ company (including division motor pool and supply)
1 recon platoon
1 armor company (heavy)
1 weapons company (including divisional artillery)
5 infantry companies

So, the company is still there, and that means, presumably, the idea and practice of the platoon* still exists as well. However, no mention is made of regiments or battalions. The latter's still a possiblilty given the number of infantry companies but the former is pretty much right out the window. There are not enough assets in the division for more than one regiment. I wonder which regimental number/history they kept or it they got rid of it altogether.

*The "heavy" armored company is listed as consisting of four platoons of 3-4 tanks each.

As to rank, the commander of the 8th is a general. A Lt. Col. commands the armor company and a major commands one of the infantry companies.

The 6th ID (2000 men and 8 tanks), also profiled in the EESB (albeit in less detail) is listed as commanded by a Colonel.

So, I guess almost anything goes.

[kato13]

I spent literally months trying to reconcile the size and equipment of the 8th Mechanized. Given the equipment that unit should be at least 3 times larger IMO. To me it was like they took the equipment of a prewar division and divided it by around 14 (more for helicopters less for IFVs). An interesting thought except when you consider that a prewar division had around 18,000 men and the 8th currently has 1000. That means that it has more firepower man for man than a prewar division.

That fact makes me reluctant to consider the 8th to be the cornerstone of any thoughts on reorganization and I am not sure the author thought things fully through.

[Webstral]

While running errands, I gave some more thought to the reorganization of brigade-sized divisions and battlefield commissions. Company-sized battalions might be commanded by captains or majors, which leaves XO and staff slots open for newly commissioned lieutenants to learn the culture and trade of being an officer. Of course, a company-sized battalion is going to have a very small staff. The XO slot might be the only one requiring an officer in a 5th ID-type battalion in 2000.

Webstral

[Raellus]

Good point, Web. I hadn't thought about the dramatic downsizing of unit staffs. That would free up more officers for line duty.

Web, I agree about not adding too may captured enemy to NATO TOEs. I figure, though, that one or two wouldn't be pusing it too much. On the other hand, for some of the German units, captured Soviet-made MBTs are listed in the sourcebooks. So, there's a bit of a quandry there.

Originally Posted by kato13

I spent literally months trying to reconcile the size and equipment of the 8th Mechanized. Given the equipment that unit should be at least 3 times larger IMO. To me it was like they took the equipment of a prewar division and divided it by around 14 (more for helicopters less for IFVs). An interesting thought except when you consider that a prewar division had around 18,000 men and the 8th currently has 1000. That means that it has more firepower man for man than a prewar division.

That fact makes me reluctant to consider the 8th to be the cornerstone of any thoughts on reorganization and I am not sure the author thought things fully through.

The 8th ID does seem like an anomaly, even for 2000. Looking through the U.S. Army Vehicle Guide though, there are a couple more units with similarly anemic listed strengths. For example...

4th ID (Mech.): 1000 men; 8 M1s & 10M1A1s

I don't know if this is helpful, but some of the listed Brigade strengths may give some clues as to unit TOEs below division level.

1st Brigade, 40th ID (Mech): 400 men; 4 M60A4 & 2 M1

2nd Brigade, 2nd Armored: 300 men; 1 M1, 3 M1A1, 1 M1A1

vs.

2nd Armored Regiment: 100 men; 2 M1A2 & 6 LAV-75

It's pretty much all over the place so I guess anything goes. Maybe the designers wanted it that way since it gives the GM a lot of flexibility.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Good point, Web. I hadn't thought about the dramatic downsizing of unit staffs. That would free up more officers for line duty.

Web, I agree about not adding too may captured enemy to NATO TOEs. I figure, though, that one or two wouldn't be pusing it too much. On the other hand, for some of the German units, captured Soviet-made MBTs are listed in the sourcebooks. So, there's a bit of a quandry there.



The 8th ID does seem like an anomaly, even for 2000. Looking through the U.S. Army Vehicle Guide though, there are a couple more units with similarly anemic listed strengths. For example...

4th ID (Mech.): 1000 men; 8 M1s & 10M1A1s

I don't know if this is helpful, but some of the listed Brigade strengths may give some clues as to unit TOEs below division level.

1st Brigade, 40th ID (Mech): 400 men; 4 M60A4 & 2 M1

2nd Brigade, 2nd Armored: 300 men; 1 M1, 3 M1A1, 1 M1A1

vs.

2nd Armored Regiment: 100 men; 2 M1A2 & 6 LAV-75

It's pretty much all over the place so I guess anything goes. Maybe the designers wanted it that way since it gives the GM a lot of flexibility.

My problem was not with the tanks. 1000 men could support ~20 tanks. The problem comes from something like 70 AFVs beyond the tanks (including 9 M109s 2 MLRS and 4 M691s IIRC plus 4 or 5 helicopters). I always assumed that the units listed above were just very tank heavy.

My answer was they started with 3000 men but lost a few to combat and many to a virulent flu. They were then trapped with to much equipment. I think I remember calculating that if you only had one support truck per combat vehicle listed that over 40% of the division was vehicle crews. And one truck per tank is not at all realistic.

[Legbreaker]

I think we had the discussion about the 8th a few months back and it was agreed that the number of M2 Bradley's as listed (42 from memory) had to be a typo.
This was based on the comment that the majority of the infantry were carried in trucks.
Therefore a more "realistic" (yeah, I know, it's an ironic term for what is essentially a work of fantasy) number of APCs might be just 22, significantly reducing the combat power and manouverability of the division.
We cannot reduce the number of M2s much lower than that as it's also mentioned that the Apache helicopter (currently dragged around on a truck) shares ammo with the 25mm cannon of the M2s and there isn't (for 2000) a shortage of this.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

I think we had the discussion about the 8th a few months back and it was agreed that the number of M2 Bradley's as listed (42 from memory) had to be a typo.

If your memory is correct, perhaps the author meant to type 24 and simply transposed the numbers.

Either way, Kato's point is well taken. I hadn't consider the division's other AFVs.

But, if you think about it, it does kind of make sense. T2K player parties tend to be small and the rules "suggest" that each group of 5 characters or whatever gets to roll for their own vehicle. How often in the modern military are five people going to get their own M113 or M2?

I guess the reasoning was, broken down/damaged vehicles can often be repaired and returned to service whereas badly wounded/dead troops can't. Vehicle parts can be salvaged and reused; people parts, not so much (at least, not yet). So, over time, the ratio of soldiers to vehicles flipped around from many to relatively few (respectively) to few to relatively many.

I dunno. I need to devote a lot more thought to this. Like a lot in T2K, there are no easy answers.

[Legbreaker]

It's every three characters gains a D6 to roll for vehicles. The larger the group, the greater the number of dice which can be rolled individually (for softskin vehicles) or pooled together for a chance at an AFV of some type (usually something light but with a small chance of an MBT).

You're right I think that soldiers, while able to heal, can't be stripped for parts, therefore those vehicles not outright destroyed are likely to see combat again (if not as a whole, then spread across several other vehicles).

However, we can't assume that vehicles of 2000 are in any way the same as those at the beginning of the war. Take Wear Value for a good example of this. What modern army would allow vehicles of a wear of more than say 2 or (at worst!) 3? How many vehicles still being used in combat in 2000 can boast a wear of less than 5?

So, yes, there may be a large number of vehicles still on the books of a unit, but not too many of them are going to be spending more time away from the mechanics than with them.

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

We cannot reduce the number of M2s much lower than that as it's also mentioned that the Apache helicopter (currently dragged around on a truck) shares ammo with the 25mm cannon of the M2s and there isn't (for 2000) a shortage of this.

The Bradley uses a 25mm M-242 Bushmaster ChainGun. The Apache uses a 30mm M-230 Bushmaster II ChainGun. They can't share ammo.

[Webstral]

Are the numbers for additional 8th ID equipment found in the Eastern European Sourcebook? I've never seen it, and from what I have heard about it I don't think I care to. From what people have written about it, the work is so shoddy that it detracts more than it adds. Perhaps it would be better to ignore the whole thing. (I know--easy for me to say, since I have no investment in the thing.)

I'm with Kato that the number of 8th ID tanks listed in the US Army Vehicle Guide can be sustained with a 1000-man organization. But helicopters? MLRS? I'd think that these assets would have been consolidated at the army level by 2000.

IFV/APC might be another matter. Several years ago, we discussed preparations for the Summer 2000 offensive into Poland. The thesis was advanced that XI Corps was selected for a concentration of available armor, etc. Without going into the details of how USAEUR would manage to gain cooperation from divisions who might be giving up some materiel, it's conceivable that 8th ID was beefed up with functional AFV at the expense of other formations. I say conceivable without making a statement about feasibility. 8th ID has 18 MBT and light tanks on the books as of July 1, 2000. It's not inconceivable that 22 M2 could be assinged to the division, giving the 1000-man force a single heavy battalion. Still, it seems like the numbers of AFV mentioned in this post are a bit sketchy for a 1000-man formation in 2000.

Webstral

[natehale1971]

Originally Posted by Webstral

I'm with Kato that the number of 8th ID tanks listed in the US Army Vehicle Guide can be sustained with a 1000-man organization. But helicopters? MLRS? I'd think that these assets would have been consolidated at the army level by 2000.

Webstral

I would think that they would have consolidated aircraft on the Corps level, unless the division is primarily used for air assault. Or aircraft that would be dedicated to Close Air Support or aerial recon.

Richard

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

The Bradley uses a 25mm M-242 Bushmaster ChainGun. The Apache uses a 30mm M-230 Bushmaster II ChainGun. They can't share ammo.

Yes, this is technically true, however the book states this aircraft is "luckily" an earlier model armed with the 25mm gun.

Originally Posted by Webstral

Are the numbers for additional 8th ID equipment found in the Eastern European Sourcebook? I've never seen it, and from what I have heard about it I don't think I care to. From what people have written about it, the work is so shoddy that it detracts more than it adds. Perhaps it would be better to ignore the whole thing. (I know--easy for me to say, since I have no investment in the thing.)

Personally I feel the book isn't half as bad as some say. Yes, it has it's problems, but no more than most of the GDW materials. On the whole the information presented (specifically unit strengths and locations) is quite useful even if the layout and some of the writing leaves something to be desired.
It also needs to be remembered that it is not 1.0 cannon, but 2.0/2.2. It was in fact one of the last books published for T2K.

Originally Posted by Webstral

I'd think that these assets would have been consolidated at the army level by 2000.

Perhaps these aircraft and other systems were assigned to the 8th before the offensive specifically because they, and pretty much them alone, were to secure the left, or northern flank of the spring offensive? If this is taken as true, then 42 M2s might be accurate (if we ignore the statement that most of the infantry rode in trucks), although I tend to doubt it.