In Defense of the Red Army

[dragoon500ly]

Although Armored Cav by Tom Clancy is liberally sprinkled with apocrypha and fervor, one statement he made in the book I've heard corroborated elsewhere by a guy I worked with who was in GW1: the Iraqi long rod penetrator rounds were made from local tungsten, not imported. While the guns were likely entirely identical to what was in Russian/Soviet tanks of the day, the ammo was most definitely not.

For the non tankers on the list, a bit of background. There are two types of AT rounds, chemical and kinetic. An example of a chemical round is a HEAT warhead, this is a charge of explosive with a funnel imprinted into one end and usually lined with copper. Typically has a long tube pointing from the business end holding a stand off fuse. When the fuse hits the armor, the explosive is denotated forcing the copper from a metal and straight into a plasma state...this blast of molten hot metal burns through armor and spalls the interior of the vehicle with white hot fragments of armor...with the amount of ammo, fuel and other flammables stored inside a tank you almost always get a secondary explosion. Advantages is that with a direct strike, you almost always get a penetration, its easy to make, armor penetration is not affected by range. Disadvantages, its a heavy, slow round so the chance to hit at long range is badly degraded, its affected by cross-winds and it has to strike the armor at the right angle or you get a wonderful roman candle effect.

Kenetic rounds depend on the speed of the round. A AP round is simply a solid block of steel, this is the WWI/WWII primary AT round. You get penetration but thicker armor is more resistant. The Germans tried to get around this with the APHE round, penetration then a light explosive charge, but face-hardened armor stopped this. Then along comes the APCR, or taper-bore round, tungsten steel penetrator with a outer shell of aluminum, the force of firing squeezes the round into a smaller caliber, thus getting more speed. But shortages of tungsten (and the complicated manufacture process) caused this to be dropped by the Nazis. The British designed the first real advance in 1945 with the APDS. A tungsten steel penetrator with, at first a wooden shoe or "sabot" (later replaced with aluminum) that allowed the advantages of APCR without the manufacture issues.

The Soviets designed the first APDSFS with the introduction of the T-62 and its 115mm smooth-bore cannon. Fin Stabilized took care of a problem with APDS, that of the spin causing the round to drift a few mils to the right during long range engagements. This was the first kenetic round to be used out to 2,000 meters. Still used the tungsten steel penetrator. Sometime around 1978-79, the US started deploying the APDSDU round, replacing tungsten steel with depleted uranimum. DU seemed to be the perfect combination of light weight and high tensile strength. Armor penetration was several times greater than that of tungsten steel. Shortly afterwards the US started deployment of the APDSFSDU rounds. Since the M-60A1/A3 tanks used rifled cannons, there was a counter-rotating feature to allow for the full advantage of FS. This is also the main reason why the decision to go with the German 120mm came about. Yes it was poltical decision, but the lack of a native smoothbore design also played a major role. This allowed the APDSFSDU to be made more cheaply by getting ride of the counter-rotating device.

What Saddam chose to go with was native manufacture of his tank rounds, he didn't have the technology to make DU rounds, and he lacked enough tungsten to make penetrators (since tungsten is also used in tools, he was faced with the same choice as the Nazis....being able to make tools, or make ammunition). He was forced to use stainless steel to make his armor penetrators and since his quality control was for shit, he wasn't able to make good quality stainless steel....this is why you hear so many stories of Iraqi AT rounds shattering on impact or just penetrating armor. The Iraqi Army depended on HEAT rounds to a great extant, but thus doomed them to except an engagement range well short of what the Allies could do.

During Desert Storm, M-1s and Challengers were able to engage with APFSDSDU to 4,500+ meters, the longest range shot was by an M-1 of the 1st Armored Division that hit a T-55 at 5,250 meters. When you consider that the Iraqis did not engage anything over 1,200 meters, you begin to understand just how demoralizing it was to go up against M-1s. The lethality of the APFSDSDU round was shown when a 2nd ACR M-1 nailed a T-72 at 2,100 meters, shooting through a protective berm 15 meters thick and still penetrating the turret ring.

There is also a confirmed story of an M-1 that was stuck in a bog and left behind for maintenance to recover. While waiting, the M-1 was attacked by three T-62 tanks. In the engagement that followed, the M-1 killed all three T-62s, for the expediture of four rounds of main gun ammo, and was hit by five 115mm APDSFS rounds. There was no penetration of the M-1's armor, one sponson box on the turret was damaged and the M-1 was fully operational and rejoined its platoon later that day.

There is also a lot of BS about how the Iraqi tanks where not of the same quaility as those used by the Russians. This has already been noted by a couple of other users and I repeat, this is nothing more than utter hogwash! The Iraqi's did not then, and do not now have the heavy industry to make their own tanks. They purchased directly from the builder, in other words, these tanks were taken directly from the Red Army's own production lines, this was Russian front line equipment. Where the Iraqi's dropped the ball was in the purchase of those little extras, like tank ammunition. In addition, the Soviets did not sell their latest ballistic computers and laser rangefinders, thus dooming the Iraqi Army to a fight that they couldn't win.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

There is also a lot of BS about how the Iraqi tanks where not of the same quaility as those used by the Russians. This has already been noted by a couple of other users and I repeat, this is nothing more than utter hogwash! The Iraqi's did not then, and do not now have the heavy industry to make their own tanks. They purchased directly from the builder, in other words, these tanks were taken directly from the Red Army's own production lines, this was Russian front line equipment. Where the Iraqi's dropped the ball was in the purchase of those little extras, like tank ammunition. In addition, the Soviets did not sell their latest ballistic computers and laser rangefinders, thus dooming the Iraqi Army to a fight that they couldn't win.

You are flat out wrong. No one here has suggested that the Iraqis made their own T-72s.

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

If you can provide reliable documentation that refutes this, please feel free to do so. Posting that something is "utter hogwash" does not make the poster an authority on the topic.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Raellus

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

Correct.

[Sanjuro]

Raellus pointed out:

AFAIK, T-80s were not sold to Iraq. Ever. It was probably a misidentified T-72E that your aquaintance saw.

In fact, I was trying to remember a conversation from the summer of 1991; I couldn't remember whether he said T-72 or T-80 and went online to find what tanks the Iraqis had on the front line: fancy the internet giving the wrong answer!
The mistake is mine; even at second hand, the clang! is the thing that sticks in the mind!

[Webstral]

Shirer's assertion that Hitler saved the Eastern Front by refusing to countenance retreat has some merit. The Army would have lost huge amounts of equipment that couldn't be moved. Who knows how many men would have been left behind for lack of transport. There were no established positions to fall back on, so the retreat could have gone right back to Poland.
We'll never know, of course; however, there is good reason to believe that a retreat would have finished the German Army on the Eastern Front during the winter.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to keep the campaign going despite the onset of a winter for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. If he saved the Eastern Front, he saved it from a blunder he made himself. I've never bought off on the idea that turning the panzers aside from Moscow to destroy Soviet forces in the Ukraine was a bad idea. However, I do believe that the rasputitsa should have marked the end of the campaign season on the Eastern Front. Small-scale offensives in lieu of Operation Typhoon could have continued to inflict losses on the Soviets west of Moscow while good winter positions were prepared. Of course, for me to say this flies in the face of Prussia military thinking and the lessons Hitler and his generation of Germans learned from WW1--namely, that only offensive warfare brings victory. Nonetheless, if Hitler saved the Eastern Front during that first terrible winter, he saved it from his own mindless adherence to the strategic offensive and his slavish devotion to the idea that the Russians, being inferior peoples, were just about finished from July, 1941 onward.


Webstral

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Shirer's assertion that Hitler saved the Eastern Front by refusing to countenance retreat has some merit. The Army would have lost huge amounts of equipment that couldn't be moved. Who knows how many men would have been left behind for lack of transport. There were no established positions to fall back on, so the retreat could have gone right back to Poland.
We'll never know, of course; however, there is good reason to believe that a retreat would have finished the German Army on the Eastern Front during the winter.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to keep the campaign going despite the onset of a winter for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. If he saved the Eastern Front, he saved it from a blunder he made himself. I've never bought off on the idea that turning the panzers aside from Moscow to destroy Soviet forces in the Ukraine was a bad idea. However, I do believe that the rasputitsa should have marked the end of the campaign season on the Eastern Front. Small-scale offensives in lieu of Operation Typhoon could have continued to inflict losses on the Soviets west of Moscow while good winter positions were prepared. Of course, for me to say this flies in the face of Prussia military thinking and the lessons Hitler and his generation of Germans learned from WW1--namely, that only offensive warfare brings victory. Nonetheless, if Hitler saved the Eastern Front during that first terrible winter, he saved it from his own mindless adherence to the strategic offensive and his slavish devotion to the idea that the Russians, being inferior peoples, were just about finished from July, 1941 onward.


Webstral

Yeah I think that the Germans didn't want to set up Static Line anywhere. They realize that it had cost them in WWI dearly. If they were able to set up Static Defensively line, then it would only lead on to believe the Soviet would do the much the same... Meaning the Germans would have much harder time restart their offensive and giving the Soviet breathing room that they need so desperately at that time.

[95th Rifleman]

PG 1 isn't a good example if you are trying to compare NATO/WP equipment.

The Iraqi's fell into the old trap of fighting the last war. They set up fixed, entrenched defensive positions in a similar fashion to how they fought the Iranians in the late 80's. Having a major armoured force drive around your flank tends to cause a few problems with such a defense.

In the late 90's the gap between Western and Russian kit was not as great as many are led to assume, also the tactics devised for fighting in Europe where designed to maximise advantage and minimise weakness of the Russian kit. The game winning card in iraq was total air superiority, this would be MUCH harder to achieve facing frontline Russian air defence systems.

The Russians where (and arguably still are) the world leaders in battlefield air defence, they had to be considering the NATO air threat. the Russians would of formed concentrations of Armour and spearheaded into NATO lines putting massive local superiorityin numbers to overwhelm NATO defensive positions.
Unless you could knock out these concentrations from the air the would just roll over a position and keep going before NATO forces cold respond in numbers sufficient to blunt the spearhead.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Raellus

You are flat out wrong. No one here has suggested that the Iraqis made their own T-72s.

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

If you can provide reliable documentation that refutes this, please feel free to do so. Posting that something is "utter hogwash" does not make the poster an authority on the topic.

I don't recall anyone claiming that these tanks weren't made in Soviet Union/Russia, but the export models always had less features that only the units going to the Soviet Union military units would get. Even today Russia keeps up the same standard when they sell their old equipment.

Much like the U. S. Army did with the equipment that they have sold to Isreal and other Middle East countries since the PG1 War.

[Raellus]

The following is from Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural- Operation Desert Storm by Steven J. Zaloga.

"As a result of the USSR’s export policy, clients such as Iraq did not receive tanks comparable in quality to the best Soviet tanks. In 1990 the best Iraqi version of theT-72 was the T-72M1 – roughly equivalent to the Soviet T-72A, which was already a decade old and not as well armored as the newer T-72B or the preferred T-80B series. Just as importantly, the Soviet Union did not export its best tank ammunition: the Iraqi army relied primarily on second-rate ammunition for its T-72 tanks." (p.24)

In Defense of the Red Army, I would also like to refer to the following excerpt:

"Despite the vehicles’ relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as onthe machines themselves." (p. 7)

These are just a couple of snippets but they sum up my main points quite nicely. It looks like the entire book can be broused on this site:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48201782/M1A1-Vs-T-72

Apparently, some of Iraq's T-72s were kit-built in Iraq and they were building a factory for local manufacture of T-72Ms in '91 (but it was destroyed by Coalition airstrikes before it could begin production).

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The following is from Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural- Operation Desert Storm by Steven J. Zaloga.

"As a result of the USSR’s export policy, clients such as Iraq did not receive tanks comparable in quality to the best Soviet tanks. In 1990 the best Iraqi version of theT-72 was the T-72M1 – roughly equivalent to the Soviet T-72A, which was already a decade old and not as well armored as the newer T-72B or the preferred T-80B series. Just as importantly, the Soviet Union did not export its best tank ammunition: the Iraqi army relied primarily on second-rate ammunition for its T-72 tanks." (p.24)

In Defense of the Red Army, I would also like to refer to the following excerpt:

"Despite the vehicles’ relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as onthe machines themselves." (p. 7)

These are just a couple of snippets but they sum up my main points quite nicely. It looks like the entire book can be broused on this site:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48201782/M1A1-Vs-T-72

Apparently, some of Iraq's T-72s were kit-built in Iraq and they were building a factory for local manufacture of T-72Ms in '91 (but it was destroyed by Coalition airstrikes before it could begin production).

When there is any discussion of the selling of arms in between countries, there is one major misconception. What is sold is NOT the latest hardware with the latest bells and whistles. What is normally sold is earlier versions that carry non-classified equipment. The M-1 that is sold to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt is not the same beast as that used by the AUS/USMC.

The Sovs were perfectly within their rights to refuse to sell their version of Chobham armor, as well as the latest fire control gear. What happened, however, was that tanks on the current production lines were pulled off, outfitted with older fire control equipment and then shipped on to Iraq. These tanks were not manufactured with substandard armor, they simply lacked the Special Armor, although they were fitted and many did carry reactive armor blocks. According to the Congressional Record, an examination of Iraqi T-72s captured in the KTO confirmed that they were fitted with "simple telescopic sights" these sights "being engraved with ballistic data and steroscopic rangefinders". These are the same sights and rangefinders as fitted to the T-55/T-62 series tanks. And Zaloga confirms this same information in his books.

The point that I call utter hogwash was the opinon that the Soviets deliberately produced a run of T-72s with substandard armor. Nowhere, in the Congressional Records, Zaloga's books, the Armor Journel and several other mainstream publiciations is this idea confirmed.

[Webstral]

I don’t think anybody is claiming that Soviets deliberately cheated the Iraqis. The Soviets went with their established policy of exporting less-capable versions of the state-of-the-art equipment. The Iraqis were unable to make good on the shortfall in capabilities with domestic industry, and the Republican Guard paid the price. In a way, it’s too bad. Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler’s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.


Webstral

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Sururov goes over Soviet exporting methods quite a bit in Inside the Red Army; there's definitely a "home standard" and an "export standard".

Sometimes, at least in the west, quality stuff winds up in the hands of allies before it gets used at home: the South Korean military fielded ASEA radar for F15s before it was equipped in US models!

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler’s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.

+1

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by Webstral

I don’t think anybody is claiming that Soviets deliberately cheated the Iraqis. The Soviets went with their established policy of exporting less-capable versions of the state-of-the-art equipment. The Iraqis were unable to make good on the shortfall in capabilities with domestic industry, and the Republican Guard paid the price. In a way, it’s too bad. Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler’s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.


Webstral

It's interesting that you bring up operation Barbarossa, Webstral; there's a theory put forth by Shirer in Rise and Fall of the Third Reich that it was Hitler's interference - at one key moment - that was precisely what saved the Army in Russia. His own "not one step back" order that kept units on the front line through the winter of 1941 rather than letting them trade time for distance probably spared the Army a total crushing rout. The Russians had not yet perfected a "cut off and bypass" strategem yet, and the strong-points and lines of defense the Red Army ran into as they counterattacked through the winter kept them from becoming too agile, and kept supply lines and rear areas from being overcome.

Had Hitler allowed the high command to permit a general retreat, the victory for the Soviets might have come much, much sooner.

(With that said I think that was more happenstance than any brilliance on Corporal Shicklegruber's part...)

Oh...edit...I feel kind of weird saying this but I feel weird NOT saying it, but I feel regardless like I should, especially given my user-handle: I'm not a skinhead, neo-Nazi, white supremacist or anything. That post above up there was not some "yeah the Nazis totally kicked ass but got some bad breaks!" type post.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

The point that I call utter hogwash was the opinon that the Soviets deliberately produced a run of T-72s with substandard armor. Nowhere, in the Congressional Records, Zaloga's books, the Armor Journel and several other mainstream publiciations is this idea confirmed.

Perhaps I missed it, but I don't recall anyone here making the claim that you are refuting. I guess we can chalk this little debate up to simple miscommunication.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Perhaps I missed it, but I don't recall anyone here making the claim that you are refuting. I guess we can chalk this little debate up to simple miscommunication.

It is I who must apoligize, I was in the midst of a rather heated exchange of private messages and that one went out in error.

What can I say, I type faster than my brain can react!