OT? A New Cold War

[RN7]

Yes the more I think about Kaliningrad the more I like it. The Germans were there since the Teutonic Knights Christianised the local pagans in the 13th Century, and maybe before if we include the Goths etc. Longer than the Russians were in the Crimea I think. Yes cancel the Potsdam Agreement and march into Kaliningrad and rename it Konigsberg and see what Putin does.

I don't think it would be that hard. The Russians just have 11,000 troops and marines in the enclave with over 800 tanks, but the naval base, the battery of SS-21's and the squadrons of Su-27's and Su-24s and S-300 SAM's could be knocked out quickly.

[stormlion1]

A NATO seizure of the Kaliningad enclave would be almost a god send for Putin. He would happily go in front of the World and the UN and the rest and declare he is not the aggressor as what's happening in the Ukraine is separatist and the Russians haven't actually invaded anywhere but NATO has seized ground. And in a way he would be right.

[RN7]

Screw what Putin thinks

[Targan]

Originally Posted by RN7

Screw what Putin thinks

+1

RN7 for PM

[Webstral]

There's a certain parallel between events in Eastern Europe and the events leading up to Hitler's invasion of Poland. However, the parallel breaks down a bit once one compares a German invasion of Poland with a Russian invasion of, say, Estonia. While Great Britain and France guaranteed Poland's security, the means to do so was not in place. It was genuine bluff. The Brits and French had no means to intervene in Poland. They would have had to invade Germany. The leadership in these countries had no stomach for a fight. Conservative Americans, on the other hand, would love to be let off the leash. Since Estonia is now a NATO member, an attack on Estonia would be an attack on every member of the alliance. It wouldn't be a question just of Russian tanks versus American tanks but of Russian tanks versus American, British, German, Dutch, Belgian, and possibly even French tanks. (Mon Dieu!) There wouldn't have to be a debate. Treaty obligations would simply kick in.

Now if the question becomes whether or not the various members of NATO would balk at honoring their treaty commitments... There's a horse of a different color. I honestly have no idea how that one would play out without an hypothesis that was two parts prejudice and three parts guesswork. I suspect there would be some pacifist sentiment in every NATO country, along with some hawkish sentiment. The balance would vary from country to country. Without having a compelling reason to think otherwise, though, I have to believe that member nations of NATO would honor their commitment under the Treaty or suffer real blowback from the other members. The United States would have to honor the terms of NATO or lose all credibility in every alliance. Once the US was on board, the UK would follow suit if not march in time with the US. After that, every other member would have to consult their consciences and self interest, bearing in mind that a spiteful Washington might consider all existing arrangements of every sort with NATO members refusing to honor their obligations up for renegotiation. If Germany and France both decided to sit out, then others might follow. If either pitched in, the other would feel obliged to follow suit.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

There's a certain parallel between events in Eastern Europe and the events leading up to Hitler's invasion of Poland. However, the parallel breaks down a bit once one compares a German invasion of Poland with a Russian invasion of, say, Estonia. While Great Britain and France guaranteed Poland's security, the means to do so was not in place. It was genuine bluff. The Brits and French had no means to intervene in Poland. They would have had to invade Germany. The leadership in these countries had no stomach for a fight. Conservative Americans, on the other hand, would love to be let off the leash. Since Estonia is now a NATO member, an attack on Estonia would be an attack on every member of the alliance. It wouldn't be a question just of Russian tanks versus American tanks but of Russian tanks versus American, British, German, Dutch, Belgian, and possibly even French tanks. (Mon Dieu!) There wouldn't have to be a debate. Treaty obligations would simply kick in.

Right, but here's the thing, NATO hasn't adequately prepared to defend the Baltics. Setting aside whether NATO would react en toto and in force, they're not really well prepared to do logistically and organizationally. There've only been a handful of joint manouvers, usually involving nothing larger than a brigade two, and there are no significant NATO units permanently based there. We're not talking Cold War West Germany any more. Estonia doesn't have any MBTs or combat aircraft of its own. Without a significant NATO presence there- boots on the ground- the Baltic states are extremely vulnerable. Russia could grab Estonia, for example, before NATO could get sufficient ground forces- we're talking heavy brigades which need significant lift resources to move long distances en masse- to stymie and/or dislodge Russian ground forces. Russian aircraft and submarines could interdict NATO sealifts by laying mines in the Gulf of Riga. This would likely begin before the shooting even started. Ground MSRs could be interdicted by sabotage or other means. Russia could warn Lithuania and Latvia that if they allow transit of NATO formations, that they will be next.

So, in the case of a Russian invasion of Estonia, NATO would be heavily dependent on air power to stop/eject the aggressor. NATO has more advanced combat aircraft than Russia, but the qualitative gap is starting to shrink. Russia has an impressive array of anti-aircraft weaponry. Last generation Russian SAMs have shot down American stealth aircraft before- it's not unthinkable that it could happen again with current generation hardware. To think that B-2s and F-22s are invulnerable is a mistake. The circumstances are not clear, but several Raptors have been "shot down" during excercises, in one case by a Qatari Mirage 2000. And we all know that aircraft can not take and hold territory.

Originally Posted by Webstral

Now if the question becomes whether or not the various members of NATO would balk at honoring their treaty commitments... There's a horse of a different color. I honestly have no idea how that one would play out without an hypothesis that was two parts prejudice and three parts guesswork. I suspect there would be some pacifist sentiment in every NATO country, along with some hawkish sentiment. The balance would vary from country to country. Without having a compelling reason to think otherwise, though, I have to believe that member nations of NATO would honor their commitment under the Treaty or suffer real blowback from the other members. The United States would have to honor the terms of NATO or lose all credibility in every alliance. Once the US was on board, the UK would follow suit if not march in time with the US. After that, every other member would have to consult their consciences and self interest, bearing in mind that a spiteful Washington might consider all existing arrangements of every sort with NATO members refusing to honor their obligations up for renegotiation. If Germany and France both decided to sit out, then others might follow. If either pitched in, the other would feel obliged to follow suit.

Look at the lukewarm public support in Europe for stronger economic sanctions. Condemnation, even, hasn't been universal. Current NATO member Hungary, for example, has shown sympathy- support, even- for Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine. Only three or four NATO member nations meet the defense spending requirements called for in the treaty. I hope that I am wrong, but I don't think that NATO unity is a given. Will all NATO member nations willingly contribute their military forces to defend the Baltic States? Once again, I really hope so. Given the uneven, lukewarm response to Russia's aggression and violations of international law over the past two years, I'm not so sure.

I think that we need to accept that the NATO of 2014 is not the same as the NATO of 1987. Yes, it's larger and more inclusive, but is it as well organized, coordinated, and prepared militarily to fight a conventional war in Europe? I don't think so.

[Webstral]

I agree that defending Estonia is out of the question. At issue is liberating Estonia.

NATO certainly is a different creature than it was in 1987. The logistical challenges are very different. The forces available to NATO are very different.

The first question would be whether or not a Russian invasion of Estonia would prompt a declaration of war by the United States or result in military action that amounts to the same thing. If the US decides to sit on her hands, Estonia belongs to the Russians. If the US goes to war over Estonia, the game is on. I can't imagine that the United States would fail to take military action to defend a member of NATO. There is too much at stake world wide for the US to let someone--anyone--invade and occupy a member of NATO. How the other members of the alliance react to that will vary from country based to some degree on what the US and Russia choose to do.

Liberating Estonia would take ground forces. How many and of what composition would be up to SACEUR. He would have to balance a number of factors, not all of them military.

Hm. Duty calls. Will get back to this interesting discussion later.

[stormlion1]

The problem is we don't have the troops or gear anymore in Europe. It would take months to bring the troops and gear back over. Best case is to do it and stall with talks or go into a war with Europe taking the lead and trying to cross the Atlantic with the gear when we can. Reminds me of a book called Red Storm Rising that does.

[Raellus]

The Baltic States, Poland, and Scandanavia are taking the threat of a Russian invasion pretty seriously. Until NATO's power players (the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France) do too, the danger will continue, if not increase.

http://www.newsweek.com/tiny-baltic-...-russia-285264

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by stormlion1

The problem is we don't have the troops or gear anymore in Europe. It would take months to bring the troops and gear back over. Best case is to do it and stall with talks or go into a war with Europe taking the lead and trying to cross the Atlantic with the gear when we can. Reminds me of a book called Red Storm Rising that does.

You’ve summarized the core challenge quite nicely. The drawing down of US forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War has only exacerbated the problem that CONUS and Europe are separated by the Atlantic Ocean.

The fashion in which NATO responds to a Russian invasion of Estonia depends to some degree on how the invasion unfolds, I think. For instance, if Russians simply put 50,000 troops (or whatever they deem suitable for the first wave) on the Estonian border, then roll over the little country without any warning to the rest of the world, government and public opinion in NATO will react differently than if there is an extended period of unrest on the part of the Russian minority followed by public statements, negotiation, posturing, incidents, etc. In short, if the Russians successfully cultivate the idea that ethnic Russians in Estonia are suffering under the tyranny of Estonian rule, public opinion in Europe especially is likely to be more favorable than if the Russians simply slap Estonia to the ground and take her purse.

Let’s assume for the moment that the Russians eventually invade and that Estonia resists, if briefly and hopelessly. Obviously, this will trigger treaty obligations on the part of every other member of NATO. NATO’s reaction hinges on the reaction of the United States. The reaction of the United States will depend to some degree on what happens leading up to the invasion and during the invasion. If, for instance, the Russians invade more-or-less out of the blue like Hussein did in Kuwait, the American response won’t involve too much of a personal stake. If, on the other hand, a period of saber rattling prompts the US to put a brigade of paratroopers in Estonia as a show of solidarity with a member of NATO, and if the Russians invade anyway and wipe out a brigade of US troops, the reaction will be more extreme. In the former case, American appeals to reluctant treaty signatories would begin with, “In keeping with the obligations enumerated in the North Atlantic Treaty…” In the latter case, American appeals to reluctant treaty signatories would start with a lapel grab and “Listen good, [expletive deleted]!”

From the Russian standpoint, there are definite advantages to either staying out of Estonia altogether or rolling in unannounced and hoping that sheer surprise and hutzpah carry the day. An extended pre-invasion crisis runs the risk of drawing NATO forces eastward. The longer the Estonians wail about being defenseless in the face of overwhelming Russian force, the greater the likelihood that the POTUS will come under pressure to have SACEUR make some show of force to settle the nerves of the Eastern European members of NATO. The most obvious idea is to send small contingents of troops from several NATO nations to Estonia. Spreading the risk out sends the right signal to everyone, while keeping the numbers small implies a strictly defensive mission. From the Russian point of view, however, the introduction of any NATO combat units into Estonia means that NATO is closer to St. Petersburg and Moscow than ever. Once the NATO troops go in, they are likely to have an extended stay. This reality poses two dangers for Russia. The first is that the viability of an invasion and occupation of Estonia without a major war virtually disappears. To whatever degree the Russians (Putin) believe Estonia can be put in the bag without a war with NATO, that chance diminishes almost to nothing if the Russian invasion force kills, captures, or otherwise drives from the country 500 troops from each the US, UK, FRG, France, Poland, Italy, Canada, etc. On the other hand, the presence of NATO troops so close to St. Petersburg is intensely dangerous. What would be the point of dragging NATO’s forces further east with no other gain anywhere to offset the change in NATO’s dispositions? Once NATO starts fortifying Eastern Europe, there is no telling where it could stop. Several NATO corps in West Germany was bad. Several NATO corps in the Baltics and Poland is much, much worse. And again, the Russians can’t help but be aware that the option of invasion without a major war basically will go off the table if American combat units go into Estonia in ANY quantity and get destroying during a Russian invasion and occupation.

So it seems to me that an invasion out of the blue is the most likely course of action if in fact an invasion is to take place. In addition to having the advantage of not drawing in the rest of NATO as irresistibly, a bolt-from-the-blue invasion would catch the Americans flat footed. The longer a pre-invasion crisis lasts, the greater the opportunity for the Americans to ship a heavy division or two to Europe and stockpile materiel under peacetime conditions. A fait accompli means that the Americans have to start their buildup from the beginning. The same logic applies to the other members of NATO, the mobilization and readiness of each of which should be kept as low as possible leading up to the moment of decision.

At the risk of showing prejudice, I feel obliged to say that the Russians really can be brutes. The argument will be put forward that slapping Estonia to the ground and taking her purse will send the right message to the effete Westerners, the argument will go. They didn’t do anything of substance in the Ukraine. They won’t get involved in Estonia. The US may piss and moan about it, but they are already bogged down with other crises; and in any event, American public opinion won’t stand for a confrontation with Russia on top of ISIL, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. I doubt Putin is foolish enough to put stock in this argument, but one never knows.

Again, duty calls so I will have to get back to this later.

[Raellus]

You've hit the nail on the head, Web. I too think the overwhelming invasion scenario is less risky for Russia. Attempting an Eastern Ukraine-style destabilization and intimidation campaign and subsidized insurgency in Latvia and/or Estonia risks NATO sending advisors and counter-insurgency forces in response. This immediately makes a military coup-de-main a much riskier proposition because NATO will have more cause to respond with matching force if its own troops are caught in the subsequent Russian attack. Putin's either going to have to be content to play the long game, or go for the jugular. If I were him, I'd go with the latter for the reasons you outlined.

Originally Posted by Webstral

At the risk of showing prejudice, I feel obliged to say that the Russians really can be brutes. The argument will be put forward that slapping Estonia to the ground and taking her purse will send the right message to the effete Westerners, the argument will go. They didn’t do anything of substance in the Ukraine. They won’t get involved in Estonia. The US may piss and moan about it, but they are already bogged down with other crises; and in any event, American public opinion won’t stand for a confrontation with Russia on top of ISIL, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. I doubt Putin is foolish enough to put stock in this argument, but one never knows.

I doubt it too, but this is the premise of our T2030 game world. The following may not be probable, but I firmly believe that it is realistic and plausible. Here's how it goes...

The U.S. is preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere in the world. Europe is struggling with dissatisfaction with the EU, and the costs of supporting anti-terror operations in the Middle East and Africa. NATO is riven by internecine bickering and acrimony. NATO has shown Russia again and again that aggression and territorial expansion won't be punished militarily. There may not be a will to do so and, even if there was, military commitments elsewhere will interfere with the way. In this atmosphere, Russia miscalculates, leaps, is met with a unexpectedly pugnacious NATO response, and WWIII in Europe is under way.

My original scenario envisioned a preliminary destabilization/intimidation phase prior to outright invasion of Estonia, but I edited that out several weeks ago because such a campaign would likely provoke a NATO military response of some kind. ATM, I really only see NATO responding strongly if the stakes aren't too high.

I'm really quite baffled as to why measures to station a NATO heavy brigade in one or more of the Baltic States. Too much expense, too much risk, not enough upside is my guess. Putin's got to be wondering the same thing, and likely drawing similar conclusions.

[Webstral]

Let us assume for the moment that Putin invades and occupies Estonia with little or no warning and that this action does not involve combat units from any of the other members of NATO. The reaction of the United States to this event is the hinge on which future events turn. The European members of NATO are highly unlikely to do anything of a military nature without the lead of the US. The reaction of the US hinges on where the POTUS leads.

Having brought up Obama, I will post a disclaimer. I’m not interested in anyone’s opinion about whether Obama is a socialist, a Muslim, a Kenyan, a coward, inept, foolish, greedy, the Antichrist, or the best thing since sliced bread. If you are unhappy that the last two Presidential elections have failed to yield a POTUS to your liking, go down to the bar and complain to your pisos. This ain’t the place for that. It’s also not the place for extolling whatever virtues you might feel Obama brings to the office. I mention him only because it’s impossible to discuss something like an invasion of Estonia by Russia in a current events context without bringing the POTUS into it. I post a disclaimer now because several of our newer members seem to struggle with separating objective analysis of the military and strategic challenges that face the Commander-in-Chief from their impulse to editorialize regarding their perceptions of the personal shortcomings of the current POTUS.

In the event of a bolt-from-the-blue Russian conquest of Estonia, the POTUS becomes faced with some very difficult policy choices. I do believe he can’t possibly stand by and allow a member of NATO to be occupied. He’s got to do something to get the Russians out of Estonia. Even if the solution ends up being a negotiated agreement that causes the Russians to withdraw, such an agreement will be based on having the Russians believe that the US is psychologically and militarily prepared to spank them. It’s hard to see how said preparedness would not involve the movement of US heavy divisions to Europe.

The POTUS would have to decide right away whether he’s going to order SACEUR to put NATO air assets into combat over Estonia. On the surface, this seems like an easy decision to me. The sooner Putin understands that his occupation of Estonia will not go unchallenged, the greater the chance that negotiations will yield fruit without recourse to major ground combat. I say this with the caveat that heavy forces sufficient for the expulsion of the Russians from Estonia must be on-hand. However, putting NATO air assets into action over Estonia immediately can have a political and military cost. Decisions about whose air assets to use probably have to be made right away, and the results of the air actions will have a bearing on the political discussions in Washington and all of the other NATO capitols immediately following the breaking of the news.

SACEUR is going to want unambiguous guidance. He will say that if he puts a single aircraft over Estonia, then he’s going to want to put up a strike package capable of accomplishing something. What exactly does the President want accomplished at this juncture?

This is where it’s going to get tricky for the POTUS right away. Simply executing ground attack missions against Russian troops in Estonia makes a statement of intent. Personally, I wouldn’t mind this at all. If you send your troops across international borders, then you should expect the allies of the invaded country to conduct air strikes against your troops in the country at the bare minimum. Everyone in NATO should expect that the US will, at the very least, attack from the air enemy troops in the process of invading a member of NATO. Still, the act of attacking Russian ground forces in Estonia is a commitment. Such a commitment would embolden some and panic others.

For those here who are even less knowledgeable about air operations than I am, a quick review of a couple of items may be warranted. Normally, aircraft flying strike missions (close air support, interdiction, etc.) do not move to the target area by themselves when the enemy is in a position to contest control of the airspace above the target. It does happen. The Tornado was designed to fly through contested airspace at heights under 60 meters. This is called ultra-low penetration. The advantage of ultra-low penetration is that strike aircraft flying very fast and very, very low can exploit ground clutter to confuse look-down radar in the defender’s fighters and thus avoid interception. Ultra-low penetration also enables the strike aircraft to evade ground based radar and allow so little time for ground based air defenses to react. So the theory goes. Operation Desert Storm was the first opportunity of the RAF to put tactics designed for the Central Front through their paces. The tactics work, but they impose a high cost in aircraft.

If an air force wants to send strike aircraft into contested airspace without operating in the ultra-low penetration mode, and if the strike aircraft aren’t stealthy, then the air force puts together a strike package. The package typically includes strike aircraft, radar jamming aircraft, air defense suppression aircraft, and fighter escorts. This combination of aircraft enables the package to fight its way to the target and back. In such a package, the strike aircraft may comprise a small percentage of the package. Most of the airframes involved are assigned to fight enemy interceptors, defeat enemy radar, or destroy enemy ground based defenses. It takes a lot of aircraft to fight this way, which is why the European Allies designed the Tornado. There’s a connection with the development of the F-111, but I’m not knowledgeable enough to put the pieces together.

Then there is stealth. Stealthy aircraft get around the requirements of the strike package by being invisible.

When an air force establishes temporary and/or localized control over the airspace, that air force is said to have achieved air superiority. Strike packages operate under conditions of air superiority because often it is the escorting aircraft that create air superiority. Once an air force has near-total control of the airspace over most of its intended targets, that air force is said to enjoy air supremacy. Once air supremacy is achieved, strike aircraft can move to their targets unescorted.

All of this connects to the ground attack mission in support of Estonian forces.

I’m out of time again. I will have to come back another time.

[Raellus]

I agree that the temperament of the POTUS, whoever that happens to be if and when the Russians roll, is going to determine what kind of response NATO makes. I'd like to stay on the safe side and move away from geo-politics for a little bit in order to talk strategy and tactics instead.

The outcome of an air war over Estonia is squarely in the realm of theory. Military aviation used to be my specialty, but that was a couple of decades ago. Things have changed a bit since then. Let's speculate, though. NATO hasn't fought a first or even second-rate air force in... well, forever. As I understand it, NATO spends a lot more on pilot training and air time than the Russians. In terms of airmen (and women), I'll give the advantage to NATO.

NATO fields greater numbers of 5th generation combat aircraft than the Russians. That said, our 3rd/4th generation Falcon and Eagle fleets are getting long in the tooth and the latest models of MiG-29 and SU-27 are at least a match for those storied warbirds. The F-22 is a game-changer, no doubt, but they're not invincible, and there aren't really that many of them. IF the JTF ever gets into serious production, it's going to give NATO a but sharper edge, but if the Russians can work out the kinks, make some refinements, and get the PAK-50 into production, the fighter gap will close again. And note that Russian combat aircraft are considerable cheaper than NATO equivalents (at least, the Russians charge their customers much less than Western nations do). Russian aircraft radars are improving, and their passive IR detection capability and off-boresight aiming systems are something that American front line fighters lack. Every source I've looked at claims that NATO will kick some serious ass in BVR engagements, but once things get up close and personal, the Russians could actually have the advantage. The fact that Falcon drivers are no longer being trained in aerial combat is worrisome. Russia has the interior lines, so its aircraft would be able to operate longer and at higher speeds in the combat zone. There's also the matter of overflight permissions. I reckon that the Russians will make threats against Lithuania and or Latvia (if the latter isn't already on the chopping block as well), trying to pressure them into pressuring NATO to back down.

Then there's the ground-based air defenses. I'm no expert, but it is my understanding that SAM technology is something that the Russians actually do pretty well, better even than NATO. Russia would, no doubt, flood its conquests with thick, multilayered SAM nets and copious AAA. Every NATO strike mission would be flying into a hornet's nest, and that's not taking into account Russia's air combat resources and capabilities. Against both, NATO's going to have a hard time of it.

The point that I'm trying to make is that the idea that NATO could do a number on the Russian air defense system like the Coalition did to Saddam's in '91 and '03 or Serbia's in the early '90s is wishful thinking. I think that NATO would eventually come out on top, but at a very, very steep cost.

It's here that we have to go back to political will. When the butcher's bill comes in, will NATO leaders keep their nerve or lose their stomach for a fight?

[Raellus]

Maybe some good news for NATO.

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/russia...175912339.html

[RN7]

Here you go Raellus the Ruskie's are now placing weapons in orbit. That Putin just won't lie down!

http://www.siliconrepublic.com/innov...s-fear-in-us-w

[Raellus]

Thanks for that, RN7. Can JDAMs and/or other "smart" munitions function fully without GPS sats?

I don't like where this is heading:

http://news.yahoo.com/russia-china-p...130004941.html

NATO needs to do more of this, but hold them in the Baltic States, or at least practice larger scale emergency deployments there.

http://news.yahoo.com/uk-troops-larg...175420900.html

The one major downside to large scale manouvers in the Baltics is that the Russians may see them as deliberate provocations, prompted Moscow to launch its own large scale manouvers on the other side of the border. This could provide a convenient cover for assembling an actual invasion force. It's a damned if you do, damned if you don't scenario.

[Raellus]

When my sophomores are learning about the causes of WWI, I teach them the mneumonic M.A.I.N. (causes of WWI). Looking at the situation in Eastern Europe, I'd say that all of the factors that contributed to

Millitarism: The Russians are definitely ramping up military spending and procurements. NATO nations are being urged to keep pace.

Alliances: You've already got NATO, and Russia's trying to assemble a Eurasian [economic] Union (which, I'm sure will somehow be twisted to accomodate a military component). If the Russians and Chinese sign some sort of mutual defense pact or military alliance...

Imperialism: Putin might say otherwise, but, in practice, empire-building (or rebuilding) is what Russia's doing in East Ukraine. And Moscow would argue that the U.S. is up to no good in the Middle East. Putin's also accused the U.S. of practicing economic imperialism around the globe.

Nationalism: Putin's trying to get the Russians riled up and behind his nationalistic endevours (see the Sochi Winter Olympics) but some reports suggest that many Russians are unhappy with Russia's expansionist adventures in East Ukraine. It's not just Russia. In other European nations, right-wing natioanlist parties have been making inroads in national and EU elections.

All of the ingredients are there. If the heat keeps getting turned up, and politicians keeps stirring the pot, things could potentially boil over.

[unkated]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The one major downside to large scale manouvers in the Baltics is that the Russians may see them as deliberate provocations, prompted Moscow to launch its own large scale manouvers on the other side of the border. This could provide a convenient cover for assembling an actual invasion force. It's a damned if you do, damned if you don't scenario.

Not buying that. Large scale maneuvers in the Baltic states would send the Russians a message they would very well understand - "we can do this, and we will if we have to/want to." Just as the large-scale maneuvers in West Germany in the 80s did not provoke a Soviet invasion.

And just as the message was clear in the Ukraine what Russia meant this past Spring and Summer when it held maneuvers on it's side of the border with eastern Ukraine.

Putin may decide in his political calculus to attack, but it would not be a snap decision proviked by NATO maneuvers

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by unkated

Putin may decide in his political calculus to attack, but it would not be a snap decision proviked by NATO maneuvers

I didn't say that it would be. He would, however, see it as a threat/provocation. If he's looking for a casus belli, that could give it to him. It doesn't mean he'd act immediately, though. He could launch an invasion months after the NATO troops left and claim that it was a preemptive act of self defense.

Originally Posted by unkated

Not buying that. Large scale maneuvers in the Baltic states would send the Russians a message they would very well understand - "we can do this, and we will if we have to/want to." Just as the large-scale maneuvers in West Germany in the 80s did not provoke a Soviet invasion.

That's fine. I don't think that you are looking at it from the Russian POV, though. To anticipate what the Russians might do, one has to think like them. To the Russians, NATO members on Russia's borders constitute an existential (from a regime point of view) threat. Putin wants buffer states, like the USSR had after WWII. "The Great Patriotic War" created deep scars in Russia's psyche. For example, what the West sees as Russian aggression in Ukraine, Russians see as self-preservation. IF there's to be war between Russia and the West, cultural misunderstanding will be at its root.

Your analogy is an apples to oranges comparison. West Germany didn't border the Soviet Union directly. East Germany, Poland, and the non-Russian, non-independent republics of Belarus & Ukraine stood between them. The Baltic States do border Russia. Large scale military maneuvers in the Baltic States will be seen as very threatening. Imagine if Russia or China held large scale military maneuvers in Mexico. Would POTUS, the DoD, and Congress be cool with that?

[unkated]

Perhaps we have different meaning to "threat."

"Threat" means Russia would be in danger of being invaded. I doubt Russia is under the apprehension that NATO will invade Russia unprovoked.

Yes, I understand very well that Putin would like to reconstitute the Soviet Union (or the Russian Empire), preferably surrounded by governments "friendly" (frightened) of Russia. Yes, as a buffer zone as well as to have more resources to play with.

My point is that while he might find NATO maneuvers in the Baltic states a sign that his goals would be frustrated there at least for the moment, he would not mistake it as a sign of imminent invasion, and indeed as the sign it would be intended as of "Do not play here except at your own peril."

Could he or would he do something afterward? Maybe.

But he would not be mistaken about the message.

Uncle Ted

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The point that I'm trying to make is that the idea that NATO could do a number on the Russian air defense system like the Coalition did to Saddam's in '91 and '03 or Serbia's in the early '90s is wishful thinking. I think that NATO would eventually come out on top, but at a very, very steep cost.

I could not agree more. At the risk of getting ahead of myself, the buildup to the ground offensive phase (assuming the war gets to that point) would be a classic air war. In order to support the ground forces decisively, NATO would have to knock Russian air power in western Russia on its fourth point of contact. This would mean penetrating Russian airspace where the air defenses will be as good as they are anywhere in the country. The imperatives of this part of the war easily could lend a strategic aspect to the war which would give the B-2 a chance to prove whether it was worth the money.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Then there's the ground-based air defenses. I'm no expert, but it is my understanding that SAM technology is something that the Russians actually do pretty well, better even than NATO.

I am given to understand much the same. Western concepts of air defense—particularly that of the United States—place a premium on aircraft-based air defense under the logic that aircraft are more flexible and more responsive. A very dense ground-based air defense cannot be repurposed very easily once air supremacy has been achieved. The USAF plans to win, whereas the Russian air defense scheme seems more oriented towards not losing. Provided the Russian air defenses don’t lose, they have properly supported the ground forces that are the instrument of decision anyway.

Getting back to where I left off, getting strike packages to deliver ordnance against Russian ground forces in Estonia means dealing with Russian air defenses. Estonia is a small country. A significant portion of the country can be put under an umbrella of ground-based air defenses based in Russia. Russian fighters operating over Estonia will be operating from Russian bases under the cover of radar based on the ground in Russia and airborne radar flying in Russian airspace. From the standpoint of waging air war, there’s hardly any distinction between Estonia and northwestern Russia. It’s less a matter of a blurry line than a gradation of color. If SACEUR is worth his pay, he will explain this to the POTUS in the simplest terms possible as briefly as possible.

The uninitiated among the civilian leadership will ask why we can’t just send our aircraft to attack targets in Estonia and leave Russia out of it. They will want to show support for Estonia without risking widening the war. This is understandable but misguided. Hopefully, someone in the DOD will be able to explain that the most effective means of protecting friendly forces from the enemy’s air defenses is to destroy the enemy’s air defenses. This means destroying the enemy’s radar, whether it is on the ground or in the air. This means grounding the enemy’s aircraft by damaging the runways or even destroying the enemy’s aircraft on the ground (where possible). This means destroying missiles and ADA before they get a chance to fire. Even if these things aren’t always possible, the enemy’s interceptors have to be dealt with before they come within range to fire their missiles at friendly strike aircraft en route to their target. Given the small size of Estonia, this means that the strike package escorts are going to have to be able to attack the enemy’s interceptors in Russian airspace. As you point out, Raellus, BVR is going to be NATO’s strong suit. It’s hard to imagine better circumstances for BVR than knowing that everything flying on the Russian side of the border belongs to the enemy. Failing to allow NATO fighters to attack targets in Russia pursuant to attacking targets on the ground in Estonia means throwing away the men and the aircraft in an attempt to dance the tango on a political tightrope. Better not to send the strike package(s) in the first place.

The point of all this is that any NATO response to a Russian invasion of Estonia almost certainly will lead to direct confrontation with Russia in the skies over western Russia. Though Western politicians will try to place some sort of artificial limits on the types of air power activities NATO conducts, placing artificial limits on the types of targets NATO can hit in western Russia will unnecessarily hamper NATO air operations in defense of a NATO member. What would remain to be seen is whether the military could convince said politicians that if NATO is going to fight at all for Estonia, then military considerations, not political ones, should guide operational guidelines if the lives of the air crews and the public investment in their machines are to be honored.

If the Russians are serious about occupying Estonia, there’s nothing the USAF or all the combined air power of NATO can do in the face of overwhelming Russian combat power on the ground. It’s hard to see how the leading Russian units won’t reach Tallinn in less than 48 hours—probably much less. I would expect that Russia would have control of the country except for isolated pockets within 2 days. This is long enough for the biggest air battle since WW2, but it’s not long enough for NATO to do much of substance.

Once the air war starts, it’s hard to know where the lines will be drawn. This uncertainty will present challenges and/or opportunities for both Putin and Obama. For instance, let us suppose that SACEUR gets the green light to operate more-or-less the way he wants with the mission of providing CAS and interdiction strikes against Russian forces in Estonia. How far north, east, and southeast of Estonia can he send air interdiction missions? Can he hit Russian air bases that are not being used to support operations in Estonia (if, in fact, there are any Russian air bases within range that are not supporting the invasion of Estonia)? Can he hit Russian Backfires, even if Backfires haven’t been used? Can he hit munitions dumps? Fuel depots? Transportation assets being used to support the invasion? Bridges being used to support the invasion? Ground based air defenses that can hit NATO aircraft attacking ground based air defenses that can cover part of Estonia? Munitions factories?

The question of which assets can be attacked all goes back to the matter of intent. Is the United States going to eject Russia from Estonia by the use of ground forces, if necessary? Will the United States mobilize the necessary resources to get that job done, even if Russia decides to mobilize her conventional resources fully? This is the million dollar question, and the POTUS has about 10 minutes to make that decision once he gets word that Russian forces are attacking Estonia. Every action taken from that moment forward hinges on whether he is going to commit to liberating Estonia or not. For the purpose of this argument, I will consider anything less than the mobilization and deployment of sufficient resources to drive the Russian Army out of Estonia in the face of large-scale Russian mobilization to be a “no”. Given the way politicians think, I doubt that Obama will commit to a “yes” answer in those 10 minutes. Neither will he abandon Estonia entirely. This ambiguity will be a problem until and unless the POTUS commits fully or withdraws completely.

Once the United States and Russia are effectively at war, declared or otherwise, escalation becomes natural. If the US is using Polish air bases to engage in air combat over western Russia, then military logic dictates those air bases are subject to Russian air attack. The same goes for any air bases in Europe being used by the USAF to fight over and around Estonia. If the air battle involves the Luftwaffe, the RAF, the Polish Air Force, or whomever, the air bases of those countries’ air forces also are subject to air attack. The same logic that dictates NATO attack air and air defense assets in western Russia applies to Russian action against NATO air and air defense assets.

On the other hand, political concerns will present themselves to the Russians, too. If the USAF is flying out of Polish air bases, for instance, attacks on Polish air bases cannot help but run afoul of Polish air defenses. It’s hard, though not impossible, to imagine the Poles giving the Russians an unrestricted approach to drop bombs on Polish air bases that will almost certainly kill Polish nationals. The Poles probably will defend their airspace against Russian intrusion. Though I am not an expert on public sentiment in Poland at this point in time, I hypothesize that combat between Polish and Russian air power in Polish airspace following the start of a Russian invasion of Estonia will, on balance, yield a more combative spirit among the Polish citizenry and government. This will be especially true if US combat air assets are operating in support of a NATO ally.

The same is probably true to varying degrees of any other NATO country. If the US is flying air combat missions out of Germany or Denmark in support of a member of NATO being invaded by Russia, and if Russian air assets attack the air bases being used by the Americans who are executing their duties under the umbrella of the terms of the alliance, the public opinion in those countries is likely to experience a net hardening. I write “net” because some citizens will crap themselves at the idea of real war with Russia and demand that their government agree to anything to avoid war. However, with Russian troops rolling across Estonia and the USAF flying combat missions in defense of a member of NATO, I believe the majority of citizens in Denmark, Germany, etc. will be outraged by Russian violation of their airspace. If air crews of the host nation become involved in the fighting (it’s hard to imagine they wouldn’t be) and suffer losses, public opinion will become more inflamed. Loss of life among the civilian population at the business end of Russian air attack would further aggravate public opinion. This hardening can be expected to manifest itself in the willingness of the government to abide by the terms of the alliance.

So the Russians have some real concerns to address before invading Estonia. They can’t control the American reaction. They can try to gauge it and perhaps manipulate it, but they cannot really control the American response. If the Russian military leadership doesn’t tell Putin that an invasion of Estonia may very well lead to an air war involving assets being attacked all over western Russia, then they won’t be earning their pay. Just as they can’t control the American reaction, they can’t decide for the Americans where they draw the line on which assets will be attacked.

The unknown quality of the American response extends beyond western Russia. If the US and Russia are at war, declared or otherwise, at H+1 on the day the Russians invade Estonia, which forces are in play and which forces are not? It’s probably a safe bet that there will be no nuclear response. But beyond that it’s hard to say where the Americans will draw the line.

The reason for this is that ejecting Russia from Estonia, if the US commits to this, will require US heavy forces be shipped from CONUS. This will require transit across the Atlantic in cargo vessels. If the Russians want to stop the US from reinforcing Europe, they are going to have to sink that shipping—at least enough to cause the Americans to reconsider their commitment to Estonia. The Americans will also understand this. Someone somewhere in the American chain of command will point out that aircraft suitable for attacking American shipping in the Atlantic should be neutralized as early as possible. Depending on how SACEUR wants to play it, aviation assets that could be used against NATO shipping in the North Atlantic could come under attack right away under the thesis that war is war, after all, and the US is fully justified in destroying Russian assets that might be used to attack American shipping bringing war assets to Europe.

Beyond this is the question of just how far the war extends. Are aircraft and bases anywhere in European Russia fair game? If so, what about aircraft and air bases in western Siberia? Eastern Siberia? If US and Russian naval vessels encounter each other outside of the combat zone, do they fire on each other? If not, why not? Aren’t US and Russian military forces engaged in combat? If so, then the US ought to just go to town on every Russian fighting platform the Americans can put in their crosshairs. Again, this is something the Russians can’t control.

Once American and Russian pilots are killing each other following a Russian invasion of a member of NATO, the logic of escalation takes over. This should give everyone pause.

[Webstral]

The Russians are an interesting group of people. They have a set of circumstances not very much like ours. They will react to perceived threats based on their criteria, not ours. Then there’s Putin, whose needs will be a variation on what we might call Russian needs.

As everyone knows, the Russian economy underwent a drastic change after 1991. The Soviet Union made almost everything, though not always well or cost effectively. When the former Soviet industries were exposed to the global marketplace, they experienced massive failures. The modern Russian economy is underpinned by sales of energy. I seem to recall a post on this topic within the last week, so I won’t reiterate my colleague’s material here.

The population of ethnic Russians has been contracting for some time. This is an enormous problem. The labor pool is shrinking, as is the pool of military manpower. One of the potential benefits of the invasion of Georgia was the absorption of 100,000 ethnic Russians in Abkhazia. Many other populations of ethnic Russians lie outside the borders of Russia. Bringing them back into the fold is more important than it ever was. Ethnic Russians comprise a quarter of Estonia’s population of 1.3 million. We might not consider the acquisition of 300,000 people of a specific ethnicity worth going to war over, but it’s not up to us to decide how the Russians see things.

People more in the know than I am have pointed out that the contraction of Russia’s borders (vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and her Eastern European ramparts) creates a security situation that they may find intolerable. For instance, St. Petersburg is now less than 200 miles from the nearest NATO member nation. For a people who are accustomed to seeing themselves as vulnerable to invasion, this situation cannot help but make them twitchy. They may act based on what they consider to be a situation that makes them vulnerable regardless of whether an invasion is in the offing.

I believe one of the reasons NATO has not moved significant forces into Eastern Europe is that the Russians are twitchy about being invaded. They might not see the presence of several non-Polish heavy divisions in Poland as a defensive measure. To Russian eyes, such a force might appear as an invasion force waiting for the right moment to strike. NATO has shown a surprising sensitivity to this possible Russian perspective. While I hope that Russians as a whole perceive NATO exercises as a defensive demonstration of support for Estonia, there is a non-negligible chance that they will see it an effort to intimidate them. Putin could exploit this. I hope he will be sensible and realize that our lackluster response to events in the Ukraine is no indicator regarding Russian designs on Estonia. We’ll see, I suppose.

[Raellus]

The population of Latvia has an even greater percentage of ethnic Russians than Estonia does. Although Kato's mentioned Russia's contracting population a couple of times here and elsewhere, I hadn't thought about it being an incentive for territorial expansion. Thanks for that, Web. If Russia takes parts of Estonia and Latvia, not only do they gain territory (buffer space), they also gain Russian people.

Thanks also for the points about how the Russian AD network spans borders. Although I've thought a lot about ways that a Russian invasion of Estonia could widen into a wider war between Russia et al (namely, Belarus) and NATO, I hadn't really thought about how the nebulous overlap of ground-based AA networks might contribute to escalation. I'd kind of touched on it with the issue of over-flight rights, but the fact that Russian SAM based on Russian soil would likely need to be dealt with to protect NATO aircraft operating over eastern Estonia. Hitting Russian forces in Estonia is one thing, hitting them on Russian soil is another.

[kato13]

While Latvian population pyramids are not as upside down as Russian ones are


They both show a very similar dramatic decline in births in the last 20 years. Both the percentage of children and the percentage of Russians have trended steadily downward in the past 2 decades.

If Putin wants new young Russians, maybe a constant loop of Barry White songs would be more effective than invading the Baltics.

edit

This does put the Latvians in more serious trouble in 15 years when they only have 60% of their current Military age men available. The Russians will have similar demographic problems, but as they have a larger population in general it would probably be easier for them to shift people around.

sources
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Latvia
http://www.indexmundi.com/latvia/age_structure.html

[RN7]

Originally Posted by kato13

If Putin wants new young Russians, maybe a constant loop of Barry White songs would be more effective than invading the Baltics.

Or maybe entice the younger Russians back to Russia. There is a whole load of them living in America and Western Europe and elswhere.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Thanks for that, RN7. Can JDAMs and/or other "smart" munitions function fully without GPS sats?

USAF X-37B undoubtedly has the ability to knock out Russian and Chinese GPS and other satellites, despite the Pentagon's denial that it supports the development of space based weapons.

NATO taking on Russian air defences in the Baltics and on the periphery of Russian territory is not something that the Pentagon would be happy about. It is possible that Russia has an ability to detect a B-2 stealth bomber attack, at least from its north-western approaches across Europe and the Arctic. Russian SAM systems are also very good, debatably as good or better than anything NATO has. Russian Air Force Flanker derivatives would cause NATO air forces huge problems. Russian AESA radar and air-to-air missiles are very good, and Russian Flanker has speed and range of an F-15E with better manoeuvrability. Even an F-22 would find this combat environment challenging to say the least.

[jester]

Stealth tech coupled with assorted radar counter measures would be more than a match for any of the Russian air defense network.

Figure anti radar missiles, jammers, false signals, EMP technology diversionary and real strikes, strikes to their air defense command centers, computer viruses and other technology if used would give an amazing strike capability.

And then lets not forget about wildweasel and similar systems that would accompany any strike forces.

Like they say "They only have to get lucky once."

[RN7]

Originally Posted by jester

Stealth tech coupled with assorted radar counter measures would be more than a match for any of the Russian air defense network.

Figure anti radar missiles, jammers, false signals, EMP technology diversionary and real strikes, strikes to their air defense command centers, computer viruses and other technology if used would give an amazing strike capability.

And then lets not forget about wildweasel and similar systems that would accompany any strike forces.

Like they say "They only have to get lucky once."

What if Russians can track stealth tech aircraft?
What NATO non-stealth aircraft can avoid detection by Russian long ranged radar?
What NATO cruise missiles can avoid detection by Russian long ranged radar?
Known NATO anti-radar missiles have a range of no more than 150 km.
Wildweasel use anti-radar missiles.
Russian S-300 and S-400 SAM missiles have a range against aerodynamic targets of 200 km plus and 400 km respectively.
Russia has over one thousand S-300 and S-400 launchers.
What non-nuclear EMP technology does NATO use and what is it's range?
What computer viruses would NATO use to degrade Russian command and air defence systems?
What defences against Russian computer viruses do NATO command and air defence systems have?
How does NATO suppress Russia's AWAC and 400 Su-27/30/35 Flanker, 300 Mig-31, 300 Mig-29 and unknown number of PAK FA fighter aircraft over Russian airspace?
How does NATO suppress potential attacks from non-nuclear Russian bombers, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles?

[StainlessSteelCynic]

It's worth noting that stealth aircraft can be tracked by using different radar wavelengths, specifically the longer wavelengths typically used by weather radar. The lower frequency radars are then used to direct higher freq radars onto the target.
Plus there's been research into tracking stealthy aircraft via the disruption in airflow and also by thermal imaging to detect changes in the air temperature caused by high speed aircraft.

Hitting the stealthy aircraft is still problematic but that's slowly changing.

http://news.usni.org/2014/07/29/chin...ee-u-s-stealth
http://airinsight.com/2014/02/24/wil...nd-of-stealth/

[RN7]

To defeat expected advancements in Russian and Chinese stealth detection capabilities the US may field two types of bombers by the mid-2020's.

The next generation B3 bomber under development will be a further progression of current US stealth technology. The B3 will likely be sub-sonic and smaller than the current B2 but also cheaper to build.

Hypersonic aircraft/missiles may be a better way to defeat enemy air defences than stealth aircraft, as they can strike so fast it would be nearly impossible to counter them in time. The SR-72 hypersonic reconnaissance aircraft under development will be the successor to the SR-71 Blackbird if its funding is not cut. It's being developed in parallel to the unmanned X-51 high speed strike weapon demonstrator. The SR-72 is expected to be able to reach speeds of Mach 6 from standstill and will likely have a strike capability.