OT? A New Cold War

[unkated]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The one major downside to large scale manouvers in the Baltics is that the Russians may see them as deliberate provocations, prompted Moscow to launch its own large scale manouvers on the other side of the border. This could provide a convenient cover for assembling an actual invasion force. It's a damned if you do, damned if you don't scenario.

Not buying that. Large scale maneuvers in the Baltic states would send the Russians a message they would very well understand - "we can do this, and we will if we have to/want to." Just as the large-scale maneuvers in West Germany in the 80s did not provoke a Soviet invasion.

And just as the message was clear in the Ukraine what Russia meant this past Spring and Summer when it held maneuvers on it's side of the border with eastern Ukraine.

Putin may decide in his political calculus to attack, but it would not be a snap decision proviked by NATO maneuvers

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by unkated

Putin may decide in his political calculus to attack, but it would not be a snap decision proviked by NATO maneuvers

I didn't say that it would be. He would, however, see it as a threat/provocation. If he's looking for a casus belli, that could give it to him. It doesn't mean he'd act immediately, though. He could launch an invasion months after the NATO troops left and claim that it was a preemptive act of self defense.

Originally Posted by unkated

Not buying that. Large scale maneuvers in the Baltic states would send the Russians a message they would very well understand - "we can do this, and we will if we have to/want to." Just as the large-scale maneuvers in West Germany in the 80s did not provoke a Soviet invasion.

That's fine. I don't think that you are looking at it from the Russian POV, though. To anticipate what the Russians might do, one has to think like them. To the Russians, NATO members on Russia's borders constitute an existential (from a regime point of view) threat. Putin wants buffer states, like the USSR had after WWII. "The Great Patriotic War" created deep scars in Russia's psyche. For example, what the West sees as Russian aggression in Ukraine, Russians see as self-preservation. IF there's to be war between Russia and the West, cultural misunderstanding will be at its root.

Your analogy is an apples to oranges comparison. West Germany didn't border the Soviet Union directly. East Germany, Poland, and the non-Russian, non-independent republics of Belarus & Ukraine stood between them. The Baltic States do border Russia. Large scale military maneuvers in the Baltic States will be seen as very threatening. Imagine if Russia or China held large scale military maneuvers in Mexico. Would POTUS, the DoD, and Congress be cool with that?

[unkated]

Perhaps we have different meaning to "threat."

"Threat" means Russia would be in danger of being invaded. I doubt Russia is under the apprehension that NATO will invade Russia unprovoked.

Yes, I understand very well that Putin would like to reconstitute the Soviet Union (or the Russian Empire), preferably surrounded by governments "friendly" (frightened) of Russia. Yes, as a buffer zone as well as to have more resources to play with.

My point is that while he might find NATO maneuvers in the Baltic states a sign that his goals would be frustrated there at least for the moment, he would not mistake it as a sign of imminent invasion, and indeed as the sign it would be intended as of "Do not play here except at your own peril."

Could he or would he do something afterward? Maybe.

But he would not be mistaken about the message.

Uncle Ted

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The point that I'm trying to make is that the idea that NATO could do a number on the Russian air defense system like the Coalition did to Saddam's in '91 and '03 or Serbia's in the early '90s is wishful thinking. I think that NATO would eventually come out on top, but at a very, very steep cost.

I could not agree more. At the risk of getting ahead of myself, the buildup to the ground offensive phase (assuming the war gets to that point) would be a classic air war. In order to support the ground forces decisively, NATO would have to knock Russian air power in western Russia on its fourth point of contact. This would mean penetrating Russian airspace where the air defenses will be as good as they are anywhere in the country. The imperatives of this part of the war easily could lend a strategic aspect to the war which would give the B-2 a chance to prove whether it was worth the money.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Then there's the ground-based air defenses. I'm no expert, but it is my understanding that SAM technology is something that the Russians actually do pretty well, better even than NATO.

I am given to understand much the same. Western concepts of air defense—particularly that of the United States—place a premium on aircraft-based air defense under the logic that aircraft are more flexible and more responsive. A very dense ground-based air defense cannot be repurposed very easily once air supremacy has been achieved. The USAF plans to win, whereas the Russian air defense scheme seems more oriented towards not losing. Provided the Russian air defenses don’t lose, they have properly supported the ground forces that are the instrument of decision anyway.

Getting back to where I left off, getting strike packages to deliver ordnance against Russian ground forces in Estonia means dealing with Russian air defenses. Estonia is a small country. A significant portion of the country can be put under an umbrella of ground-based air defenses based in Russia. Russian fighters operating over Estonia will be operating from Russian bases under the cover of radar based on the ground in Russia and airborne radar flying in Russian airspace. From the standpoint of waging air war, there’s hardly any distinction between Estonia and northwestern Russia. It’s less a matter of a blurry line than a gradation of color. If SACEUR is worth his pay, he will explain this to the POTUS in the simplest terms possible as briefly as possible.

The uninitiated among the civilian leadership will ask why we can’t just send our aircraft to attack targets in Estonia and leave Russia out of it. They will want to show support for Estonia without risking widening the war. This is understandable but misguided. Hopefully, someone in the DOD will be able to explain that the most effective means of protecting friendly forces from the enemy’s air defenses is to destroy the enemy’s air defenses. This means destroying the enemy’s radar, whether it is on the ground or in the air. This means grounding the enemy’s aircraft by damaging the runways or even destroying the enemy’s aircraft on the ground (where possible). This means destroying missiles and ADA before they get a chance to fire. Even if these things aren’t always possible, the enemy’s interceptors have to be dealt with before they come within range to fire their missiles at friendly strike aircraft en route to their target. Given the small size of Estonia, this means that the strike package escorts are going to have to be able to attack the enemy’s interceptors in Russian airspace. As you point out, Raellus, BVR is going to be NATO’s strong suit. It’s hard to imagine better circumstances for BVR than knowing that everything flying on the Russian side of the border belongs to the enemy. Failing to allow NATO fighters to attack targets in Russia pursuant to attacking targets on the ground in Estonia means throwing away the men and the aircraft in an attempt to dance the tango on a political tightrope. Better not to send the strike package(s) in the first place.

The point of all this is that any NATO response to a Russian invasion of Estonia almost certainly will lead to direct confrontation with Russia in the skies over western Russia. Though Western politicians will try to place some sort of artificial limits on the types of air power activities NATO conducts, placing artificial limits on the types of targets NATO can hit in western Russia will unnecessarily hamper NATO air operations in defense of a NATO member. What would remain to be seen is whether the military could convince said politicians that if NATO is going to fight at all for Estonia, then military considerations, not political ones, should guide operational guidelines if the lives of the air crews and the public investment in their machines are to be honored.

If the Russians are serious about occupying Estonia, there’s nothing the USAF or all the combined air power of NATO can do in the face of overwhelming Russian combat power on the ground. It’s hard to see how the leading Russian units won’t reach Tallinn in less than 48 hours—probably much less. I would expect that Russia would have control of the country except for isolated pockets within 2 days. This is long enough for the biggest air battle since WW2, but it’s not long enough for NATO to do much of substance.

Once the air war starts, it’s hard to know where the lines will be drawn. This uncertainty will present challenges and/or opportunities for both Putin and Obama. For instance, let us suppose that SACEUR gets the green light to operate more-or-less the way he wants with the mission of providing CAS and interdiction strikes against Russian forces in Estonia. How far north, east, and southeast of Estonia can he send air interdiction missions? Can he hit Russian air bases that are not being used to support operations in Estonia (if, in fact, there are any Russian air bases within range that are not supporting the invasion of Estonia)? Can he hit Russian Backfires, even if Backfires haven’t been used? Can he hit munitions dumps? Fuel depots? Transportation assets being used to support the invasion? Bridges being used to support the invasion? Ground based air defenses that can hit NATO aircraft attacking ground based air defenses that can cover part of Estonia? Munitions factories?

The question of which assets can be attacked all goes back to the matter of intent. Is the United States going to eject Russia from Estonia by the use of ground forces, if necessary? Will the United States mobilize the necessary resources to get that job done, even if Russia decides to mobilize her conventional resources fully? This is the million dollar question, and the POTUS has about 10 minutes to make that decision once he gets word that Russian forces are attacking Estonia. Every action taken from that moment forward hinges on whether he is going to commit to liberating Estonia or not. For the purpose of this argument, I will consider anything less than the mobilization and deployment of sufficient resources to drive the Russian Army out of Estonia in the face of large-scale Russian mobilization to be a “no”. Given the way politicians think, I doubt that Obama will commit to a “yes” answer in those 10 minutes. Neither will he abandon Estonia entirely. This ambiguity will be a problem until and unless the POTUS commits fully or withdraws completely.

Once the United States and Russia are effectively at war, declared or otherwise, escalation becomes natural. If the US is using Polish air bases to engage in air combat over western Russia, then military logic dictates those air bases are subject to Russian air attack. The same goes for any air bases in Europe being used by the USAF to fight over and around Estonia. If the air battle involves the Luftwaffe, the RAF, the Polish Air Force, or whomever, the air bases of those countries’ air forces also are subject to air attack. The same logic that dictates NATO attack air and air defense assets in western Russia applies to Russian action against NATO air and air defense assets.

On the other hand, political concerns will present themselves to the Russians, too. If the USAF is flying out of Polish air bases, for instance, attacks on Polish air bases cannot help but run afoul of Polish air defenses. It’s hard, though not impossible, to imagine the Poles giving the Russians an unrestricted approach to drop bombs on Polish air bases that will almost certainly kill Polish nationals. The Poles probably will defend their airspace against Russian intrusion. Though I am not an expert on public sentiment in Poland at this point in time, I hypothesize that combat between Polish and Russian air power in Polish airspace following the start of a Russian invasion of Estonia will, on balance, yield a more combative spirit among the Polish citizenry and government. This will be especially true if US combat air assets are operating in support of a NATO ally.

The same is probably true to varying degrees of any other NATO country. If the US is flying air combat missions out of Germany or Denmark in support of a member of NATO being invaded by Russia, and if Russian air assets attack the air bases being used by the Americans who are executing their duties under the umbrella of the terms of the alliance, the public opinion in those countries is likely to experience a net hardening. I write “net” because some citizens will crap themselves at the idea of real war with Russia and demand that their government agree to anything to avoid war. However, with Russian troops rolling across Estonia and the USAF flying combat missions in defense of a member of NATO, I believe the majority of citizens in Denmark, Germany, etc. will be outraged by Russian violation of their airspace. If air crews of the host nation become involved in the fighting (it’s hard to imagine they wouldn’t be) and suffer losses, public opinion will become more inflamed. Loss of life among the civilian population at the business end of Russian air attack would further aggravate public opinion. This hardening can be expected to manifest itself in the willingness of the government to abide by the terms of the alliance.

So the Russians have some real concerns to address before invading Estonia. They can’t control the American reaction. They can try to gauge it and perhaps manipulate it, but they cannot really control the American response. If the Russian military leadership doesn’t tell Putin that an invasion of Estonia may very well lead to an air war involving assets being attacked all over western Russia, then they won’t be earning their pay. Just as they can’t control the American reaction, they can’t decide for the Americans where they draw the line on which assets will be attacked.

The unknown quality of the American response extends beyond western Russia. If the US and Russia are at war, declared or otherwise, at H+1 on the day the Russians invade Estonia, which forces are in play and which forces are not? It’s probably a safe bet that there will be no nuclear response. But beyond that it’s hard to say where the Americans will draw the line.

The reason for this is that ejecting Russia from Estonia, if the US commits to this, will require US heavy forces be shipped from CONUS. This will require transit across the Atlantic in cargo vessels. If the Russians want to stop the US from reinforcing Europe, they are going to have to sink that shipping—at least enough to cause the Americans to reconsider their commitment to Estonia. The Americans will also understand this. Someone somewhere in the American chain of command will point out that aircraft suitable for attacking American shipping in the Atlantic should be neutralized as early as possible. Depending on how SACEUR wants to play it, aviation assets that could be used against NATO shipping in the North Atlantic could come under attack right away under the thesis that war is war, after all, and the US is fully justified in destroying Russian assets that might be used to attack American shipping bringing war assets to Europe.

Beyond this is the question of just how far the war extends. Are aircraft and bases anywhere in European Russia fair game? If so, what about aircraft and air bases in western Siberia? Eastern Siberia? If US and Russian naval vessels encounter each other outside of the combat zone, do they fire on each other? If not, why not? Aren’t US and Russian military forces engaged in combat? If so, then the US ought to just go to town on every Russian fighting platform the Americans can put in their crosshairs. Again, this is something the Russians can’t control.

Once American and Russian pilots are killing each other following a Russian invasion of a member of NATO, the logic of escalation takes over. This should give everyone pause.

[Webstral]

The Russians are an interesting group of people. They have a set of circumstances not very much like ours. They will react to perceived threats based on their criteria, not ours. Then there’s Putin, whose needs will be a variation on what we might call Russian needs.

As everyone knows, the Russian economy underwent a drastic change after 1991. The Soviet Union made almost everything, though not always well or cost effectively. When the former Soviet industries were exposed to the global marketplace, they experienced massive failures. The modern Russian economy is underpinned by sales of energy. I seem to recall a post on this topic within the last week, so I won’t reiterate my colleague’s material here.

The population of ethnic Russians has been contracting for some time. This is an enormous problem. The labor pool is shrinking, as is the pool of military manpower. One of the potential benefits of the invasion of Georgia was the absorption of 100,000 ethnic Russians in Abkhazia. Many other populations of ethnic Russians lie outside the borders of Russia. Bringing them back into the fold is more important than it ever was. Ethnic Russians comprise a quarter of Estonia’s population of 1.3 million. We might not consider the acquisition of 300,000 people of a specific ethnicity worth going to war over, but it’s not up to us to decide how the Russians see things.

People more in the know than I am have pointed out that the contraction of Russia’s borders (vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and her Eastern European ramparts) creates a security situation that they may find intolerable. For instance, St. Petersburg is now less than 200 miles from the nearest NATO member nation. For a people who are accustomed to seeing themselves as vulnerable to invasion, this situation cannot help but make them twitchy. They may act based on what they consider to be a situation that makes them vulnerable regardless of whether an invasion is in the offing.

I believe one of the reasons NATO has not moved significant forces into Eastern Europe is that the Russians are twitchy about being invaded. They might not see the presence of several non-Polish heavy divisions in Poland as a defensive measure. To Russian eyes, such a force might appear as an invasion force waiting for the right moment to strike. NATO has shown a surprising sensitivity to this possible Russian perspective. While I hope that Russians as a whole perceive NATO exercises as a defensive demonstration of support for Estonia, there is a non-negligible chance that they will see it an effort to intimidate them. Putin could exploit this. I hope he will be sensible and realize that our lackluster response to events in the Ukraine is no indicator regarding Russian designs on Estonia. We’ll see, I suppose.

[Raellus]

The population of Latvia has an even greater percentage of ethnic Russians than Estonia does. Although Kato's mentioned Russia's contracting population a couple of times here and elsewhere, I hadn't thought about it being an incentive for territorial expansion. Thanks for that, Web. If Russia takes parts of Estonia and Latvia, not only do they gain territory (buffer space), they also gain Russian people.

Thanks also for the points about how the Russian AD network spans borders. Although I've thought a lot about ways that a Russian invasion of Estonia could widen into a wider war between Russia et al (namely, Belarus) and NATO, I hadn't really thought about how the nebulous overlap of ground-based AA networks might contribute to escalation. I'd kind of touched on it with the issue of over-flight rights, but the fact that Russian SAM based on Russian soil would likely need to be dealt with to protect NATO aircraft operating over eastern Estonia. Hitting Russian forces in Estonia is one thing, hitting them on Russian soil is another.

[kato13]

While Latvian population pyramids are not as upside down as Russian ones are


They both show a very similar dramatic decline in births in the last 20 years. Both the percentage of children and the percentage of Russians have trended steadily downward in the past 2 decades.

If Putin wants new young Russians, maybe a constant loop of Barry White songs would be more effective than invading the Baltics.

edit

This does put the Latvians in more serious trouble in 15 years when they only have 60% of their current Military age men available. The Russians will have similar demographic problems, but as they have a larger population in general it would probably be easier for them to shift people around.

sources
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Latvia
http://www.indexmundi.com/latvia/age_structure.html