Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars

[Abbott Shaull]

Yes, but too many people fail to realize that General Lee wasn't the first choice for the job of leading the 'Main Confederate Army' in the East. It was only after General Johnson had been wounded on the field that General Lee was moved from wherever they had him to take command of the field army.

Yes General Hood as with some of the rotating lineup up out west were excellent Brigade commander, others could lead a Division, a share could lead Corps and few were qualified to lead an Army. The trouble for the south is there wasn't a large pool of unqualified political appointees to take their place like the North had. The strength is that the pool they had, were currently serving officers in the US Army previous to the Confederate State breaking away.

Not all of the Southern born officer resigned from the Union Army, but also there were a share of Northern born officers who resigned to fight for the Confederacy too.

[dragoon500ly]

One of the many common questions about LBH is why didn't GAC take the Gatlings with him on the march. A detachment of three .50-caliber Gatlings had been assigned to the Terry column, manned by a detachment of soldiers from the 20th Infantry Regiment.

On the plus side, there is no argument about the firepower that a single Gatling could deliver, a rate of fire of some 350rpm had to be respected. The Gatlings were mounted on a artillery limber and had a box mounted on either side of the gun, each holding 24 40-round magazines, a third box was mounted underneath the gun, and it held 2,000 rounds in their packing boxes. The limber was attached to a artillery cassion that held another 6,000 rounds of boxed ammo. Each gun was manned by a six man crew (piece commander, gunner, loader and three men to pass ammo and reload magazines).

The downside of the Gatlings also bear no argument. These guns were of the same design of the original Civil War-era Gatlings and were known to be prone to malfunction; often jamming from the residue from firing black powder or overheating. Firing the guns to fast ran the risk of having bullets strike a support bar at the muzzle end, sending pieces of bullet and bar flying, usually back towards the crew. The Gatlings were designed to repel massed attacks, such as those customery in the Civil War, it is doubtful that the Indians would have been so accomdating. One other thing to consider is that the Gatlings were mounted on artillery limbers, which meant that the crew had to stand erect in order to work the piece, making them ideal targets for Indian sharpshooters.

Perhaps the major factor in the decision not to take the Gatlings lies in the simple difficulty of getting them to the battlefield. Each gun was drawn by four condemned horses (no longer suitable for riding) and each obstacle would have required the horses to be unhitched, the guns moved across the obsticale and then rehitched, thus greatly impeding the progress of the column. On the march of Terry's column, this drawback was known to have delayed the arrival by at least one day.

There are even historians who suggest that the Gatlings would have so slowed the arrival of the Seventh by at least two days, allowing him to link up with the Terry-Gibbon column and allowing the unified command to attack the Indian village, thus leading to a TERRY-GIBBON LAST STAND!

Custer is also known to have discussed the Gatling Guns with scout Fred Girard prior to the march. Girard was of the opinion that the Indians would not charge the Gatlings or simply stand around getting picked off by the weapons. The scout told Custer that a twelve-pounder mountain howitzer would be more effective as they could destroy the village by lobbing in shells from a mile away.

The effectivness of the mountain howitzer had been proven by Colonel Kit Carsen in November, 1864 at Adobe Walls, Texas. Carsen had commanded fewer men than Custer and faced more Indians, in fact the largest concertation of Indians ever known on the plains, and was able to destroy a large Kiowa-Comanche village and prevent himself from being surrounded by several thousand warriors due to the two mountain howitzers he had brought along.

Finally, General Nelson Miles wrote to General Sherman on July 8, 1876, that Gatlings "are worthless for Indian fighting."

[Stich2.0]

Three United States Army National Guard soldiers (MSgt. William Connors, Pvt. Michael McCluskey, Cpl. Richard Langsford) are a tank crew participating in a war game being conducted near the Battle of Little Bighorn site of Lieutenant Colonel George Custer's last stand. Their orders coincide with the route of Custer and his men.

As they follow the route, they have several strange occurrences such as Indian battle cries, and horses running. As there is nobody there, the men examine the possibilities and come to the conclusion that they've somehow gone back in time. They report to their commanding officer what had occurred and are reprimanded.

The following day they again begin to experience the same strange occurrences. Their commanding officer contacts them via radio and orders them to return to base when they try to explain what is happening. They break contact, and the commanding officer sends out MP's to search for them.

The three men, however, abandon their tank and continue along on foot with their side arms and rifles. They find a group of tepees and one of the soldiers goes to investigate; he soon returns, with an arrow protruding from his back.

The troops climb up a ridge where they find the battle. They join it and are never seen again. Later, the commanding officer finds the Custer Battlefield National Monument and the graveyard of the soldiers killed at the Battle of Little Bighorn. An MP reports back that all they found was the abandoned tank. The officers then notice the names of the missing soldiers on the monument with the names of the men killed in the battle. The commanding officer states that it was a pity that the missing soldiers could not have taken the tank back with them to the battle.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Stich2.0

Three United States Army National Guard soldiers (MSgt. William Connors, Pvt. Michael McCluskey, Cpl. Richard Langsford) are a tank crew participating in a war game being conducted near the Battle of Little Bighorn site of Lieutenant Colonel George Custer's last stand. Their orders coincide with the route of Custer and his men.

As they follow the route, they have several strange occurrences such as Indian battle cries, and horses running. As there is nobody there, the men examine the possibilities and come to the conclusion that they've somehow gone back in time. They report to their commanding officer what had occurred and are reprimanded.

The following day they again begin to experience the same strange occurrences. Their commanding officer contacts them via radio and orders them to return to base when they try to explain what is happening. They break contact, and the commanding officer sends out MP's to search for them.

The three men, however, abandon their tank and continue along on foot with their side arms and rifles. They find a group of tepees and one of the soldiers goes to investigate; he soon returns, with an arrow protruding from his back.

The troops climb up a ridge where they find the battle. They join it and are never seen again. Later, the commanding officer finds the Custer Battlefield National Monument and the graveyard of the soldiers killed at the Battle of Little Bighorn. An MP reports back that all they found was the abandoned tank. The officers then notice the names of the missing soldiers on the monument with the names of the men killed in the battle. The commanding officer states that it was a pity that the missing soldiers could not have taken the tank back with them to the battle.

Its from the original Twilight Zone TV series. Its nothing but pure Hollywood...

[Stich2.0]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Its from the original Twilight Zone TV series. Its nothing but pure Hollywood...

But it could be real. It could be based on a true story. You can't prove that it isn't just a amazingly cool story dreamed up by Rod Sterling.

[Fusilier]

Originally Posted by Stich2.0

As they follow the route, they have several strange occurrences such as Indian battle cries, and horses running. As there is nobody there, the men examine the possibilities and come to the conclusion that they've somehow gone back in time.

LOL - well obviously.

[helbent4]

Originally Posted by Fusilier

LOL - well obviously.

Fuse,

I'm sure we could prove it, somehow.

That said, I remember seeing a documentary about this, hosted by Rod Serling. The rusty M1911s, M1 carbines and shell casings they recovered when they went over every inch of the LBH battlefield are now kept on display at the memorial. They caused quite an uproar when they were found. President Gore had to make a statement about it and everything! If I were them, I would have stayed with the bloody tank! I mean, seriously, don't they have to pay for it if they lose it or something?

Then later, saw another documentary about how a teenager used a DeLorean to escape from Libyan terrorists, accidentally going back in time in the process. He had to make sure his parents met and fell in love so he could be born. He also discovered rock and roll. But because he left a book of sports records behind, a then-childhood bully ended up controlling his town in the future. After, he had to go even further back in time to save his great-grandparents (who looked suspiciously like him and his birth mother, implying an uncomfortable degree of consanguinity, but never mind) during the Old American West from a giant mechanical spider controlled by a bitter Confederate General name Loveless. It must be true, I saw it on TV.

"TV is real, TV is very real!" - Reggie's boyfriend, "Night of the Comet"

Tony

[Abbott Shaull]

Wow...Thanks for the laugh...

[Raellus]

I'm just finishing The Last Stand by Nathanial Philbrick (I've also read his other excellent histories, In the Heart of the Sea and Mayflower) about Custer's defeat at the Little Bighorn. Have either of you read it? If not, I highly recommend it. It's really well-written and researched.

Based on my reading, I think that you can put Custer's defeat down to three major factors: Poor intelligence/inadequate battlefield reconaissance, disunity among the regiment's officers (most notably, the extreme antipathy between Custer, Reno, and Benteen- and the latter two didn't much care for one another, either), and Custer's decision to split up his command into no less than three parts in the face of a numerically superior enemy.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I'm just finishing The Last Stand by Nathanial Philbrick (I've also read his other excellent histories, In the Heart of the Sea and Mayflower) about Custer's defeat at the Little Bighorn. Have either of you read it? If not, I highly recommend it. It's really well-written and researched.

Based on my reading, I think that you can put Custer's defeat down to three major factors: Poor intelligence/inadequate battlefield reconaissance, disunity among the regiment's officers (most notably, the extreme antipathy between Custer, Reno, and Benteen- and the latter two didn't much care for one another, either), and Custer's decision to split up his command into no less than three parts in the face of a numerically superior enemy.

Just picked up Last Stand and started reading it.

There was an article a few years ago in the Armored Journal about a war game that was run by the War College. They presented LBH in more modern terms and changed the names of the innocent of course, but the intresting thing to come out was just how many officers split their battalion task force and did the same sort of flanking maneuver as GAC. The general conclusion is that Custer's basic battle plan was sound...."hold them by the nose and kick them in the ass!"

If Reno had engaged the Indian villages, yes he would have been outnumbered, but the Custer battalion would have been crossing the Little Big Horn River and hitting the Indians on the cavalry right flank while Benteen's battalion would have been doing the same thing on the left flank. The failure of Reno to take his objective, the failure of Benteen to complete his maneuver as planned; the failure of the both battalions to move towards Custer or to even send dispatches alerting Custer to the failure of Reno'a attack are what led to Custer being hit by the majority of the Indians present. It was not until the 20th Century when some historians started playing "armchair general" that the debate on Custer's splitting the regiment caused his defeat. His tactics were known to his fellow officers, and most importantly, they did not condemn his tactics.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

If Reno had engaged the Indian villages, yes he would have been outnumbered, but the Custer battalion would have been crossing the Little Big Horn River and hitting the Indians on the cavalry right flank while Benteen's battalion would have been doing the same thing on the left flank. The failure of Reno to take his objective, the failure of Benteen to complete his maneuver as planned; the failure of the both battalions to move towards Custer or to even send dispatches alerting Custer to the failure of Reno'a attack are what led to Custer being hit by the majority of the Indians present. It was not until the 20th Century when some historians started playing "armchair general" that the debate on Custer's splitting the regiment caused his defeat. His tactics were known to his fellow officers, and most importantly, they did not condemn his tactics.

Yes, indeed. If his plan had worked, he'd have won the career-elevating, legacy-ensuring victory that he craved. Military historians would be hailing him as a military genius instead of branding him a rash fool. I'm not sure it's Custer-bashing or airmchair generalling to be critical of his decision. It's a military maxim dating back millenia not to divide your force in the presence of numerically superior enemy. He had information to suggest that the village he was attempting to find was far larger than any other he'd seen and he chose to split his command anyway. If he'd only split it once, his plan might actually have worked or, at the very least, his battalion wouldn't have been wiped out. Instead, he split it three times (Reno, Benteen, two wings of his own battalion) and, as a result, one of the groups (his battalion) was wiped out and another (Reno's) nearly so.

Considering his horrible relationships with Benteen and Reno, Custer should have kept them closer. It seems odd that he gave them the leeway that he did, considering that both of them had made no secrets for the contempt and lack of respect they had for their nominally superior officer. As it stands, Benteen ignored a direct, written order to rejoin Custer and Reno, drunk on duty, was a silly mess throughout the battle. Custer gave them the rope, and they hung him with it. The decision to split the command into three plus separate elements that could not offer mutual support is Custer's fault alone, and the genesis of his eventual defeat.

[Abbott Shaull]

Yes it was wisdom of not dividing one forces goes way back before the Indian Wars, but it was tactic that the US had used time and again with success. So yeah the tactic, just happen not to work too well this time. When most of the times the Indian would cut and run, why would he stake this time was any different.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Yes it was wisdom of not dividing one forces goes way back before the Indian Wars, but it was tactic that the US had used time and again with success. So yeah the tactic, just happen not to work too well this time. When most of the times the Indian would cut and run, why would he stake this time was any different.

Why indeed!

Now if you want to argue gross stupidity, the classic example would have to be the Fetterman Massacre during the Red Cloud War of 1866-1868.

Explorer John Bozeman pioneered a route to the newly discovered Montana goldfields that passed directly through the Sioux hunting grounds in 1863. By 1865, the government had completed a road from Fort Laramie, Wyoming into Montana (the Bozeman Trail). Oglala Sioux chief Red Cloud and other Sioux bands showed their support for developement of the area by attacking miners, army patrols and wagon trains that trespassed onto thie land that had been promised them by under terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 (WHAT, you expect the government to actually keep their own treaties?)

In 1866, the army attempted to negotiate a new treaty, but Red Cloud's demand that no new forts be built halted the treaty talks. The army built two new forts to protect the Bozeman Trail, Phil Kearny in Wyoming and C.F. Smith in Montana and reinforced Fort Reno in Wyoming.

Red Cloud retaliated by a series of hit-and-run attacks that harasses the soldiers at every turn with over 2,000 warriors, including such raising war leaders as Rain-in-the-Face, Gall and Crazy Horse, and managed to keep Fort Phil Kearny under near constant seige. A favorite target of the Indian raids were the parties that were sent out to cut wood and hay. Into this situation, enters one Captain William J. Fetterman, 27th Infantry. Fetterman is perhaps the closest to matching Hollywood's version of GAC, brash, hard-headed, and certain of his own greatness, Fetterman held the Sioux Indians in the highest disregard, being best remembered for his boost that he "could ride through the entire Sioux nation with eighty good men."

On December, 21, 1866, Captain Fettermen got his chance.

A woodcutting detail had been sent out and came under Sioux attack. Fetterman was ordered to take a detail to reinforce the woodcutting detail. Instead, Fetterman followed a party of Indians, led by Crazy Horse, who proceeded to flee from Fetterman's command. Violating his orders not to ride over Lodge Pole Ridge, Fetterman followed the decoy party into the teeth of Red Cloud's Sioux warriors. By sheer luck, Fetterman was facing 2,000 Sioux warriors with 80 infantry and cavalrymen. The results were foregone, Fetterman and his 80 men were annihilated.

The Red Cloud War continued through 1867 and ended in the Wagon Box Fight on August 2, 1867. A woodcutting detail was ambushed six miles from Phil Kearny. The Indians, over the course of four hours, alternated in between sniping and attacks before reinforcements from Phil Kearny arrived. The soldiers were armed with Spencer rifles and managed to inflict heavy losses on the Indians...estimates for Indian losses range from 60 killed to 6 killed, the soldiers lost 6 killed and 2 wounded.

The constant harassment made the soldiers virtual prisoners inside their forts and safe travel over the Bozeman Trail was impossible. The government finally gave in to the situation and the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 ended hostilities. The government agreed to abandon the forts on the Bozeman Tail and to provide the Sioux a reservation that encompasses almost all of South Dakota west of the Mississippi River. Whites were expressly forbidden to trespass on Indian lans. More than 200 chiefs signed the treaty on July 2, 1868. Red Cloud did not sign until November 6, following the withdraw of the soldiers from the forts. The forts were literally burned down by the waiting Sioux before the soldiers were out of sight.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Why indeed!

Now if you want to argue gross stupidity, the classic example would have to be the Fetterman Massacre during the Red Cloud War of 1866-1868.

Explorer John Bozeman pioneered a route to the newly discovered Montana goldfields that passed directly through the Sioux hunting grounds in 1863. By 1865, the government had completed a road from Fort Laramie, Wyoming into Montana (the Bozeman Trail). Oglala Sioux chief Red Cloud and other Sioux bands showed their support for developement of the area by attacking miners, army patrols and wagon trains that trespassed onto thie land that had been promised them by under terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 (WHAT, you expect the government to actually keep their own treaties?)

In 1866, the army attempted to negotiate a new treaty, but Red Cloud's demand that no new forts be built halted the treaty talks. The army built two new forts to protect the Bozeman Trail, Phil Kearny in Wyoming and C.F. Smith in Montana and reinforced Fort Reno in Wyoming.

Red Cloud retaliated by a series of hit-and-run attacks that harasses the soldiers at every turn with over 2,000 warriors, including such raising war leaders as Rain-in-the-Face, Gall and Crazy Horse, and managed to keep Fort Phil Kearny under near constant seige. A favorite target of the Indian raids were the parties that were sent out to cut wood and hay. Into this situation, enters one Captain William J. Fetterman, 27th Infantry. Fetterman is perhaps the closest to matching Hollywood's version of GAC, brash, hard-headed, and certain of his own greatness, Fetterman held the Sioux Indians in the highest disregard, being best remembered for his boost that he "could ride through the entire Sioux nation with eighty good men."

On December, 21, 1866, Captain Fettermen got his chance.

A woodcutting detail had been sent out and came under Sioux attack. Fetterman was ordered to take a detail to reinforce the woodcutting detail. Instead, Fetterman followed a party of Indians, led by Crazy Horse, who proceeded to flee from Fetterman's command. Violating his orders not to ride over Lodge Pole Ridge, Fetterman followed the decoy party into the teeth of Red Cloud's Sioux warriors. By sheer luck, Fetterman was facing 2,000 Sioux warriors with 80 infantry and cavalrymen. The results were foregone, Fetterman and his 80 men were annihilated.

The Red Cloud War continued through 1867 and ended in the Wagon Box Fight on August 2, 1867. A woodcutting detail was ambushed six miles from Phil Kearny. The Indians, over the course of four hours, alternated in between sniping and attacks before reinforcements from Phil Kearny arrived. The soldiers were armed with Spencer rifles and managed to inflict heavy losses on the Indians...estimates for Indian losses range from 60 killed to 6 killed, the soldiers lost 6 killed and 2 wounded.

The constant harassment made the soldiers virtual prisoners inside their forts and safe travel over the Bozeman Trail was impossible. The government finally gave in to the situation and the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 ended hostilities. The government agreed to abandon the forts on the Bozeman Tail and to provide the Sioux a reservation that encompasses almost all of South Dakota west of the Mississippi River. Whites were expressly forbidden to trespass on Indian lans. More than 200 chiefs signed the treaty on July 2, 1868. Red Cloud did not sign until November 6, following the withdraw of the soldiers from the forts. The forts were literally burned down by the waiting Sioux before the soldiers were out of sight.

Wow talk about stupidity...

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Wow talk about stupidity...

Yup...the Fetterman episode is the closest to the Hollywood version of LBH.

And the whole Red Cloud War was a defeat for the army...helps explain why they were so determined to push forward in the 1870s..

[Abbott Shaull]

Yeah I understand that....

[dragoon500ly]

I hold the work of Dr Fox on LBH to be a real breakthrough in the study of what happened to the Custer Battalion...until I managed to get my hands on some of the Upton manual of cavalry tactics...

Dr Fox talks alot about what he called bunching on the field, for those of us who have walked the battlefield, you see single tombstones then pairs of tombstones (long claimed to be the bodies of "bunkies" these are really mismarked graves of single troopers, the dirt being scooped up from either side to make a mound left two "grave" depressions), and finally you see clusters of tombstones, especially around one of the markers for an officer's grave.

The bunching theory is basically that as command & control breaks down, the troops crowd together, each man inching closer to another as the skirmish line breaks down. Then, eventually, the men start to flee the skirmish line, again moving closer to each in a blind effort to seek mutual support/courage. The end of the bunching theory holds that the troopers fled back to their officers and clustered around the last vestigae of command, shortly before the Indians overran the troopers. This was especially used to explain the rather large cluster of dead troopers found on Battle Ridge around the body of Captin Keeogh.

I'm trying to confirm this by getting additional pages from the Upton manual, but I have found several references to the troops should rally on their officers in the event of the skirmish line being hard pressed. Was the bunching caused simply by troopers falling back on their officer? Or is Dr Fox correct in stating that this is simply a sign of the breakdown of the battalion in the face of heavy pressure?