OT: Rhodesian War Resources

[Webstral]

I've been reading a Christmas present over the past couple of weeks: The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry. This, together with Fireforce by Chris Cocks, The Bush War in Rhodesia by Dennis Croukamp, Britain's Rebel Air Force (author unknown--I gave it to my father), and a USMC review of the Rhodesian War paint a fascinating picture of the Rhodesian counter-insurgency effort. One of the more interesting points is that the insurgents got creamed until Chinese-backed ZANU, operating out of Mozambique, started using Maoist methods of turning the local population in northeastern Rhodesia. At this point, the intelligence that had been so critical to Rhodesian security efforts dried up. Equally importantly, the British South African Police (basically, the Rhodesian cops) led the counter-insurgency effort in many areas until ZANU started using its Maoist methods in the northeast. Until that time, the BSAP could obtain information from the locals easily. After ZANU infiltrated a given village, the police lost their effectiveness entirely.

The lessons of the Rhodesian War probably have more application to the NATO effort in Afghanistan than the Twilight War. Still, a few of the salient points can be applied, perhaps. The Rhodesian Air Force operated a tiny fraction of the airframes the USAF, USN, and USMC operated over South Vietnam, but they were able to provide good air support to the Rhodesian troops on the ground. Aircraft availability was higher than for the USAF in South Vietnam, despite the embargo imposed on Rhodesia. Conventional wisdom holds that counterinsurgency forces need to maintain a 10:1 force ratio. The Rhodesians maintained something like a 1:1 ratio and won every fight for fifteen years. They were moderately-well equipped. Their effectiveness all seems to come back to morale, discipline, and training. The level of motivation was very high.

In particular, the Selous Scouts deserve mention. The Scouts fought the enemy on his own terms and did him one better. The Scouts went into the water to fight the shark, so to speak, and learned to bite him hard indeed. Okay, I'm getting away from lessons that are applicable to Twilight: 2000.

Support of the local population matters--especially when one is operating small units of light infantry. If the primary form of combat in a region is raids by light fighters, then the attitude of the locals makes a big difference. When an Army formation is trying to control a large area, such as the 78th Infantry Division in New Jersey, then the willingness of the locals to provide information may be the difference between success and failure in the Army's efforts to track and destroy marauders, etc. Generally, we'd think that the locals would be happy to provide whatever information they could on the bad guys; however, if the bad guys are good at intimidating the locals or have figured out a way to get the locals on their side, a small reaction force might not be able to deal with the marauders. I know we've discussed this idea many times, but reading about how ZANU used Maoist tactics to defeat the Rhodesians brings the lesson home to me again.

Freedom to use the roads means freedom to bring overwhelming force to bear. The wise enemy will try to deny Blue Force the ability to use the roads in his own rear area. The effect on mines on the Portuguese in Mozambique was pretty debilitating. Raiders from both sides will try to disrupt transportation in the enemy's rear. As applied to Thunder Empire, Mexican raiders will try to prevent Fort Huachuca's forces from using the roads to bring in overwhelming combat power once (if) the Mexican raiders are discovered. A steady trickle of random casualties also would be a good thing, if only to sap American morale and make road movement an exercise in anxiety.

Small quantities of equipment in the hands of well-trained, highly-motivated, and well-led troops can perform brilliantly on the battlefield. Obviously, this is not news to anyone here. The Rhodesian experience, however, really highlights the fact that this principal can be applied to very small forces.

Again, though, the Rhodesian War probably offers more lessons for Afghanistan than for Twilight: 2000.


Webstral

[Raellus]

After I wrote up the back-story for my oft-delayed T2K Kenya campaign (Operation Proud Lion), I started reading up on the Rhodesian bush wars since they seem to offer a precedent for that kind of low-tech, low intensity warfare in the African veldt that I am envisioning for the 173rd BCT c.2000. I've read both Fireforce, which was not bad, and Croukamp's book, which I found very disappointing. I really wanted to learn more about Selous Scout tactics and operations and Croukamp's book offered very little detail concerning either. Most of the book seemed to center around his personal life which, at times, was pretty creepy (dating a 13 year old and groping a married woman who was in bed with her husband). When he did write about combat ops, which was pretty rarely, he really didn't offer much detail. He mentioned finding guerilla "spoor" countless times but he never went into detail about what that actually was. He really came across as a bit of a sociopath and his writing voice and style verged on sophomoric.

Unfortunately, books about Rhodesia's wars are both rare and expensive.

[Webstral]

I agree that one learns too little of the "trade secrets", if you will.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Although they're not going to reveal trade secrets in great detail, you want to look for books by Peter Stiff.
I have the ISBNs for the following: -
"See You In November" ISBN 0 94702 026 8
"Selous Scouts Top Secret War" ISBN 0 620 06674 1

The last book was written by Stiff from the words of Lt.Col. Ron Reid Daly.

Other books include: -
"Tommy Goes Home"
"Selous Scouts - A Pictorial Account"
"Taming The Landmine"

Publication was typically in the 1980s so these books are probably best located through places like Amazon, ALibris or AbeBooks

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by StainlessSteelCynic

Although they're not going to reveal trade secrets in great detail, you want to look for books by Peter Stiff.
I have the ISBNs for the following: -
"See You In November" ISBN 0 94702 026 8
"Selous Scouts Top Secret War" ISBN 0 620 06674 1

The last book was written by Stiff from the words of Lt.Col. Ron Reid Daly.

Other books include: -
"Tommy Goes Home"
"Selous Scouts - A Pictorial Account"
"Taming The Landmine"

Publication was typically in the 1980s so these books are probably best located through places like Amazon, ALibris or AbeBooks

LTC Ron Reid Daly was the former commander of the Selous Scouts, his book goes a bit more into the background and forming of the unit and covers some of their wilder operations (including their cross-border ones).

"Spoor" was local slang for tracks, while the Selous Scouts did quite a bit of tracking (it was their official cover story), what they were really known for was using "turned" guerillas to combat active guerillas. Surprisingly enough, none of these former guerillas ever betrayed their Rhodesian allies after being turned.

Selous Scouts,Top Secret War is one of the better reads, good luck finding a copy!

[Targan]

I don't regard "spoor" as slang. Spoor is one of the old words used in hunting. Perhaps it might seem like slang now because it is a word rarely used in modern American English but it isn't a colloquialism.

[dragoon500ly]

You know, if I ask about 20 of the local rednecks what "spoor" meant...I'd bet a paycheck that at least 15 of them will check the bottoms of their boots...and the other 5 will start scrapping their boots on the nearest curb!

[headquarters]

Originally Posted by Targan

I don't regard "spoor" as slang. Spoor is one of the old words used in hunting. Perhaps it might seem like slang now because it is a word rarely used in modern American English but it isn't a colloquialism.

in our beautiful Norse tongue , spor means literally "track" - to track somebody is to "spore "

anyways.

The Rhodesian war has interesting points indeed - their home made equiptment for one- read about them producing their own FAVs on a budget when embargos etc dried out their sources.

[helbent4]

Originally Posted by Targan

I don't regard "spoor" as slang. Spoor is one of the old words used in hunting. Perhaps it might seem like slang now because it is a word rarely used in modern American English but it isn't a colloquialism.

Targan,

Spoor is not an unused or even particularly rare term in North America, albeit it's normally used relating to hunting/tracking animals (hence Lee's comment about rednecks). What might make it slang in this context is applying it to the tracking and hunting of human beings during counter-insurgency operations, as it were. I'm sure the comparison of African guerrillas to animals hunted for sport is purely unintentional!

(Seriously, for all their faults the Europeans in Rhodesia were certainly more willing accept the principle of majority rule before the Apartheid-era South Africans, at least when their ship was going down.)

Tony

[Panther Al]

Until recently my knowledge of the war was sparse, but recently I started reading up on it I have to admit, I'm impressed with what they was able to do with all the handicaps they suffered under. Makes one wonder what they could have done without the sanctions. As an aside, back when I was Iraq we was assigned to do escort for the folks moving all the new currency to they banks. They also had private security, mostly from Fiji. But two of them, both older, was from Rhodesia and talked about all the times they was running around in g-cars. Wish I knew then what I know now, would have loved to hear those stories.

[Panther Al]

Originally Posted by headquarters

in our beautiful Norse tongue , spor means literally "track" - to track somebody is to "spore "

Heh, always wanted to pick up a scandinavian language but never had the chance. Except for a summer in high school when I found the only copy of "Burnt Njal" they had was in old norse and I spent the summer pouring over a old textbook edited by Tolkien translating it. Man, is it wierd I found that fun?

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Panther Al

Heh, always wanted to pick up a scandinavian language but never had the chance. Except for a summer in high school when I found the only copy of "Burnt Njal" they had was in old norse and I spent the summer pouring over a old textbook edited by Tolkien translating it. Man, is it wierd I found that fun?

I once, with a Latin-English dictionary, spent months giving most of the D&D monsters Latin genus and species names.

[Panther Al]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

I once, with a Latin-English dictionary, spent months giving most of the D&D monsters Latin genus and species names.

Now that's just awesome. Please tell me you have a copy of that still and if you do, what's the odds of getting one myself?

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Panther Al

Now that's just awesome. Please tell me you have a copy of that still and if you do, what's the odds of getting one myself?

Naw, one of those things that got lost over the years, like my D&D characters. Now that really hurt. I used to save them all, dead or alive.

[dragoon500ly]

The Oppos:

There were basically three African nationalist organizations involved in the Rhodesian Bush War, there are:

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). This was the original nationalist movement led by Joshua Nkomo. It's military wing is the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army or ZPRU, led by "Nikita" Mangena until his death in 1978 and succeeded by "Lookout" Masuku. Basically, this is the Russian-backed faction. ZIPRA is the more "regular" of the two major organizations. It remained based in Zambia and Botswana. Enjoying lavish Soviet supportthan its ZANLA rivals. By 1977, ZIPRA had few guerrillas in Rhodesia (200 active vs 3,000 ZANLA). This was partially due to their hope for a negotiated settlement, but there was also a widely-held belief that they were waiting for ZANLA and the Rhodesian security forces would fight each other to a standstill. ZIPRA held its main forces in Zambia where they built-up a conventional mechanized brigade equipped with T-34 tanks and BTR-152 APCs. It was also confirmed that ZIPRA was planning a full scale assault into Rhodesia by 1979, supported by their own air force.

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Formed in 1963 when a number of more radical nationalists left ZAPU to form their own movement. Led by Robert Mugabe after 1975. Its military army is the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), intially led by a political committee until 1974, when Joseph Tongogara was appointed commander until his death in 1979 and replaced by Rex Nhongo. Basically, this is the Chinese-backed faction. Initially operated from bases in Zambia, but following the the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1974, they shifted the majority of their forces/support network there. ZANLA had more manpower and maintained more guerrillia groups in Rhodesia. Also noted as the more terrorist-like of the guerrillias.

Front For the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). Formed in 1970 by breakaway sections of both ZAPU and ZANU. It tried to operate its own guerrilla groups but could not compete with the larger organizations. Disappeared after 1974.

Having two different nationalist organizations is clearly counter-productive and in 1972, ZAPU and ZANU were persuaded to establish a Joint Military Command by the various African states that also supported the two organizations. The JMC failed to work. A more determined attempt was made in 1975, when the military wings were forced to unite as the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). It was commanded by a new Joint Military Command headed by ZANLA's Nhongo, with a ZIPRA deputy. There were several attempts to integrate the two forces, but there were difficulties from the start, by 1977, the ZIPA was effectively ZANLA-controlled.

Both groups operated in teams of about ten men, armed with a RPG-7 or light mortar, a light machine gun and half a dozen automatic rifles. Weapons included Russian grenades, Tokarov pistols, PPSh SMGs, SKS carbines and AK-47 assault rifles, Czech M52/65, French MAS and even old German Mauser rifles and MP-40 SMGs. Soviet pattern land lines and even 75mm recoilless rifles were also used, but the problems of transporting them limited their use.

Each team would have a commander and his deputy, a political commissar and his deputy, medical, supply and security specialists and about three ordinary guerillias. Reconnaissance was the responsibility of the "mujibas", boys of school age who hung around the army camps and passed on details of what they saw. Other services were provided by "chimbwidos", female helpers who cooked and carried supplies and messages for the guerillias.

[Matt W]

Important point to note for those who admire the fighting ability of Rhodesians or - for that matter - people like Confederates and Waffen SS.

THEY LOST

All of these example sindicate that "Good tactics are less important than good strategy"

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Matt W

Important point to note for those who admire the fighting ability of Rhodesians or - for that matter - people like Confederates and Waffen SS.

I think that a lot of people are attracted to these eras/groups/whatever because of the romantic appeal of the valiant fight to defend a lost cause. Oh, and maybe their racist ideologies have something to do with it too. It's kind of sad.

[headquarters]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I think that a lot of people are attracted to these eras/groups/whatever because of the romantic appeal of the valiant fight to defend a lost cause. Oh, and maybe their racist ideologies have something to do with it too. It's kind of sad.

that said - if you consider who was the better force and start that argument, many a loosing side has had its share of legendary units and soldiers.

I would like to think we can discuss these matters without actually coming across as condoning any unacceptable views.

please correct me if I am wrong.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by headquarters

please correct me if I am wrong.

I agree with you. I was just pointing out why I think that these groups appeal to some folks. I think one can admire their weapons, tactics, fighting spirit, uniforms, etc. without glorifying their darker ideological/political sides. One can never truly separate the two, though.

[dragoon500ly]

The sad thing is that the true losers of any war is the civilians who tried to stay out of the fight; keep food on the table; see their kids get an education.

When you take the time to study both sides with an open, objective mind, it's kinda intresting how both sides had such high ideals....and how both sides sank to the bottom of the septic tank. By no means do I agree with Ian Smith's stand...and I do not agree with Joshua Nkomo's and Robert Mugabe's stands. There was more than enough racism and stupidity on both sides of the Rhodesia Bush War to fill several volumes. Of the three leader's I have more respect for Nkomo, at least he started out trying to peacefully bring about change. And as for Mugabe, the current President for Life of Zimbabwe can only be described as little better than a cheap thug.

That being said, my passion is military history (cause Lord knows, it sure ain't spelling!!!). I try to set down and research as many sides of the story as I can find and I do consider myself to be objective. Racist....

As the old saying goes..."I'm can't be a racist, I hate everybody!!!"

[dragoon500ly]

On the eve of what the Rhodesians called The Bush War and what the various nationalist fronts would call the Second Chimurenga (Liberation Struggle), saw Rhodesia with a tiny regular Army, a small Air Force, a Police force jealous of its ability to maintain order, government departments reluctant to yield authority and a population that was not ready for any conflict. Yet the Rhodesian Security Forces would soon earn a reputation as one of the best counter-insurgency forces in the world. Yet unlike the British in Malay, The Rhodesians may have won every battle, but they lost the war.

The two major problems facing Rhodesia was the lack of manpower and the sheer size of the area and borders to be defended. Solutions had to be found that focused on quality rather than quantity.

The Bush War never saw any conventional set-piece battles, it was rather a war of small teams of men, fighting each other...

The Rhodesian African Rifles
The 1st Bn, RAR is the oldest regular service battalion in the Rhodesian Army. The RAR would field three battalions and numerous Independent Companies in the war. Like its colonial forebearers(King's African Rifles), the RAR was a traditionally white-officered unit, but African officers entered service by 1979. The companies and battalions followed the traditional British Army set up of three rifle companies with a support company. The RAR was always known for the steadfast loyalty of its troopers, as well as a quirky sense of humor. There is on memorable story about a private who, in mid-contact, found the time to yell "I am the OC's driver, and if you fire that bazooka at me, I'll call the helicopters and you will surely die!"

The Rhodesia Regiment
A total of four battalions wore the RR stable belt and insignia. These four battalions, however, were merely holding units of the numerous Independent Companies that were the real work force of the RR. They would typically operate in 7-8 man sections and could provide mortar and MG support or act as a mobile stop group as the need required.

The Rhodesian Light Infantry
Formed in 1961 as the regular European infantry battalion in the order of battle, the RLI was reorganized in 1964 into a commando. It consisted of 4 Commandos (1,2,3 and Support). The RLI had a high esprit de corps and was widely known by one of its two nicknames---the Incredibles and the Saints. They were the backbone of the fireforce effort and saw service all over the country as well as in numerous cross-border operations. A typical fireforce would consist of three 4-man heliborne sticks and a Dakota-transported 16-man para detachment.

The Special Air Service Regiment
From 1961, the SAS provided Rhodesia's first paratrooper unit. The SAS was primarily a reconnaissance unit, although from 1970 onwards, they focused on cross-border (externals) operations to secure prisoners and intelligence. They always tried to maintain a low profile. They commonly worked in four-man teams.

The Selous Scouts
Formed in 1973 as a combat tracker unit, the Scouts had a more sinster role in real life. Once committed to operations, the Scouts would control "pseudo-ters" using turned terrorists to eliminate their former comrades both inside and outside of Rhodesia. The Scouts were officially a company strength unit, divided into troops, each of three eight-man tracker combat teams. The unit was fully integrated with over 1,000 "tame-ters" on its books. While the Scout's were never supposed to initiate contact, they are credited with involvement in nearly 70% of all internal contacts.

Grey's Scouts
Growing out of an experiment unit in 1975, by 1976, the Grey's were in service. It consisted of three combat and one support squadron, with three troops per squadron and four 8-man sections per troop. The Grey's were always mounted infantry rather than cavalry. An average day's patrol would cover around 40km, the riders alternating between a 7km/hr walk and a 12km/hr trout, with the occasional 18km/hr canter. Height and weight were the only limiting factors; while the horses could carry loads in excess of 150kg, the riders had to weigh 80kg or less.

The Armored Car Regiment
The RhACR was formed in 1972. It consisted of four squadrons, each numbering 300-500 men. Equipment was the Eland 90 and Ferret armored cars as well as a large and diverse collection of funnies (home-made vehicles tailored to specific roles). Each troop consisted of four cars and their crews. The RhACR was trained in both conventional and COIN roles. With the looming presence of enemy armor across the border, the crews reguarly exercised their light armor skills.

1 Field Regiment, Rhodesian Artillery
Established in 1963, the RhA was a flexible organization, noted for its skill in gunnery. Equipped with Mark III 25-pounder field guns as well as various 105mm and 155mm howitzers, the RhA was often broken up and deployed in stratic locations around the country.

The Corps of Engineers
Formed in 1961 and rising to a total of six field squadrons, the Engineers fulfilled their traditional tasks in support of the army. The most (in)famous achievement was the creation of CORSAN---the Cordon Sanitaire---to inhibit movement across the border. The 800km-long minefield has yet to be cleared.

Reinforcement Holding Unit
With the call-up of the 38-40 age group in 1973, at first three, later reduced to two RHUs were formed, they were fully integerated units divided up into seven independent companies and providing static guards, railway patrolling and convoy protection...thus freeing up younger men for the front-line units.

The Rhodesian Air Force
Formed in 1959, the UDI hit the RhAF harder than any other service. In spite of the loss of support form Great Britain, improvisation and local manufacture quickly took the place of imported equipment and technicians. During the course of the Bush War, the RhRAF was able to maintain an 85% serviceability record and they acheived this with an incredibly low man-to-aircraft ratio of 1:25.
No.1 Squadron: equipped with Hunter FGA.9 ground-attack aircraft.

No.2 Squadron: equipped with a variety of Vampire fighter-bombers.

No.3 Squadron: equipped with DC-3 Dakotas. These were the chief means of resupply as well as carrying the bulk of fireforce operations. One DC-3 was fitted out as a flying command center and also provided ELINT.

No.4 Squadron: equipped with "Lynxes", a local slang term for any kind of light aircraft. Primarily used in aerial recon and casualty evacuation. The Lynxes were also armed with MAG mgs and small caliber aerial rockets.

No.5 Squadron: equipped with Canberra B.2s and T.4s. This light bomber squadron provided ground-support with loads of up to 10,000lbs (and the bombs were often homemade) as well as aerial recon.

No.6 Squadron: equipped with Percival Provosts, this was the training squadron.

No.7 Squadron: equipped with over 40 Alouette III and after 1978 reinforced with 12 old Bell 205 Hueys. This squadron was the backbone of the fireforce. Each fireforce would consist of a K-Car (attack) armed with either a 20mm cannon or a quad MAG mount. G-Cars (transport) would carry a four-man stick of troopers and would be armed with a twin MAG or single Browning M-2HB.

British South African Police
For many years the BSAF functioned as an unarmed civil police force, with the advent of UDI, the BSAF took on a more para-military role. Police Antiterrorist Units (PATU) were formed to combat increased guerrilla activty in the border areas. The PATU were primarily a recon unit, although they were noted for extreme fitness and fast cross-country movement, running up to 30km a day were commonplace and one PATU actually ran 40km in one day, taking part in no less than 5 contacts.


The Rhodesian Security Forces were fully integrated units, with two exceptions, the SAS and the RLI. This did not mean black officers, the first of whom started service in 1979.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Matt W

Important point to note for those who admire the fighting ability of Rhodesians or - for that matter - people like Confederates and Waffen SS.

THEY LOST

All of these example sindicate that "Good tactics are less important than good strategy"

Ah. None of the books I read covered that bit. Honestly, Matt, have you been hanging out at NPR, where people need to have these sorts of things explained to them?

The losers of a war can teach us a great deal, just as the winners are not necessarily worth uniformly emulating. The US, for instance, clung to the imperatives of mass producing the Sherman, despite the obvious need for a heavier tank in widespread use. The use of sheer weight of numbers masks other deficiencies which, had they been corrected, might have resulted in victory at a lower cost or an earlier date.

All that said, I couldn't agree more that good strategy outweighs good tactics. Hitler flushed a magnificent fighting machine down the toilet. The US accomplished more-or-less the same thing in Vietnam. The Rhodesians failed to enact political reforms largely because they appeared to be doing so well on the battlefield. The Japanese never developed a suitable strategy for bringing to successful conclusions the wars in China or the Pacific; thus the fighting skills and spirit of the Japanese soldiers, seamen, and aircrews were squandered. We could go on and on in this fashion, but I'm sure everyone knows what I'm saying.

Still, soldiers don't make national policy. They do they best they can with the resources at hand. Those who do well with the resources at hand are worth studying.


Webstral

[HorseSoldier]

It may be worth noting that among the people today nostalgic for Rhodesia are a lot of black Zimbabweans old enough to remember white rule. While it may not have been an ideal system by any stretch of the imagination, it was infinitely better than the manmade apocaypse there now under Mugabe.

[helbent4]

Originally Posted by Matt W

Important point to note for those who admire the fighting ability of Rhodesians or - for that matter - people like Confederates and Waffen SS.

THEY LOST

All of these example sindicate that "Good tactics are less important than good strategy"

Matt,

As a friend of mine would say, "what's that got to do with the price of rice in China?"

While losers in a historical sense, the examples of the Waffen SS and the American Confederates are no doubt also chosen to draw a clearly negative moral comparison. (There are plenty of "good guys" out there who lost battles and wars, too.) There's a moral point being made here that doesn't apply because the Twilight War didn't have a clear moral dimension (at least beyond a certain point).

Further, Twilight 2000 is generally not played on a strategic level, although the game designers did "game out" the course of the war. I think we can agree these early players made many questionable strategic decisions. Still, for the most part the players can't influence the strategy of the war directly, so your assertion that "Good tactics are less important than good strategy", while certainly true, isn't relevant.

Tony

[helbent4]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Ah. None of the books I read covered that bit. Honestly, Matt, have you been hanging out at NPR, where people need to have these sorts of things explained to them?
Webstral

Web,

As a non-American (MattW too and others, I believe) having listened to NPR I get the impression that at least with them, if they don't understand something, you could at least explain it to them. Without speaking for other kinds of Americans, of course!

Tony

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by helbent4

Web,

As a non-American (MattW too and others, I believe) having listened to NPR I get the impression that at least with them, if they don't understand something, you could at least explain it to them. Without speaking for other kinds of Americans, of course!

Tony

Explaining something to a NPR talking head? Can't be done old boy with nothing less than a tac nuke. And I'm not too sure about that!

There was a debate the other night on those horrid, evil, things known as firearms and how much safer we all will be if we would just outlaw ownership of the devil devices....sigh

Of course being a gun owner, I'm one of these evil individuals just waiting to climb up into a clock tower and gun down innocent people going about their business. I really should be locked in a 6'x8' cell and have the key thrown away before I have a PTSD moment and open fire.

I often wonder if these people have ever sat down and taken the time to read the Constitution, not to mention the papers of the Founding Fathers and find out what they were thinking about when they wrote the 2nd Amendment...and if they could see what is going down nowdays, if they would have rewrote it to "And the ability of all men and women in the United States to own firearms shall not be infringed in anyway by Congress, nor by the Supreme Court, and especially not by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals."

[pmulcahy11b]

Hey, I'm a card-carrying (well not literally, I don't carry a card) Democrat, but I do think that guns are not evil and the right for most people to have them should not be infringed. However, I do agree with background checks, use and ownership classes, waiting periods, and licensing, including tough licensing for fully-automatic weapons. I am not personally a danger with firearms just because I'm mentally ill, but I understand that you can't send each prospective firearms owner to a psychiatrist to determine whether he should be allowed to own a firearm -- and mental illness can get worse and people can decide not to take their medication.

California government and the Brady Gun Ban people are one end of the pole, the NRA and those who believe in personal ownership of AAA in their back yards are the other -- both are extremists with regard to gun rights.

BTW, I think the 2nd Amendment is obsolete -- it describes primarily a concept of a militia that has been obsolete since the National Guard was formed in the early 1900s. It needs to be either discarded or amended into something that more accurately describes personal firearms ownership as it exists today.

[helbent4]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Explaining something to a NPR talking head? Can't be done old boy with nothing less than a tac nuke. And I'm not too sure about that!

Lee,

Hey, I never said they would agree.

Jeeze Louise, now we're going to get fifty bloody posts about guns in America, the Second Amendment, the Founding Fathers, their original intent and how to correctly read the US Constitution.

Tony

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

...those who believe in personal ownership of AAA in their back yards....

What's wrong with having a 40mm Bofors in the back shed? You never know when you might need it to go, oh, I don't know, rabbit hunting....

[Panther Al]

Nah, its the zombies, Don't you know a bofors loaded with 3p is just the thing for dealing with the zombie hordes?