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#1
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I'm guided by the beauty of our weapons...First We Take Manhattan, Jennifer Warnes Entirely too much T2K stuff here: www.pmulcahy.com |
#2
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Now that's just awesome. Please tell me you have a copy of that still and if you do, what's the odds of getting one myself?
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Member of the Bofors fan club! The M1911 of automatic cannon. Proud fan(atic) of the CV90 Series. |
#3
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Naw, one of those things that got lost over the years, like my D&D characters. Now that really hurt. I used to save them all, dead or alive.
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I'm guided by the beauty of our weapons...First We Take Manhattan, Jennifer Warnes Entirely too much T2K stuff here: www.pmulcahy.com |
#4
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The Oppos:
There were basically three African nationalist organizations involved in the Rhodesian Bush War, there are: Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). This was the original nationalist movement led by Joshua Nkomo. It's military wing is the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army or ZPRU, led by "Nikita" Mangena until his death in 1978 and succeeded by "Lookout" Masuku. Basically, this is the Russian-backed faction. ZIPRA is the more "regular" of the two major organizations. It remained based in Zambia and Botswana. Enjoying lavish Soviet supportthan its ZANLA rivals. By 1977, ZIPRA had few guerrillas in Rhodesia (200 active vs 3,000 ZANLA). This was partially due to their hope for a negotiated settlement, but there was also a widely-held belief that they were waiting for ZANLA and the Rhodesian security forces would fight each other to a standstill. ZIPRA held its main forces in Zambia where they built-up a conventional mechanized brigade equipped with T-34 tanks and BTR-152 APCs. It was also confirmed that ZIPRA was planning a full scale assault into Rhodesia by 1979, supported by their own air force. Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Formed in 1963 when a number of more radical nationalists left ZAPU to form their own movement. Led by Robert Mugabe after 1975. Its military army is the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), intially led by a political committee until 1974, when Joseph Tongogara was appointed commander until his death in 1979 and replaced by Rex Nhongo. Basically, this is the Chinese-backed faction. Initially operated from bases in Zambia, but following the the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1974, they shifted the majority of their forces/support network there. ZANLA had more manpower and maintained more guerrillia groups in Rhodesia. Also noted as the more terrorist-like of the guerrillias. Front For the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). Formed in 1970 by breakaway sections of both ZAPU and ZANU. It tried to operate its own guerrilla groups but could not compete with the larger organizations. Disappeared after 1974. Having two different nationalist organizations is clearly counter-productive and in 1972, ZAPU and ZANU were persuaded to establish a Joint Military Command by the various African states that also supported the two organizations. The JMC failed to work. A more determined attempt was made in 1975, when the military wings were forced to unite as the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). It was commanded by a new Joint Military Command headed by ZANLA's Nhongo, with a ZIPRA deputy. There were several attempts to integrate the two forces, but there were difficulties from the start, by 1977, the ZIPA was effectively ZANLA-controlled. Both groups operated in teams of about ten men, armed with a RPG-7 or light mortar, a light machine gun and half a dozen automatic rifles. Weapons included Russian grenades, Tokarov pistols, PPSh SMGs, SKS carbines and AK-47 assault rifles, Czech M52/65, French MAS and even old German Mauser rifles and MP-40 SMGs. Soviet pattern land lines and even 75mm recoilless rifles were also used, but the problems of transporting them limited their use. Each team would have a commander and his deputy, a political commissar and his deputy, medical, supply and security specialists and about three ordinary guerillias. Reconnaissance was the responsibility of the "mujibas", boys of school age who hung around the army camps and passed on details of what they saw. Other services were provided by "chimbwidos", female helpers who cooked and carried supplies and messages for the guerillias.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#5
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Important point to note for those who admire the fighting ability of Rhodesians or - for that matter - people like Confederates and Waffen SS.
THEY LOST All of these example sindicate that "Good tactics are less important than good strategy" |
#6
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I think that a lot of people are attracted to these eras/groups/whatever because of the romantic appeal of the valiant fight to defend a lost cause. Oh, and maybe their racist ideologies have something to do with it too. It's kind of sad.
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Author of Twilight 2000 adventure modules, Rook's Gambit and The Poisoned Chalice, the campaign sourcebook, Korean Peninsula, the gear-book, Baltic Boats, and the co-author of Tara Romaneasca, a campaign sourcebook for Romania, all available for purchase on DriveThruRPG: https://www.drivethrurpg.com/product...--Rooks-Gambit https://www.drivethrurpg.com/product...ula-Sourcebook https://www.drivethrurpg.com/product...nia-Sourcebook https://www.drivethrurpg.com/product...liate_id=61048 https://preview.drivethrurpg.com/en/...-waters-module |
#7
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I would like to think we can discuss these matters without actually coming across as condoning any unacceptable views. please correct me if I am wrong. |
#8
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The losers of a war can teach us a great deal, just as the winners are not necessarily worth uniformly emulating. The US, for instance, clung to the imperatives of mass producing the Sherman, despite the obvious need for a heavier tank in widespread use. The use of sheer weight of numbers masks other deficiencies which, had they been corrected, might have resulted in victory at a lower cost or an earlier date. All that said, I couldn't agree more that good strategy outweighs good tactics. Hitler flushed a magnificent fighting machine down the toilet. The US accomplished more-or-less the same thing in Vietnam. The Rhodesians failed to enact political reforms largely because they appeared to be doing so well on the battlefield. The Japanese never developed a suitable strategy for bringing to successful conclusions the wars in China or the Pacific; thus the fighting skills and spirit of the Japanese soldiers, seamen, and aircrews were squandered. We could go on and on in this fashion, but I'm sure everyone knows what I'm saying. Still, soldiers don't make national policy. They do they best they can with the resources at hand. Those who do well with the resources at hand are worth studying. Webstral |
#9
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It may be worth noting that among the people today nostalgic for Rhodesia are a lot of black Zimbabweans old enough to remember white rule. While it may not have been an ideal system by any stretch of the imagination, it was infinitely better than the manmade apocaypse there now under Mugabe.
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#10
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As a non-American (MattW too and others, I believe) having listened to NPR I get the impression that at least with them, if they don't understand something, you could at least explain it to them. Without speaking for other kinds of Americans, of course! ![]() Tony |
#11
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As a friend of mine would say, "what's that got to do with the price of rice in China?" While losers in a historical sense, the examples of the Waffen SS and the American Confederates are no doubt also chosen to draw a clearly negative moral comparison. (There are plenty of "good guys" out there who lost battles and wars, too.) There's a moral point being made here that doesn't apply because the Twilight War didn't have a clear moral dimension (at least beyond a certain point). Further, Twilight 2000 is generally not played on a strategic level, although the game designers did "game out" the course of the war. I think we can agree these early players made many questionable strategic decisions. Still, for the most part the players can't influence the strategy of the war directly, so your assertion that "Good tactics are less important than good strategy", while certainly true, isn't relevant. Tony |
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