German III Corps?

[Legbreaker]

I had the 2nd crawl very slowly west to link up with the following units of the XI Corp. One of the conrtibuting reasons why the 3rd army did not follow on was that the vehicle heavy 2nd, which at the time was in a stragegically advanced position, soaked up most of the available fuel stocks. This both made them semi-mobile once more while also impacting heavily on the unit which had to give up their reserves.
This drain was particularly heavy on the 50th AD - the nearest allied unit to the Marines.

You could explain the Canadians and Danish being in the area by assigning them the duty of escorting the gathered fuel. They then took up covering positions while the Marines refueled and reorganised (the crawl westward would have sevrely disorganised them as some component units were able to move quicker than others).
There is no real need for all of the Canadian and Danish strength to be shifted though, the bulk could well remain where they were facing the Poles and Soviets.

Why didn't the Germans leapfrog the XI Corp? I'm guessing fuel once again (as well as increasing pressure on the British). With the Marines requiring something like several million litres, every unit needed to give up subtantial percentages of their reserve or risk the Marines being attack while immobile and destroyed. Note this was before the 5th even got close to Lodz.
I feel there is a strong chance that at this relatively early stage, the 5th and 8th were probably still in physical contact with the XI Corp and therefore would also have lost fuel reserves to the Marines. This may help expain why a division which had spent a year or more in preperation had needed to stoip and brew more fuel along the way.

[Legbreaker]

Here's a thought, perhaps the naval assets which landed the Marines were also carrying the III German Armies fuel supply for the second phase of the offensive? With that on the bottom of the sea, it would have been suicide to continue an eastward movement.
The 5th and 8th were already well underway with specific objectives which we felt could still be reached, or communications were so bad (or disrupted by the enemy) they didn't get confirmation of the general halt of the advance?

A couple of wild ideas that need more work, but conceivable I think....

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Here's a thought, perhaps the naval assets which landed the Marines were also carrying the III German Armies fuel supply for the second phase of the offensive? With that on the bottom of the sea, it would have been suicide to continue an eastward movement.
The 5th and 8th were already well underway with specific objectives which we felt could still be reached, or communications were so bad (or disrupted by the enemy) they didn't get confirmation of the general halt of the advance?

An interesting idea but I just don't see 3rd Army putting all of its eggs (or fuel) in one basket like that. One unswept mine, one errant diesel boat, one airstrike, one shore-launched SSM, and all of that fuel goes up in flames. I definitely can see the 2nd MarDiv losing nearly all of its own fuel in this way, but the entire army's? The rest of the 3rd Army would need that fuel, at the very least, just to break through to the 2nd MarDiv. Otherwise, it could become stranded all alone (with way too much fuel) and reduced at the enemy forces' leisure. The 8th ID clearly has plenty of fuel as they somehow managed to drive all the way to Latvia, apparently before figuring out how far they'd just gone (this notion really bothers me).

I'm still thinking on your first post in this latest couplet. I think this is a really interesting discussion.

[Legbreaker]

You're probably right about not putting it all in the one basket, however by mid 2000, maybe they didn't have a choice? Perhaps they had only one large fuel carrier left plus a few smaller vessels converted from other uses. The main ship went down even though it was protected by every available asset the combine Nato navies had and "poof", the whole operation was in serious jeopardy.

Pre, or even early war, such a risky gamble might not have been considered, but by the time of 2000, there's not a lot of choice left...

[Targan]

I'm not as switched on as you guys when it comes to having all of the unit names and locations in my head but hear me out. What if the reasons behind the German 3rd Army's failure to push forward were psychological? Specifically, panic induced by the apparance of Soviet units at their front which their intel said just should not have been there. Actually, COULD NOT have been there (until it was realised that the Soviet units were running on diesel and had vastly increased mobility compared to NATO's units facing them).

Keep in mind that NATO's forces had not seen more than a trickle of diesel for a couple of years. It would have been a major blow to morale for the German brass to discover that not only are their troops suddenly facing many, many more Soviet tanks and other AFVs than they had expected (with unit designations that should be 1000km away) but also they could smell their diesel exhaust and see with their own eyes that their enemies' vehicles are zooming around at full power.

I think that NATO's commanders would have had certain expectations of their enemy (reinforced by the way things had been for the last couple of years) and a whole bunch of Soviet armour running on diesel just turning up out of no where would have shocked them (not to mention throwing a year of planning into disarray). Maybe the German 3rd Army's commanders were shocked and panicked into a defensive frame of mind (and ignored the Americans' commanders who were no doubt screaming for their German counterparts to continue with the offensive).

And now my second point. I believe it has been said previously in this thread that NATO forces in the north of Poland were facing a lot of cavalry (some Soviet, some Polish) and the strongest armour/MRD forces they were facing were Polish. In the south the Germans and the US 5th ID were facing a greater proportion of Soviet units. I suspect that the Soviets would have kept most or all of their diesel for their own units. The Poles would still have been running on alcohol (in just as limited supply as NATO forces). This means that while the US 8th ID and 2nd MarDiv might have been facing numerically strong opposition, both sides would have similar mobility constraints. Also the WarPac units in the north of the country would have tended to be roughly where NATO's intelligence suggested they would be. The NATO operations in the north would therefore be expected to go roughly as planned (or as it turned out better than planned in some ways).

In the south of Poland the situation would have been completely different. There were a higher proportion of Soviet units in the south and while initially only the Soviet units being rushed from the east would have been running on diesel, as the offensive wore on more and more of the local Soviet units would start to receive diesel supplies as well. That would have created a confused situation for NATO and WarPac units in the south. You've got unexpected Soviet units from the east suddenly appearing in southern Poland. You've got Soviet units already in southern Poland suddenly having many more options than before because they have reinforcements and diesel, thus allowing them to leave their cantonments for the first time in a couple of years. Local Polish units would be expected in many cases to take over those cantonments (they didn't have diesel or reinforcements and in many cases would have been very happy to see their Soviet counterparts move out).

Canon shows that following all that confusion and the destruction of the US 5th ID there was a great deal of Soviet movement. Some Soviet units stayed in western Poland, facing the German 3rd Army. Some were so badly mauled by NATO that they couldn't even return to their cantonments (which were probably now being garrisoned by Poles anyway) and went marauder. Some went into wholesale mutiny and decided to use their last remaining diesel reserves to strike out east towards home.

I am hoping that some of the above points will prove useful to the ongoing discussion (which I am finding to be very interesting thank you).

[Raellus]

Thanks, Targan. You raise a very important consideration that I think the rest of us (or I, at least) have missed. I think your psychological impact explanation works pretty well. It would explain the relatively bloodless failure of the offensive and the mostly intact conditions of most of the NATO units of 3rd Army when they end up back in their cantonments.

I think we still need to explain why none of them were shifted south, though, since that's where the Soviets had done most of their damage. Perhaps the numerous small, but mobile Polish and Soviet cavalry units gave NATO military intel the impression that the WTO forces were way more powerful than they actually were, kind of like the finale in the film Three Amigos. (Yes, I've just connected a broad '80s comedy set in 1920s Mexico with Twilight 2000 ) It was all the 3rd could do to turn around under pressure and return to its cantonments in northern Germany.

In fact, I will go one up on you and theorize that the cavalry units would actually have been even more mobile, in the long run, at least, than motorized units since cavalry wouldn't have to stop as often to brew more fuel (and they're not as reliant on roads).

Just to reassure you that I'm not super anal-retentive, the reason I'm being so detail oriented when it comes to the units involved in 3rd Army's offensive (and where they are when) is I'm working on a campaign setting revolving around the Baltic city of Elblag. I want to be able to convincingly explain why cut-off elements of American units (easy), German (not too hard), Canadian (getting tougher), and Danish units (the real challenge) are congregating there.

I think you may have gotten me most of the way there, Targan.

@Legbreaker: I still don't think 3rd army would detach most of its hard-earned fuel (almost 6 division's worth, not counting the U.S. 5th or 8th Mech IDs) and send it in a wide, amphibious flanking manouver with the hope of meeting up with it later. That's not just daring, it's plain rash. Plus, I think that most units would be used to hauling around most of its own fuel and the equipment to brew more. It would be routine by 2000. Canon implies this time and again. I will use your idea for the 2nd MarDiv's fuel quandry, though. One division losing almost all of its fuel in one fell swoop works for me. Thanks for that.

[Legbreaker]

I was thinking that the first few weeks work of fuel wold be carried within the divisions but fuel for after then would be supplied by sea. With transportation of bulk good so difficult in 2000, there wouldn't be too many other options available for them.
Perhaps all the fuel was not lost, but instead it was the capacity to move it to where it would be needed? Every last available truck was required in the effort to get the marines mobile again, thereby effectively halting the rest of Nato until the job was done. This allows for millions of tonnes of fuel to be stockpiled in Germany, probably located around port facilities, but unable to be moved to the units that needed it until mid July.

Targan, your idea is good, however petroleum based fuels were only in evidence with Soviet units around Kalisz - only the 3rd shock army (?) was supplied with it while everyone else, Soviet and Pole, had to rely on alternate fuels. Even the Polish units involved in the destruction of the 5th were not trusted with deisel, etc.

With regard to the Danes in Elblag, I find that a bit hard to believe. The Nato Vehicle Guide (both editions) place all Danish units in their home country although some did take part in the offensive. It also appears according to the available canon info that only the XI Corp (which the Danes were not part of) took a truely offensive role. The Canadians however were part of the XI Corp.