Iraq

[Jason Weiser]

Web,
We're leaning the same way you are with regards to Kuwait. We happen to have a spare heavy brigade lying around..... As for other matters, the other options are there specifically because of Soviet support, but in your earlier work which is a big start point for what we've been doing, you do have Desert Storm go off, so we're figuring that Saddam has reasons both to get into and stay out of the war. believe me, this was the end result of some disagreement between us DCWG members.

[Rainbow Six]

Reading Chico's options, my initial reaction was to favour option 4, a move against Iran.

However, upon reflection...I'm presuming that would ultimately make Iraq a Soviet ally and therefore, by definition, an enemy of NATO. And we all know how badly Saddam's first attempt to occupy Iranian territory went for Iraq...so that option begins to look maybe a little less likely...would making enemies of NATO and Iran be a wise move?

Whereas in 1990 he was able to take Kuwait in a matter of hours.

So, weighing up the different options, I've ended up in favour of option 2/3. As Chico states, the Coalition that threw him out of Kuwait first time round is somewhat busy fighting a World War, so he may think there's a chance that he might get away with it this time.

As to whether he only goes for Kuwait or also goes for Saudi....If he takes Kuwait only, I think there is a possibility that the rest of the Arab World might let that go, meaning Saddam has scored big time, assuming his numerical superiority means he can overcome any Western forces present in Kuwait. (Yes, I know that's put him at War with NATO, but he's not at War with Iran as well, and as noted above CENTCOM's resources are going to be limited)

On the other hand if he continues on into Saudi, then the conflict might widen, as other Arab states send forces to Saudi Arabia to help defend Mecca and Medina from Iraqi aggression. How would Saddam fare against the combined Egyptian, Syrian, and Saudi armies (amongst others)?

Of course, as you say Saddam could choose to do something completely different that's both irrational and illogical. And once the nukes start flying in Europe absolutely anything is possible (perhaps an attack on Western Iran supported by chemical weapons?). Personally I think the most likely outcome post November 1997 is a break up of Iraq into various tribal / religous areas.

Hope that all makes sense...

[Webstral]

Rainbow, your ideas do make sense. In the real world, there is supposed to be a Gulf Coalition force for the purpose of reinforcing Kuwait in the event of a new Iraq. Obviously, events have moved far beyond where they would have been in Twilight: 2000 in January 1997. However, I think it's useful to ask whether Gulf forces would have moved in support of Kuwait.

If the United States has a heavy brigade in place in Kuwait in 1997, a move by Hussein's Iraq is a move towards war with the West. I'm inclined to believe that the Kremlin would want this for the reasons you and others have indicated. I think the West would then place very heavy pressure on the Gulf States to make good on their commitment of arms. What do the Gulf States do?

Surely Saudi mobilizes and sends forces to the border, at the very minimum. Their oil is just too vulnerable for them to sit on their hands. Whether they send troops into Kuwait or undertake air missions against Iraqi forces in Kuwait or even Iraqi forces in southen Iraq is another question. I can't say for certain what the answer is, but I'm inclined to argue that the Saudis will throw their collective hat in the ring with the US in Kuwait. They are obliged by formal agreement, and they are obliged by self-interest. The Saudi oil fields are just too tempting a target for an aggressive Iraq for the Saudis to believe that Hussein would quit after seizing Kuwait, regardless of what the Kremlin and Baghdad may say on the subject. If there's going to be war with Iraq, from Riyadh's point of view that war is better fought north of the Saudi border. The early and energetic introduction of Saudi forces multiplies existing US strength to a greater degree than a tardy and/or limited introduction of Saudi forces. Following this chain of logic, then, I believe the Saudis will commit themselves decisively to supporting the US and Kuwait once Iraqi forces cross the border.

The other Gulf States will probably find themselves obliged to follow suit, to one degree or another. A victorious Iraq, backed by Soviet resupply, will be a bugbear to deal with. If Iraq defeats Kuwait and seizes the Saudi oil fields along the Gulf Coast, then Iraq might be inclined to go further. Failure to act might well be seen as more dangerous than action. Although we should proceed on a case-by-case basis, I think there's some grounds for believing that the Gulf States would send forces to Saudi and Kuwait--if only to protect their own interests.

Another key question is what happens in Kuwait. There are lots of variables here. If Hussein uses the Republican Guard again, how many divisions does he use? How well do they fare against US and Kuwaiti forces in Kuwait? How much does the arrival of Saudi forces (assuming such arrival occurs) affect things? How much does the arrival of other Gulf States forces (assuming such arrival occurs) affect things? To what degree does the threat to Gulf oil affect the US global airlift prioritization scheme? If Hussein bogs down in Kuwait, then he may not have a chance to threaten Saudi oil.

From a dramatic point of view, I like the idea of US/Kuwaiti forces being pushed back to Kuwait City in furious fighting. An intended withdrawal of US forces to the south is foiled by a powerful flanking attack by the Republican Guard. A valiant and perilous airlift effort brings a brigade of the 82nd into Kuwait City. Saudi and Gulf States forces assemble in northeastern Saudi Arabia to Coalition forces fight without the kind of quantitative and qualitative superiority they enjoyed in Operation Desert Storm. Again, though, this scenario is at least as much drama as cold realism.

Webstral

[sglancy12]

As much as I love Frank Frey (and here's where I get to boast about having played Call of Cthulhu with him at GenCon last year), The RDF Sourcebook wasn't exactly prescient about the Persian Gulf. The three big snafus are:

1) His idea that the USSR could get rid of Saddam and Assad of Syria in a pair of coups in 1991 that would bring in more pro-Moscow leaders.

2) The idea that the Mullahs in Iran would get less bat-shit crazy.

3) No Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

However, I can't really give Frank any grief about not predicting the Invasion of Kuwait. Everyone missed that one.

So there are a couple of big questions to resolve in the Persian Gulf. The biggest is: Does Iraq invade Kuwait in 1990? Depending on what happens there, any number of things could change in the canon.

For my alt time-line, I have Iraq invading Kuwait right on schedule. Because Gorbachev was assassinated the previous year, on his way to visit Peking prior to the Tianamen Square Massacre, the guys running the Kremlin are a more reactionary bunch. This confrontation between the Soviet's premier client stat in the Middle East and the West might have lead to the Twilight War kicking off five years early. What stops it from happening is that the Kremiln is seriously occupied trying to get the toothpaste back in the tube in Eastern Europe. The 1989 pro-democracy revolutions that swept Eastern Europe are being put down with force, and the Kremlin doesn't think it can take on the West and clean up it's backyard at the same time.

In my alt time-line, the USSR bluffs the USA and the West, offering the West a free hand to deal with Iraq using a UN mandate (short of occupation, dissolution or regime change) so long as sanctions against the USSR's crackdown on pro-democracy in Eastern Europe are lifted. The USSR knows the US is going to eject Iraq one way or another, and would prefer if it was done under UN mandate rather than as unilateral US action. Why? Because the USSR wants to preserve the "authority" of the UN. The UN's authority is base on public opinion, something that can limit US policy choices, but has never affected the Kremlin.

Worried that a teetering and panicky Soviet Empire might go to war over a US intervention in the Persian Gulf, President George H.W. Bush makes that deal, thus throwing eastern Europe under the bus to protect US energy needs. That's twice in one century that Hungary and Poland get hung out to dry, but the gold medal for getting screwed by the West still goes to Czechoslovakia: THREE times in one century!

The US conducts the Gulf War as it does in our time-line, with the Soviet Military getting a preview of US capabilities. Perhaps this sneak peak helps them perform better against NATO during the later war in Europe?

In this time-line, it is Kuwait where US Forces are based, not Iran. The French Marine Division and air assets would just have to be shifted to Saudi Arabia and Basrah, where they already have forces in place.

In my time-line (IMTL?), the Iranians never calm down and stop with blaming everything that goes wrong in Iran on the Great Satan. So when the Soviets invade and the US intervenes, it's a three-way fight, with the Iranians fighting everyone... including each other as a kind of Civil War breaks out over the issue of whether to cooperate with the Americans or not. Nevertheless, the average Iranian is more hostile to US personnel than depicted in the RDF Sourcebook, which is why more US forces are stationed in Kuwait.

But back to Iraq.

In the RDF sourcebook, there is a Soviet counter-offensive that is launched in July 28, 1997 following a Spetsnaz strike at decapitates CENTCOM's command structure. It catches the US forces strung out, away from the coast. The new US CENTCOM commander, General McLean orders a fighting retreat to the coast, and the Soviets pursue.

IMTL Saddam sits out the war in Iran until the Soviets start that counter-offensive in 1997. On his own initiative, without consulting Lt. General Suryakin or the Kremlin, Saddam invades Iran and Kuwait to attack the retreating US forces in the hopes of getting revenge for the humiliating defeats of 1991.

There are two ways this could go... either it starts off pretty badly for US forces getting surprised on their flank and in their rear areas, but they quickly turn it around and maul the Iraqis... this could also cause Baghdad to catch some US nukes since according to canon, the US and USSR are exchanging tac-nukes in Iran at this time.

OR

US intelligence detects Saddam concentrating his forces and decide there's no point in waiting to get attacked. So they launch preemptive air attacks against logistical and air assets to blunt the attack. This leaves the retreating US forces in Iran without the air support they'd like for a few days or even a week, but otherwise things progress as canon. The attack still goes off, and Saddam gets a bit of a PR boost because the "Crusaders and Zionists" shot first, but his forces still get mauled.

Should we start another thread to discuss what changes occur if Iran doesn't go all warm and fuzzy on the west, as it does in the RDF sourcebook?

Would that 1997 US drive into Iran even happen if the government of Iran was hostile to the US intervention? I kind of doubt that even the bone heads in congress would pressure CENTCOM to pursue the Soviets if the Iranians weren't close allies. If the Iranians are actively hostile, it seems the height of folly for the US Forces to abandon their primary mission (keeping the oil fields out of the Soviet hands) just to score some hits on the Soviet Transcaucasus Front.

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

[Raellus]

I guess I'm a v1.0 purist, in terms of the historical background. I see it as an alternative history that diverged from our own around '89-'91, specifically with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Desert Storm could have happened in that alternate reality but I'm not so sure it would have, if the Soviet Union had stuck around. Despite the various wars in the Middle East, both the Soviets and the West had vested interests in maintaining stability in the region. Leading up to the '73 Yom Kippur War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union tried fairly hard to prevent a shooting war between the Arab bloc (led by Egypt) and Israel, despite the commonly held (and erroneous) perception that Egypt was egged on by the Soviets and Israel by the U.S.

I'll admit that I don't know as much about the Iran-Iraq war. I know that the U.S. backed both sides (albeit covertly, for the Iranians) but I don't really know if/how the Soviets were involved.

I think that Saddam very well could have invaded Kuwait in the alternative '91, but I think that the combined political and economic pressure the West and the Communist Bloc would have forced Saddam to back down and pull out of Iraq before military action was taken on the part of the Coalition. That's the way I see it. Saddam invaded but pulled out under pressure from both the West and the Soviet Bloc, before Desert Storm.

To get back to Chico's question, I'm not sure I could say what Saddam would have done. If Desert Storm had taken place, his armed forces would have been significanly weaker than they would have if it had not. Perhaps he would be more cautious with how he used his remaining forces.

If Desert Storm had not occured (my preference), I think Saddam would have waited to see how things played out in other theatres before deciding which horse to back. A badly divided Iran would have been a very tempting target. On the other hand, Kuwait would have been easy pickings. As a blatant opportunist, I'm sure Saddam would have pounced on one or the other (or both). Both the Eastern and Western Blocs would have been seriously preoccupied with their own affairs elsewhere and he may have believed that they would be unable to respond to his own regional power grabs.

[Abbott Shaull]

Actually if you go with v1 of the game time line and insert the events that lead to Iraq invading Kuwait, without the fall of the Soviet Union.

With Central Command still having/had Brigade size force forward deployed there since the end of the war. It makes US bases in Saudi Arabia easier to explain. Also one could used it as justification to bring US based Army units up to strength and made tweak the US Army OOB from 1991 to 1995 a bit.

It also explains why the XVIII Airborne Corps made it way to the Middle East with the 24th Mechanized Division instead of having this Division deploy to Germany. Now come up with why it is plausible for the 9th to end up in the Middle East instead of Korea.

[sglancy12]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Desert Storm could have happened in that alternate reality but I'm not so sure it would have, if the Soviet Union had stuck around.

Everyone keeps talking like the USSR wasn't around in 1990. It was.

Saddam invaded Kuwait August 2, 1990.

The ground campaign part of Desert Storm kicks off on Feb 24th 1991.

The Coup against Gorbachev that led to the dissolution of the USSR was on August 19, 1991.

So, there was a Soviet Union at the time of the Gulf War... there just weren't any satellite states in Eastern Europe any more, even though the Warsaw Pact wasn't formally dissolved until July 1, 1991.

Originally Posted by Raellus

I think that Saddam very well could have invaded Kuwait in the alternative '91, but I think that the combined political and economic pressure the West and the Communist Bloc would have forced Saddam to back down and pull out of Iraq before military action was taken on the part of the Coalition. That's the way I see it. Saddam invaded but pulled out under pressure from both the West and the Soviet Bloc, before Desert Storm.

I disagree with you on this on the grounds that the historical record indicates that Saddam was impervious to diplomatic pressure. He also appears to have been impervious to being able to tell when he was getting in over his head.

While there wasn't any serious diplomatic pressure on Iraq to stop fighting Iran (what with Iran being a pariah state), there can be little doubt that Saddam had bitten off more than he could chew with Iraq. By the second year of the eight year war, Iraq was on the strategic defensive.

In the First Gulf War, no amount of diplomatic pressure could shift him. Furthermore, Saddam seemed unable to understand the capability of the military force arrayed against him, nor the world's political will to use it. He seemed to think he could wave Israel at the Arab world, like a red cape in front of a bull, and the Arab states would just bail out of the coalition and American will to act would crumble without Arab support. He seemed to bank on a fantasy that even if the US used military force, America's "cowardice" and unwillingness to accept casualties would lead to a failure of will and an American pullout. Maybe he was banking on a repeat of the US pullout from Peacekeeping in Beirut. But it's clear he couldn't be reasoned with and he couldn't see the danger he was placing himself in because he preferred to see the world as he wished it was, rather than how it really was.

Same thing in 2002. When faced with diplomatic pressure and the threat of military action from a country that was still looking for payback for 9/11, a country that had clearly demonstrated it's ability to clean his clock ten years earlier, he still wouldn't get out of the way of the oncoming train. He didn't even have any WMDs to hide from the UN inspectors, which makes his game of chicken all the more baffling.

History demonstrates that Saddam couldn't be made to back down through diplomatic pressure.

He had to be put down through military action.

He got away with attacking Iran. He thought he could get away with attacking Kuwait. He thought he could get away with bluffing the US on inspections. This guy clearly got his intel from the Department of Wishful Thinking.

For my money Saddam's MORE likely to Invade Kuwait in an alternate 1990 because, with the Cold War still hot, he'd think the USSR wouldn't want to look weak by allowing the US to beat up on one of their client states. The truth is that the USSR wouldn't much appreciate one of their client states (like Iraq) drawing the USSR into a confrontation with the West that the USSR may not be prepared for.

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing.

[Abbott Shaull]

It all in the details. Granted the Soviet Union break up happen after Saddam invaded Kuwait.

The tearing down of the Berlin Wall, and rapid fall of Communist governments of Eastern Europe along with the Baltic Republics and others wishing more freedom. The Soviet Union was on extreme life support. In fact Mr. Gorbachev fall from power set up the current state of the Regime that leads the Russia now...

At the point the Mr. Gorbachev knew his time was limited and also knew that even if he wanted to do something militarily, it would of pushed the movements in the outlying Republics to speed up the process of it collapse. Especially since the Pact had ceased to exist with the fall of the Berlin Wall and all their allies removed their communist parties respectfully.

In fact, the Pact alliance was only a paper alliance. The Soviets by being part of the winning alliance at the end of WWII and concession given in to them they had free hand in Eastern Europe and many of their Military Commands were indeed commanded by Marshals of the Soviet Union for many years, on into the 1970s. Those that they didn't retain control directly, there was alway Group of Forces and veil threat invasion if you didn't toe Moscow line.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Nice tone, Mr. Glancy. Nice tone.

If you don't know what I meant regarding my first point then you are either being disingenuous or you simply don't want to acknowledge the merit in my point. Fine either way, but please don't patronize me.

The Soviet Union of v1.0 canon and the Soviet Union of 1991 are not one in the same.

As to Saddam not backing down, he did not have the full weight of the [former] Eastern Bloc leaning on him. The "Soviet Union's" response to Sadam's aggression in 1991 was fairly indifferent. If a more powerful Soviet Union- like the one in the v1.0 canon- and its satellites were actively pressing him, he may have behaved more prudently. I am not, nor have I ever been, a Saddam apologist.

In the six years or so I've been part of this online community, many people have disagreed with me. I can handle that. But no one, to this point, has been so disrespectful about it.

I think we all agree the 1990 Real life Soviet Union should be considered a Version 2.0 minus. Very different from a Version 1 USSR. Everyone this may just be a difference in perspective or a poor choice of words.

Due to NATO Forces being tied Europe in V1 I suspect the V1 and V2 Desert Storm would use a vastly different force base. This is why "canon" arguments are often contradictory even within the confines of fully established canon.

However I think we all can say that Saddam made some very bad decisions in real life and could have made just as many ill thought out ones in any gaming scenario.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by kato13

I think we all agree the 1990 Real life Soviet Union should be considered a Version 2.0 minus. Very different from a Version 1 USSR. Everyone this may just be a difference in perspective or a poor choice of words.

Due to NATO Forces being tied Europe in V1 I suspect the V1 and V2 Desert Storm would use a vastly different force base. This is why "canon" arguments are often contradictory even within the confines of fully established canon.

However I think we all can say that Saddam made some very bad decisions in real life and could have made just as many ill thought out ones in any gaming scenario.

Very well put Kato.

[Legbreaker]

Personally I think the 1990-91 middle eastern events fit nicely into the leadup to the Twilight war.
It's quite concievable that even though the USSR still existed IRL, they stayed out of participating in any real way due to the imminent breakup of the "empire". Although officially this disolution didn't happen until later, it's unlikely that those in power didn't see the writing on the wall beforehand.

Involving themselves in conflict with those troubles on horizon wouldn't have been in anyones interests on the Soviet side of things.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by kato13

Due to NATO Forces being tied Europe in V1 I suspect the V1 and V2 Desert Storm would use a vastly different force base.

Good point. I never really thought about that before.

[Legbreaker]

Does anyone know roughly what percentage of the available forces of the involved nations were used in 91?
And what percentage were occupied elsewhere (particularly Europe)?

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by kato13

Due to NATO Forces being tied Europe in V1 I suspect the V1 and V2 Desert Storm would use a vastly different force base. This is why "canon" arguments are often contradictory even within the confines of fully established canon.

Figuring out how NATO juggles forces would be a very interesting exercise. Perhaps a REFORGER run would be in order. Certainly, the weakness of having a Regular Army division hobbled by a National Guard roundout brigade would be exposed by a 1990 REFORGER.

Webstral

[Jason Weiser]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Figuring out how NATO juggles forces would be a very interesting exercise. Perhaps a REFORGER run would be in order. Certainly, the weakness of having a Regular Army division hobbled by a National Guard roundout brigade would be exposed by a 1990 REFORGER.

Webstral

Think you already did that Web...to quoth your "Storm In Germany" article:

Originally Posted by From The Persian Gulf War, Chapter 3

[III US Corps moves to Europe along with 5th ID(M). Two National Guard formations, 35th ID(M) and 116th ACR are called up and deployed to Europe to take over the duties of VII US Corps. 4th ID(M), which is supposed to transit by air to Europe to draw POMCUS equipment, remains on alert at Ft. Carson, CO. 1st CD, 2/2nd AD and 3rd ACR, all of which are slated for deployment to Europe, are replaced by 49th AD (TXNG), 194th Armd Bde (Sep) and 278th ACR (TNNG) as CONUS-based reserves for air deployment and drawing of POMCUS equipment. The USMC activates 4th Marine Division to take the place of 1st Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, which is deploying to Saudi Arabia.]

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Figuring out how NATO juggles forces would be a very interesting exercise. Perhaps a REFORGER run would be in order. Certainly, the weakness of having a Regular Army division hobbled by a National Guard roundout brigade would be exposed by a 1990 REFORGER.

Webstral

Yeah Desert Storm did open some eyes in the US Army, but it took Operation Iraqi Freedom to learn the entire lesson that they had learned for the what the 4th time in 20 odd years. Starting with Operation Urgent Fury up to Operation Iraqi Freedom the only three or four Divisions were full Deployed in any of them. The other US Divisions had other units borrowed from other to make whole Divisions. In fact, Desert Storm was the first time in which a whole Division command had been deployed.

Even in follow the initial operations of Iraqi Freedom, it was rare that an entire Division is in country. If the entire Division happens to be in country they rarely work as an entirely under the same command. Usually they are split up to make up composite Divisions.

I feel 1997 would see Brigades jumbled around, especially during offensive operations. Units would be left in place when depleted while those units of capable of offensive action would be transferred to the next passing Brigade/Battalion. The only Divisions I can see still being whole by 1998 would be 101st and 82nd Airborne Division where they weren't set up to support heavy troops.

[sglancy12]

Originally Posted by kato13

Due to NATO Forces being tied Europe in V1 I suspect the V1 and V2 Desert Storm would use a vastly different force base.

In all this arguing back and forth, this may be the most perceptive comment I've read.

If we go with a canon v1 USSR and WTO, then there is no upheaval in Eastern Europe and the WTO alliance is firmly in place and firmly under the control of the USSR. So NATO member states might be unwilling to send conventional forces to the Persian Gulf and therefore give the WTO a window of opportunity to attack during a period of rising East-West tensions.

So, if the US cannot create a wide enough coalition of forces with sufficient conventional conventional strength to force Saddam out of Kuwait, then how does the West proceed? You can't threaten Iraq with nuclear forces because they don't have any of their own and there seems to be an unwritten law of international brinksmanship that somehow states with nuclear arsenals are not allowed to use such weapons against states that don't have them. So no nuking Iraq. Diplomatic pressure on Iraq clearly has no effect. Forcing the Soviets to fix it by using nuclear brinksmanship and diplomatic and economic pressure presumes that the Soviets can even get Iraq to budge. Which I don't believe they could accomplish.

Maybe to your ver 1 canon answer is that Saddam invaded and got to KEEP Kuwait! Or at least until Saddam starts looking to start a war with Syria (dreams of a pan-Arabic State from the Persian Gulf to the Med?) and the KGB pulls off a coup that topples his regime in 1991! As a gesture of good faith to their Arab neighbors the new (more pro-Soviet) Iraq disgorges Kuwait as an independent state, maybe even allowing the Emir to return.

There. Problem solved. Iraq invades in 1990, USSR fixes problem in 1991. The Sovs expect kudos from the Arab world as peacemakers and liberators, but instead (according to ver 1 canon) they are seen by the Arab world as Imperialistic meddlers.

The only problem with this idea is the we have to accept that the US and Western Europe would need sit around for a year and take no decisive military action against Iraq. Is that really likely? Could the US and Western Europe really be so completely impotent. Particularly the US, which is still stinging from the humiliation of the Iran Hostage Crisis and the bombings and kidnappings in Lebanon.

At the bare minimum... the absolute minimum we should expect a division sized or greater US military force permanently stationed in Saudi Arabia in order to prevent Saddam from going after that country next. Or at least until the post-Saddam government withdraws from Kuwait.

Of course having US troops stationed in Iraq, even for a year, might still mean that Osama Bin Laden gets to create Al Queda for the purpose of "freeing" Saudi Arabia from US "occupation." With the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan still ongoing, Islamic fundamentalism will probably still emerge as the enemy of the West and Soviet Communism. Or maybe, the Saudi government takes Bin Laden up on his offer to create an army of Mujahideen (like in Afghanistan) to fight the Iraqi occupation. Of course, I always thought Bin Ladin's idea was pretty bone-headed... what with Kuwait having no history of insurgency (unlike Afghanistan), no terrain appropriate to hide guerilla forces in (unlike Afghanistan), and no border conducive to smuggling in weapons and foreign fighters (unlike Afghanistan). Add to that the brutal efficiency of Saddam's secret police in an urban environment, and Osama's plan to push Saddam out of Kuwait looks doomed to failure.

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

[kato13]

Originally Posted by sglancy12

In all this arguing back and forth, this may be the most perceptive comment I've read.

If we go with a canon v1 USSR and WTO, then there is no upheaval in Eastern Europe and the WTO alliance is firmly in place and firmly under the control of the USSR. So NATO member states might be unwilling to send conventional forces to the Persian Gulf and therefore give the WTO a window of opportunity to attack during a period of rising East-West tensions.

So, if the US create a wide enough coalition of forces with sufficient conventional conventional strength to force Saddam out of Kuwait, then how does the West proceed?.

IMO The Turks would need to apply serious pressure. If Nato could get them to commit to crossing the northern Iraqi border (perhaps with a promise look the other way on how they handle Kurdish Rebels), the rest of the Coalition could get away with having the US 18th Corps and the 5th and 8th Mechanized (Rounded with the 192nd and the 197th) plus marine assets as the core of the force. National Guard and Reserve Units would need to be mobilized as Europe's reserve.

I don't know much about what other coalition members would be able to provide, I expect Nato's commitment would be generally lower, but the forces from the Middle East would probably be the same or larger.

[Legbreaker]

What we need to do is work out which units from which countries were available for a middle eastern operation.
Perhaps there were enough units from other nations to kick Iraq out.
Perhaps China led the coalition...

[sglancy12]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The Soviet Union of v1.0 canon and the Soviet Union of 1990 (IRL) are not one in the same, at least not in my book

I'm not trying to say that. But I am willing to argue that the Soviet Union of v1 canon isn't going to be any more successful at reining in Saddam than anyone else.

Originally Posted by Raellus

As to Saddam not backing down, IRL, he did not have the full weight of the [former] Eastern Bloc leaning on him. The "Soviet Union's" response to Saddam's aggression in 1991 was fairly ambivalent. If a more powerful Soviet Union- like the one in the v1.0 canon- and its satellites (i.e. the Warsaw Pact) were actively pressing him, he may have behaved more prudently.

I'm not saying the canon v1 USSR wouldn't have an interest in stopping Saddam from creating a situation that will get them embroiled in a conflict with the West. I'm just saying they wouldn't be able to stop him.

Originally Posted by Raellus

True. This is why the Soviets tried to prevent Egypt from attacking Israel in '73

How, exactly, do you see this pressure being applied? What leverage does this canon v1 USSR have that the USSR in 1973 did not when they were dealing with Egypt?

You do have to admit that the Soviets didn't prevent the Egyptians from attacking Israel. All they succeeded in doing wad getting their advisers kicked out of Egypt. Ultimately that helped move Egypt from the Soviet camp to the US camp. It is an example of Soviet inability to control their clients.

Furthermore, the avowed policy of Egypt was to win back the Sinai Peninsula by military force. From 1970-1973 the Soviets, under Brezhnev, knew this was coming. They participated directly with the Egyptians in the so-called War of Attrition over the Sinai Peninsula and even lost fighter pilots who were piloting Egyptian aircraft. They didn't want to sell Egypt their most advanced SAM missiles but Sadat threatened to resign and bring in someone more US-oriented and Brezhnev relented and sold them the SAMs.

Even worse, when Egypt got themselves completely backed into a corner the USSR had to come in and get embroiled in a confrontation with the US which led to the USSR having to back down after the US raised its nuclear defcon level.

So Egypt manipulated the USSR into arming them. Kicked the Soviet advisers out. Attacked Israel against the Sov's wishes. Completely screwed up and then whined to the USSR which got the Sovs into exactly the kind of situation they were trying to avoid.

Originally Posted by Raellus

and why the Soviet Union [of canon] might very well exert much stronger diplomatic and economic pressure on Saddam to back down and pull out of Kuwait. In this case, the Soviets would put a lot of pressure on Iraq, in part to demonstrate to the world that they can control their clients and, in part, to try to stabilize the region.

The problem I have with your analysis is that I just don't understand who you think this Soviet Union of the v1 canon is. What I mean is, if the powerful Soviet union of 1973 (maybe the pinnacle of Soviet power and prestige), under the leadership of an old Bolshevik like Brehznev, couldn't control Egypt when they had three years of warning... then who are these v1 canon Soviets?

With Saddam the USSR gets no warning. No one did. He just acted on his own without consulting anyone... besides some oblique and frankly dissembling questioning of US Abassador Glaspie... how is the USSR going to fare better when they get no advanced warning and are faced with an fait accomple of Kuwaiti annexation?


A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by sglancy12

How, exactly, do you see this pressure being applied? What leverage does this canon v1 USSR have that the USSR in 1973 did not when they were dealing with Egypt?

Well, perhaps an arms embargo, including spare parts for Saddam's existing stockpiles of Soviet-made weaponry. The Soviets would also force their Eastern European clients to follow suit. A collective refusal on the part of the WTO to purchase fuel from Iraq. I honestly don't know how much economic and military logistical pressure the RL Soviet Union and former WTO nations actually placed on Saddam. My impression was that it was minimal, at best.

I do admit that your point about the Soviet's innability to stop their Egyptian clients in 1973 is a good one. IIRC, the Soviets' refusal to allow the Egyptians to use Soviet-supplied SSMs against Irael was a big reason why the Soviet advisors were kicked out.

Maybe- and this is a bit of a stretch- Saddam would have learned something about how an isolated Arab/Muslim nation (i.e. Egypt after the Soviets withdrew their support) fared against the U.S.-supplied Israelis and backed down. I concede that, based on his track record, this is fairly unlikely.

Originally Posted by sglancy12

The problem I have with your analysis is that I just don't understand who you think this Soviet Union of the v1 canon is. What I mean is, if the powerful Soviet union of 1973 (maybe the pinnacle of Soviet power and prestige), under the leadership of an old Bolshevik like Brehznev, couldn't control Egypt when they had three years of warning... then who are these v1 canon Soviets?

Honestly, I haven't made up my mind about who the v1.0 Soviets are but, in my mind, they are closer to the Soviets of RL 1984 than they are to the Soviets of RL 1991. I am somewhat of a Soviet apologist, and an unabashed one at that. You should take a look at my archived In Defense of the Red Army thread (it's listed on the forum thread map) for a better understanding of my thoughts about the Soviet Union in the T2K v1.0 timeline.

Originally Posted by sglancy12

With Saddam the USSR gets no warning. No one did. He just acted on his own without consulting anyone... besides some oblique and frankly dissembling questioning of US Abassador Glaspie... how is the USSR going to fare better when they get no advanced warning and are faced with an fait accomple of Kuwaiti annexation?

Scott (do you mind if I call you by your first name?), I'm worried that you missed part of my first point.

To reitterate, I don't think that the v1.0 Soviets could have prevented the Iraqis from invading Kuwait. I do, however, think that the v1.0 Soviets could have helped compel Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait after the fact but before getting his ass handed to him by the U.S. led coalition. Perhaps, by diplomatic means, the v1.0 Soviets helped Saddam save face- a very important consideration based on his psych profile- which in turn motivated him to pull out. I think that part of the reason he stayed and got spanked IRL was that he didn't want to look like a pussy by backing down without a fight.

Perhaps- and this is my effort to compromise- the v1.0 helped compel Saddam to pull out after a few days of his military in Kuwait getting pounded by coalition airstrikes but prior to the kick-off of the ground campaign.

I'm kind of thinking out loud here.

[sglancy12]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Well, perhaps an arms embargo, including spare parts for Saddam's existing stockpiles of Soviet-made weaponry. The Soviets would also force their Eastern European clients to follow suit. A collective refusal on the part of the WTO to purchase fuel from Iraq.

The collective refusal to buy their oil might be a pinch to Iraq (and a boon to Soviet and Romanian oil sectors) but it seems that while the Soviets did not diplomatically support Iraq they did not break their military ties to Iraq. Wikipedia has this to say:

"The Soviet Union was critical of Saddam Hussein's 2 August 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and supported a United Nations resolution authorizing the use of military force, if necessary, to enforce an arms embargo against Iraq. But the Soviet Union's military support for Hussein also drew substantial criticism from the United States and other Western countries. In Washington, D.C., the Heritage Foundation foreign policy experts Jay P. Kosminsky and Michael Johns wrote on 30 August 1990 that, "While condemning the Iraqi invasion, Gorbachev continues to assist Saddam militarily. By Moscow's own admission, in an 22 August official press conference with Red Army Colonel Valentin Ogurtsov, 193 Soviet military advisors still are training and assisting Iraq's one million-man armed forces. Privately, Pentagon sources say that between 3,000 and 4,000 Soviet military advisors may be in Iraq."

The actual withdrawal of those advisers might have been critical, but since the kinder gentler USSR of RL didn't withdraw them, it's hard to imagine that the more hard-line Stalinist USSR of ver 1 canon would have withdrawn them. In fact, there probably would have been plenty of hard liners who would have pushed for more support of Iraq... not that this would have been a very good idea.

Of course the wild card here would be Red China. If the WTO, NATO and the Arab world are all leaning on Iraq to get out of Kuwait, would China will willing to take up the slack as far as diplomatic of military support. Clearly the RL PRC didn't, but who are these guys running the various canon PRCs?

Originally Posted by Raellus

I honestly don't know how much economic and military logistical pressure the RL Soviet Union and former WTO nations actually placed on Saddam. My impression was that it was minimal, at best.

I agree it was probably pretty minimal. Many of the former WTO nations were still reeling from the economic shock of independence. However, IIRC the Czechs in RL send some 200 chemical warfare decontamination troops to the Gulf as part of the Coalition Forces. Apparently the Hungarians sent a handful and the Poles sent some 300 as part of a "naval and medical deployment."

Originally Posted by Raellus

I do admit that your point about the Soviet's innability to stop their Egyptian clients in 1973 is a good one. IIRC, the Soviets' refusal to allow the Egyptians to use Soviet-supplied SSMs against Irael was a big reason why the Soviet advisors were kicked out.

What I read recently (on the admittedly often flawed wikipedia) is the USSR was cajoled into selling the SAMs to Sadat, only to try and head off the invasion by leaking news of Egypt's plans. That, the article claimed, was the reason Sadat expelled his Soviet military advisers.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Maybe- and this is a bit of a stretch- Saddam would have learned something about how an isolated Arab/Muslim nation (i.e. Egypt after the Soviets withdrew their support) fared against the U.S.-supplied Israelis and backed down. I concede that, based on his track record, this is fairly unlikely.

Agreed.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Honestly, I haven't made up my mind about who the v1.0 Soviets are but, in my mind, they are closer to the Soviets of RL 1984 than they are to the Soviets of RL 1991.

I agree that the alternative timeline Kremlin, whether ver1, ver2 or homebrew, needs to be made up of old-line communists who remember fondly the days of Brezhnev. Maybe even some neo-Stalinists who want the extreme police state without the cult of personality centered around one man. They want the USSR to be like it was during WWII, untied, strong, moving in one direction with one purpose.

Originally Posted by Raellus

I am somewhat of a Soviet apologist, and an unabashed one at that. You should take a look at my archived In Defense of the Red Army thread (it's listed on the forum thread map) for a better understanding of my thoughts about the Soviet Union in the T2K v1.0 timeline.

I have and I'm not sure that is what I would call being a Soviet apologist. To be a Soviet apologist you'd have to claim something like "All those Poles at Katyn Forrest clearly had it coming."

No, you see the USSR's military capacity as being closer to it's advertised ability. Closer to what we thought it was in 1984 when the Red Army was staring across the Fulda Gap, rather than how it turned out to be in 1991 when they were humiliated in Chechnyia.

I think the truth of any alternative timeline should rest somewhere between the two. I think the US forces would far better than we expected in many cases, but the USSR wouldn't be brushed aside like Iraq. In my own timeline I have the USSR and China allied and fighting the USA because I think that the USSR couldn't fight a two front war the way the canon describes. I think for civilization to be ground down in a war of attrition, it should be the USA who has to fight on two fronts, forces stretched to the limits. Otherwise the USA would be too successful in the European, Persian Gulf and Korean Theatres and the USSR would go nuclear too soon. And commit more nukes to more targets than the canon states.

I'm not marred to any of the canon, but I'd really prefer to change the absolute minimum number of events for my homebrew.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Scott, I'm worried that you missed part of my first point.

To reiterate, I don't think that the v1.0 Soviets could have prevented the Iraqis from invading Kuwait. I do, however, think that the v1.0 Soviets could have helped compel Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait after the fact but before getting his ass handed to him by the U.S. led coalition. Perhaps, by diplomatic means, the v1.0 Soviets helped Saddam save face- a very important consideration based on his psych profile- which in turn motivated him to pull out. I think that part of the reason he stayed and got spanked IRL was that he didn't want to look like a pussy by backing down without a fight.

My only point about preventing the invasion was that preventing it from happening seems like it would be easier than forcing a withdrawal after blood, gold, and reputation had already been invested and the deed was done.

I do not deny in any way that the Soviets of any timeline would have an interest in making sure that one of their clients is not militarily humbled by the west. That's just bad P.R... makes the East Bloc look weak.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Perhaps- and this is my effort to compromise- the v1.0 helped compel Saddam to pull out after a few days of his military in Kuwait getting pounded by coalition airstrikes but prior to the kick-off of the ground campaign.

For the USSR to reign in Saddam would have taken extra-ordinary efforts... like the USSR participating in the air campaign. Then Saddam would have no illusions about hiding under the USSR's skirt. But air campaigns IMHO only work in concert with action on the ground. By the time the ground forces are moving, its too late for Saddam. His army is toast.

But if Saddam could be forced out without a war (air or ground), the near disaster would certainly give the USSR a motive behind their ver 1 coup in The RDF Sourcebook that unseats Saddam in 1991. Saddam is not named but the books says the government of Iraq is replaced.

Also, being forced out of Kuwait might teach Saddam a lesson... never attack a western ally. He got away with attacking Iran (at least diplomatically) because Iran was a pariah state allied with no one. Kuwait was too important internationally. The RDF Sourcebook has Iraq and Syria drifting towards war in 1991. Maybe Saddam decided that he should take on a Soviet Client state thinking that the US wouldn't get involved?

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing