T2K: State of the U.S. Army in the late Twilight War

[kota1342000]

Sorry for not being around, getting net service when youre driving truck can be iffy.
I agree with the initial assessments Raellus, Outstanding. I think Ill print it off as a summary for new players.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by kota1342000

Sorry for not being around, getting net service when youre driving truck can be iffy.
I agree with the initial assessments Raellus, Outstanding. I think Ill print it off as a summary for new players.

Welcome back and thank you.

I'm working on adding some material based on the discussion here. I hope to have it up soon. Stay posted.

[Raellus]

Here's the updated version of my essay in full. I added sections on morale, supply (field factories), and communications. Feedback is still welcome. Feel free to use the essay in full or in part.


After nearly three years of heavy combat, and two years removed from significant replacements of men and equipment, by 2000, the U.S. Army in Europe is a shadow of its pre-war self. Nevertheless, with no peace in sight, adjustments were made at all levels to allow the remains of the U.S. Army to continue to fight its Soviet and Warsaw Pact counterparts.

Supply

With most supply depots either destroyed by tactical nuclear strikes or emptied of their contents, keeping the troops in the field fed and clothed had become increasingly difficult by the year 2000. As early as 1998, commanders in the field received orders instructing them to live off of the land. The massive American logistics system had almost completely broken down and could keep only a handful of units supplied at mere fraction of their operational requirements. Creative, proactive commanders quickly secured food producing areas and either employed civilian farmers or tasked available troops to begin cultivation of crops for food and fuel production. Commanders that neglected matters of supply soon found their troops approaching starvation and were forced to requisition food, sometimes by force, from the local population, greatly harming the U.S. Army’s civilian relations in the affected areas.

Prepackaged combat rations and other processed foodstuffs became increasingly scarce as 2000 dawned. Although MREs and the like were still issued as emergency rations, hard-baked bread, cured meats, canned goods, and field-brewed beer had become far more familiar as combat rations as the war grinded on. Field uniforms were routinely used far past the point of viability. Civilians were frequently employed mending or even making various items of uniform. As well as weapons, helmets, and body armor, hard to make uniform items like boots and LBE were routinely stripped from the dead and reissued. Overall, a certain DIY ethos developed as field units were forced to become increasingly self-sufficient.

Field factories- usually small workshops staffed by a couple dozen local civilian workers under U.S. military supervision- sprang up in most forward cantonments. Such factories produced all manner of military equipment and supplies. The foremost and battlefield industry was small arms ammunition reloading. Spent brass was collected, and when primers and high grade power were available, reloaded with cast lead bullets (sometimes copper jacketed). Some cantonments had the capacity to manufacture simple mortar tubes and explosive and smoke bombs (60-82mm)- the most famous example of post-exchange mortars was the WOJO multi-caliber mortar manufactured in the Free City of Krakow. Larger caliber ammunition (all types of explosive, canon, and artillery rounds) was much more difficult to manufacture with the limited resources at hand in most forward cantonments. A very limited supply of common caliber heavy weapons ammunition was produced in cities with the surviving industrial capacity to produce it. Rudimentary uniforms, boots, LBE, and other relatively simple equipment were also produced by field factories.

Transportation

By the year 2000, the means to transport the limited quantities of food, fuel, and ammunition that were available to the front line troops had also become scarce. NATO’s supplies of military trucks had been winnowed down by attrition due both to enemy action and to extended hard use. A dearth of spare parts made repairing damaged or broken down vehicles incredibly difficult. Damaged and broken down vehicles were cannibalized to provide spare parts for other vehicles. Due to their mobile role, priority in motorized transport was given to the Army’s armored and mechanized divisions. Infantry divisions had to find other means to move their supplies and equipment.

Horses in occupied areas were requisitioned and simple yet functional wheeled carriages were fashioned out of truck parts. Horse-drawn wagons soon became a common sight in the rear areas of units on both sides of the conflict and they were soon tasked in hauling much of the standard infantry divisions’ artillery as well as their supplies. In this regard, as in many others, armies in the year 2000 resembled the German and Soviet armies of WWII.

Although NATO armies typically did not create horse cavalry units on anything approaching the scope or scale of the Soviet and Polish armies, smaller horse-mounted combat units were developed and deployed. Typically, horse mounted units were not encountered in NATO armies in anything larger than battalion size. More often, horse cavalry units operated at company or platoon size. These units were usually employed for reconnaissance, screening larger units during advances or withdrawals, and rear-area security operations. Although not as fast as, and more vulnerable than, wheeled vehicles, horse cavalry’s cross-country mobility was unsurpassed. An example of a horse cavalry unit in U.S. Army service is the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division’s reconnaissance battalion, the 4th squadron of the 12th cavalry, which preceded the division’s ultimately disastrous raid into northern Poland in the summer of 2000.

In order to increase the mobility of units that lacked sufficient motorized transportation, several attempts were made to reintroduce the concept of bicycle-mounted units. Some army battalions were converted to bicycle infantry. These units often served as their parent regiment’s mobile reserve when in it was in a defensive posture.

Communication

By early 2000, with the growing scarcity of replacement components and batteries for its radios, the Army had resorted to older, slower, and more reliable methods of communication. The field telephone (often simple, sound powered units) became increasingly important, especially in cantonments and other fixed defensive positions. The use of runners and dispatch riders- sometimes local civilians- to convey messages also became common as radios broke down or wore out. In a few cases, attempts to use carrier pigeons to transport messages between distant cantonments were made. Many AFVs operated without functioning radio units. Often, those AFVs with functioning radios were assigned to unit commanders. Although accurate statistics are difficult to collect from this period, a ratio of 3 to 1 (three inoperable radios to every functioning one) seems reasonable. In this regard, as in many others, the Army of 2000 had more in common with the Army in the first two World Wars than it did with the Army of just a half a decade earlier.

Mail deliveries between the troops on campaign and the folks back in the United States all but ceased in late 1998. Telephone calls and e-mails home had stopped cold prior to that, following the TDM. A drastic decrease in morale soon followed this breakdown in personal communication. As a result, increased space on the few flights and freighters between the foreign fronts and “back home” was devoted to carrying personal mail. Distribution in the field was a nightmare and many pieces of corresponded ended up in various dead-letter offices. Nonetheless, just the impression that the Army was making significant efforts to deliver the mail had a positive effect on the morale of the troops in the field.

Replacement Personnel

By late 1998, the flow of replacement troops from the United States slowed to a trickle. Those troops that did arrive in the ETO were poorly trained and marginally equipped with heavy weapons. Supply simply could not keep up with demand. Heavy combat losses could not be replaced at anything approaching a 1 for 1 basis. If fact, only about 10% of all combat losses from mid 1998 were replaced by American troops from the CONUS. Battlefield commanders were forced to find replacement combat troops from among the thousands of rear echelon soldiers already in theater. By 2000, this pool was considerably smaller than it had been in the war’s first two years. In many cases, rear echelon troops had suffered more from tactical nuclear strikes against the operational rear areas than front line combat troops had.

First to be pulled for front line duty were the pilots and ground crew of air force and army units who, due to aircraft losses and the scarcity of fuel and spare parts for what few aircraft remained, found themselves surplus to requirements. Then dedicated air defense troops who, by mid 1998, had largely lost their raison de etre, were drafted into Army units. Finally beached navy personnel, their ships destroyed or damaged beyond repair in the fierce fleet and small unit actions of 1997 and ’98, were called upon to serve in ground combat formations (when local circumstances permitted, navy personnel were usually assigned as replacements for “local” marine infantry units). Although some naval infantry and Air Force field units were formed during the Twilight War’s later years, these units were usually relatively small. The majority of surplus Air Force and Navy personnel were integrated into existing Army units. By early 2000 around 35% of all divisional personnel were former Air Force, Navy, and Army aviation and air defense troops.

Another method for increasing the fighting strength of American ground combat units was reducing the amount of time wounded servicemen (and women) spent convalescing before returning to active duty. Soldiers who in previous wars would have been sent home with a “million dollar wound” were cycled back into combat units. Soldiers with more serious wounds- those missing limbs, for example- were often assigned to logistics services. In order to maintain unit cohesion and morale, recuperated troops were placed back in their original parent unit whenever possible.

After 1997, it became increasingly common to encounter troops from allied militaries serving in American combat units. Field commanders, desperate for experienced manpower, often made little or no effort to return stranded allied personnel (often wounded troops returning to duty after receiving treatment in American medical facilities) to their original units. Although many of these men deserted and returned to their own forces when the opportunity presented itself, hundreds (if not thousands) of allied troops elected to remain in their assigned American units after developing strong bonds with their new American comrades in arms. Therefore, it was not uncommon to meet British and German soldiers serving in American units (and vice-versa). Less common, but also present in American fighting units by 2000, were Canadians, Danes, Dutch, and even Australian troops.

In addition to allied troops, some former enemy troops were also eventually incorporated into U.S. army units. Enemy defectors were often employed as translators and guides. POW camps throughout the ETO were canvassed for enemy combat personnel deemed safe/stable enough to be employed as laborers or supply troops. As time wore on, many of these defectors and former prisoners found their way into combat formations. By 2000, it was not unusual to encounter former enemy combatants serving in U.S. Army line infantry units. Although there were some notable exceptions, for the most part, former enemy soldiers were assimilated piecemeal into existing American units rather than being organized wholesale into nationally homogenous “foreign legions”.

This fresh infusion of military personnel, a large proportion of which was relatively untrained and inexperienced in ground combat, was still not nearly enough to replace the devastating losses suffered by combat units. In order to free up more American soldiers for combat duty, rear echelon troops had to be culled for combat replacements. More and more duties traditionally fulfilled by rear-echelon troops were turned over to local civilian volunteers. Most supply production and distribution duties were entrusted to local civilian “contactors”. In some cases where volunteers were not forthcoming, civilians were “conscripted”. Field commanders who were able to recruit and employ willing civilian workers in these essential noncombat tasks were able to significantly increase the fighting ability of their units.

On occasion, some of these civilian laborers joined the units to which they were attached on campaign outside of the cantonment. In some respects, these collections of civilian logistics and support workers resembled the baggage trains and camp followers of armies through the Napoleonic Wars.

Organization

By 2000, most United States army and Marine divisions were operating at around a third of their authorized operational strengths, oftentimes much less. This posed numerous organizational and operational complications for field commanders. In many cases, shattered brigades were disbanded and their surviving personnel used as replacements for other units. The number of maneuver battalions in each brigade was often reduced. Infantry companies routinely operated at around pre-war TOE platoon strength. Most armored brigades contained only enough functional MBTs to equip a single tank battalion. Due to heavy losses in IFVs and APCs, mechanized infantry divisions were often forced to reequip at least one of their brigades with trucks, some of which were lightly armored by field depots. Wherever possible, captured enemy vehicles were used to supplement the dwindling supplies of domestically manufactured vehicles and were often organized into separate units. For example, a mechanized infantry battalion might contain one company mounted in M2 Bradley IFVs, another in M113 APCs, and a third equipped with captured BMP-2s. As with combat personnel, allied AFVs were often claimed by American units. For example, in July of 2000, the U.S. 2nd Marine Division listed a former Bundeswehr Leopard III on its rolls.

In order to mislead enemy military intelligence as to NATO units’ actual strengths, and to provide whatever morale boost divisional identity and tradition may have given its members, divisional designations were maintained.

Late in the Twilight War, Divisional, brigade, and regimental HQs routinely operated with reduced staffs. Battalions, companies, and platoons were often commanded by officers of lower grade than the units’ established TOEs called for. Many platoons were commanded by NCOs. Field commissions were granted in abundance but the Army bureaucracy was so broken down that many of those commissions were never officially recognized.

Morale

Following years of nearly constant fighting, reduced supplies, and little to no contact with the folks back home, morale in the U.S. Army of 2000 was understandably low. Efforts were made to boost the troops’ morale, increase their fighting spirit, and discourage desertion.

After the nuclear exchanges, USO shows and other official morale-boosting entertainments all but ceased. Enterprising morale officers took stock of local talent and recruited musicians, actors, comedians, and other performers from among their parent units to stage improvised shows for the troops. After the TDM, leaves were by and large dispensed with. Most major leave centers had been destroyed by nuclear strikes and small groups of unarmed troops were no longer safe travelling the roads between surviving population centers. This removal of even the temporary respite of a hard-earned leave no doubt led to a widespread decrease in morale. Unit commanders had to get creative. Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) centers offering bathing facilities, clean sheets, food, drink, games, and other entertainments were set up in cantonment rear areas to provide some relief for exhausted, battle-weary troops. In some cases, the MWR included an Army-sanctioned brothel employing local women (volunteers, for the most part) and supervised by Army health officers. As often as possible, troops were rotated through these MRWs in an attempt to improve morale.

As their predecessors had done for centuries, unit chaplains also played an important role in helping to maintain morale. Whether officiating over religious services, administering the last rights, or simply providing the troops with someone to talk to, most chaplains worked hard to improve their charges’ sagging morale.

American propaganda officers made great use of the fact that dozens of American cities had been destroyed, and millions of civilians killed, by Soviet nuclear strikes. “Remember the TDM” (Thanksgiving Day Massacre) became a slogan frequently employed to demonize the communist enemy and rouse American troops’ fighting spirits. To a lesser extent, the idea that soldiers were fighting for freedom and democracy- the “American Way of Life”- against a godless, totalitarian regime bent on world domination also motivated many of the more idealistic troops to fight on. The cantonment, with its strong sense of community involvement and belonging, also acted as a pull-factor to keep soldiers from deserting. Many soldiers continued to fight more to defend their local cantonment than to defend their distant homeland.

Despite the Army’s best efforts, desertion became an increasing problem and field commanders were given extended latitude in dealing with deserters. Desertion was discouraged to some extent by geography. Outside CONUS, most American troops were unfamiliar with the language and culture of their surroundings. The sense of being a stranger in a strange land probably went a long way in maintaining unit cohesion. The cantonment offered a tangible sense of community and belonging to the troops who lived, worked, and fought there. Tales of cutthroat marauders* roaming the areas outside most cantonments also discouraged some would-be deserters.

*In nearly all cases, marauders were said to have been enemy deserters or local bandits. Reports of American or NATO marauder bands were generally suppressed as much as possible.

Nonetheless, officers had to contend with the slow but steady loss of fighting manpower to desertion. Over time, the Army developed a carrot- and-stick approach to discourage desertion. From time to time, amnesties were offered to deserters (the message being delivered by air-dropped leaflets and vehicle-mounted loudspeakers). Floggings and firing squads acted as the stick. Many units saw a return to corporal and capital punishment for a range of offenses, desertion foremost among them. Discipline was usually left up to the division commander and some deservedly earned a reputation for strict and sometimes brutal enforcement.

Skyrocketing suicide rates also slowly sapped the fighting strength of units in the field. A sense of dislocation, news of the massive civilian casualties back home, the traumatic experience of combat and the widespread sense that the war would never end led many troops to depths of despair. The Army in the field simply did not have the resources to provide mental health services to the growing number of troops dealing with PTSD and other psychological problems. Despite the Army’s best efforts to raise morale, many soldiers decided that death was the only way out of a horrific and hopeless situation.

In most cases, however, soldiers kept fighting for the same reason soldiers have continued to fight under miserable circumstances for millennia- they fought for their buddies.

[kato13]

This seems perfect for a handout so I attached it as an rtf file.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Raellus

In most cases, however, soldiers kept fighting for the same reason soldiers have continued to fight under miserable circumstances for millennia- they fought for their buddies.

A very nice piece of work, Raellus. I agree with others that this would make a very good, very tidy introduction to Twilight: 2000 for new players.


Webstral