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#1
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Were the "new" divisions formed before, or after, the nukes started? I could easily see the Army figuring they were heading into a full-on conventional war between late '96 and into '97, and taking the time to form a division HQ and support troops, then tying them together with existing NG brigades and reserve service units. If the brigades have trained together, then that's at least halfway to an effective division, and there should have been attempts to have the divisions train together before heading across the Atlantic.
According to USAVG, the 44th had 2 months+ between formation and deployment. I'd bet the brigades had been federalized and had some refresher training before then, and more time for training together before shipping out. Anyway, as far as rear-area jobs for independent units, I'm sure that SACEUR worked out that the Germans were going to handle most rear-area jobs, and he needed heavy divisions up front more than armor in the rear.
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My Twilight claim to fame: I ran "Allegheny Uprising" at Allegheny College, spring of 1988. |
#2
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The NG was federalized in Fall '96, so when the decision is taken to form the new divisions, their components are already on active duty. SACEUR needs more divisions at the front lines than he needs rear-area security (which the Germans and Dutch are providing). Remember that in wartime, no plan survives first contact, so when it was becoming obvious that new divisions were needed, fast, the decision was made to form them out of existing ARNG brigades.
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Treat everyone you meet with kindness and respect, but always have a plan to kill them. Old USMC Adage |
#3
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The independent brigades were always intended for economy of force operations or to be used to reinforce a division for a specific task. They were to be treated as corps-level assets, the same way that the field artillery brigades were, that something extra that a corps commander could through in...
In the 1985-1990 timeframe, the Army deployed one infantry brigade (Berlin), one understrength infantry brigade (Panama), one infantry brigade in Alaska (this was being used to form up the 6th Infantry Division), a air cavalry combat brigade (Ft Hood, Texas), one armored brigade (Ft Knox, Kentucky), one mechanized infantry brigade (Ft Benning Georgia). For the Regular Army thats 6 independent Brigades supporting 12 active Divisions. For the National Guard, the picture is 9 infantry brigades (2 are roundout), 6 mechanized infantry brigades (3 are roundout), and 3 armored brigades (1 roundout). A total of 12 brigades (6 more are roundout), supporting 10 reserve Divisions. The Army Reserve deployed 1 mechanized and 2 infantry brigades. While a independent brigade can be used to form a division, the process still took two years before the 6th Infantry was up and running and one of its brigades was still a National Guard roundout brigade, ditto with the 10th Mountain Division. Forming up brigades into ad-hoc divisions, doubtful that it could be done within canon timeline. It would be more likely that as the various brigades were federalized, that they would be shipped to Korea, Persian Gulf, Germany and Canada and used in their doctrine roles until losses had mounted to such an extreme that the brigades would be either broken up as replacements, or plugged into existing divisions, allowing the division to "mothball" a brigade and reinforce the remaining brigades. |
#4
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I think you'd be amazed at how fast things can move when there's nukes flying about....
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If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem |
#5
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Any old group of troops can be thrown together and called a division. A combat-capable division is specialized creature. Like any living thing, a division requires the availability of certain nutrients. A division headquarters contains certain specialists without whom the operations of the division are negatively affected entirely out of proportion to the numbers of the specialists. In WW2, it took the US Army a year to build a new division from scratch, while the component regiments required a fraction of that time.
That much being said, I agree with Leg that niceties of TO&E go out the window once the mushroom clouds start forming. A two-star or senior one-star gets put in charge and is handed an inadequate bag of C3I troops with the instructions to make the godamned best of it. Perhaps some of the corps-level C3I folks are reassigned to the new division. In any event, we are talking about a world war leading to a nuclear war. Despite the tendency of peacetime militaries to demand that circumstances adapt to military bureaucracy, once the balloon goes up reality intervenes quickly. There is another good reason not to have a basket of separate combat brigades reporting directly to a corps headquarters. Commanders can only juggle so many balls effectively. Napoleon's armies enjoyed many of their early triumphs because he instituted the division level of command; he had subordinate commanders controlling brigade-sized units instead of managing them all himself or creating a number of ad hoc and differently sized commands. The same rules apply today. Webstral |
#6
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All valid arguments; I'm just pointing out that the US Army of the 1980s/90s had a plan to use divisions and brigades for specific purposes. I don't believe that divisions would have been formed from the independent brigades. Too many were tasked with specific missions, reinforcement of Korea, deployment to Alaska in case of invasion, at least two of the National Guard brigades had defensive missions in case of war with Mexico. And so on.
Simply plugging three Natonal Guard brigades from as many different states, calling it a armored division and then tossing it into the hell of Central Europe in the middle of WWIII, is, in my own opinion, just asking for a diaster. |
#7
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Which is exactly what the world was dealing with at the time.
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If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem |
#8
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Whilst I realise that it was impossible to cover every unit, I always found it a bit odd that the US Army Vehicle Guide overlooked the 177th Armoured Brigade.
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Author of the unofficial and strictly non canon Alternative Survivor’s Guide to the United Kingdom |
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