Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars

[dragoon500ly]

In 1870, the army's Ordnance Department held field trials of various rifles and carbines to replace the mismash of Civil War relics that armed the troops. The army sought a weapon that was reliable and used a single-shot system rather than the newer repeaters due to manufacturing cost. The initial ninety entrys from such makers Elliott, Freeman, Mauser, Peabody and Spencer were narrowed down to four: The Remington rolling block; the sliding breech block Sharps; the trapdoor Springfield and the bolt-action Ward Burton. The final selection was made by the 1872 board presided by General Alfred Terry and including Major Marcus Reno as a member. The board's decision was announced on May 5,1873 by the secretary of war.

The Model 1873 Springfield Carbine in .45/55 caliber was the winner. It was a single-shot, breech-loading carbine that measured 41.3 inches in length and weighed 6.9 pounds. Its .45-caliber cartridge used a copper-case loaded with 55 grains of black powder and an effective range of 300 yards and a maximum range of 1,000 yards. A properly trained cavalryman could fire his carbine at 15 rounds per minute. The Seventh was issued the M1873 prior to the 1874 Black Hills Expedition. The Springfield would remain the basic weapon of the army until its replacement by the Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifle in 1892.

The troopers were also issued the Model P 1872 Colt single-action revolver which was chosen because of its simpler operation, stronger parts and reliability. This .45-caliber weapon had a 7.5-inch barrel, fired six metallic cartridges loaded with 28 grains of black powder and had an effective range of 60 yards.


At the Battle of the Little Big Horn, the troopers of the Seventh were issued 100 rounds of carbine ammunition, half carried in their saddle bags and half carried in issue ammo boxes holding 28 rounds or in the new "prairie belts" that held 50 rounds (the prairie belt was a leather belt with leather thimble loops sewed on). A disadvantage of the prairie belt was the interaction of the chemicals used in the tanning process interacting with the copper cases, resulting in deposits on the cartridge. The trooper was also issued 24 rounds for his revolver, six in the weapon and 18 carried in a small pouch on his belt.

Contrary to Hollywood/TV, the frontier trooper did not carry his issue saber into the field. The saber was a heavy, cumbersome and noisy weapon that was merely an ornament for the parade field. Only one officer, 1st Lt Charles DeRudio, who had served as a cavalryman in Europe, carried his saber into LBH.

In the years since 1876, there has been a stream of debates about the malfunctions of the Springfield carbine. The primary cause was the use of copper cases, combined with a defective extractor mechanism and simple dirt, could cause the base of the cartridge to be torn away when the block was opened. This would leave the body of the cartridge stuck inside the firing chamber, requiring the use of a pocket knife or horseshoe nail to pry the cylinder out prior to reloading and firing. While this is a known problem, just how bad was this defect at LBH?

The best source is the 1983-1986 archaelogical survey conducted by Dr. Richard A. Fox . A study of recovered .44/55-caliber cartridge casings confirmed that very few displayed evidence of pry or scratch marks. On the Custer portion of the battlefield only 3 of 88 casings showed any evidence of pry marks. On the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, out of 257 casings, only 7 showed evidence of prying. Based on this sample, it appears that malfunction caused by the carbines jamming was, at best, minimal and therefore cannot be considered to be a factor in the defeat.

There is another possibility in that the men simply ran out of carbine ammunition, Each trooper only carried 50 rounds in his cartridge belt. The additional 50 rounds in his saddle bags were lost when the Indians stampeded the horses. Fifty rounds fired in the heat of battle could be expended in a very short period of time. The Colt revolvers, with their 24 rounds of ammo, would not have lasted long.

Remember that Custer dispatched an urgent message to the pack train asking that the regimental ammo reserve be brought forward. There is a possibility that rather than jamming carbines, the real cause of Custer's defeat is that his men simply ran out of ammunition.

This would also explain why Custer's command was strung out along Battle Ridge instead of being formed into a compact defensive position. The companies to the south, may have been trying to hold open a corridor for the pack train and the ammunition reserve.

[dragoon500ly]

One of the enduring myths of LBH is that the Indians were armed with Winchester rifles and that this allowed them to overwhelm Custer's Battalion under the sheer weight of their firepower. At LBH the Indians were armed with weapons ranging from warclubs, bows and arrows, lances, knives, tomahawks and a wide array of old and new firearms. The Indians obtained their firearms through a variety of means ranging from trade, gun running, capture from enemies, or issued by the US government for hunting purposes.

The archaeological excavations of the battlefield, starting in 1983 recovered cartridge casings from 45 different makes of firearms used by 371 different individuals. This evidence confirms that the Indians were in possession of Spencers, Sharps, Smith & Wessens, Evans, Forehand & Wadworths, Remingtons, Henrys, Starrs, Winchesters, Maynards and Enfields, as well as Springfields and Colts captured from the cavalry.

An intresting view on the weapons used by the Indians came from the last survivor of the battle, Private Charles Windolph, a Medal of Honor winner with Company H. Windolph stated that at least half of of the Indians were armed with bows and arrows, another quarter were armed with old muzzleloaders and single-hot rifles, and the remainder were armed with repeaters.

Major Marcus Reno stated in his Court of Inquiry that "the Indians had Winchester rifles and the column made a large target for them and they were pumping bullets into it." The Winchester was THE weapon of choice of the Indians whenever they could get get their hands on it.

The Winchester Model 1866 fired a .44-caliber, 200-grain bullet with 28 grains of black powder. It had a magazine capacity of seventeen rounds and had an effective range of 100 yards and a maximum range of about 400 yards. Its main advantage was its high rate of fire of 34rpm, compared to the 17rpm of the Springfield.

Indian tactics called for the warriors to remain hidden a safe distance away while they fired an endless barrage of arrows at the cavalrymen. Add to the arrow barrage the favored Indian tactic of infiltrating as close as possible to the cavalry and then using the awesome short range firepower of the Winchester...this allowed them to acheive complete fire-superiority over the cavalry.

[mikeo80]

What I find the most unusual tale of June 26, 1876, is the note sent by GAC via Pvt John Martin to Captain Benteen.

GAC commanded 5 companies of the 7th Cav
Reno commanded 3
Benteen commanded 3
One company was with the pack train.

WHAT IF.....

Benteen had not been ordered by GAC to scout the left flank, instead stay with Reno, and the pack train to form a more compact unit.

Could the 7 Companies do more than the 5 with Custer?

Hard to tell. Reno and Benteen fought for 2 days once reunited until reinforced by Terry. Probably would have made no difference on "Last Stand Hill"...But one of those little "what if's" of history

[dragoon500ly]

WHAT IF.....

Benteen had not been ordered by GAC to scout the left flank, instead stay with Reno, and the pack train to form a more compact unit.

Could the 7 Companies do more than the 5 with Custer?

Hard to tell. Reno and Benteen fought for 2 days once reunited until reinforced by Terry. Probably would have made no difference on "Last Stand Hill"...But one of those little "what if's" of history

A more intresting "what if" is if Major Reno had not been present. In this case Benteen would have had the command of the valley fight. While everyone notes that Benteen hated Custer, nobody disputes Benteen's willigness to fight. Would he have paused halfway down the valley and go on the defensive? Or would he have driven his charge home and completed the scatter of the Indians?

[weswood]

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads?

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by weswood

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads?

Wouldn't know. During the Civil War a Infantry Company was divided into two platoons. There really wasn't such a thing as squads if I remember the organization. It was more or less ad hoc below. One has to remember tactics still weren't much more advance in lining the companies in lines of two, hence two platoons and then fire at each other....

[Abbott Shaull]

Looking at the numbers that are present per company, the Cavalry had two Platoons. The thing is they had 5 Sergeants after the company First Sergeant. Usually the 1st Lt commanded the 1st Platoon and the 2nd Lt commanded the 2nd Platoon. The senior Sergeant was usually teamed with 2nd Lt platoon and the next senior would be with the First Lt platoon. If IIRC the Corporals would at time act more like E-5 of today Squad Leaders.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by weswood

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads?

In 1874, the US Army adopted a new tactics manual, authored by Emory Upton. Prior to this time, each regiment generally used thier own, unique version, based on their colonel's experience. The Upton manual did away with this and brought the army a common system of drill. Another advantage of the Upton manual is that it took into account the increasing use of the breech-loading and repeating carbines.

As part of this change, Upton introduced the "set of fours" as the basic tactical unit. Also referred to as a squad, the set of fours allowed for simplified operations, increased speed, and eliminated cumbersome maneuvers.

Platoons, at least as we know them today, did not exist. If a smaller unit was needed, then the company was split into two even parts and these were called platoons. The company would often be split into platoons for the dismounted skirmish role, since Upton called for each company to maintain a small reserve. One platoon skirmished while the other platoon stood ready to reinforce the skirmish line, restock ammo, or mount charges to restore the line.

Skirmish tactics called for the cavalry to fight dismounted and deployed in a line with every 4th trooper acting as horse-holder for the rest of the set of fours. Skirmishers deployed with 5 yards between each trooper and 15 yards between each set of fours. The commander could order a wider or closer interval, depending on the situation.

When ordered to engage, the odd-numbered men would fire first and start reloading, then the even-numbered men would fire and reload, this would continue until the command to cease fire was given. Dismounted skirmishers would stand or kneel to fire as they thought best, they could even seek cover, but not at the expense of firepower. The skirmish line could deliver direct or oblique fire as needed.

Within the battalion organization, "wings" could be used, at the commander's discreation. The companies would be organized according to their commander's seniority. The Custer battalion, based on Indian testimony, operated in two wings. The Right Wing consisted of Companies C, I and L, with Captain Myles Keogh commanding. The Left Wing consisted of Companies E and F with Captain George Yates commanding.

Just as a note, some authors group the wings differently, and even split up one company to bring the wings "up to equal strength". The Upton manual, allows for wings of different sizes and a company would never be broken up this manner.

[Abbott Shaull]

Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.

Yeah I would say it probably more lack of resupply of ammo, in combination with some reckless tactics, and some disregard of orders (depending on how you look at it). It kinda like reading one of those Second from disaster shows. Not one thing in particular may have led to a lost battle, but enough incidents happen during a timeline that led to failure.

I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.

On a side note, same Lt. Colonel GAC, seems to have been suspended from command of the said regiment, and was court martial for being AWOL due to the fact he went to see his wife.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.

100 rounds per rifle wasn't far off "official issue" numbers in WWII.

[mikeo80]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.

I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.

Major Reno was court martialed for "improper advancements on a fellow officer's wife" in 1877.

What the press did to him is very familiar to what happens today if a military officer "gets out of line".

[dragoon500ly]

When you look at the available ammo loadout, you need to consider the means of transport. The typical cavalry mount has a useful load of 240 pounds. Attached is a list of equipment to be carried by a trooper for a five day patrol.

Halter: 2lbs 1oz
Watering Bridle: 1lb, 1.5oz
Bridle: 2lbs 13oz
Saddle: 14lbs 13.5oz
Saddle Bags: 2lbs 2oz
Filling of near side pouch of saddle bags,
10lbs of rations with meat in the can: 11lbs 2 oz
Filling of off side pouch of saddle bags,
1pr socks, 1 pr drawers, 2 shirts, 40rds carbine ammo, toilet articles: 7lbs 8
oz
Forage Sack with 15lbs of oats: 15lbs 6oz
Lariat and pin: 3lbs 1.5oz
Overcoat: 4lbs 6.5oz
Brush and shoe pouch: 1lb
Near-side pocket, curry comb and brush: 1lb
Off-side pocket, 2 horseshoes, 15 shoe nails: 2lbs
Saddle cover: 1lb
Surcingle: 11.5oz
Saber & slings: 4lbs 13oz
Waist belt and plate: 1lb
Pistol and holster: 3lbs 2oz
Carbine sling and swivel: 10lbs 4 oz
Carbine cartridge box: 1lb
24rds carbine ammo in box: 2lbs
Pistol cartridge pouch: 4oz
12rds pistol ammo in pouch: 14oz
Man: 140lbs

Total weight: 240lbs 12.5oz

As you can see, there is not a lot of room for extra gear, this is perhaps the major reason why the saber was left in garrision, that 4lbs and 13oz translates allowed for extra carbine/pistol ammo.

[dragoon500ly]

I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.

Reno called for and was granted a Court of Inquiry, this court was little more than a dog-and-pony show, carried out by career military officers who wanted nothing more than to white-wash the entire LBH episode. Aided by the effort by the Seventh's remaining officers to avoid disgrace the unit. Their stories differed from reports made at the time, the only testimony against Reno was made by several of the civilian packers whose testimony was dismissed.

The finding of the court was as follows: "The conduct of the officers throughout was excellent, and while subordinates, in some instances, did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion (criticism or censure) from this Court."

It was later discovered that one of the Courts officers Colonel Wesley Merritt had "closeted with the Recorder alone for several hours, and, it is understood, did most of the work of the decision, the Recorder having no voice save to present the case on trial."

Merritt had hated Custer since their days in the Cavalry Division of the Army of the Potomac and there was little doubt among the handful of Custer supporters that he had taken full advantage to blacken the name of his old rival.