Fiddle's Green

[dragoon500ly]

One of the main reasons that the T-55 was kept in service in the Warsaw Pact countries is that, for its environment, it was a good tank. The perceived battle ground of West Germany has a lot of terrain that doesn't allow for long range tank sniping. One NATO study gives an average range of 900 meters, well within effective range of the 100mm main gun. The Soviets (and the WP) trained for short range engagements, where whoever gets the first round off, wins the fight. They also used an intresting gunnery technique that compensated for the poor fire control system.

You see, the Russians do not practise one-on-one engagements.

What they practise is platoon-on-one engagements. A typical four-tank platoon would start with the platoon leader's tank calling out his estimated range and firing. The second tank in the platoon, would call out their adjustment and fire, then the third and fourth tanks would repeat the process. With four tanks engaging, the assumption is that the NATO tank would find itself overwhelmed by targets and forced into breaking off its engagement by firing its smoke grenades or abandoning its fighting position, thus allowing the Soviet platoon to close the range and negate the superior NATO fire control systems.

It was only with the issue of the new generation of laser-rangefinders and digital computers that NATO was able to come with a counter to this technique.

As for a lot of the T-55s poor rep...it has a lot to do with the Middle East Wars of 1967 and 1973...the T-55 was used in an environment that allowed for long range sniping by tanks as well as terrain that features dunes and sharper hills than those found in the Central Russian steppes. Here the numerous design flaws of the T-5s were brought into view and ruthlessly exploited by the IDF.

[Abbott Shaull]

That and the pure numbers of T-55s produced. Yeah, it always been the Soviets goal attempt to overwhelm an enemy tank with the numbers games.

[dragoon500ly]

And why not...it worked in the World War II and the Russians have also been big fans of don't mess with a working method.

[dragoon500ly]

Was websearching and came across a fansite; one of the postings was a modified US OOB for Twilight 2000. In this OOB, the writer had several units activated; now some of them I can understand, like reactivating the 4th Armored Division and sending it to the Persian Gulf; reactivating ACRs like the 10th and 14th and sending one to Europe and one to the Persian Gulf. Okay, gives some badly needed firepower for the XVIII Airborne and I Amphibious Corps....

But it was his reactivation of the 11th, 13th and 17th Airborne Divisions that raised an eyebrow. I know I'm going to start a major flame war, but this is my opinion; the age of throwing airborne divisions into major operations via transport aircraft ended with World War Two. Nowdays, the "Airborne" portion simply means that the division has strategic mobility via the Air Force. I feel that Desert Storm simply confirmed that while it is very easy to transport several thousand paratroopers to a distant theater, their ability to project power is limited to how far they can march in a day. This is the major drawback of the light divisions and the reason why the US Army is moving to the medium division format. Light Divisions are to light to project power and Heavy Divisions tie up too much strategic sealift in sending them to the area of operations.

Now, by no means am I slamming the Light fighters, I have the deepest respect for them, I am simply questioning their ability to project power. Tactically, they have a range of about 30 miles, they do not have the ability to transport enough supplies to sustain operations without the assignment of transportation companies. They truely are a case of "too little tail, not enough teeth."

Now I have strapped on my flame-proof longjohns, put on my SCBA....FLAME AWAY!

[Adm.Lee]

No argument from me, at least as far as new divisions.

I like an idea that I remember reading in Patton's "War as I knew it," in which he recommended a parachute regiment for each Army, for quick-grab operations, like a bridge in the enemy rear. With the advent of helicopters, I think some kind of air-assault unit on call for a corps or army commander would be a handy force-multiplier.

I point out that the Soviets apparently agreed, and there was an air-assault brigade assigned to each Front, and another for the Shock Army/Tank Armies that were supposed to be the breakthrough and exploitation forces. These were in addition to the airborne-mechanized divisions held in strategic reserve.

For me, I guess for the US, I would have liked to make that a Ranger unit (company/battalion) semi-attached to a corps' helicopter brigade. It could be dropped or choppered to some location really quickly. If not Rangers, then consider them light dragoons, and we are back to the cavalry theme of this thread.

[dragoon500ly]

I for one would like to see a "reasonable" expansion of the Ranger Program, something capable of the missions that the Ranger Battalions were intended for. While a battalion per corps may be too much, I can see two battalions assigned to each theater.

[Abbott Shaull]

Honestly the formation of 11th, 13th, and 17th Airborne Divisions to me wouldn't be much, if they were treated as holding unit with at least one of the Brigades airborne-trained and the other Air Assault/Air mobile trained. Still having a Division at Army/Army Group levels would give major command enough troops that one could move in to take Bridge or something like that as needed and allowing the Brigades enough time to train and absorb replacement in between operations. Even if these Divisions only had two Brigade Combat Teams it would still give Army Group Commanders, or UN Korea Command option they wouldn't have.

Even WWII showed a military force that got to cocky with their Airborne troops, would attempt foolishness that could only be topped by the other side couple years later. Crete and Market Garden proved the limitation. It interesting that the last airdrop in Europe was more of tactical one much similar to what today Air Assault/Air mobile troops fill in today.

I do remember that even though at time the West German Army had an HQ for their Airborne Division each of the operational Brigades were tasked to a Corps.

As for the 4th Armored along with the 10th and 14th ACR would of seemed to make sense. Especially if they were heading out to the Middle East and Korea.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

I for one would like to see a "reasonable" expansion of the Ranger Program, something capable of the missions that the Ranger Battalions were intended for. While a battalion per corps may be too much, I can see two battalions assigned to each theater.

Yeah I would think there would be some type of expansion and not likely to find the entire Regiment in the Middle East since they were suppose to operate as independent Battalions or smaller size unit during operations.