Thought of less covered arms exporter.

[Webstral]

Economics and politics are going to have as much to do with decisions regarding arms exports as perceived military needs. Exports generate hard currency. Domestic use generates government debt.

The absence of Chinese arms exports is an important factor in global demand, but more factors exist. Another important factor is anxiety about the direction the Sino-Soviet War will head. Countries around the world will ask themselves what the fighting in the Far East means to regional players affected by the Soviet and Chinese commitments, respectively. Pakistan, an important Chinese client, may well feel that the massive Chinese commitment of manpower and materiel in northeastern China may give India cause to reassess the risks and benefits of war with Pakistan. As the war drags on, Soviet clients in Africa will find that spare parts, ammunition, and technical expertise from the Soviet Union become harder to come by. Soviet clients in the Middle East will experience a similar phenomenon. In effect, the ability of Soviet clients to wage war will be affected detrimentally as the Sino-Soviet War drags on. Even if the various Soviet clients are not immediately handicapped by the departure of East Bloc technical experts and the cessation of imports of materiel, the various leaders may find that their willingness to invest their existing and perhaps irreplaceable stockpiles dimishes as the Sino-Soviet War drags on.

On the other hand, the foes of the Soviets and their clients may perceive the threat level to increase. As the flow of Soviet gear dries up and the technical experts are recalled, the Soviet clients may be more inclined to wage pre-emptive warfare (in the minds of the neighbors of the Soviet clients) in a use-it-or-lose-it modality. This thinking may inspire non-Soviet clients states to enhance readiness and accelerate armaments acquisition to ensure that no window of opportunity is perceived to be open. Naturally, the Soviet clients will be alarmed by such activity on the part of their neighbors. Are the neighbors getting ready to take advantage of the changed circumstances? All of this uncertainty will tend to lead to orders being placed with the available arms providers.

Since China will do her utmost to go into debt to the West to ensure that the West has a powerful vested interest in seeing the current regime in Beijing survives to pay the debt, the Western powers probably will have their hands full supplying China's needs througout late 1995 and 1996. This means that the regional players will have to turn to the second-string arms providers like Brazil, South Africa, and the like. Interestingly enough, this might result in countries like Brazil opening up assembly lines to produce spare parts for Soviet and Chinese arms in the hands of African and Middle Eastern customers. I think the 800-pound gorilla in the room is the course China pursues in becoming indebted to the West and how the orders for arms and ammunition are placed.

Webstral