OT; The Longest Day

[dragoon500ly]

I'm not sure if the program was written for one of the Beltway Bandits or if its was a home brewed version, I've heard rumors of both for several years.

Churchill's take on a southern landing was his notion that the "soft underbelly" of Europe would be easier to invade than the Atlantic Wall. The problem with attacking through the Balkans (Greece and Yugoslavia) was that the Allies would have been fighting through mountainious terrain with little or no critical infrastructure. And after fighting in Italy, the Chiefs-of-Staff were not ready for another mountain campaign.

The issue with an initial landing in southern France was that it too would not hurt the Germans quickly, better terrain, but still a long way to the critical points.

The Dieppe raid proved that attacking the harbors (and their defenses) would be a bloody affair. While Churchill favored the concept of the Mulberry artificial harbors, the USN view was that they could deliver more tonnage over the beaches by using large numbers of LSTs (and they were right!).

Overlord's planners were left with two basic choices, Pas de Calis was a short hop across the Channel, had favorable terrain and had the attraction of being the shortest route into Germany's industrial heartland, the Ruhr. The Germans realized this and to describe the 15th Army's defenses in PdC as "formidable" is classic understatement.

Normandy was chosen because it was a less likely target, the defenses were not as built up as PdC, there was a large port nearby (Cherbourg), the ground was well suited for building airstrips and the bocage (hedgerows) offered excellent defensive terrain against German counterattacks (and boy did that one come back to haunt the planners!).

[natehale1971]

I remember all the cons that showed how bad that a southern assault through the Balkans would have been, but I swear that I had read smowhere that the soft underbelly of Europe that Churchill was talking about was suppose to be an attack through Vichy France, using Sardina and Corsica as bases for forces to land in Southern France.

That they'd be able to push in and cut Germany off from Northern Italy and get to the Rhine, cutting German Occupation forces along the Atlantic Seaboard off from supplylines with the Fatherland. This would have been followed by the Normandy Landings when the Germans were focused on the Southern Offensive that was pushing towards the Rhine.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

I remember all the cons that showed how bad that a southern assault through the Balkans would have been, but I swear that I had read smowhere that the soft underbelly of Europe that Churchill was talking about was suppose to be an attack through Vichy France, using Sardina and Corsica as bases for forces to land in Southern France.

That they'd be able to push in and cut Germany off from Northern Italy and get to the Rhine, cutting German Occupation forces along the Atlantic Seaboard off from supplylines with the Fatherland. This would have been followed by the Normandy Landings when the Germans were focused on the Southern Offensive that was pushing towards the Rhine.

Churchill was mostly opposed to the southern France landings in August 44, as that took forces away from the Italian campaign. What he wanted was more operations in Italy and the Balkans, for two reasons. One was to block future Soviet penetration of the Balkans, the other was to try to break into Germany from the south. He spoke of the Ljubljana Gap, and sending the Eighth Army's mechanized forces (pretty formidable, actually) through there. This was his "soft underbelly."

Churchill (and several of his military chiefs) was also opposed to the Normandy landings, because they knew it was something of a gamble, and that the British Empire had only one shot at it-- their armies had been bled out, and would be losing strength over time. If it failed, they'd be unable to meaningfully affect the war. Attacking the enemy where he has strength is usually a bad idea if you have waning strength yourself.

IMO, attacking the Balkans is bad idea.This is based on some map study, and a bit of wargaming. You know those supply shortages the W.Allies had in the autumn of 1944, when Patton famously outran his supply lines? One key culprit there was the damage inflicted on the French rail net by the Allied air forces. Compare the state of the French rail net, with the air campaign, to the far less developed Balkan railnet, with bombing and Yugoslav partisans. Then add in in all of the effects of dealing with those partisans, other ethnic militias, and so on. Then add in the fact that the Allies would be pushing through mostly rough terrain, against the Germans who had proved themselves to be no slouches at defense. Result? The Soviets still get to Berlin, and France is un-liberated.

As for shooting up the Italian peninsula and making a right turn at Trieste, it could work, IMO, only if the Allies had made better northward progress before the winter of '43-44 set in, and continued to make such progress in the spring of '44. If Anzio hadn't been a stalemate for several months, maybe that could have done the trick, but it's hard to make that happen. Either way, you're again trying to shove a big armored corps through the southern foothills of the Alps to try to get to Vienna, leaving a long flank exposed to those same mountains. If you get there before the winter of '44-45, and If you can get through the "Gap," and IF you have the Americans and French to cover that flank, Maybe you get to Vienna by Christmas. And Maybe you invite the Germans to throw the forces that went to the Ardennes in December to descend on Austria instead.

What I haven't seen done, and might work in a game someday, is the part about cutting off the Germans in Italy by cutting across the top of the peninsula from the southern France landings. If those Germans are removed from the OB, then maybe a shove east could work out.

All of the above is again, my opinion as a wargamer.

[simonmark6]

Beevor holds the opinion that Churchill was wrong in his wish to attack through the Balkans and Italy and I have to say that looking at the maps I have to agree with him. He also makes the case, however, that if he hadn't persuaded the Americans to pursue the North Africa/Italy strategy in 1943, then an early D-Day might have failed when the amphibious landings would have seen the Germans in a much stronger position.

I need to look into this further, but it sounds possible to me. On the other hand, Churchill could usually be trusted to screw up tactics and strategy from his Gallipolli Adventure onward so it may well have been the case that even a stopped clock is right twice a day rather than any true strategic acumen.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by simonmark6

Beevor holds the opinion that Churchill was wrong in his wish to attack through the Balkans and Italy and I have to say that looking at the maps I have to agree with him. He also makes the case, however, that if he hadn't persuaded the Americans to pursue the North Africa/Italy strategy in 1943, then an early D-Day might have failed when the amphibious landings would have seen the Germans in a much stronger position.

I need to look into this further, but it sounds possible to me. On the other hand, Churchill could usually be trusted to screw up tactics and strategy from his Gallipolli Adventure onward so it may well have been the case that even a stopped clock is right twice a day rather than any true strategic acumen.

I'm sort of an admirer of Churchill. I like the quote by Portal or Brooke (I can't remember which) to the effect, "Winston has ten ideas before breakfast each day. My job is to sort out the 1 really bad one, and the 2 bad ones from the seven good ones before he implements them all."

IMO, his strategic instincts outstripped the capabilities of the British Empire (and the Allies), and he was reluctant to let go of things in the "nice to have, but we don't have the time or the forces to do that" categories.

To wit, Gallipoli nearly succeeded, and would have been fantastic if it had succeeded, but it didn't. It was, at least, worth trying.

Re: North Africa and the Mediterranean campaign, no less than General Marshall admitted that it was a necessity for the Allies, and that he was wrong to have opposed it. Primary evidence: suppose the US II Corps that was shattered at Kasserine Pass had been in Normandy, instead of the divisions that were there in June 1944?

[Legbreaker]

Gallipoli in principle was a brilliant idea. It's the execution that let everyone down.
It was the first time in history an amphibious operation took place on a "modern" battlefield with "repeating" (ie mag fed) rifles and machineguns. If the navigation had been on the money, if the commanders on the ground had been a bit more agressive (particularly in the area of Suvla Bay), and if there'd been a little more initiative taken at critical moments the whole thing would have been an outstanding success. Unfortunately the initial landings were in the wrong location and delays in moving inland allowed the Turks to bring in reinforcements trapping the Anzacs on the beaches and cliffs of the landing areas.

The real crime was not acknowledging it was a lost cause early on and continuing to waste men in a hopeless attempt to force the way inland against prepared positions and heavy fire.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

The real crime was not acknowledging it was a lost cause early on and continuing to waste men in a hopeless attempt to force the way inland against prepared positions and heavy fire.

That sin was a trademark of British operations throughout WW2. There was a view that if we could throw enough men at a problem we would make it go away.