Just how much hurt Soviet Artillery will bring to bear....

[ArmySGT.]

The Smallest Soviet target is a 1000 x 1000 meter grid square.

Soviets will to "Artillery Grid Search" a sort of "Recon by Fire". If they hit something and it explodes they bring the other tubes to bear.

What your missing is the Soviets have on Echelon of Command and Control Greater than NATO. The Front. NATO stops at Army to which several Divisions are attached. The Soviets go one higher with Front to which several Armies are attached.

The Doctrinal difference lies in how much East there is when looking from the West.

[dragoon500ly]

Once again FM 100-2-1 Soviet Operations and Tactics is the source...

At regiment and above, an artillery officer who plans and coordinates artillery fires serves on the staff of maneuver un it commanders. He is called the Chief of Arty (COA) at regiment and the Chief Rocket Troops and Artillery (CRTA) at division or above. While he does not command the artillery units organic or attached to his maneuver unit, he is responsible for their control. The commander of the organic artillery unit attached to the maneuver unit is directly responsible for the performance of his artillery unit.

The division CRTA controls the divisional artillery regiment, the MRL battalion, the SSM battalion, the AT battalion and the ATGM batteries, mortar batteries and howitzer battalions of the subordinate maneuver regiments, though he does not command any of these units. The CRTA also has the authority to inspect the artillery units of the division and to hold them accountable for their technical proficiency.

In combat, the artillery groups form the basic framework for the control of artillery fires in the division. Decisions about the employment of artillery are made on a centralized basis. The division commander, with recommendations from the CRTA, exercises control over all organic and allocated artillery within the division. The following procedures are observed:
1) The division commander specifies the artiller organization for combat and the tasks to be carried out by the artillery.
2) The CRTA conducts and coordinates fire planning.
3) Artillery commanders normally are collocated with the commanders of the supported maneuver force.
4) The DAG commanders report directly to the CRTA.
5) RAG commanders report directly to the supported maneuver regimental commander while retaining contact with the CRTA.
6) Artillery battery and battalion commanders keep their supported maneuver commanders informed and report to their controlling artillery headquarters.


The artillery commander normally is collocated with the commander of the maneuver unit he is supporting and therefore effects coordination face-to-face. Provisions is also made for the artillery commander to enter the VHF(FM) command net of the supported unit. Except when subunits have been detached for special missions, artillery commanders retain rigid control of the deployment of weapons and observation posts to provide continuous artillery support in all phases of combat.

Radio and wire are the primary means of communications with visual and sound devices being used as a secondary means of communications. By regulation, communications are established from senior to subordinate and from supporting units to supporting unit.

Soviet artillery units may send radio traffic over support unit command nets, artillery command nets and fire direction nets. Artillery group command nets (RAG/DAG) have battalion commanders as substations. Battalion nets have battery commanders and the battalion observation nets if required.

Towed artillery units rely on the R-107 (VHF) portable radio for internal radio communications. Self-propelled units use the R-123 (VHF) vehicular radio, which is installed in every howitzer. At higher levels of command, long-range HF (AM) radios, such as the R-130 are used.

Wire communications are used whenever subunits remain in one location for any length of time, such as when in defensive positions. To provide redundancy, artillery wire nets normally parallel the wire nets of the supported units.

The Soviets also use pyrotechnics, especially in coordinating prearranged fires with the advance of maneuver units. Signal flags are used to acknowledge fire commands at the gun positions, for convoy control and for signaling between the firing point and the truck park (prime movers and ammunition carriers) in a battery firing position.

[dragoon500ly]

Soviet field artillery is subdivided into field guns, howitzers, mortars and multiple rocket launchers. Most Soviet field artillery is towed (with the exception of the MRLs). Towed guns are lightweight, low cost and simple. Their disadvantages are their lack of cross-country mobility and the absence of crew protection from NBC and counterbattery.

Field Guns are used for killing troops in the open; destroying buildings above ground level; engaging of rapidly moving targets; bombardment of distant targets such as artillery batteries, headquarters and columns moving in the rear areas; destroying tactical nuclear delivery means.

Howitzers are used for hitting indirect targets and for destroying or neutralizing enemy defensive positions.

SP Howitzers have been introduced in recent years, enhancing the Soviet artillery's ability to give continuous support in a conventional or NBC environment. While SP howitzers are protected by light armor and NBC filtration systems, their ability to resupply ammunition is limited as they depend on wheeled vehicles for logistic support.

Multiple Rocket Launchers are used to deliver massive strikes at decisive moments in a battle. They are an excellent area coverage weapon. Their ability to coverage a large area and their rapid ripple fire make MRLs an excellent delivery system for chemical agents.

Mortars are used to provide immediate support to motor rifle regiments.

[dragoon500ly]

Conventional artillery ammunition in the Red Army consists of HE, Fragmentation and HE-Fragmentation types. HE shells are used for destroying fortifications. Fragmentation shells are used for attacking personnel and equipment in the open. HE-Fragmentation shells are fitted with fuses for either instantaneous or delayed detonation and are the standard projectiles for all guns and howitzers. A time-delay fuse is also available for airburst effects.

The impact area of fragments from one HE-Fragmentation shell are:
122mm: 800 square meters
152mm: 950 square meters

The sizes of craters caused by one HE shell varies according to the surface struck, its condition and the type of fuse used. These are average dimensions for point detonation fuzes striking flat ground:
122mm: 1.5 meters at its widest point and 0.5 meters maximum depth.
152mm 1.5 meters at its widest point and 1.5 meters maximum depth.

Field artillery pieces (152mm and smaller) have an antitank capability and 10% of their basic load is armor-piercing ammunition.

Smoke is used to obscure the view from OPs and fire positions. Smoke shells are used when the wind is blowing towards or across the enemy positions. Smoke is also used for marking enemy positions and deceiving the enemy by concealing the size and direction of an attack.

Illumination rounds are used in night combat to observe enemy movements, to acquire targets for all arms and to provide reference points. The standard illumination shell lights up an area of up to 1.5 kilometers radius for 30 seconds. One gun firing 2-3 rounds per minute is required to provide continuous illumination for every 750-1,000 meters. Other types of ammunition include: Nuclear, HE rocket assisted projectiles, chemical, incendiary, canister and propaganda.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by ArmySGT.

What your missing is the Soviets have on Echelon of Command and Control Greater than NATO. The Front. NATO stops at Army to which several Divisions are attached. The Soviets go one higher with Front to which several Armies are attached.

Not so much-- the Soviets didn't use corps HQs as a rule. Armies were 4 or 5 divisions, plus supporting arms, with no intervening corps. A front was usually 3 armies, reinforceable to 5, plus an air army. NATO used corps of 2-4 divisions, with an army HQ controlling 3-5 corps.

[ArmySGT.]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

Not so much-- the Soviets didn't use corps HQs as a rule. Armies were 4 or 5 divisions, plus supporting arms, with no intervening corps. A front was usually 3 armies, reinforceable to 5, plus an air army. NATO used corps of 2-4 divisions, with an army HQ controlling 3-5 corps.

Still a Corps is smaller than a Army, In addition it is coordination of Asset between Armies, with yet another level of assigned logistic and support assets. In addition to another layer of Artillery and Rocket forces that can be moved from Army to Army.

A level of coordination that would be like a having a five star general on each Front with Staff and more.

[HorseSoldier]

Soviet Armies tended to have four divisions, NATO Corps probably average three when looked at from the big picture level -- but this is somewhat misleading, since NATO divisions and corps tend to be bigger than Soviet/WP divisions and armies. The two are essentially identical echelons -- in Soviet usage a Corps was an oversized division, and so isn't a one for one counterpart to a NATO Corps.

[Grimace]

I've heard various stories (don't know how many are true), from either people IN World War 2 or people who had fathers who served in WW2. I even heard from people who knew Germans in WW2. Pretty much everything I've heard supports one common thought between U.S. and Soviet artillery.

U.S. artillery was very effective at what it did. It "seemed" like a lot because it was accurate and therefore effective. The Soviets, on the other hand, had a MASSIVE amount of artillery. It wasn't as effective as U.S. artillery, but it didn't have to be. Where the Americans used 4-5 guns to do something and do it with less shots, the Soviets used 20-30 guns to do it. The Soviets used more rounds, but eventually they accomplished the same thing.

I have a feeling that, based on the Soviets WW2 experience, they kept that same principle of thought for their artillery. I'm friends with a Marine that was in Artillery while in the USMC. While he was in, he was all gung-ho and "we'll kick their ass" and the U.S. was the biggest, baddest mamma-jamma out there. Now that he's been out a while, he admits that the biggest threat to them was the sheer quantity of the Soviet equipment. Sure, they could counter-battery two, or even three Soviet batteries pretty quickly (in practice), but there was so much Soviet artillery they were pretty sure they'd have to vacate their position pretty quickly or the numerical superiority would eventually zero in on them.

That's all it takes. Sure the U.S. can do a lot with their pieces, but the Soviets could do a lot with all their pieces as well. NATO would take out their fair share and then some, but the sheer size of the Soviet artillery branch would eventually leave them with artillery cover.

I, personally, don't view arial counter-battery to be all that effective against something like the Soviet army. Oh, it'll work some, but the Soviet ADA as well as the rather massive Soviet Air Force would make most arial counter-battery would likely turn into a pretty big blood bath for BOTH sides.

The biggest question mark for the whole thing is how much of a drain the Chinese front would be. Would it be enough to reduce the artillery forces in the West? Somehow I doubt that the Soviets woud weaken themselves against a more modern, possibly even more aggresive enemy in the West to fight a mostly foot army in the East. If China ever made a strong push into the USSR proper, then I could see a much greater amount of power being drawn the from West and pushed into the East.

[dragoon500ly]

The artillery organization of the Soviets has developed to meet two conflicting requirements, responsiveness and centralization. In order to meet the needs for the breakthrough attack, centralization of all artillery assets is required. At the same time, the mobile battle and the meeting engagements requires a rapid response. At every level from battalion up, the Soviets provide the support needed by the commander to accomplish these two goals.

The NATO response to these two requirements is to adopt a flexible system, in which a single forward observer can direct all artillery within range onto a single target. Furthermore, this system does not require the FO to relay his request through ever higher levels of command, but can instead, speak directly to the artillery.

First introduced in World War II, and refined in Korea and Vietnam, this type of organization allows for an incredibly short response time, a US forward observer can expect the first rounds to be falling on target within 100 seconds. With a battery dedicated to a specific unit, this response time can be shortened even further to as little as 38 seconds.

The Soviets are well aware of this system, but they have made the decision not to use it. Their belief that the NATO system's almost total reliance on radio communications will fail under the power of Soviet electronic warfare. NATO's fire control system will also be vulnerable to the EMP effects of nuclear weapons and finally they realize the difficultly of using a microphone while wearing a NBC suit or a protective mask.

The Soviet emphasis on centralization of artillery planning at regimental and divisional level does not allow for the NATO system. Its use by the Soviets would impose an incredible strain in terms of the numbers of forward observers, radios and technicians to support it.

The above is based on FM 100-2-1 and "Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army".

[dragoon500ly]

based on the FM 100-series and Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army.

The artillery offensive is intended to suppress enemy defenses before and during an attack and precedes the assault units as they advance from one objective to another. It may be combined with air strikes and NBC weapons (if needed). It strength and duration depend on the time available to prepare the offensive; the type of attack being launched as well as other factors.

In the attack from march, artillery support is limited and will often be provided by the battalion's mortars or by the regiment's howitzer battalion in the direct-fire role. The artillery offensive becomes more refined in support of the hasty attack, and increases in its sophistication, duration and size up to the breakthrough attack when the Soviets will mass the fire of 80-100 guns and expend 10,000-20,000 shells per kilometer of frontage.

Reconnaissance and target acquisition will precede the artillery offensive. For a hasty attack, the artillery will rely on the reports of reconnaissance patrols or troops in contact to identify targets. A breakthrough attack will be preceded by lengthy and through reconnaissance and systematic target acquisition. A detailed list of targets will be drawn up: the destruction of nuclear capable delivery systems having first priority, followed by command posts, observation posts, communications and radar centers, field and air defense artillery units, combat units in reserve positions, combat support positions and defensive strongpoints.

In the hasty attack, target identification and the allocation of guns to each target are carried out orally and on the spot, usually by the artillery regiment/battalion commander.

In the breakthrough attack, the artillery offensive will be set out in detail, with barrage plans prepared with the aid of extensive charts and formulas to calculate the number and type of shells each target will require. Typically, these plans are drawn up by the Army's Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery (ACRTA). If time does not permit, then the planning will take place at divisional or even regimental level.

Once reconnaissance and target acquisition has been completed, the artillery offensive takes place over three phases: The Preparation Phase; The Fires in Support of the Attack Phase and the Fires Through the Depths of the Defense Phase.

In a hasty attack, the preparation phase depends on the tactical situation and how quickly the artillery can deploy into its firing positions. Preparation for a hasty attack averages between 10-20 minutes while the troops form up for the attack and includes direct-fire.

In a breakthrough attack, the preparatory fires can list 40-60 minutes. All preparatory fires are halved if a nuclear strike is planned. The purpose of preparatory fires is to suppress enemy defenses; disorganize command and control; neutralize defending artillery and fire control; and create passages through obstacles. False preparatory fires can be used to disguise the location of an attack.

Preparatory fires start with several minutes of firing at the maximum rate, then reverts to a slower sustained rate for most of the preparation and then ends with several minutes of firing at the maximum rate. Only enemy batteries that have actually opened fire will be engaged so that front-line targets will receive the full weight of the preparation.

As the assault units advance from the line of departure, the fires supporting the attack phase commences. These fires are both pre-planned and available on call (usually through direct-fire). The centralization mode will end as attacking units (only!) assume control of their artillery assets.

The fires supporting the attack will continue to hit enemy front-line positions until the lead attacking tanks are 250 meters from them; a shorter distance would make the tanks vulnerable to their own shells and a longer distance would give the enemy time to engage the tanks.

As the tanks reach the enemy positions, the fires supporting the attack phase ends and the fires through the depth of the defenses phase begins, this proceeds the advance as the assault unit breaks through the forward positions and into the depths of the defense. This is not a rolling barrage, but rather is a pre-planned shift of fires to targets in the enemy's rear designed to suppress and defenses. By this point, army control of the artillery ceases and
control of any remaining artillery is released to regimental/divisional control. In addition, a reserve of artillery will be maintained on call to defeat enemy counterattacks.

During this latter phase, Soviet artillery will start moving forward (no more than one third of the batteries moving at any one time). The Soviets believe that effective suppression requires continuous, uninterrupted fire. SP batteries will displace more frequently than towed batteries (who will typically remain in place to provide on call fire).

The Soviet artillery offensive is a vital part of the Soviet combined-arms approach to warfare.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

The Soviets are well aware of this system, but they have made the decision not to use it. Their belief that the NATO system's almost total reliance on radio communications will fail under the power of Soviet electronic warfare. NATO's fire control system will also be vulnerable to the EMP effects of nuclear weapons and finally they realize the difficultly of using a microphone while wearing a NBC suit or a protective mask.

The Soviets also don’t trust their junior officers to exercise initiative on their own. Predictable tactical performance is a predicate of flexible operational performance. Lieutenants, captains, and light colonels can’t go screwing with the fire plan just because they have a local problem. Junior officers who are accustomed to exercising their own initiative are dangerous—dangerous to the operational plan and dangerous to the State. Soldiers of almost any rank can be replaced, according to the Soviet way of thinking. The security of the State cannot be compromised; and if that means a clunky performance on the battlefield, then so be it.

I’m reading The Soviet-Afghan War by the Russian General Staff (translated into English and edited by American officers). I read this book several years ago, but I find this time around I’m paying closer attention to some of the details that eluded me the first time. The Russians note the inability of detailed fire plans to respond to fluid situations. The Muj fought in place or maneuvered as circumstances dictated—often in total disregard of the Soviet plan of action. Combat aviation responded well, but the artillery did not for some time. Once the artillery acquired a degree of flexibility, the rest of the Soviet Army struggled to keep the newly acquired flexibility of the afghansty contained in Afghanistan. I’ve read this sort of thing before, but it’s useful to review periodically.

I’ve often assumed that the hard-learned lessons of the Far East would make their way to Europe quickly. Now I’m questioning that assumption. If the Soviet troops in the Far East learned a degree of tactical flexibility in response to Operation Red Willow (the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995) and the failed Pact offensive of Spring 1996 (is there a name for this anywhere?), then the Soviets might try to keep said flexibility in its Far Eastern bottle. The same might apply to air operations as well. If so, then the entrance of the USAF, RAF, and CFAC (Canadian Forces Air Command) would have creamed Soviet air power in Central Europe. On the ground, the Soviets would have found the GSFG fighting in a fashion for which neither training nor doctrine was well-suited at all. Just how the Soviet experience in the Far East affected the Soviet (and Pact) forces in Eastern Europe is a question worth reexamining.