OT: German vs Allied Tech in WW2

[RN7]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I'm sorry, but I'm going to have to go with Max Hastings on this one. In WWII, the Allies had some superior weaponry- the P-51 Mustang, M-1 Garand, and the T-34/85 are all examples. Overall, they also had superior artillery. Allied naval superiority isn't really a matter of debate (aside from the Japanese Yamato class super-battleships which were impressive but anachronistic by 1941 and a couple of advanced German U-boat classes).

On the other hand, the Germans fielded a clearly superior GPMG in the MG-42, the word's first assault rifle, the STG-43/44, and the deadly 88mm DP gun. Most WA tanks crews would have gladly traded in their Sherman or Churchill for a Panther or Tiger, depite their often finicky engines.

And the Allies fielded a superior light machine gun; The Bren Gun, the world's first real infantry support weapon, still used by the British Army until the 1980's and still built in India. The Allies also fielded the M2 Browning, the best heavy machine gun ever made and still the standard heavy machine gun of every NATO and western country and many more besides. Despite its limitations the Germans also had a very healthy respect for the Sherman Firefly, who's 17 pounder chewed up some Panthers and Tigers in Normandy after D-Day, and are credit with killing the Tiger tank commanded by Michael Wittmann who was Germany's top scoring tank ace of WW2. The Allied tank commanders would no dount have prefered to have gone into battle against the Germans with the M26 Pershings and Centurion but the Sherman weighed 33 tonnes as opposed to 46 tons for the Pershing and I think the Centurion was even heavier. I think the logistical problems of transporting them across the sea in landing craft and then putting them on the beaches may have played a part in prolonging their introduction as the smaller Shermans were doing a good enough job and their were thousands available.

Originally Posted by Raellus

The ME-262 had is problems and vulnerabilities, but it still gave the allies fits in the air. Most ME-262s that were shot down were done so when they were landing. The Brits might have had jet aircraft first, but they didn't field them in any significant numbers until the war was nearly over. ASFAIK, there weren't any Meteor aces. The Germans also developed the world's first ballistic missile and the first radio-controlled ASMs.

The Germans were well ahead of the rest of the world in ballistic and radio controlled missiles. The Brits didn't have any need to field the Meteor in any significant numbers until the war was nearly over as the Allied air superiority over Western Europe and Germany was so great they werent needed. Also the RAF forbid Meteor pilots to fly over German occupied territory or to go east of Eindhoven in Holland until January 1945, to prevent downed aircraft being captured by the Germans or the Soviets. There werent any Meteor aces because there were relatively few German fighters flying in 1945 and the Meteor never actually encountered any German fighters.

Originally Posted by Raellus

The German's biggest mistake was devoting so much of their war industry on small production runs of extremely complex and complicated wonder-weapons. That, coupled with a delay in converting to a war economy and late-war shortages of fuel and raw materials due to strategic bombing and sabotage meant that the Germans would never be able to translate any technological edge into a decisive strategic advantage.

No one can argue that the correlation of forces was not the decisive factor in the Allies' victory. We had numerical advantages of at least 3-to-1, and in some cases 5-to-1 or more, in every major category of weaponry, from tanks to fighters to warships to men in uniform.

True

Originally Posted by Raellus

Now back to the Red Army. In WWII, the Soviet Union lost more citizens and soldiers than any other nation on earth. The U.S. had the lowest casualties of any major combatant. With all of their technology, the U.S. and UK combined to kill approximately 500,000 German men at arms during the entire war. The Soviets killed about 4.5m. The Red Army began the war with a decimated officer corps, outdated infantry weapons, and generally very poorly equipped troops. Four years later, they were a juggernaut.

The Germans also killed three times as many Soviets as the Soviets killed Germans. Outside of air and naval operations the only major land battlefield between the UK/USA and Germany from 1940 until the invasion of Sicily in 1943 was North Africa, a small side show compared to the Eastern Front. The UK/USA armies were only realy able to get to grips with the Germans with their full military forces in a geographicaly open battleground after D-Day. The German army casualty rates in the west after D-Day were every bit as severe as they were in the east, and Western air power was superior in technology and also in numbers to even the Soviets.

Originally Posted by Raellus

As for arguments about doctrine- no plan survives first contact with the enemy. The idea that superior doctrine would have won the war assumes a short war with flawless execution, no surprises, and a fairly predictable, cooperative enemy. In a longer war, both sides learn to make adjustments.

Hitler expected the U.S.S.R. to collapse in a matter of weeks. "Kick in the door and the whole rotten building will collapse" he said. For a few weeks, it looked like he might be right. Four years later, the Red Army was at the gates of Berlin.

The Allies could have taken Berlin before the Soviets, in fact the Germans probably wanted them to take Berlin before the Soviets. But the decision who was to take Berlin was decided at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Eisenhower’s halted the Western Allied advance at the Elbe River.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by RN7

And the Allies fielded a superior light machine gun; The Bren Gun, the world's first real infantry support weapon, still used by the British Army until the 1980's and still built in India.

Don't get me wrong, I like the Bren, but the MG-42 was superior to the Bren Gun in nearly every way except maybe weight. The modern German version of the MG-42, the MG-3, is still in use around the world today, as is the M60 which was modelled on the MG-42.

Originally Posted by RN7

The Allies also fielded the M2 Browning, the best heavy machine gun ever made and still the standard heavy machine gun of every NATO and western country and many more besides.

Good call.

Originally Posted by RN7

Despite its limitations the Germans also had a very healthy respect for the Sherman Firefly, who's 17 pounder chewed up some Panthers and Tigers in Normandy after D-Day, and are credit with killing the Tiger tank commanded by Michael Wittmann who was Germany's top scoring tank ace of WW2.

Yes, the 17-pounder was a badass AT gun. It was the gun the Germans respected, not the tank it what mounted on.

Originally Posted by RN7

The Germans also killed three times as many Soviets as the Soviets killed Germans.

Very true. But the Soviets still won. I only bring this up as it supports my premise in the Defense of the Red Army thread.

Originally Posted by RN7

The German army casualty rates in the west after D-Day were every bit as severe as they were in the east, and Western air power was superior in technology and also in numbers to even the Soviets.

I don't think your first claim is very accurate. During the five weeks of Operation Bagration, launched in June of '44, the Red Army destroyed Army Group Center and bagged the Soviets 17 German divisions utterly destroyed and 50 others shattered. The Soviets claimed 400,000 Germans killed, 2000 tanks destroyed, and 158,000 prisoners taken. By contrast, the Germans lost about 200,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, and 250,000 men captured during the entire Normandy campaign, including the Falaise Pocket battles (all told, nearly three months of fighting). That's just the most glaring example.

Your second claim is right on the money.

Originally Posted by RN7

The Allies could have taken Berlin before the Soviets, in fact the Germans probably wanted them to take Berlin before the Soviets. But the decision who was to take Berlin was decided at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Eisenhower’s halted the Western Allied advance at the Elbe River.

The Western Allies were also much more reluctant to take casualties and so Eisenhower decided to let the Soviets earn Berlin with their blood. Stalin and the Red Army generals were more than willing to oblige.

[95th Rifleman]

Allies where behind he curve right up to 1944.

Look t the British, we didn't even have a tank that could fire HE and AP untill we bought the American M3's! We had to have one tank in every squadrn equipped with a howitzer to provide smoke and HE shells because the 6 pounders on everything else could only fire AP.

The Firefly was a quickfix because nothing in the British inventory could carry the 17pouner and we had to turn it on it's side to squeeze it into the the sherman. Only one in eery 4 tanks was a Firefly at best and the Germans learned to knock them out first.

[Panther Al]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

Allies where behind he curve right up to 1944.

Look t the British, we didn't even have a tank that could fire HE and AP untill we bought the American M3's! We had to have one tank in every squadrn equipped with a howitzer to provide smoke and HE shells because the 6 pounders on everything else could only fire AP.

The Firefly was a quickfix because nothing in the British inventory could carry the 17pouner and we had to turn it on it's side to squeeze it into the the sherman. Only one in eery 4 tanks was a Firefly at best and the Germans learned to knock them out first.

Exactly, which was what the Brits (And the yanks) learned to do in Africa when the long gunned IV's started showing up, so turnabout always sucks.

[Legbreaker]

It's worth noting that besides the American M1, virtually everyone else where using bolt action rifles. And the M1, although semi-automatic, had a bit of a serious drawback - that pesky "ping" announcing to the world it was empty.

[LAW0306]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

It's worth noting that besides the American M1, virtually everyone else where using bolt action rifles. And the M1, although semi-automatic, had a bit of a serious drawback - that pesky "ping" announcing to the world it was empty.

True leg it does make a ping....but as you know we fight in teams like you aussies do. So please stick your head up and my battle buddy will smoke you or the attached MG team. just not a very good point. we never fight one on one...thats tv and movies...we fight as teams....war is a team sport.

[Adm.Lee]

Something to consider when comparing the WW2 Wehrmacht and NATO's forces is that those German wonder-weapons were pretty rare on the ground.

They equipped only some of their formations as panzer and panzergrenadiers, the vast majority of German soldiers fought with the Kar98k, hardly any armored support, and artillery from captured Soviet 76mm guns pulled by horses.

The Western Allies in WW2, and NATO in the Cold War, had the wherewithal to back up their "just good enough" and "dependent on firepower" forces and doctrines when they fought. You can say that the King Tigers and Jagdpanthers were a luxury force, deployed in small numbers and overwhelmed by heavy odds, but the Leopards and Challengers and Abrams tanks were meant to equip *all* of the NATO armies.

Second item: check out the book Death traps by Belton Cooper. He was a WW2 Ordnance officer in the 3rd Armored Division. In his version, the Ordnance Corps offered Patton and others the Pershing tank in the winter of 1943-44, but they turned it down, not wanting to a) deal with the inevitable teething troubles, and b) have a disruption in the supply chain, especially one that would cut the number of tanks shipped by a factor of 2 or 3. Given the Allies' superiority in airpower, artillery, and the presence of 90mm TDs, that might be a compromise to consider.

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

It's worth noting that besides the American M1, virtually everyone else where using bolt action rifles. And the M1, although semi-automatic, had a bit of a serious drawback - that pesky "ping" announcing to the world it was empty.

Oh the Marines in the Pacific and shortly thereafter among the US Army in Africa that there's a way to use that to your advantage in some circumstances.

While you're in the rear, find a couple of small pieces of metal. Drop them on each other, to test whether they sound like an M1 Garand that is out of ammo.

Then, in battle, have one of your buddies fire up to seven rounds (enough so that you're not out of ammo). Then, drop your magic piece of metal. Your squad then looks for what enemy dummy sticks his head up, and they promptly fill enemy dummy with lead.

That trick worked great with enemy snipers or sharpshooters, and enemy machinegun teams.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

While you're in the rear, find a couple of small pieces of metal. Drop them on each other, to test whether they sound like an M1 Garand that is out of ammo.

This is true, however my point was that the M1 was about the only semi automatic rifle issued as standard to any nation in WWII. Virtually everyone else, including the US Marines in the beginning, were equipped with WWI or earlier bolt action rifles, or weapons which were only a "modernised" version of them.

Personally, I'd have preferred a semi auto over bolt action, and automatic over semi, however that's just me. I know of soldiers who could accurately fire a bolt action rifle faster than could be imagined - around 100+ rpm! (ignoring reloading) My own grandfather was one of them, and he wasn't even infantry.

Despite having a number of advantages over the traditional bolt action rifle, the M1 still has that flaw which, although could be turned to advantage on occasion, was still a significant drawback most of the time when compared with more modern designs.

[headquarters]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

It's worth noting that besides the American M1, virtually everyone else where using bolt action rifles. And the M1, although semi-automatic, had a bit of a serious drawback - that pesky "ping" announcing to the world it was empty.

Considering the ranges most firefights took place - and the general din of battle- the M1 was by far better in practical application than any other prolific stsndard issue rifle of the war. The clink at the end of the mag sounds like a possible drawback to alert your enemy that you are empty - as I imagine the frantic swearing of a bolt rifle fireing grunt would be when he runs out..

just my opinion of course

[headquarters]

I believe that most powers in that horrible war fielded some good - and indeed some bad gear.

Doctrine and leadership were often the most difficult obstacle to utilize the technology to a marked advantage.Lack of foresight in the higher echelons and in some cases lack of political will to commit resources to win come to mind. The Germans didnt start to run their aircraft factories around the clock until a couple of years in for example. The last major war still influenced peoples concepts of ho to fight the present one.

The Germans were quick however to capitalize on their armour and use modern doctrine- but for instance - during the invasion of France and the low countries in 1940 the actual number of German tanks were NOT superior to allied tank power. The allies spread their thinly - the Germans concentrated /manouvered theirs as proved a winning tactic in that combat enviroment.

The Italians believed for the longest time that they did not need to upgrade their airpower / fighters to allied standards. They of course - got clobbered by the Allies overall in the sky. They did make a few good things though such as Beretta MP 38s , and the Beretta service pistol. But they still issued most troops with the questionable Mannlicher-Carcano.

The Japanese had fierce troops with what seemed like unswerving loyalty etc. They opted to issue them with semi obsolete bolt action rifles and tried to win the war without upgrading their infantry gear throughout the war

The Brits fielded the Sten Gun - arguably one of the simplest automatic firearms ever made prolific - but they made good use of it through training their lads and employing tactics that were workable.

Its easy to think that the powers that be in those days cooly calculated their moves - but they made decisions in an enviroment of casualties in the hundreds of thousands and in some cases with enemy arial bombardment actually hitting their place of business / seat of governance.

all in all - the shear economical disparity ( especially after the bombing of the industrial base of Germany) made the Axis chances of winning militarily very slim from mid 42. They could of course hope to get a victory because of a US forfeit , but luckily the US saw it through until the end and in a fashion that at the same time showed stalin that his advance had better halt were it did.

just one guys opinion everybody.

In game terms I find the emergency programs of weapon making that the loosing side and indeed the Soviets ( and to some extent the Brits in 1940) had going highly interesting.The making of field expedient armaments would be a valued skill in T2K I imagine. If you could churn out a few scrap metal/plumbing based SMGs to whatever crate of handgun caliber bullets the village has traded for then you could probably have the best horse, the best-washed wench and the least rotten potatos and the only house with a complete roof in the whole village!

[Sanjuro]

RN7 said

in electronics and radars the British were probably ahead of everyone.

True: and then there is computing and codebreaking. The world's first electronic computer, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colossus_computer , and a cryptology facility so advanced that for over thirty years no one even believed their achievements were even technically possible. Britain was even able to sell captured Enigma technology all over the world as "unbreakable coding machines" and then happily read everyone's encrypted messages...
On the subject of Gloster jets... in my first flying instruction job, there was a retired pilot who taught groundschool. He had been a Hurricane pilot early in WW2, then after several combat tours he was "rested" by being assigned to fly with the ATA delivering aircraft to combat stations.
One day he was ordered to collect a new aircraft- with two engines. Not having much multi-engine experience, he read all he could about multi-engine handling techniques on the train to the airfield. On arrival, he was told "it's behind the hangar, help yourself"- but was very confused because the aircraft had no propellors.

[Mahatatain]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The Western Allies were also much more reluctant to take casualties and so Eisenhower decided to let the Soviets earn Berlin with their blood. Stalin and the Red Army generals were more than willing to oblige.

If I remember correctly (I read this book quite a few years ago) in Stephen E. Ambrose's biography of Eisenhower (Eisenhower: Soldier and President) he says that Eisenhower resisted pressure to take Berlin and chose instead to engage the major remaining elements of the German Army, approaching his strategy from a military rather than a political point of view.

Ambrose then went on to say that when Eisenhower became President he recognised that the political point of view sometimes outweighs the military and that he may have made a strategic mistake in not driving straight to Berlin when he could have.

We will never know however.....

[copeab]

A few points:

The undergunning of the Sherman was largely the result of the flawed doctrine of the US in having tank destroyers (like the M-10, M-36 and M-18) kill other tanks.

The Arado Ar 234 was the blitz bomber Hitler wanted the Me 262 to be, but had it showed up a few months earlire in it's role as recon plane, the Germans would have almost certainly spotted the D-Day invasion fleet assembling (at that time, the Germans really had no effective air recon over England).

The Me 262, with engine development problems, probably would not have entered service much sooner even without Hitler's meddling.

The US viewed solders as interchangable pieces and had a disgraceful method of replacing dead/wounded soldiers with new ones. The "we'll sacrifice four Shermans for one Panther" was just an extension of this.

The M-1 carbine (and especially M-2) could be viewed as an early version of the PDW concept -- a light, handy weapon for use by troops whose primary job isn't a rifleman.

Although the Germans get all the attention, the US successfully used guided glide bombs in the Pacific, mostly for destroying bridges in the CBI Theater.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by copeab

The US viewed solders as interchangable pieces and had a disgraceful method of replacing dead/wounded soldiers with new ones.

In the line, no less! Good God, where would we have been without our crushingly superior industrial capacity? How many [expletive deleted] green infantrymen did we sacrifice on the altar of our impatience? Even today, I wonder what would happen if we needed to replace thousands of infantry in short order.

This, by the way, is why I advocate for a National Guard three times the size of the current National Guard with few infantry units but lots of MPs and engineers. When there is a massive requirement for infantry replacements, the junior enlisted guys and the buck sergeants can be run through a 90-day infantry school with better results than one would get with raw recruits. Raw recruits then either replace the Guardsmen or go through a 6-month infantry school, including at least one JRTC rotation, so they actually know [expletive deleted] something before being required to hit the lines.

When will we ever learn from the Germans?

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by Webstral

When will we ever learn from the Germans?

Not going to happen I'm afraid. That would mean applying some common sense to the situation....

Although I have a different opinion on the detail, I'm with you on the preference for some sort of national service. Doesn't have to be military (although that would be preferred), could be simply joining an emergency service such as Rural Fire Service (RFS), State Emergency Service (SES) or something similar. Put idle young hands to use, perhaps assisting farmers with manual labour, cleaning up rubbish from highways, or something else productive. Throw in some discipline and maybe a bit of drill and you'll end up with people willing to listen and obey chains of command - could cut a few weeks off training times in case of wartime emergency.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by Webstral

In the line, no less! Good God, where would we have been without our crushingly superior industrial capacity? How many [expletive deleted] green infantrymen did we sacrifice on the altar of our impatience? Even today, I wonder what would happen if we needed to replace thousands of infantry in short order.
...
When will we ever learn from the Germans?

The Germans who only sent out replacement soldiers at the end of the month? Who had to combine companies nearly every week to have even half-strength battalions in some regiments? Who regularly scraped up whatever soldiers were nearby, such as transients or hospital dischargees, and sent them willy-nilly into combat as "replacement" platoons, with little or no integration into the command structure or unit?

When the American army could make attacks, take casualties and have units at full strength again in two days? That's what the system was designed for, and as far as that goes, it worked. Where it fell down was in our small army in the ETO. There weren't enough divisions to allow any unit to pull back long enough to absorb replacement soldiers.

With as few formations as Ike had, even with the slower replacement system the Germans had, we would have been forced to throw the raw replacements into the line, in ad hoc replacement companies and platoons, just like the Germans did. I doubt the results would have been any better.

I don't see the replacement system itself as the limiting factor, but perhaps the underestimation at the regiment/battalion level on how long infantry small units needed to absorb and assimilate new men. I've read in places that it got better as the divisions and regiments accumulated experience, and took their time to rotate units more often.

[Webstral]

The Germans did not have an ideal solution. We know this because they didn't win. Every army throws together scratch teams as required by circumstances. The strategic and operational realities imposed on the German Army by the lunacy of the senior leadership compelled them to do things like mentioned above, despite the fact that the Germans understood the value of having replacements absorbed in an orderly fashion.

We were not so desperate. We behaved like we were desperate, but that's not the same as actually being desperate. There's a world of difference between combining companies of veterans and fleshing out a company of veterans with new arrivals.

Ike may not have had overwhelming numerical superiority, but he wasn't at a numerical disadvantage, either. We made the numbers picture much worse than it had to be by making awful choices, like attacking through the Hertgen Forest to no good end. Or continuing the offensive up the Italian boot. This is not to say, of course, that the Germans weren't saddled by awful decisions coming down from the top.

What we really should have learned from the Germans is a proper investment in training up front. New officers trained for a year before going into the line. NCOs trained for six months or more. I can't remember off the top of my head how long infantry privates trained. I know that number changed over the course of the war. Nonetheless, German infantry and infantry leadership arrived at the front better trained than our guys did. The qualitative problems led to an ongoing need on our part to throw yet more raw troops into the front and yet more after that because the poor SOBs kept getting themselves killed in few days' time. The Germans eventually reached the point at which they were obliged to send poorly-trained units to the front, but only after attrition had taken its toll on everybody. Warfare by the numbers is cruel, and we could have done much better given our numerical advantage overall.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

The Germans who only sent out replacement soldiers at the end of the month? Who had to combine companies nearly every week to have even half-strength battalions in some regiments? Who regularly scraped up whatever soldiers were nearby, such as transients or hospital dischargees, and sent them willy-nilly into combat as "replacement" platoons, with little or no integration into the command structure or unit?

By the end of the war, yes. At the start, no.

The German policy in 1939 was to ;et a unit drop to a certain level due to attrition, then pull it out of combat for a period of time. New soldiers then joined the unit and were integrated/indoctrinated while the veterans were resting. Then, after a period of time, the unit was sent back into action.

This system probably worked well until the first half of 1943, with Stalingrad, Kursk and the fall of North Africa, and continued to deteriorate the rest of the war.

The US, OTOH, just threw new soldiers arriving at the front into units in combat. Many veterans didn't bother to learn the new guys' names, since they expected them to be dead in 2-3 days. Some wouldn't bother to get to know a replacement until he had survived a couple of weeks.

When the American army could make attacks, take casualties and have units at full strength again in two days? That's what the system was designed for, and as far as that goes, it worked. Where it fell down was in our small army in the ETO.

More accurately, the US did have enough riflemen in the war. Other troop types were generally available in adequate (in some cases abundant) numbers.

For example, if doctrine had allowed the Sherman to be armed so it could hunt and kill other tanks, there really would have been no need for all the independent tank destroyer battalions.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Yes, the 17-pounder was a badass AT gun. It was the gun the Germans respected, not the tank it what mounted on.

The Germans respected French tanks in 1940 because on paper they were better than their own, but their now just an afterthought in WW2 history. The Allies coverted 2,300 Sherman Fireflies which was probably equivalent to most of the German tank fleet in Western Europe from 1944-45.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Very true. But the Soviets still won. I only bring this up as it supports my premise in the Defense of the Red Army thread.

There are many reasons why the Soviet won and the Germans lost, and there isn't enough time or space in this thread to fully discuss it.

Originally Posted by Raellus

I don't think your first claim is very accurate. During the five weeks of Operation Bagration, launched in June of '44, the Red Army destroyed Army Group Center and bagged the Soviets 17 German divisions utterly destroyed and 50 others shattered. The Soviets claimed 400,000 Germans killed, 2000 tanks destroyed, and 158,000 prisoners taken. By contrast, the Germans lost about 200,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, and 250,000 men captured during the entire Normandy campaign, including the Falaise Pocket battles (all told, nearly three months of fighting). That's just the most glaring example.

German frontline strength during Operation Bagration were 400,000 troops, under 500 tanks and assault guns, with another 400,000 support and non combat personnel. The Soviets had over 2.3 million troops and 4,000 tanks and assault guns. The Germans were outnumbered 3:1 to one or 6:1 if you only count frontline German troops. The actually German casualties in Bagration were 400,000 total casualties (killed, missing and wounded) and the Soviets lost 780,000 men and 2,900 tanks.

In Operation Overlord from the 6th June until the 25th of August the Allies had over 2 million troops as opposed to just over 1 million Germans. German casualties were 209,000 troops and 2,200 tanks and assault guns, while the Allied casualties were 226,000 troops and 4,000 tanks. During Operation Dragoon, the other less well known Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944 200,000 Allied troops faced 300,000 Germans. Allies casualties were 20,000 as opposed to 27,000 Germans.

Basically the battles fought on the Eastern Front throughout the war were one a titanic scale, as whoever lost faced extermination due to the polar opposite ideologies and the Nazi racial element that was brought into the war. Losses throughout the war were staggering but the Soviet tended to lose a lot more even in victory until 1945 when Germany was all but defeated. For most of the war the German troops were far better trained and led than their Soviet counterparts, but were let down by supply problems and political interference from Berlin. However German land forces were less dominant throughout the war against Western forces excluding the catastrophic problems the Allies had in 1940 for various reasons. The casualty rates of German troops versus American and British troops are generally similar on both sides in North Africa, Italy and NW Europe after D-Day with a few exceptions, but in general the Allies inflicted heavier casualties against the Germans than what they received, and more importantly they generally won the battles and had manpower and supply problems that the Germans only dreamed of having.

Originally Posted by Raellus

The Western Allies were also much more reluctant to take casualties and so Eisenhower decided to let the Soviets earn Berlin with their blood. Stalin and the Red Army generals were more than willing to oblige.

Stalin had a lot less respect for human life than any Western General

[Panther Al]

RN7,

This might feel like I am bashing, but I swear, I'm not...


A couple more fallacies in the last one you put up. In 1940, on the whole, the French Tanks *was* the best out there. True, they did have problems (One man turrets anyone?), but by and large the latest generations (S35 and H35/39 - not to mention the Char B-1) of French tanks was much better than most of what was fielded by the germans. It was German Tactics - and french strategic stupidity - that allowed the Fall of France.

While manpower losses might be accurate for Overlord, the Tank loss numbers you have came from allied sources. Which are massively overstated by almost a factor of 10. I've seen the daily strength reports of the German Units involved in the normandy campaign, and while they did lose a lot of tanks, they never fielded that many in the first place on the western front at any one time. The strongest, and only up to strength, Panzer Unit there was the Panzer Lehr, and they only had 162 Panzers. The various SS Panzer divisions was averaging around a hundred each. The 21st was at a lower number. Replacements sent to the front from June to September amounted roughly 300 Panzers of all types (This doesn't include new units arriving). At peak: 31 August, the total Panzer Strength in the western front topped out at 784. Including those in workshops - which amounted to half of that number. Just taking Panthers alone, only 1130 was sent west before Sep 1, of those, 397 was still on the books as operational, 240 (I don't have the exact number for this handy, want to say it was between 240 and 250) in workshops, with another 124 withdrawn to other fronts.


Panthers accounted for half of all the panzers (including StuG's) on the western front between 6 June and 6 August. Of those present (484 with 1.SS-Pz.Rgt 1, 2, 9, 12; 1.Pz-Rgt 3, and 6, each of 79 (Save for Pz-Rgt6 with 89)) only 131 was wrote off as a total loss. By this time 32 was sent from ordnance depots, and another 73 from Mailly-le-Camp training school upping totals to 458 on hand. Oddly enough, it wasn't till August that Panthers stopped being the bulk of Panzers sent to the west - August to September was when the Panzer Brigades arrived, and they was only 1-3 in panther/other panzer strength.

Part of the accounting issue for German Panzer losses between German Sources and Allied, is that we counted Halftracks as Panzers: Which is stupid, but there you go. And the Lehr's Infantry Regiments was fully equipped to the last man with all the latest armoured halftracks for rides. The only division (Heer or SS) to be so equipped - and they took heavy losses in those rides while serving as fire brigades.

Granted, come november, the strength reports ballooned for the Ardennes offensive, but thats not important to this point.


Copeab is spot on as to why the Sherman was under gunned. It was never meant to take on tanks in the first place: it was supposed to be an Infantry Support Tank.

[Raellus]

If you're comparing German casualty figures on both fronts after June 6th, 1944, I think you need to take into consideration the fact that a lot of Germans surrendered to WA formations because they didn't want to be captured and/or killed by the Red Army. These voluntary surrenders would presumably be counted in the tally of overall casualties, skewing that number slightly in favor of the WA (making the WA look more effective than they actually were). I think that this is misleading, because it happened almost by default. If anything, this willingness of some German units to surrender to Western forces indicates that the Red Army was in some ways a force modifier, its mere existence helping the WA (in that they didn't have to fight Germans hoping/seeking to be captured by them). In other words, if it weren't for the threat posed by the Red Army, some of those German units in the west would have fought as hard as the ones on the Eastern Front did.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by Raellus

If you're comparing German casualty figures on both fronts after June 6th, 1944, I think you need to take into consideration the fact that a lot of Germans surrendered to WA formations because they didn't want to be captured and/or killed by the Red Army. These voluntary surrenders would presumably be counted in the tally of overall casualties, skewing that number slightly in favor of the WA (making the WA look more effective than they actually were). I think that this is misleading, because it happened almost by default. If anything, this willingness of some German units to surrender to Western forces indicates that the Red Army was in some ways a force modifier, its mere existence helping the WA (in that they didn't have to fight Germans hoping/seeking to be captured by them). In other words, if it weren't for the threat posed by the Red Army, some of those German units in the west would have fought as hard as the ones on the Eastern Front did.

I didn't include prisoner of war figures for either front. But if I was in the German Army on the Eastern front in 1945 I think I'd be making my way as far west as I could get as soon as possible!

[Legbreaker]

Which I believe is exactly what happened, particularly in the last weeks and especially days of the war. Nobody wanted to be captured by the Russians!

[RN7]

Originally Posted by Panther Al

RN7,

This might feel like I am bashing, but I swear, I'm not... .

Oh no fell free to contradict all you like!

Originally Posted by Panther Al

A couple more fallacies in the last one you put up. In 1940, on the whole, the French Tanks *was* the best out there. True, they did have problems (One man turrets anyone?), but by and large the latest generations (S35 and H35/39 - not to mention the Char B-1) of French tanks was much better than most of what was fielded by the germans. It was German Tactics - and french strategic stupidity - that allowed the Fall of France.

Well I sort of presumed that you knew I knew the reasons why the French were so poor in the Battle of France as I think every knows them, hence why I said later in my reply to Raellus “excluding the catastrophic problems the Allies had in 1940 for various reasons”

Originally Posted by Panther Al

While manpower losses might be accurate for Overlord, the Tank loss numbers you have came from allied sources. Which are massively overstated by almost a factor of 10. I've seen the daily strength reports of the German Units involved in the normandy campaign, and while they did lose a lot of tanks, they never fielded that many in the first place on the western front at any one time. The strongest, and only up to strength, Panzer Unit there was the Panzer Lehr, and they only had 162 Panzers.

I think I included September figures as well, strike that it’s a typo.

From my sources Panzer Lehr had either 188 tanks (89 Panthers and 99 Pz IV and 41 Stug) or 144 tanks (52 Panther, 92 Pz IV and 40 Stug) on the 1st of June 1944. Obviously a few discrepancies in combat ready/short term and long term repair reports.

Originally Posted by Panther Al

The various SS Panzer divisions was averaging around a hundred each. The 21st was at a lower number.

Off the top of my head at the start of D-Day the following German divisions had....

Panzer Lehr Division: 188 tanks (89 Panther, 99 Pz IV, 41 Stug)
1st SS Panzer Division: 88 tanks (38 Panther, 50 Pz IV, 45 Stug)
2nd Panzer Division: 166 tanks (70 Panther, 96 Panzer IV, 19 Stug)
2nd SS Panzer Division: 92 tanks (37 Panther, 55 Pz IV, 42 Stug)
3rd Fallschirmjager Division; 0 tank
10th SS Panzer Division: 39 tanks (39 Panther, 38 Stug)
12th SS Panzer Division: 148 tanks (50 Panzer, 98 Panzer IV, 2 Stug)
17th SS Division: 0 tanks
19th SS Division: 0 tanks (42 Stug)
21st Panzer Division: 112 tanks (112 Panther)
716th Infantry Division: 0 tanks

Originally Posted by Panther Al

Replacements sent to the front from June to September amounted roughly 300 Panzers of all types (This doesn't include new units arriving). At peak: 31 August, the total Panzer Strength in the western front topped out at 784. Including those in workshops - which amounted to half of that number. Just taking Panthers alone, only 1130 was sent west before Sep 1, of those, 397 was still on the books as operational, 240 (I don't have the exact number for this handy, want to say it was between 240 and 250) in workshops, with another 124 withdrawn to other fronts.

Panthers accounted for half of all the panzers (including StuG's) on the western front between 6 June and 6 August. Of those present (484 with 1.SS-Pz.Rgt 1, 2, 9, 12; 1.Pz-Rgt 3, and 6, each of 79 (Save for Pz-Rgt6 with 89)) only 131 was wrote off as a total loss. By this time 32 was sent from ordnance depots, and another 73 from Mailly-le-Camp training school upping totals to 458 on hand. Oddly enough, it wasn't till August that Panthers stopped being the bulk of Panzers sent to the west - August to September was when the Panzer Brigades arrived, and they was only 1-3 in panther/other panzer strength.

Part of the accounting issue for German Panzer losses between German Sources and Allied, is that we counted Halftracks as Panzers: Which is stupid, but there you go. And the Lehr's Infantry Regiments was fully equipped to the last man with all the latest armoured halftracks for rides. The only division (Heer or SS) to be so equipped - and they took heavy losses in those rides while serving as fire brigades.

I believe German tank reinforcements for June was 48 Tiger I, 256 Panther and 121 Pz IV. Losses were 19 Tiger 1, 80 Panther, 125 Pz IV and 27 Stug.
In July they received 42 Tiger 1, 83 Panther, 31 Pz IV and 56 Stug. Losses were 14 Tiger 1, 125 Panther, 149 Pz IV and 68 Stug plus others.
In August they received 14 Tiger 1, 11 Pz IV and 59 Stug. Losses were 15 Tiger 1, 41 Panther, 49 Pz IV and 78 Stug plus others.

I believe the total German tank losses were 224 for June, 288 for July, 105 for August and 1,228 for September for a total 1,845. The September figure obviously increases total German tank losses.

[Panther Al]

Originally Posted by RN7

Oh no fell free to contradict all you like!



Well I sort of presumed that you knew I knew the reasons why the French were so poor in the Battle of France as I think every knows them, hence why I said later in my reply to Raellus “excluding the catastrophic problems the Allies had in 1940 for various reasons”



I think I included September figures as well, strike that it’s a typo.

From my sources Panzer Lehr had either 188 tanks (89 Panthers and 99 Pz IV and 41 Stug) or 144 tanks (52 Panther, 92 Pz IV and 40 Stug) on the 1st of June 1944. Obviously a few discrepancies in combat ready/short term and long term repair reports.




Off the top of my head at the start of D-Day the following German divisions had....

Panzer Lehr Division: 188 tanks (89 Panther, 99 Pz IV, 41 Stug)
1st SS Panzer Division: 88 tanks (38 Panther, 50 Pz IV, 45 Stug)
2nd Panzer Division: 166 tanks (70 Panther, 96 Panzer IV, 19 Stug)
2nd SS Panzer Division: 92 tanks (37 Panther, 55 Pz IV, 42 Stug)
3rd Fallschirmjager Division; 0 tank
10th SS Panzer Division: 39 tanks (39 Panther, 38 Stug)
12th SS Panzer Division: 148 tanks (50 Panzer, 98 Panzer IV, 2 Stug)
17th SS Division: 0 tanks
19th SS Division: 0 tanks (42 Stug)
21st Panzer Division: 112 tanks (112 Panther)
716th Infantry Division: 0 tanks




I believe German tank reinforcements for June was 48 Tiger I, 256 Panther and 121 Pz IV. Losses were 19 Tiger 1, 80 Panther, 125 Pz IV and 27 Stug.
In July they received 42 Tiger 1, 83 Panther, 31 Pz IV and 56 Stug. Losses were 14 Tiger 1, 125 Panther, 149 Pz IV and 68 Stug plus others.
In August they received 14 Tiger 1, 11 Pz IV and 59 Stug. Losses were 15 Tiger 1, 41 Panther, 49 Pz IV and 78 Stug plus others.

I believe the total German tank losses were 224 for June, 288 for July, 105 for August and 1,228 for September for a total 1,845. The September figure obviously increases total German tank losses.

*waggles his fingers* Those numbers are not the ones I have, though with all things when it comes to german records you never do know.

However, the 21st's numbers is *way* off. The 21st had NO panthers at all in its TOE. Also, while September was a murderous month for the Panzer forces, by this time there was only 3 Panther Regiments left by 9 Sept: they had all been withdrawn, so a lot of those losses was older models. Not to mention I do believe - though I have scant evidence, just enough to make me think this - that the loss numbers are slightly exaggerated. Most of my numbers come from actual strength reports as reported by the units, coupled with delivery information. While none are fully and totally reported, and there is always room for 'inflation' on the combat reports, I feel comfortable about them.

The Pocket trapped a lot of German Equipment, but the legend of all the Panzers being left behind is largely that: Legend. A lot was abandoned don't get me wrong, but the Germans knew how important it was to get the armour out, and they recovered more than was believed at the time. Not enough to make a huge difference, but...

Ritgen mentioned - at least I want to say it was him, but I know I read it one of the post war memoirs, that it was pretty common to have units overstate its losses to a slight degree in order to encourage the rear to increase its importance in receiving replacements. Early in the war, it was to the advantage to overstate strength, but by the time the war was heading to its conclusion, it was felt it was better to try to find any reason to get to the head of the line for replacements.

Its this, and the aformentioned scarcity of solid info due to the destruction of files and records that makes this such a point of debate.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by Panther Al

*waggles his fingers* Those numbers are not the ones I have, though with all things when it comes to german records you never do know.

However, the 21st's numbers is *way* off. The 21st had NO panthers at all in its TOE.

Sorry that was a typo, the 2st had 112 Panther IV, I also made one with the 12th SS Panzer: Should be 50 Panther, 98 Panzer IV and 2 Stug.

I'm also looking at a German source (7AOK Kriegtagbuch from captured German documents) that show the 2nd panzer battalion of the 21st Panzer Division was still using some ex-French Somua tanks at the beginning of June, and the 3rd battalion was due to be refitted with Panthers.