Chemical warfare

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by James Langham

* New America with chemical weapons is something that hasn't been explored yet.

You're a bad, bad man, James. I like the way you think, even as I am filled with horror.

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by Webstral

You're a bad, bad man, James. I like the way you think, even as I am filled with horror.

I am pessimistic, that way I can be pleasantly surprised...

[Webstral]

It’s been a week since I wrote a word in reply to you, Jason. I’m going to knock out something rough and dirty rather than continue to try to give a polished product that might never get finished.

Okay, so the bottom line is that I think chemical warfare in the Far East as I outlined it in my piece on the Sino-Soviet War could stand an update. I don’t agree that Chinese attempts at chemical retaliation are going to go the way of the nuclear attacks for a couple of reasons. I stick to my thesis that general chemical use will enter abeyance; however, I acknowledge that you’ve got a point about the temptations of use. I now believe that chemical warfare will be highly punctuated. I maintain that the lessons learned in the Far East will result in a dramatic lessening of chemical use in Europe until the nukes start to fly.

The attitude of the Soviets towards the Sino-Soviet War matters a lot. This is not a war of national survival for them in 1995. In 1996, the regime might be feeling a bit more pressure. But in 1995, chemical use will be in keeping with battlefield necessities. They aren’t out to kill millions of Chinese. They aren’t out to topple the regime, though obviously that might be beneficial side effect if it could be done without widening the war or risking a strategic exchange of WMD. The Soviets are in the game to put the Chinese in their place and reassert themselves as the other superpower such that Soviet prestige recovers from Operation Desert Storm and Soviet weapons—especially aircraft, air defense systems, and MBT—reclaim their place on the international market.

So we should expect to see non-persistent agents used to prepare Chinese defenses for Soviet breakthroughs, while persistent agents are used for area denial on vulnerable Soviet flanks, Chinese supply dumps and depots, and PLAAF bases near the front. Of course, the Chinese are going to retaliate as best they can. The simplest form of retaliation is the application of persistent agents right where the Soviets are going to break through. Blood agents could act as Chinese FASCAM. Naturally, the Soviets would motor through these as required to maintain the impetus of the advance. Pretty soon, though, the already-taxed Soviet supply system is going to be hard-pressed to meet the needs of soldiers continually exposed to persistent agents. If the Chinese combine persistent agents with well-placed blocking or canalizing minefields tied into good defensive terrain, the Soviets are going to have real problems. Either the Soviets will have to slow the tempo of advance or find a way around the chemical weapons problem.

One solution would be to up the ante of chemical use in the hopes that saturation of the Chinese would forestall defensive use by the Chinese. This approach is problematic. How much does one have to up the ante to prevent the Chinese from using chemical weapons? I really don’t know the answer, but I bet the term “profligate” probably would apply to the level of use required. There are two drawbacks with going this route. The first is that at a certain point the Chinese are going to a) use chemical weapons against Soviet population centers to even out the casualties and b) be sorely tempted to go nuclear—because, after all, at a certain point the loss of life on the Chinese side starts to look a lot like a nuclear exchange. The Soviets aren’t in this game to go nuclear. If they were, they’d have started off with nuclear use.

The other problem is Western perception. Here I refer to my own work, which one is free to accept or ignore. The Soviets have worked hard to mend fences with the West. Win or lose in the Far East, profligate chemical use will have a negative effect on relations. Worse, profligate chemical use will have an unforeseeable affect on Western support for the PRC. Therefore, the costs of profligate use might outweigh the benefits long after the battlefield matter has been settled.

Ballistic delivery of chemicals by the Chinese poses a separate problem for the Soviets. The v1 chronology notes that Chinese ballistic missile attacks are frustrated by an active an efficient ABM system. Whatever ABM system the Soviets have in place in 1997 is going to be oriented towards defending Soviet Europe. That’s where the population centers are. This isn’t to say that there won’t be some sort of ABM system east of the Urals. Such a system will not have the lion’s share of capability—whatever that capability is. If the Chinese are pushed by Soviet chemical use to reply in kind against Soviet logistical hubs in the rear, then the Soviets have hard decisions to make. Let’s imagine that the Soviets use theater ABM to intercept a single Chinese TBM (theater ballistic missile) en route to a hub on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This tips their hand and invites the Chinese to try a saturation attack with TBM. The results cannot help but give the Chinese a much clearer picture of what is required to get WMD on-target in-theater. This is dangerous for the Soviets.

The simplest solution simply might be to come to an agreement about chemical use. Once the Soviets stop believing that they are deriving an advantage from chemical use, they’ll want to stop. The Chinese will be motivated to stop using chemical weapons because they will want to spare their own troops, populace, and landscape.

The beginning of Operation Red Willow might very well see a Soviet resumption. If ORW achieves operational surprise and early success, the Soviets might be startled into resuming use of chemical weapons. Under these conditions, we might expect to see them using persistent agents against communications hubs, which would mean using them against population centers. Here, Western opinion again would be aggravated. By this time, China has been borrowing as rapidly as possible. The US can’t afford for China to go down and not pay her debts. Therefore, the US might be strongly tempted to provide offensive and defensive chemical warfare materiel to China. Perhaps such an offer even might include cruise missiles (refitted for export) that can deliver chemical agents (or nuclear warheads) under the Soviet ABM shield. And again, the Chinese would be sorely tempted to retaliate against Soviet targets they can reach, like Vladivostok. If 10% of the Chinese TBM get through, it shouldn’t be too hard for the Chinese to cause major casualties. And again, this isn’t yet a fight to the death for the Soviets. They are still looking to win a limited conventional war.

It’s possible that the Soviets would open the 1996 offensive with chemical weapons. However, by this point we should expect that the lessons from 1995 would have been absorbed. The Chinese would be ready to lay down barriers of persistent agents in as much depth as required to bring breakthroughs to a halt. They already will have had all winter to prepare defenses. I question the math behind further chemical use on the battlefield or behind the lines, given that the Soviets are looking for rapid breakthroughs to bring the campaign to a rapid conclusion.

Of course, all bets are off once the nukes start flying.

[Jason Weiser]

Originally Posted by Webstral

It’s been a week since I wrote a word in reply to you, Jason. I’m going to knock out something rough and dirty rather than continue to try to give a polished product that might never get finished.

Appreciate you putting the effort in regardless.

Okay, so the bottom line is that I think chemical warfare in the Far East as I outlined it in my piece on the Sino-Soviet War could stand an update. I don’t agree that Chinese attempts at chemical retaliation are going to go the way of the nuclear attacks for a couple of reasons. I stick to my thesis that general chemical use will enter abeyance; however, I acknowledge that you’ve got a point about the temptations of use. I now believe that chemical warfare will be highly punctuated. I maintain that the lessons learned in the Far East will result in a dramatic lessening of chemical use in Europe until the nukes start to fly.

I can agree here, and I think you have a point about the law of diminishing returns.

The attitude of the Soviets towards the Sino-Soviet War matters a lot. This is not a war of national survival for them in 1995. In 1996, the regime might be feeling a bit more pressure. But in 1995, chemical use will be in keeping with battlefield necessities. They aren’t out to kill millions of Chinese. They aren’t out to topple the regime, though obviously that might be beneficial side effect if it could be done without widening the war or risking a strategic exchange of WMD. The Soviets are in the game to put the Chinese in their place and reassert themselves as the other superpower such that Soviet prestige recovers from Operation Desert Storm and Soviet weapons—especially aircraft, air defense systems, and MBT—reclaim their place on the international market.

See and that's the problem with the entire Soviet war effort. It's a war in search of a war aim? How do you put the Chinese "in their place"? They're not going to meekly acknowledge the Soviet superiority, especially after Red Willow. So, I think pre-Red Willow, you can make this murky argument (not your fault, it's the kind of thin thinking that got the Soviets into RL trouble in Afghanistan). But after? If the Soviets make peace, the Politboro may wind up like Beria. If the Chinese make peace, their own Politboro might wind up the victim of a military coup or a popular uprising. Both sides are riding the tiger from the start, and neither can afford to get off.

So we should expect to see non-persistent agents used to prepare Chinese defenses for Soviet breakthroughs, while persistent agents are used for area denial on vulnerable Soviet flanks, Chinese supply dumps and depots, and PLAAF bases near the front. Of course, the Chinese are going to retaliate as best they can. The simplest form of retaliation is the application of persistent agents right where the Soviets are going to break through. Blood agents could act as Chinese FASCAM. Naturally, the Soviets would motor through these as required to maintain the impetus of the advance. Pretty soon, though, the already-taxed Soviet supply system is going to be hard-pressed to meet the needs of soldiers continually exposed to persistent agents. If the Chinese combine persistent agents with well-placed blocking or canalizing minefields tied into good defensive terrain, the Soviets are going to have real problems. Either the Soviets will have to slow the tempo of advance or find a way around the chemical weapons problem.

True, but what level of casualties do the Soviets begin to consider troublesome under these circumstances?

One solution would be to up the ante of chemical use in the hopes that saturation of the Chinese would forestall defensive use by the Chinese. This approach is problematic. How much does one have to up the ante to prevent the Chinese from using chemical weapons? I really don’t know the answer, but I bet the term “profligate” probably would apply to the level of use required. There are two drawbacks with going this route. The first is that at a certain point the Chinese are going to a) use chemical weapons against Soviet population centers to even out the casualties and b) be sorely tempted to go nuclear—because, after all, at a certain point the loss of life on the Chinese side starts to look a lot like a nuclear exchange. The Soviets aren’t in this game to go nuclear. If they were, they’d have started off with nuclear use.

More than agree here, I think the threshold for Chinese nuclear use would be unrestricted use of chemical and biological weapons against Chinese urban centers.

The other problem is Western perception. Here I refer to my own work, which one is free to accept or ignore. The Soviets have worked hard to mend fences with the West. Win or lose in the Far East, profligate chemical use will have a negative effect on relations. Worse, profligate chemical use will have an unforeseeable affect on Western support for the PRC. Therefore, the costs of profligate use might outweigh the benefits long after the battlefield matter has been settled.

Yes, Danilov's charm offensive will need to pay attention, but Sauronski is running the Ministry of Defense, short of nuclear release, there is a lot of shenanigans he could pull. And he might have a point:

"Comrade General Secretary, we should worry what the capitalists think of what we're doing in China? The same capitalists who arm the Chinese to kill our boys?"

Ballistic delivery of chemicals by the Chinese poses a separate problem for the Soviets. The v1 chronology notes that Chinese ballistic missile attacks are frustrated by an active an efficient ABM system. Whatever ABM system the Soviets have in place in 1997 is going to be oriented towards defending Soviet Europe. That’s where the population centers are. This isn’t to say that there won’t be some sort of ABM system east of the Urals. Such a system will not have the lion’s share of capability—whatever that capability is. If the Chinese are pushed by Soviet chemical use to reply in kind against Soviet logistical hubs in the rear, then the Soviets have hard decisions to make. Let’s imagine that the Soviets use theater ABM to intercept a single Chinese TBM (theater ballistic missile) en route to a hub on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This tips their hand and invites the Chinese to try a saturation attack with TBM. The results cannot help but give the Chinese a much clearer picture of what is required to get WMD on-target in-theater. This is dangerous for the Soviets.

The simplest solution simply might be to come to an agreement about chemical use. Once the Soviets stop believing that they are deriving an advantage from chemical use, they’ll want to stop. The Chinese will be motivated to stop using chemical weapons because they will want to spare their own troops, populace, and landscape.

The beginning of Operation Red Willow might very well see a Soviet resumption. If ORW achieves operational surprise and early success, the Soviets might be startled into resuming use of chemical weapons. Under these conditions, we might expect to see them using persistent agents against communications hubs, which would mean using them against population centers. Here, Western opinion again would be aggravated. By this time, China has been borrowing as rapidly as possible. The US can’t afford for China to go down and not pay her debts. Therefore, the US might be strongly tempted to provide offensive and defensive chemical warfare materiel to China. Perhaps such an offer even might include cruise missiles (refitted for export) that can deliver chemical agents (or nuclear warheads) under the Soviet ABM shield. And again, the Chinese would be sorely tempted to retaliate against Soviet targets they can reach, like Vladivostok. If 10% of the Chinese TBM get through, it shouldn’t be too hard for the Chinese to cause major casualties. And again, this isn’t yet a fight to the death for the Soviets. They are still looking to win a limited conventional war.

It’s possible that the Soviets would open the 1996 offensive with chemical weapons. However, by this point we should expect that the lessons from 1995 would have been absorbed. The Chinese would be ready to lay down barriers of persistent agents in as much depth as required to bring breakthroughs to a halt. They already will have had all winter to prepare defenses. I question the math behind further chemical use on the battlefield or behind the lines, given that the Soviets are looking for rapid breakthroughs to bring the campaign to a rapid conclusion.

Of course, all bets are off once the nukes start flying.

Could be, and I suspect that very action had a role in halting the 1996 offensive. You have a good point on further chem use, as the Chinese stocks may be depleted (native stocks not coming from bombed out factories and US stocks being diverted to Europe) and the Soviets not getting more chemical weapons (diversion of most of their stocks to Europe). And yeah, I agree with you on the nukes part, but there may not be a whole lot of chemical weapons left in theater once the nukes do begin to fly, so the point may be moot.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Jason Weiser

See and that's the problem with the entire Soviet war effort. It's a war in search of a war aim? How do you put the Chinese "in their place"? They're not going to meekly acknowledge the Soviet superiority, especially after Red Willow. So, I think pre-Red Willow, you can make this murky argument (not your fault, it's the kind of thin thinking that got the Soviets into RL trouble in Afghanistan). But after? If the Soviets make peace, the Politboro may wind up like Beria. If the Chinese make peace, their own Politboro might wind up the victim of a military coup or a popular uprising. Both sides are riding the tiger from the start, and neither can afford to get off.

Too true. I have postulated that the Soviets created a stop line that would encompass all of Manchuria and Beijing. They pick this stop line in line with the belief that China can be driven the bargaining table and settle on terms for peace that are favorable to the Soviets. I’ve also postulated that there is no Plan B in case the Politburo doesn’t come to the table in the event of the fall of Beijing. Of course, the fall of Beijing might have resulted in the failure of the Chinese regime; but there is no guarantee that a replacement regime would be willing to come to the table, much less settle for peace on Soviet terms. I agree that Operation Red Willow does recast the situation dramatically.

Originally Posted by Jason Weiser

True, but what level of casualties do the Soviets begin to consider troublesome under these circumstances?

That’s good question. Knowing the answer would mean reading the thoughts of men who are dramatically unlike any of us posting here. The best I can say is that the operations staff at each major command (division and higher?) would be encouraged to give their best assessment about the impact of chemical weapons on operations. At some point, the effects of ongoing chemical use will be more detrimental than beneficial as regards operational tempo, estimated exchange rate, or logistical effort. I’m inclined to think that in the first eight weeks of the offensive, the Soviets would be most concerned with the operational tempo. The assessments of the division and corps staffs would be compiled at the respective army headquarters, who would pass them on to the front headquarters. I believe that at some point in the first eight weeks, the front commanders are going to tell the Far Eastern TVD commander that ongoing chemical use is costing them forward momentum, on balance.

Originally Posted by Jason Weiser

Yes, Danilov's charm offensive will need to pay attention, but Sauronski is running the Ministry of Defense, short of nuclear release, there is a lot of shenanigans he could pull. And he might have a point:

"Comrade General Secretary, we should worry what the capitalists think of what we're doing in China? The same capitalists who arm the Chinese to kill our boys?"

That makes me smile. I do believe you’ve captured Sauronski’s spirit. Danilov might well reply that without Western grain, the regime is going to have to choose between further privatization of Soviet agriculture, famine, or revolution.

The Minister of Agriculture might point out: “Comrades, you realize that the capitalists are playing both sides in this game. They sell us their grain, making the excuse for their profiteering by claiming that they bear no ill will towards the Soviet people and do not wish to see the people starve. They supply China with weapons and food to help them repel foreign aggression. We may be fighting China, but the Americans are winning the war.”

Finance Minister: “The same situation offers us an opportunity to hurt both our rivals. China has borrowed extraordinary sums from the West—especially the United States. If we can push China to the point at which the government changes hands, we can score a double victory. We can fix the terms of peace with China. A new government may default on the Western loans. This will have devastating effects on the economies of the capitalists. We will be able to buy grain at better terms, and their ability to make war will be appreciably diminished. Who can say what opportunities that may open up?”

Murmurings of assent went round the table.

Danilov snorted. “Who here thinks the Americans don’t understand the financial position at least as well as we do? No doubt they have legions of bankers and financiers lined up inside the White House and the Capitol telling the President and Congress that the West cannot afford to let China default on its debt. We already know that weapons and ammunition are on their way. Since we have never intended to occupy all of China, we can’t keep them from using and copying whatever they get from the West. If I have to choose what the Americans are willing to sell China, I’d prefer it be tanks and guns over chemical weapons technology and ballistic missiles.”

Danilov turned his gaze on Sauronski. “Ivan Sergeyovich, did you not support the first chemical cease-fire because chemical weapons were slowing our progress? Why support their use now, when we are on the defensive? We won’t reach our goals any more quickly, and we inspire the Chinese to improve their own arsenal. Once we stabilize the lines, we’ll have to rebuild to finish this damned business next spring. Our troops can’t swim through a sea of blood agents between the front line and Beijing. Every use at this point jeopardizes our next offensive.”

Raising one eyebrow, Sauronski said, “So, Comrade, you are committed to a spring offensive?”

“What choice do we have, Ivan Sergeyovich? We can’t make peace with nothing to show for it.”

“Very good, Comrade. In that case, will you meet with some of my generals and admirals regarding a plan I asked them to submit regarding strategic operations to be carried out throughout the winter? In the event that we had to suspend operations through the winter?”

Danilov expression soured. “I suppose we had better.”

[Legbreaker]

My limited understanding says chemical weapons are usually disposed of by incineration. If so, how would this effect the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield? Could there be an increased use in flame type weapons in areas persistent agents have been used in an effort to minimise their effects? I'm not talking simple flame throwers and the like, but large scale weapons such as FAE/thermobaric bombs and missiles.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

My limited understanding says chemical weapons are usually disposed of by incineration. If so, how would this effect the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield? Could there be an increased use in flame type weapons in areas persistent agents have been used in an effort to minimise their effects? I'm not talking simple flame throwers and the like, but large scale weapons such as FAE/thermobaric bombs and missiles.

This is a perfectly valid question. If there is any promise to the idea, the Soviets surely will try it as a means to open a corridor through Chinese defensive barriers of persistent agents.