This Day in History

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Originally Posted by Raellus

There's a logical fallacy here that I'd like to point out. I don't think one can justify the killing of Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by arguing that the Japanese [military] killed many civilians throughout Asia. The women and children and senior citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weren't the ones killing civilians in China and elsewhere, so they didn't really "earn" the fate that befell them. Most people wouldn't argue that Yugoslavian or French or Ukranian or Polish (etc.) civilians deserved to get shot by the Nazis as reprisals for partisan actions. That, in most people's minds, would constitute a clear war crime. Unfortunately, this standard gets tossed out the window when it could be applied to "enemy" civilians. I guess that I just don't believe in collective punishment.

From the standpoint of projected military and civilian casualties for planned invasion of the Home Islands, I can understand the reasoning to drop the bombs. Preserving the lives of American and Allied servicemen that surely would have perished during an invasion of the Home Islands is certainly a logical rationale. Considering that the Japanese high command was actively mobilizing civilians, including women and children, to participate in the defense of the Home Islands, civilian casualties in Japan would likely have been much higher than the toll exacted by the atomic bombings. In that sense, the bombings most liklely saved many Japanese civilian lives. There's a cold mathematical logic there that it is difficult to argue against.

That said, I wish a purely military target was selected for the first bombing, instead of a civilian population center. I think that would have been the more ethical path to tread.

To complicate things further, a secondary motive of the bombings was to demonstrate American power to the emergent Soviet Union. That this display cost tens of thousands of third party civilian lives is kind of messed up.

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

The inital estimates for Operation Olympic placed the losses at 32% of the assault force.

Total Allied losses for Operation Downfall for all services, ran as high as 350,000 killed/wounded/missing. Estimates for the Japanese military ran into at least 800,000 k/w/m with another 1.2-2 million civilian losses.

I don't envy the decision that President Truman had to make, there is no doubt, that at the time, he made the only decision possible, ironically to destroy two cities so suddenly and in such a frightful manner that even the Japanese military had to admit that the war was lost.

Nowdays, it is popular to proclaim that his decision was based on racism and that more "humane" methods of fighting would have brought the Japanese to the peace table...etc, etc, ad nauseum and so forth.

But if one bothers to ask the GIs who were destined to disembark on X-Day..."When the bombs were dropped, I knew that the war would end and I would live."

I understand and empathize with the sentiments expressed here about both sides of the war in the Pacific but unfortunately as Raellus stated, there is a cold mathematical logic applied.
This has to be the case if the war was to be concluded without a vastly extended casualty list on both sides. No matter what, the atomic bomb was going to be used and used for the reasons others here have pointed out - to be really simplistic, Japan was the giant and the atomic bomb was the giant killer.

Unfortunately for civilians, a military target would not have been a sufficient demonstration of the power of the 'bomb'. The Japanese had many bases and could probably afford to lose half a dozen without destroying their will to wage war. But cities, cities were manufacturing the goods that ALL the bases needed to survive. It's not enough to kill the enemies soldiers, you have to kill his ability to wage war. It means destroying cities and it means civilians will get killed but a leader of a nation at war cannot afford to think of the enemy civilians and really, they cannot afford to think of the lives of individual soldiers from their own forces.

They have to think of the majority and only the majority. The emotional burden from thinking otherwise would crush the spirit of many people but a leader at war cannot afford this luxury. It's a vile notion and I despise the rationale that "the ends justifies the means" but the fact remains - to stop the enemy, you have to stop their ability to wage war and at that time, the quickest way to do so was to destroy their workforce and further, their will to fight.

[headquarters]

I guess the topic is an example of a grey area when it comes to morals and ethics etc etc

We could put together an argument pro and an equally compelling one con.

War crimes committed by both sides gets me down a bit. I prefer thinking of the purely military operations with purely military targets and objectives - not the horrible truth that in war the various sides will target the enemy where it hurts the most - his women and children - to subdue him.

This could of course end the war - which is good. Then again attacking the women and children is evil.

Just my two cents - and I of course see that I didnt invent gunpowder here..

Thanks Dragon for the facts and info . Very interesting to see the actual numbers.

[dragoon500ly]

The Imperial Japanese Army fielded several types of infantry divisions during World War II. The "Standard" Infantry Division had a TO&E strength of 20,000 personnel; transport was provided by some 7.500 horses; armament wise, this division was equipped with 9,000 rifles, 382 light machine guns, 340 grenade launchers, 112 heavy machine guns, 22 37mm/47mm anti-tank guns, 18 70mm battalion guns, 12 65mm regimental guns, 36 75mm field guns and 7 tankettes.

The "Strengthed" Infantry Division had a TO&E strength of 29,408 personnel; transport was provided by 9,906 horses and 502 motor vehicles. Weapons included 10,000 rifles, 405 light machine guns, 457 grenade launchers, 112 heavy machine guns, 72 20mm anti-tank rifles, 30 37mm/47mm anti-tank guns, 36 70mm battalion guns, 24 75mm regimental guns, 12 75mm field guns, 24 105mm howitzers, 12 150mm howitzers, 20 light tanks, 48 medium tanks and 13 tankettes.

The final type of Infantry Division was the "Strengthed (Modified) Division. Its TO&E strength was 24,600 men; transport was provided by 7,930 horses and 284 motor vehicles. Armament included 10,000 rifles, 411 light machine guns, 453 grenade launchers, 114 heavy machine guns, 78 20mm anti-tank rifles, 18 37mm/47mm anti-tank guns, 36 70mm battalion guns, 12 75mm regimental guns, 24 75mm field guns, 12 105mm howitzers and 6 tankettes.