Second Battle for Berlin: December 1996

[Webstral]

By December, the West Germans have lost the initiative and are losing the struggle. Of course, the US, UK, and Canada get involved at this point and change the whole equation of the war.

The v1 chronology implies without actually stating so that the NATO offensive across East Germany is a relatively slow affair. I think that terribly unlikely. The Pact has exerted itself to the max to contain the West Germans. By sheer weight of numbers, they have held and started to push back the Bundeswehr. Suddenly, the weight of ten fresh heavy divisions hits the Pact. Just as significantly, the USAF in Europe is added to the equation. It’s hard to see that the outcome isn’t a disaster for the Pact. Whatever happens in Berlin, a powerful NATO thrust across the North German Plain north of Berlin would reach the Oder in short order. Obviously, this won’t be a complete recreation of Operation Desert Storm, but the quality, quantity, and freshness of the NATO mechanized formations can’t help but completely unhinge the Pact defenses.

I see the Pact withdrawing into Czechoslovakia, since the USAF will close the Oder crossings until NATO forces reach the river near the Baltic. Then NATO forces will roll up the left bank of the river, threatening Pact forces in central East Germany with encirclement. The Pact forces will fall back to the south. NATO won’t make too strenuous an effort to encircle and destroy large numbers of Pact formations because the civilian leadership wants simply to finish the fighting in East Germany. In the interests of re-establishing peace and commerce after the forcible reunification of Germany, they are content with pushing the Pact off German soil instead of killing or capturing Pact troops en masse.

[HorseSoldier]

NATO, especially US, prep for the entering the war may have initially been hamstrung by a fear that ramping up could, in itself, trigger a nuclear exchange, so the other NATO nations that joined the West Germans may have been launching from more of a standing start than anyone at the tactical/operational level would have liked.

Possible idea to explain what happened, anyway.

On the fight for Berlin, I'd say the French must have pulled out. Alternately, the .sovs could have ignored the French sector with French troops still in it, but if France wanted to stay out of the war, pulling their troops before the battle for Berlin kicked off would be a much preferable course of action. They could certainly spin it in domestics politics as not running away, but rather continuing their policy of not supporting German reunification by force.

[Webstral]

US Army Vehicle Guide leaves room for the idea that the US Army was not poised at the border waiting for the word to go. In the following short list, two dates follow each listed formation. The first date is the border crossing, and the second date is when the formation went into combat.

1st AD: 12/5/96, 12/6/96
1st CD: 12/10/96, 12/15/96
2nd AD: 12/3/96, 12/7/96

3rd AD: 12/5/96, 12/11/96
1st ID: 12/4/96, 12/8/96
3rd ID: 12/3/96, 12/7/96

4th ID: 12/7/96, 12/11/96
8th ID: 12/5/96, 12/10/96
2nd ACR: 12/3/96, 12/7/96

3rd ACR: 12/7/96, 12/12/96
11th ACR: 12/2/96, 12/5/96

So, of the US combat formations listed in US Army Vehicle Guide, none were present on East German soil prior to 12/2. None were in combat against Pact forces until 12/5. Four divisions went into action between 12/6 and 12/8. Three more divisions first saw action on 12/10 and 12/11. 1st Cavalry Division first saw action on 12/15.

There are a couple of explanations for this. One is that the USAEUR was behaving as though there was no plan to enter combat in East Germany. This is reasonable. However, the commanders would have thought this one through and made some plans to organize movement to the front in keeping with an operational plan. Even if Anglo-American forces had occupied positions at their start lines, they would have been organized into echelons. The dates for formations entering combat seem to support two corps-sized efforts each with two divisions up and one to two divisions in follow-on. The forward divisions may have fought for 3-4 days before being fought out, at which point the second echelon would have been passed through to maintain the momentum.

[Webstral]

According to NATO Vehicle Guide, Canadian 4th Mech Brigade crossed the East German border on 12/9 and entered combat on 12/12.

British Army
1st AD: 12/10/96, 12/12/96
2nd AD: 12/10/96, 12/12/96
3rd AD: 12/9/96, 12/10/96

5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards: 12/96, actual date of first combat unknown
The Royal Hussars: 12/96, actual date of first combat unknown

So we basically have the equivalent of four more divisions entering combat between 12/10 and 12/12. When one takes into account the additional three US heavy divisions that also enter combat in this timeframe, it seems likely that a major operation exploiting one or more breakthroughs by the first echelon of the NATO attack beginning 12/6 and expanding through 12/8.

Without knowing where the front line trace was leading up to the US offensive, it’s hard to do anything more than conjecture as to the shape of things. However, it seems reasonable to believe that the West Germans would have made every effort to keep their lines relatively straight as they fell back so as to avoid presenting tempting salients. SACEUR would have wanted to exploit the armor friendliness of the North German Plain for offensive operations while exploiting the defensive advantages offered by the terrain in the south. This may help explain the gaps between US Army units crossing the frontier and their first action. I imagine UD forces attacking on a four-division front through Magdeburg with the intent of having the right flank of the offensive skirt the northwest shoulder of greater Berlin. The second echelon, or a portion thereof, would have continued the offensive on a northeasterly axis past Berlin and to the Oder River. Pact forces left in Mecklenburg would have been cut off from resupply except by air. Once these forces were dealt with, Anglo-American divisions could have been reoriented to face south along an arc north of Berlin. An attack south along the left bank of the Oder would have been able to use the river to protect the left flank of the drive while inviting the Pact to allow some of its forces to be encircled at Berlin. In general terms, NATO (including West German forces) might then have pressed south to squeeze the Pact out of East Germany.