1997 hypothetical

[Raellus]

If the writers had PACT nations turning their coats, the T2KU would look and feel very differently. In essence, the game world that all of us know (and most of us love) would be thrown out of balance. Yes, they certainly underestimated the level of anti-Soviet feeling in most of the PACT nations, but I think, as westerners, we tend to overestimate it a bit. We also have to take into consideration the effect that a pre-emptive German attack on two WTO nations would have had on public opinion in the others. Poland, for one, has an almost atavistic fear of Germany. The Czechs too suffered from Germany's attempts at "reunification" in 1938. I don't think that a lot of eastern European nations would have welcomed an aggressive, reunified Germany. To the contrary- it's possible that their collective fear and indignation would have bound them together and more tightly to their Soviet patrons.

My tastes run towards finding ways to make the established gameworld work, rather than tearing it down and starting over again.

[Olefin]

Having a few units changing their coats back in 1997 wouldnt appreciably change the game balance - and it could add a reason for the huge Russian counterattack and the use of nukes - i.e. you have a couple of Polish units suddenly go turncoat and the Polish General Staff tells the Russians that unless something is done right now and in a big way they cant guarantee the rest of the army staying loyal - going nuclear and sending in a huge counteracttack to push NATO back on their heels would definitely have made and units thinking of defecting change their minds

especially if any defecting unit got vaporized as part of the nuclear strikes

And it does go to making the game work - i.e. the Germans and US went for broke, but misunderestimated the extent of anti-German feeling in Eastern Europe. Still some units turned to NATO and pushed the Russians, already feeling cornered after the Germans crossed into their territory, into a situation where its either go nuke or go home

so adding a few defecting units that get decimated by the Russians as part of their strikes fits right into the game - and could explain where some of the Poles, Czechs, etc.. that are in NATO units came from - i.e. the 100 or so survivors of a Polish infantry brigade that went turncoat and got nuked and joined up with the US as they retreated


the Russian Civil War motif is also a good idea to work into the game - i.e. the Germans crossed the border and the leaders in the Kremlin were ready to surrender or ask for a cease fire - but hardliners in the KGB or military, who couldnt face that prospect, nuked Moscow or another city where they had moved to since Moscow was too obvious a target for a nuke to take out their leaders and then blame the attack on the US and away we go with nuclear retaliation and an all out offensive against NATO

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Olefin

Having a few units changing their coats back in 1997...

You mentioned entire nations in your previous post.

[Olefin]

actually I said 'That is one thing that the timeline I feel fails to address by having the vast majority, if not all of the forces of those PACT countries stay loyal to the Soviets thru most of the war"

not saying that whole nations go over to the US or NATO - but at least some units of significant size - i.e. brigades to divisions - should have gone over to NATO in 1997 during their drive thru Poland - a division or two is a lot of men but not saying an entire nation would do so

i.e. more like what happened in Russia in WWII where men did go over to the Germans (especially among the Balts) - but in this case the Russians put a stop to it by a combo of the successful counterattack and using nukes on those units to make any further possible defectors think twice about it, realizing the cost the previous units had just paid

As for the Czechs - the two halves of that country are very different in their outlooks - the western part was always much more pro-West versus the eastern part - so having at least some Czech units from the west - i.e. the current Czech Republic - defect to NATO makes sense in the game

and again provides for where former PACT soldiers came from that are in NATO units by 2000 - i.e. they are what is left of the defecting units from 1997 that have now been absorbed by the NATO units

[Raellus]

My apologies, Olefin.

Some of the former PACT troops serving in NATO units in 2000 certainly could have switched sides as early as '97.

[Webstral]

The timing of the first Soviet actions against Norway deserves some attention, I think. Frankly, I’ve always chalked it up to editorial error. Nonetheless, the idea merits discussion.

Let’s assume for the moment that the timing of the Soviet offensive into Norway, the initial stages of which predate the first US Army unit crossing into the DDR, is not an editorial error. If the Soviets invade Norway prior to the war with Germany widening into a general war with NATO, what do the Soviets expect to get out of such an action? I believe but can’t reference at the moment that the Soviet invasion of Norway is supposed to begin after 20 NOV 96.

The obvious answer is that they expect to open the door to the North Atlantic so that the Northern Red Banner Fleet can interdict the trans-Atlantic supply route. By invading Norway, the USSR threatens to bring all of NATO into the Pact-German War. At the very least, NATO can be expected to react very strongly. Let’s look at the trans-Atlantic sealift first.

We know that the US Army already has activated REFORGER. Several divisions and independent brigades fly in their personnel, marry up with their equipment in POMCUS sites, and get into the field in good order. The Soviets have missed their opportunity there. Nonetheless, we have good reason to believe that massive resupply for the West Germans takes to the Atlantic as soon as the balloon goes up. Whether the West Germans win or lose, they are going to need major replenishment. By mid-November, we should expect that the Atlantic is full of shipping carrying military cargoes bound for North Sea ports. I wonder whether this shipping is moving in convoys, which would indicate a war footing, or as single ships, which would indicate that the US does not expect to become a belligerent. Either way, the Soviets have a major interest in breaking out into the Northern Atlantic to start sinking ships.

Of course, the Soviets keep a third of their nuclear attack boats at sea at all times in the 1980’s. The Soviets might change this policy somewhat as their economy suffers in the early 1990’s. Also, subs might get concentrated in the Pacific once the Sino-Soviet War gets underway. Still, it’s not unreasonable to believe that a substantial number of Soviet subs are in the North Atlantic in October, 1996. The Kremlin might find cause to up the number of Soviet subs on patrol in the North Atlantic throughout November just in case the US does exactly what the US does. I can’t say how many of these Soviet subs will be tracked and tailed by NATO attack boats and other ASW forces. If the Soviets already have a large number of subs in the North Atlantic by the time the situation on the ground in East Germany begins to turn in favor of the Pact, one wonders what they think they might gain by invading Norway compared to the near certainty of bringing the rest of NATO into the fight—even if only (for the time being) in support of Norway.

We should bear in mind that France, Belgium, Italy, and Greece all denounce the West German invasion of the DDR. We don’t know what Spain and Portugal think of the matter, but I’ve always cast them with France and Italy. If the Soviets invade Norway before France breaks with NATO, then the USSR forces France to live up to her treaty obligations. There’s a chance, of course, that France will renege anyway. However, even for France there’s a difference between pulling out of NATO over active Anglo-American support for a West German war of aggression and failing to come to the defense of a fellow member of NATO who is clearly a victim of Soviet aggression.

We can’t know what diplomatic maneuvering is going on in October and November, 1996. Surely, though, someone in the Soviet chain of command is going to point out to that by mid-November the West Germans are starting to run out of steam. The correlation of forces is working more and more in favor of the Pact in Germany. Several members of NATO are wondering what happened to the defensive organization they joined. Why answer the question for them—above all, France—just to get control of Norway? Until 01DEC 96 (or thereabouts), NATO is not involved in the Pact-German War. Is possession of Norway really worth war with the rest of NATO, which is obliged by treaty to come to Norway’s defense? Does anyone in the Kremlin believe the Soviet-NATO fighting will be limited to Norway? Air and sea operations over Norway inevitably will bleed over into German air and sea space; and then the rest of NATO will be dragged into the fighting in Germany. Someone is going to argue that until the situation in Germany is completely lost, the gain-loss ratio of bringing the rest of NATO into the war is distinctly unfavorable for the Soviet Union.

Someone else is going to argue that the trans-Atlantic pipeline of materiel has to be closed if the Pact forces in Germany are to fight on the best possible terms. There is logic to this. However, balanced against a medium-term (and not guaranteed) throttling of the supply line running from North America to Western Europe is an almost certain entrance of strong, fresh NATO air and ground forces into the fighting in Central Europe.

A good deal depends on the particulars, it must be said. If there ever was a chance to attack the North Atlantic with strategic surprise, by the second week of October the Soviets have missed that opportunity. Nevertheless, we don’t really know what the disposition of NATO naval forces in the North Atlantic is as October turns to November. It’s hard to believe that the US Atlantic Fleet does nothing. At the same time, there isn’t much justification for going to a full war footing. Mobilization and deployment of naval assets probably is somewhere between the two extremes. It’s hard to imagine that the US Navy fails to observe the growing number of Soviet subs in the North Atlantic or fails to implement countermeasures that would amount to putting more ships to sea. Given all this, is the potential gain of a late November offensive in Norway worth the potential cost? I’m inclined to think not.

[Bullet Magnet]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The timing of the first Soviet actions against Norway deserves some attention, I think. Frankly, I’ve always chalked it up to editorial error. Nonetheless, the idea merits discussion.

I believe but can’t reference at the moment that the Soviet invasion of Norway is supposed to begin after 20 NOV 96.

Now that it's been brought up, I'd guess it is either the editorial error as you suggested, or deliberate, to have a canon source to keep the Soviets the "bad guys" by having them invade a NATO nation's territory first. It was the 1980s after all, and we couldn't have the US being the aggressor party.

Just a theory.