OT? A New Cold War

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

There's a certain parallel between events in Eastern Europe and the events leading up to Hitler's invasion of Poland. However, the parallel breaks down a bit once one compares a German invasion of Poland with a Russian invasion of, say, Estonia. While Great Britain and France guaranteed Poland's security, the means to do so was not in place. It was genuine bluff. The Brits and French had no means to intervene in Poland. They would have had to invade Germany. The leadership in these countries had no stomach for a fight. Conservative Americans, on the other hand, would love to be let off the leash. Since Estonia is now a NATO member, an attack on Estonia would be an attack on every member of the alliance. It wouldn't be a question just of Russian tanks versus American tanks but of Russian tanks versus American, British, German, Dutch, Belgian, and possibly even French tanks. (Mon Dieu!) There wouldn't have to be a debate. Treaty obligations would simply kick in.

Right, but here's the thing, NATO hasn't adequately prepared to defend the Baltics. Setting aside whether NATO would react en toto and in force, they're not really well prepared to do logistically and organizationally. There've only been a handful of joint manouvers, usually involving nothing larger than a brigade two, and there are no significant NATO units permanently based there. We're not talking Cold War West Germany any more. Estonia doesn't have any MBTs or combat aircraft of its own. Without a significant NATO presence there- boots on the ground- the Baltic states are extremely vulnerable. Russia could grab Estonia, for example, before NATO could get sufficient ground forces- we're talking heavy brigades which need significant lift resources to move long distances en masse- to stymie and/or dislodge Russian ground forces. Russian aircraft and submarines could interdict NATO sealifts by laying mines in the Gulf of Riga. This would likely begin before the shooting even started. Ground MSRs could be interdicted by sabotage or other means. Russia could warn Lithuania and Latvia that if they allow transit of NATO formations, that they will be next.

So, in the case of a Russian invasion of Estonia, NATO would be heavily dependent on air power to stop/eject the aggressor. NATO has more advanced combat aircraft than Russia, but the qualitative gap is starting to shrink. Russia has an impressive array of anti-aircraft weaponry. Last generation Russian SAMs have shot down American stealth aircraft before- it's not unthinkable that it could happen again with current generation hardware. To think that B-2s and F-22s are invulnerable is a mistake. The circumstances are not clear, but several Raptors have been "shot down" during excercises, in one case by a Qatari Mirage 2000. And we all know that aircraft can not take and hold territory.

Originally Posted by Webstral

Now if the question becomes whether or not the various members of NATO would balk at honoring their treaty commitments... There's a horse of a different color. I honestly have no idea how that one would play out without an hypothesis that was two parts prejudice and three parts guesswork. I suspect there would be some pacifist sentiment in every NATO country, along with some hawkish sentiment. The balance would vary from country to country. Without having a compelling reason to think otherwise, though, I have to believe that member nations of NATO would honor their commitment under the Treaty or suffer real blowback from the other members. The United States would have to honor the terms of NATO or lose all credibility in every alliance. Once the US was on board, the UK would follow suit if not march in time with the US. After that, every other member would have to consult their consciences and self interest, bearing in mind that a spiteful Washington might consider all existing arrangements of every sort with NATO members refusing to honor their obligations up for renegotiation. If Germany and France both decided to sit out, then others might follow. If either pitched in, the other would feel obliged to follow suit.

Look at the lukewarm public support in Europe for stronger economic sanctions. Condemnation, even, hasn't been universal. Current NATO member Hungary, for example, has shown sympathy- support, even- for Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine. Only three or four NATO member nations meet the defense spending requirements called for in the treaty. I hope that I am wrong, but I don't think that NATO unity is a given. Will all NATO member nations willingly contribute their military forces to defend the Baltic States? Once again, I really hope so. Given the uneven, lukewarm response to Russia's aggression and violations of international law over the past two years, I'm not so sure.

I think that we need to accept that the NATO of 2014 is not the same as the NATO of 1987. Yes, it's larger and more inclusive, but is it as well organized, coordinated, and prepared militarily to fight a conventional war in Europe? I don't think so.

[Webstral]

I agree that defending Estonia is out of the question. At issue is liberating Estonia.

NATO certainly is a different creature than it was in 1987. The logistical challenges are very different. The forces available to NATO are very different.

The first question would be whether or not a Russian invasion of Estonia would prompt a declaration of war by the United States or result in military action that amounts to the same thing. If the US decides to sit on her hands, Estonia belongs to the Russians. If the US goes to war over Estonia, the game is on. I can't imagine that the United States would fail to take military action to defend a member of NATO. There is too much at stake world wide for the US to let someone--anyone--invade and occupy a member of NATO. How the other members of the alliance react to that will vary from country based to some degree on what the US and Russia choose to do.

Liberating Estonia would take ground forces. How many and of what composition would be up to SACEUR. He would have to balance a number of factors, not all of them military.

Hm. Duty calls. Will get back to this interesting discussion later.

[stormlion1]

The problem is we don't have the troops or gear anymore in Europe. It would take months to bring the troops and gear back over. Best case is to do it and stall with talks or go into a war with Europe taking the lead and trying to cross the Atlantic with the gear when we can. Reminds me of a book called Red Storm Rising that does.

[Raellus]

The Baltic States, Poland, and Scandanavia are taking the threat of a Russian invasion pretty seriously. Until NATO's power players (the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France) do too, the danger will continue, if not increase.

http://www.newsweek.com/tiny-baltic-...-russia-285264

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by stormlion1

The problem is we don't have the troops or gear anymore in Europe. It would take months to bring the troops and gear back over. Best case is to do it and stall with talks or go into a war with Europe taking the lead and trying to cross the Atlantic with the gear when we can. Reminds me of a book called Red Storm Rising that does.

You’ve summarized the core challenge quite nicely. The drawing down of US forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War has only exacerbated the problem that CONUS and Europe are separated by the Atlantic Ocean.

The fashion in which NATO responds to a Russian invasion of Estonia depends to some degree on how the invasion unfolds, I think. For instance, if Russians simply put 50,000 troops (or whatever they deem suitable for the first wave) on the Estonian border, then roll over the little country without any warning to the rest of the world, government and public opinion in NATO will react differently than if there is an extended period of unrest on the part of the Russian minority followed by public statements, negotiation, posturing, incidents, etc. In short, if the Russians successfully cultivate the idea that ethnic Russians in Estonia are suffering under the tyranny of Estonian rule, public opinion in Europe especially is likely to be more favorable than if the Russians simply slap Estonia to the ground and take her purse.

Let’s assume for the moment that the Russians eventually invade and that Estonia resists, if briefly and hopelessly. Obviously, this will trigger treaty obligations on the part of every other member of NATO. NATO’s reaction hinges on the reaction of the United States. The reaction of the United States will depend to some degree on what happens leading up to the invasion and during the invasion. If, for instance, the Russians invade more-or-less out of the blue like Hussein did in Kuwait, the American response won’t involve too much of a personal stake. If, on the other hand, a period of saber rattling prompts the US to put a brigade of paratroopers in Estonia as a show of solidarity with a member of NATO, and if the Russians invade anyway and wipe out a brigade of US troops, the reaction will be more extreme. In the former case, American appeals to reluctant treaty signatories would begin with, “In keeping with the obligations enumerated in the North Atlantic Treaty…” In the latter case, American appeals to reluctant treaty signatories would start with a lapel grab and “Listen good, [expletive deleted]!”

From the Russian standpoint, there are definite advantages to either staying out of Estonia altogether or rolling in unannounced and hoping that sheer surprise and hutzpah carry the day. An extended pre-invasion crisis runs the risk of drawing NATO forces eastward. The longer the Estonians wail about being defenseless in the face of overwhelming Russian force, the greater the likelihood that the POTUS will come under pressure to have SACEUR make some show of force to settle the nerves of the Eastern European members of NATO. The most obvious idea is to send small contingents of troops from several NATO nations to Estonia. Spreading the risk out sends the right signal to everyone, while keeping the numbers small implies a strictly defensive mission. From the Russian point of view, however, the introduction of any NATO combat units into Estonia means that NATO is closer to St. Petersburg and Moscow than ever. Once the NATO troops go in, they are likely to have an extended stay. This reality poses two dangers for Russia. The first is that the viability of an invasion and occupation of Estonia without a major war virtually disappears. To whatever degree the Russians (Putin) believe Estonia can be put in the bag without a war with NATO, that chance diminishes almost to nothing if the Russian invasion force kills, captures, or otherwise drives from the country 500 troops from each the US, UK, FRG, France, Poland, Italy, Canada, etc. On the other hand, the presence of NATO troops so close to St. Petersburg is intensely dangerous. What would be the point of dragging NATO’s forces further east with no other gain anywhere to offset the change in NATO’s dispositions? Once NATO starts fortifying Eastern Europe, there is no telling where it could stop. Several NATO corps in West Germany was bad. Several NATO corps in the Baltics and Poland is much, much worse. And again, the Russians can’t help but be aware that the option of invasion without a major war basically will go off the table if American combat units go into Estonia in ANY quantity and get destroying during a Russian invasion and occupation.

So it seems to me that an invasion out of the blue is the most likely course of action if in fact an invasion is to take place. In addition to having the advantage of not drawing in the rest of NATO as irresistibly, a bolt-from-the-blue invasion would catch the Americans flat footed. The longer a pre-invasion crisis lasts, the greater the opportunity for the Americans to ship a heavy division or two to Europe and stockpile materiel under peacetime conditions. A fait accompli means that the Americans have to start their buildup from the beginning. The same logic applies to the other members of NATO, the mobilization and readiness of each of which should be kept as low as possible leading up to the moment of decision.

At the risk of showing prejudice, I feel obliged to say that the Russians really can be brutes. The argument will be put forward that slapping Estonia to the ground and taking her purse will send the right message to the effete Westerners, the argument will go. They didn’t do anything of substance in the Ukraine. They won’t get involved in Estonia. The US may piss and moan about it, but they are already bogged down with other crises; and in any event, American public opinion won’t stand for a confrontation with Russia on top of ISIL, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. I doubt Putin is foolish enough to put stock in this argument, but one never knows.

Again, duty calls so I will have to get back to this later.

[Raellus]

You've hit the nail on the head, Web. I too think the overwhelming invasion scenario is less risky for Russia. Attempting an Eastern Ukraine-style destabilization and intimidation campaign and subsidized insurgency in Latvia and/or Estonia risks NATO sending advisors and counter-insurgency forces in response. This immediately makes a military coup-de-main a much riskier proposition because NATO will have more cause to respond with matching force if its own troops are caught in the subsequent Russian attack. Putin's either going to have to be content to play the long game, or go for the jugular. If I were him, I'd go with the latter for the reasons you outlined.

Originally Posted by Webstral

At the risk of showing prejudice, I feel obliged to say that the Russians really can be brutes. The argument will be put forward that slapping Estonia to the ground and taking her purse will send the right message to the effete Westerners, the argument will go. They didn’t do anything of substance in the Ukraine. They won’t get involved in Estonia. The US may piss and moan about it, but they are already bogged down with other crises; and in any event, American public opinion won’t stand for a confrontation with Russia on top of ISIL, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. I doubt Putin is foolish enough to put stock in this argument, but one never knows.

I doubt it too, but this is the premise of our T2030 game world. The following may not be probable, but I firmly believe that it is realistic and plausible. Here's how it goes...

The U.S. is preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere in the world. Europe is struggling with dissatisfaction with the EU, and the costs of supporting anti-terror operations in the Middle East and Africa. NATO is riven by internecine bickering and acrimony. NATO has shown Russia again and again that aggression and territorial expansion won't be punished militarily. There may not be a will to do so and, even if there was, military commitments elsewhere will interfere with the way. In this atmosphere, Russia miscalculates, leaps, is met with a unexpectedly pugnacious NATO response, and WWIII in Europe is under way.

My original scenario envisioned a preliminary destabilization/intimidation phase prior to outright invasion of Estonia, but I edited that out several weeks ago because such a campaign would likely provoke a NATO military response of some kind. ATM, I really only see NATO responding strongly if the stakes aren't too high.

I'm really quite baffled as to why measures to station a NATO heavy brigade in one or more of the Baltic States. Too much expense, too much risk, not enough upside is my guess. Putin's got to be wondering the same thing, and likely drawing similar conclusions.

[Webstral]

Let us assume for the moment that Putin invades and occupies Estonia with little or no warning and that this action does not involve combat units from any of the other members of NATO. The reaction of the United States to this event is the hinge on which future events turn. The European members of NATO are highly unlikely to do anything of a military nature without the lead of the US. The reaction of the US hinges on where the POTUS leads.

Having brought up Obama, I will post a disclaimer. I’m not interested in anyone’s opinion about whether Obama is a socialist, a Muslim, a Kenyan, a coward, inept, foolish, greedy, the Antichrist, or the best thing since sliced bread. If you are unhappy that the last two Presidential elections have failed to yield a POTUS to your liking, go down to the bar and complain to your pisos. This ain’t the place for that. It’s also not the place for extolling whatever virtues you might feel Obama brings to the office. I mention him only because it’s impossible to discuss something like an invasion of Estonia by Russia in a current events context without bringing the POTUS into it. I post a disclaimer now because several of our newer members seem to struggle with separating objective analysis of the military and strategic challenges that face the Commander-in-Chief from their impulse to editorialize regarding their perceptions of the personal shortcomings of the current POTUS.

In the event of a bolt-from-the-blue Russian conquest of Estonia, the POTUS becomes faced with some very difficult policy choices. I do believe he can’t possibly stand by and allow a member of NATO to be occupied. He’s got to do something to get the Russians out of Estonia. Even if the solution ends up being a negotiated agreement that causes the Russians to withdraw, such an agreement will be based on having the Russians believe that the US is psychologically and militarily prepared to spank them. It’s hard to see how said preparedness would not involve the movement of US heavy divisions to Europe.

The POTUS would have to decide right away whether he’s going to order SACEUR to put NATO air assets into combat over Estonia. On the surface, this seems like an easy decision to me. The sooner Putin understands that his occupation of Estonia will not go unchallenged, the greater the chance that negotiations will yield fruit without recourse to major ground combat. I say this with the caveat that heavy forces sufficient for the expulsion of the Russians from Estonia must be on-hand. However, putting NATO air assets into action over Estonia immediately can have a political and military cost. Decisions about whose air assets to use probably have to be made right away, and the results of the air actions will have a bearing on the political discussions in Washington and all of the other NATO capitols immediately following the breaking of the news.

SACEUR is going to want unambiguous guidance. He will say that if he puts a single aircraft over Estonia, then he’s going to want to put up a strike package capable of accomplishing something. What exactly does the President want accomplished at this juncture?

This is where it’s going to get tricky for the POTUS right away. Simply executing ground attack missions against Russian troops in Estonia makes a statement of intent. Personally, I wouldn’t mind this at all. If you send your troops across international borders, then you should expect the allies of the invaded country to conduct air strikes against your troops in the country at the bare minimum. Everyone in NATO should expect that the US will, at the very least, attack from the air enemy troops in the process of invading a member of NATO. Still, the act of attacking Russian ground forces in Estonia is a commitment. Such a commitment would embolden some and panic others.

For those here who are even less knowledgeable about air operations than I am, a quick review of a couple of items may be warranted. Normally, aircraft flying strike missions (close air support, interdiction, etc.) do not move to the target area by themselves when the enemy is in a position to contest control of the airspace above the target. It does happen. The Tornado was designed to fly through contested airspace at heights under 60 meters. This is called ultra-low penetration. The advantage of ultra-low penetration is that strike aircraft flying very fast and very, very low can exploit ground clutter to confuse look-down radar in the defender’s fighters and thus avoid interception. Ultra-low penetration also enables the strike aircraft to evade ground based radar and allow so little time for ground based air defenses to react. So the theory goes. Operation Desert Storm was the first opportunity of the RAF to put tactics designed for the Central Front through their paces. The tactics work, but they impose a high cost in aircraft.

If an air force wants to send strike aircraft into contested airspace without operating in the ultra-low penetration mode, and if the strike aircraft aren’t stealthy, then the air force puts together a strike package. The package typically includes strike aircraft, radar jamming aircraft, air defense suppression aircraft, and fighter escorts. This combination of aircraft enables the package to fight its way to the target and back. In such a package, the strike aircraft may comprise a small percentage of the package. Most of the airframes involved are assigned to fight enemy interceptors, defeat enemy radar, or destroy enemy ground based defenses. It takes a lot of aircraft to fight this way, which is why the European Allies designed the Tornado. There’s a connection with the development of the F-111, but I’m not knowledgeable enough to put the pieces together.

Then there is stealth. Stealthy aircraft get around the requirements of the strike package by being invisible.

When an air force establishes temporary and/or localized control over the airspace, that air force is said to have achieved air superiority. Strike packages operate under conditions of air superiority because often it is the escorting aircraft that create air superiority. Once an air force has near-total control of the airspace over most of its intended targets, that air force is said to enjoy air supremacy. Once air supremacy is achieved, strike aircraft can move to their targets unescorted.

All of this connects to the ground attack mission in support of Estonian forces.

I’m out of time again. I will have to come back another time.