Berlin in 1996

[StainlessSteelCynic]

The Stasi.

While not directly (or even indirectly) about the topic at hand, there's a decent German movie called The Lives Of Others that illustrates the workings of the Stasi.
While not completely accurate in its portrayal of East Germany** - surprise, surprise, a movie that's not true to reality - it shows well enough the emotional aspects as well as repercussions of "failing the regime".



** SPOILER ALERT

For example, it would have been incredibly difficult for a Stasi officer to conceal information from superiors because Stasi personnel themselves were subject to surveillance and monitoring.

[WallShadow]

Originally Posted by StainlessSteelCynic

The Stasi.

** SPOILER ALERT

For example, it would have been incredibly difficult for a Stasi officer to conceal information from superiors because Stasi personnel themselves were subject to surveillance and monitoring.

....by personnel who were under observation by agents who were being watched by snitches who....

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Originally Posted by WallShadow

....by personnel who were under observation by agents who were being watched by snitches who....

Yep!
I vaguely recall some info that East Germany was the country with the highest percentage of surveillance conducted on it's own citizens. I believe that Stasi officers and their official assistants numbered about 2% of the population giving a figure of about one Stasi operative for every 60 people.

There's also a 2015 article from Spiegel Online that infers that the "citizen helpers" (i.e. those who were not officially employed by the Stasi), informing on their work colleagues, neighbours, family, friends etc. etc. numbered well over two million people, (and that doesn't include the West Berliners who informed on East Berliners). Two million people out of a population of 16 million meaning about 12% of the population informed on the rest of the populace.

And they weren't all motivated by politics, it's well worth a read.
Article here

[Jason Weiser]

That's kind of why I think if anything...the Stasi HAD to be in on the coup..now, that said..there might have been a falling out between them and the Army later..but, initially, the Stasi had to be in on it, or any coup was doomed to fail.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

I am inclined to agree with you Jason. The Stasi had a massive apparatus in place to collect information, I just can't imagine them missing something like the coup.
Whether it was a case of high ranking Stasi telling the lower ranks to "just go along with it" or whether the lower ranks performed their own coup and kept the higher ranks uninformed could make for a whole other discussion but regardless of who played what part, as mentioned, I cannot see the Stasi not knowing something about the coup and taking some part (either by participation or by not actively opposing it).

[James Langham2]

Originally Posted by Jason Weiser

That's kind of why I think if anything...the Stasi HAD to be in on the coup..now, that said..there might have been a falling out between them and the Army later..but, initially, the Stasi had to be in on it, or any coup was doomed to fail.

An alternative may be a vast disinformation campaign so the truth was hidden following Churchill's maxim

[Raellus]

Here are some possible explanations for the Stasi's inability to detect the "invasion", or convince the Soviets that it's coming.

1. They've shifted focus to the Far East. Perhaps the Stasi that count have been reassigned to monitor the Chinese diplomatic corps in Europe. It would be quite a stretch for them, as I'm sure language would be a barrier. A good chunk of the KGB and GRU would also have shifted their focus to the situation in the Far East.

2. The Soviets don't believe Stasi reports of an impending W. German invasion. Perhaps they believe that the Stasi is simply acting in concert with the civilian gov't of the DDR to forestall sending yet more NVA units to China. Canon's pretty clear that WARPACT governments are not happy with repeated requests for more military manpower. Perhaps the Soviets see reports of a coming West German invasion as a foot-dragging technique to avoid making more "contributions" to the fighting in the Far East.

3. Key Stasi have been turned by Western Intelligence. Perhaps they're contradicting or burying reports of the impending invasion. Disinformation spread via double-agents would also contribute to #2.

A combination of all of the above scenarios is the most plausible explanation for why the Soviets are caught flat-footed, IMO.

[Raellus]

I don't buy the idea of an air corridor to W. Berlin remaining open after fighting kicks off between the Bundeswehr and the GoSFiG. The fog-of-war would be so thick, you could cut it with a knife, and "accidents" would be unavoidable- inevitable even. Both sides would know this. I imagine W. Berlin would be placed in a de-facto stage of siege as soon as Bundeswehr forces cross the border into the DDR. Sure, the Soviet Union wouldn't be keen on provoking the rest of NATO into joining the fight, but I just don't see them being willing to allow air traffic from the West unimpeded access to East German territory. The Soviets would be too rattled- paranoia isn't paranoia when the fear is substantiated- by the clear and present danger of losing its western buffer to an aggressive, potentially united Germany (1941, anyone?). Sure, they'd warn off the West in the most unambiguous of terms and, unlike 1948, I think they'd back their threats with deadly force (the Soviets didn't have an operational nuclear deterrent in '48; in '96, they would, and it would be massive). The Stavka would remember Stalin's mistake of writing off reports that Barbarossa was underway, and instructing border troops not to fight back in fear of "provoking" Hitler. I think a hard-line, military backed Politburo would draw a line in the sand, and prepare for the worst. With a war well underway in the Far East and a war flaring up in central Europe, the Soviets would not be willing to show weakness.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Here are some possible explanations for the Stasi's inability to detect the "invasion", or convince the Soviets that it's coming.

1. They've shifted focus to the Far East. Perhaps the Stasi that count have been reassigned to monitor the Chinese diplomatic corps in Europe. It would be quite a stretch for them, as I'm sure language would be a barrier. A good chunk of the KGB and GRU would also have shifted their focus to the situation in the Far East.

2. The Soviets don't believe Stasi reports of an impending W. German invasion. Perhaps they believe that the Stasi is simply acting in concert with the civilian gov't of the DDR to forestall sending yet more NVA units to China. Canon's pretty clear that WARPACT governments are not happy with repeated requests for more military manpower. Perhaps the Soviets see reports of a coming West German invasion as a foot-dragging technique to avoid making more "contributions" to the fighting in the Far East.

3. Key Stasi have been turned by Western Intelligence. Perhaps they're contradicting or burying reports of the impending invasion. Disinformation spread via double-agents would also contribute to #2.

A combination of all of the above scenarios is the most plausible explanation for why the Soviets are caught flat-footed, IMO.

I read somewhere (I think in a 2300AD article) that rumours about the Germans planning a reunification were known to Western intelligence agencies well in advance of the event. But nobody took it seriously and no evidence ever surfaced to implicate the Germans. Turning back the clock to this period and the idea that the Germans would unilaterally unite by themselves under the noses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be considered preposterous. It seems the diversion of the warfare in China and other international Super-Power tension gave them the chance to do it.