OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[swaghauler]

Cappy has just posted an update on Ukraine.

https://youtu.be/REBRCVqnbiA

Swag

[swaghauler]

Originally Posted by Raellus

@Vespers: I misspoke (or mis-typed, rather). I meant to write that the Gripen would probably be cheaper to maintain and fly (than older US models like the F-4 Phantom). That was just an educated guess, though, and I very well could be wrong. Do you know off hand if a newer build F-16 is cheaper, off-the-shelf, and to fly and maintain, than a current model Gripen? I guess I fell for the Saab marketing that the Gripen is a low-cost alternative to NATO's Gen 4 offerings.

Another thing the Gripen has going for it is it's ability to operate dispersed from conventional airbases and take off from and land on roads. It's also designed to be serviced by conscripts. Add all of that to a closer working relationship with Sweden, and I think it might be worth it to the Baltics to pay a little more (and NATO to subsidize the whole deal).

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No, it's not cheaper. The reason is an odd one though. The F16 is cheaper to maintain and fly (in dollars per flight hour) for the exact same reason the Cessna 182 is the most economical general aviation plane to own. There have been SO MANY F16s produced (over 1,000) for such a long period of time that maintenance costs have been pared down to the bone, even on newly manufactured parts. The Gripen and Viggen were made in MUCH SMALLER NUMBERS and do not have the ubiquitous support that the F16 has. Thus, their cost per flight hour is higher. In addition, the Grippen has VERY "short" legs... even shorter than the F16 (which is no champ in this area either). To some countries (like Canada), that IS an issue which must be considered. For example, the Canadians DON'T want to build airfields in the Arctic to support short-ranged fighters. That's why the F18 beat out the F16 for Canadian service.

[swaghauler]

Here's a video on the Bayractar Drone System.

https://youtu.be/Wn_wuD6bf5o


Swag

[swaghauler]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Are they shore-launched versions? AFAIK, if Ukraine has any navy at all left, it would take some doing to mount Penguins on essentially Warsaw Pact vessels. I imagine it would also be very tricky to rig UAF planes to launch Penguin (on the avionics-weapon targeting links side of things). The simplest, most practical platform ATM would, I imagine, be a land-based mobile launch system.

It makes a lot of sense to offload former Pact members' Pact-based heavy weaponry and aircraft and replace it with western stuff. A sticking point may be who foots the bill for it all. Western stuff is more expensive to purchase and maintain. What needs to happen (and we're starting to see a bit of it already) is that all NATO member nations' defense spending needs to pick up.

Re equipping the Baltic States' air forces with F-4s and other older models, it'll still take a couple of years to train up pilots and, by the time they're ready, those aircraft will be even further out of date. I'd love to see a deal between the Baltics and Sweden for Grippens. Not only is it a newer, arguably more capable (and probably cheaper) alternative, it would bind Sweden closer to NATO.

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The Penguin comes with an "off the self" launcher CLU (command launch unit) and the whole thing CAN be mounted on a 5-Ton truck. NATO can already do this. Send in the nearly expired older Penguins and buy newer more capable ones. The 24km range when ground launched makes for a good "intermediate range" weapon that's deployable from small boats.

[chico20854]

Originally Posted by swaghauler

The Penguin comes with an "off the self" launcher CLU (command launch unit) and the whole thing CAN be mounted on a 5-Ton truck. NATO can already do this. Send in the nearly expired older Penguins and buy newer more capable ones. The 24km range when ground launched makes for a good "intermediate range" weapon that's deployable from small boats.

There are also the truck-mounted Harpoon ASMs that the Danish Navy operated from the mid-80s until 2004 or so. I wonder what happened to those! The Taiwanese requested a couple batteries of them last year, which the US deferred.

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by chico20854

There are also the truck-mounted Harpoon ASMs that the Danish Navy operated from the mid-80s until 2004 or so. I wonder what happened to those! The Taiwanese requested a couple batteries of them last year, which the US deferred.

"A couple batteries" for Taiwan being 100 trucks carrying 400 missiles (plus another 25 radar trucks). The deferment was postponing delivery from 2024 to 2025.

[Raellus]

This article includes a very T2k photo of a BMP-1 painted in the colors of the Unified German military.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...les-to-ukraine

Interestingly,

"The German government's approval of the transfer of the 56 Pbv-501s to Ukraine reportedly came after an earlier request from Czech authorities was denied. The need for authorities in Germany to authorize the deal at all is a product of the original sale of these Soviet-era vehicles, which it had inherited from the defunct East German military, to Sweden. The Swedish government had then sold them to the Czech Republic."

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[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Raellus

This article includes a very T2k photo of a BMP-1 painted in the colors of the Unified German military.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...les-to-ukraine

Interestingly,

"The German government's approval of the transfer of the 56 Pbv-501s to Ukraine reportedly came after an earlier request from Czech authorities was denied. The need for authorities in Germany to authorize the deal at all is a product of the original sale of these Soviet-era vehicles, which it had inherited from the defunct East German military, to Sweden. The Swedish government had then sold them to the Czech Republic."

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For some reason, what shocked me the most in this article is that they had to do asbestos remediation on those BMPs! How many East German vets are wondering why they can hardly breathe anymore?

[Ramjam]

Just read a interesting post on the BBC News website about the Russian 331st Guards Parachute Regt and the amount of losses they have taken.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60946340

The interesting bit is right at the end where they list the names and ranks.
That is a lot of officers killed and also a lot of senior NCOs.
Out of those listed I would say its around 50%.
Now is that a example of leading from the front or are the Ukrainians targeting unit leadership to make the Privates run?

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Not sure how to embed it but I just caught a short video of Russian troops being abandoned; drone footage shows a bunch of guys running after the last truck seen leaving wherever they were holed up.

"Удачи, вы сами по себе."

https://nz.news.yahoo.com/russian-ar...072747190.html

[chico20854]

Ok, here's my amateur interpretation of where things currently stand:

The Russian Army is in some state of partial collapse, having abandoned the attack of Kiev and failing to make substantive advances ont he ground in weeks. Stockpiles of precision guided munitions have been largely depleted, the Ural tank plant has stopped production and the 135,000 conscripts called up last week will take months to be trained and formed into effective combat units. Nontraditional sources of reinforcements (Wagner group mercs, 16,000 Syrian veterans and various Chechen private armies) are unlikely to arrive in sufficient mass and be able to integrate effectively into the Russian armed forces to effect the outcome. Byelorussian units are unlikely to intervene on Russia's behalf. The Russian military itself is scraping the bottom to the barrel for combat troops, having denuded the Pacific Fleet of Marines, for example.

The Ukrainians are likely to follow/drive the Russians back to the Byelorussian border in the north. Mariupol is probably lost, the Russians control about 85% of it. The Russian units retreating from the Kiev front are likely to be re-commited in the Donbas region, or at least allow a shuffle of uncommited units (if any exist) to the Donbas. The Russian hope is that the influx of troops there will shore up the front line enough to resist the coming Ukrainian counterattack. To limit the scope of the counterattack the Russians are trying to tie down as many Ukrainian troops as they can in other areas, launching diversionary attacks in Odessa and Kharkov to prevent the Ukrainian command from stripping those areas of troops to reinforce the counterattack.

Russian control of occupied areas is tenuous, with repeated anti-occupation protests in the only city they have occupied, Kherson. The Russians lack sufficient troops to secure these areas, and attempts to recruit local sympathizers to assume administrative duties has failed as heavy-handed kidnappings of local government officials feeds civilian resistance. Russian attacks on semi-beseiged cities and civilian facilities (shelters, schools, hospitals, apartment buildings) is intended to terrorize the Ukrainain population and destroy civilian morale, creating pressure on the Ukrainian government to sue for peace.

The Ukrainian military is still smaller and limited in its abilities, although with very high morale. Allied aid has allowed them to prevail in the defensive battles and the government has a deep potential manpower pool. (They are currently only calling up veterans with combat experience since 2014, although accepting volunteers with less experience). The amount of training required for the Ukrainians to be outfitted with advanced non-Soviet equipment will be prohibitive - Stinger missiles can be used effectively with a few days of instruction, Patriots will require months of training, and NATO has largely retired the masses of equipment required for Ukraine to hastily form combined arms mechanized units.

Going forward, on the battlefield my personal estimation is that the Russians will struggle to make any further territorial gains. The level of additional troops and their effectiveness that can be thrown in Donbas will effect how successful the Ukrainians are in recapturing that territory, although the Ukrainian drive will be largely of a light infantry/partisan nature, infiltrating behind Russian combat units and cutting them and their supporting logistic coumns to pieces in small packets. The Russians will continue to use whatever long-range munitions they have left to attack targets throughout the depth of Ukraine, but those attacks will continue to have little strategic effect other than unifying Ukrainians in the will to fight and keeping Western publics pressuring their governments to continue supporting Ukraine (hence Zelensky's address to parlianments around the world and Grammy awards message).

Which brings us to where the war goes strategically going forward. I'm confident that the only meeting Putin will accept with Zelensky is to accept Zelensky's surrender. Not going to happen. The Russian propaganda machine has already recast the war goals from demilitarization and denazifaction of Ukraine - regime change - down to expansion of the separatist puppet states. The possibility of continued failue by the Russian military on the ground puts even this objective in doubt. The Ukrainians soon will be able go to the peace talks offering recognition of Russian control of Crimea and Donbas and a pledge to memorialize NATO non-membership and probably get Russian acceptance. (By the way, regime change in Moscow in the short term is probably not going to happen... the oligarchs are able to hide their money from Western sanctions, the urban middle class is fleeing and too small to effect a change and the 50% of the population in the regions and rural areas are too willing consumers of state propaganda to rise up against Putin. Now, in a year or two when the defeated Army is back home, please see 1905 and 1917!) Zelensky has to choose how to move forward in war termination... 1) seek a more or less immediate ceasefire, accepting the loss of territory in Crimea and Donbas, ending the bloodshed and leaving open a "frozen conflict" like the ones in South Osetia, Transdnistr and Nagorno-Karabakh, or 2) take the risk that the Russian miltiary collapse will continue and his forces will be able retake not only the territory they lost in the last 2 months but also the Donbas separatist regions without provoking a Russian escalation.

Fairly high-level and simplified, but that's where I think things stand now! I'm happy to hear your thoughts!

[Raellus]

Astute analysis, Chico- spot on, IMHO.

I don't think that Ukraine is going to be able to retake the Donbass (militarily, at least). The Ukrainian armed forces have excelled in defensive ops, but offense requires a lot more training, C2, and heavy weapons. The tables will turn if/when Ukraine attempts a strategic counteroffensive. Russian troops have failed pretty spectacularly in offensive ops, but again, defense is simpler, and their backs will be up against home soil (increasing motivation and easing logistics issues). The Russians also have solid local support in the de-facto separatist-controlled regions.

It's hard to see Zelensky accepting permanent loss of regions of eastern Ukraine, especially in light of recent evidence of large-scale Russian war crimes, but there's probably not much he can do to stop it. He might be willing to cede Crimea at the negotiating table, but that's a fait accompli, but that's not likely to restore the status quo ante bellum. I don't see Putin as willing to give up anyterritory firmly under Russian control, so yeah, a frozen conflict seems the most likely outcome at this point.

The fates of Donbass and Mariupol might depend on which leader, Putin or Zelensky lasts longer. In that contest, the ruthless autocrat has the advantage.

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[kato13]

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FPi7zvlX...name=4096x4096

Again too big to embed

[Raellus]

Cool find, Kato. Just wish the city names were easier to read.

Re the article linked below, it must be frustrating for Russian soldiers to be facing off against fresh waves of Russian-made (or designed, at least) AFVs. If Moscow only knew then (back in the 1970s & '80s) what it knows now...



https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...ded-to-ukraine

I hope this deal doesn't get blocked like the 3rd party MiG-29 transfer.

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[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Cool find, Kato. Just wish the city names were easier to read.

Re the article linked below, it must be frustrating for Russian soldiers to be facing off against fresh waves of Russian-made (or designed, at least) AFVs. If Moscow only knew then (back in the 1970s & '80s) what it knows now...



https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...ded-to-ukraine

I hope this deal doesn't get blocked like the 3rd party MiG-29 transfer.

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The way some of the Czech articles were phrased, it sounded like the vehicles have already been moved. The tanks, unfortunately, are "monkey model" T-72M1, the export version of the T-72A, which is hideously outdated. It's understandable that the Czechs wouldn't transfer any of their 30 T-72M4CZ that have been modernized (they have ~80-90 T-72M1 that weren't modernized), but the T-72M1 is basically a deathtrap on the modern battlefield. They're best used as either training vehicles or parts donors for Ukraine's modernized T-72 tanks. The BMP-1 will probably enter service as quickly as Ukraine can check them and replace any Czech language markers with Ukrainian ones, because Ukraine uses literally hundreds of BMP-1 in their military.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Cool find, Kato. Just wish the city names were easier to read.
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The creator also has the Kharkiv-Donbas Strategic Front where the names are clearer.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FPou3yHX...name=4096x4096

Here is the latest largest picture
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FPouUCxW...name=4096x4096

Source
https://twitter.com/JominiW/
Not normally a twitter fan but information is information.

[pmulcahy11b]

When this is over, Ukraine is going to need something like the Marshall Plan after World War 2. I heard a report on NewsNation that it will take more than $1 trillion to rebuild Ukraine.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Vespers War

Regarding the Switchblade, I saw 100 were included in the most recent assistance package, but I haven't seen whether they're the 300 or 600 (the latter is quite a bit larger).

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...e-tank-killers

Switchblade 600s have entered the fray.

[Raellus]

It'll be interesting to see what effect Switchblade- especially the anti-armor version- has on the conflict. I hope it's not too little, too late.

One way that T2k discussion on this forum has proved particularly prescient is evidenced by the improvised "special armor" increasingly seen fitted to Russian soft-skinned vehicles on the Ukraine battlefield.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...an-major-power

I thought the MTLB engine hood mounted to the truck was particularly interesting. In my PotV PbP campaign, the crew used a similar trick to give the Wisla Krolowa river tug's bridge some protection against small arms fire.

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[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Raellus

It'll be interesting to see what effect Switchblade- especially the anti-armor version- has on the conflict. I hope it's not too little, too late.

One way that T2k discussion on this forum has proved particularly prescient is evidenced by the improvised "special armor" increasingly seen fitted to Russian soft-skinned vehicles on the Ukraine battlefield.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...an-major-power

I thought the MTLB engine hood mounted to the truck was particularly interesting. In my PotV PbP campaign, the crew used a similar trick to give the Wisla Krolowa river tug's bridge some protection against small arms fire.

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On another forum, I've referred to that as "psychosomatic armor" - it makes the driver feel better about his chances, but it doesn't really do much against a dedicated opposition.

[swaghauler]

Cappy is giving us an update;



https://youtu.be/OZUMJ_T1YBI

Swag

[Raellus]

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...manys-approval

What are the odds that this goes through? I doubt it'll happen, but I hope it does.

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[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Raellus

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...manys-approval

What are the odds that this goes through? I doubt it'll happen, but I hope it does.

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Goose eggs, for the reasons given in the article, and since Germany hasn't seen fit to contribute anything useful to the Ukraine effort besides attaboys.

[kcdusk]

So Russia is withdrawing forces east. But looks like mounting a new attack in the south, with forces cueing up again along highways.

I wonder if their tactics will be different this time, if they learnt anything from the resistance they received from their initial thrusts. Or if it will just be the same grinding advance.

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by kcdusk

So Russia is withdrawing forces east. But looks like mounting a new attack in the south, with forces cueing up again along highways.

I wonder if their tactics will be different this time, if they learnt anything from the resistance they received from their initial thrusts. Or if it will just be the same grinding advance.

It does seem that the Russians don't learn from their mistakes, doesn't it?

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by kcdusk

I wonder if their tactics will be different this time, if they learnt anything from the resistance they received from their initial thrusts. Or if it will just be the same grinding advance.

One of the big reasons for the failure of the first phase of the Russians' offensive (around Kiev) was that their tanks were operating in wooded and/or urban areas, were Ukrainian infantry armed with ATGMs and RPGs could effectively use ambush and hit-and-run tactics. Russian tactics don't necessarily need to change for them to have success in the east. The terrain there is much more open. The landscape is much more conducive to massed tank formations and artillery fires operating at range, negating many of the advantages that Ukrainian forces had during the Kiev campaign. The Russians will also have much shorter supply lines in the Donbass (and more local support). This article does a good job of explaining this in a bit more detail:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...ains-of-donbas

In more positive news,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...ine-by-the-u-s

I wonder why Slovakia's MiGs are OK, but Poland's were too risky to transfer.


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[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Raellus

One of the big reasons for the failure of the first phase of the Russians' offensive (around Kiev) was that their tanks were operating in wooded and/or urban areas, were Ukrainian infantry armed with ATGMs and RPGs could effectively use ambush and hit-and-run tactics.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...ains-of-donbas


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We used to do that at all the units I was stationed at -- get the tanks to follow us into the woods, where they couldn't turn their turrets without being blocked with a tree and the TC had to pop up in his hatch to use the commander's machinegun. He usually died fast and we could pelt the tanks as much as we wanted with AT-4s and ATGMs. One brave soul even snuck to the rear quarter of an M1, climbed up on the engine deck without the crew noticing, and set a (simulated) thermite grenade on top of the engine deck. The M1 was called by the referees a total loss.

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I wonder why Slovakia's MiGs are OK, but Poland's were too risky to transfer.


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Maybe the Polish wanted too much in return -- much more than simply F-16s, but something else that was not advertised. The Slovakians may have given NATO a better deal.

[Top-Break]

Putin's current strategy may go something like this.

1. Take hammer.

2. Bash objective with hammer.

3a. If objective breaks, move on to next objective.

3b. If hammer breaks, put in requisition for a larger hammer.

Repeat until all objectives have been broken, or the supply of hammers has been exhausted.

Putin ran short of hammers trying to take Kyiv, so he's taking his remaining hammers east where he intends to whale away at the Ukrainians in the Donbas and along the Azov coast.

[Tegyrius]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I wonder why Slovakia's MiGs are OK, but Poland's were too risky to transfer.
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The political difference seems to be a direct transfer versus the US acting as a passthrough.

There may also be technology transfer issues. I seem to recall another War Zone article stating that Poland's MiGs have received some upgrades not present in the Slovakian fleet.

- C.