OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Vespers War]

According to a European acquaintance of mine, one of the rumors/theories/speculations going around Russian social media of people with an interest in military matters is that Ukraine is using RAAM (Remote Anti-Armor Mine) shells to re-fill minefields after Russian units clear them, and that is the reason for some of the recent videos of multiple vehicles getting taken out by mines. The theory is that Ukraine's laying a minefield, waiting for scout units to clear a path (and presumably observing where the path is from a drone), then using RAAM to re-deploy anti-tank mines into the cleared path before the main body of a formation can pass through. Each 155mm RAAM shell deploys 9 anti-tank mines with either a 4 hour or 48 hour self-destruct designed into them.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Vespers War

According to a European acquaintance of mine, one of the rumors/theories/speculations going around Russian social media of people with an interest in military matters is that Ukraine is using RAAM (Remote Anti-Armor Mine) shells to re-fill minefields after Russian units clear them, and that is the reason for some of the recent videos of multiple vehicles getting taken out by mines. The theory is that Ukraine's laying a minefield, waiting for scout units to clear a path (and presumably observing where the path is from a drone), then using RAAM to re-deploy anti-tank mines into the cleared path before the main body of a formation can pass through. Each 155mm RAAM shell deploys 9 anti-tank mines with either a 4 hour or 48 hour self-destruct designed into them.

I seem to remember reading about a similar tactic, albeit drone-free, in Red Storm Rising or similar late Cold War military fiction.

On Friday, Reuters reported that Russia has resorted to the "tactic" of sending conscripts across minefields in the vicinity of Vuhledar to "clear" them in advance of the main effort. That might just be Ukrainian propaganda fed to the Western media, but I certainly wouldn't put it past the Russians at this point.

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[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I seem to remember reading about a similar tactic, albeit drone-free, in Red Storm Rising or similar late Cold War military fiction.

On Friday, Reuters reported that Russia has resorted to the "tactic" of sending conscripts across minefields in the vicinity of Vuhledar to "clear" them in advance of the main effort. That might just be Ukrainian propaganda fed to the Western media, but I certainly wouldn't put it past the Russians at this point.

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Nor would I-could be disinformation but sounds very reminiscent of the NKVD penal units sent forward through minefields. Wouldn't surprise me a bit.

[kato13]

For what rainy day is Russia saving its air force?

• Spring boarding an offensive
• Exploiting a breakthrough
• Stopping a UKR offensive (perhaps towards Mariupol?)
• Punishing civilian targets if the war starts to sour
• Last ditch effort to protect Crimea
• Some form of complicated logistical interdiction (intercepting new NATO Equipment?)

I was expecting a bit more action from the Russian air force for the probing attacks and small scale advances that have been made in the last few weeks. But I have not heard of any tick up. When do you think they will make a major appearance?

[kcdusk]

I don't think the airforce will make an appearance. Its felt to me like loosing a helicopter or aircraft always resulted in more promotional advantage for Ukraine, that its not worth the risk to Russia to fly them. Too embarrassing to loose a single unit.

Or, aircraft require so much more maintenance that they are not fit to fly.

So i don't think its a case of saving the air force for a rainy day. Its either embarrassment or not in a fit state.

[Raellus]

It is somewhat surprising that the Russians haven't made greater use of their air force during this war. In the lead up to the war, much was made of Russia's superiority in air power vis-a-vis the Ukranians.

That said, I have seen references to an uptick in Russian tactical air sorties during the recent fighting for Bakhmut. In fact, in a PR stunt, the Wagner PMC head challenged President Zelensky to an air duel after allegedly flying a SU-24 over the embattled city. That same SU-24 was damaged a day or two later by a MANPAD in the AO, but the aircraft made it to base safely.

Re helicopters, I recently read that the Russians have changed their tactics after losing up to a third of their KA-52 fleet so far. They are now pairing KA-52s with Mi-28s because their respective defensive countermeasures complement each other. I can't remember which is which, but one is stronger against radar-guided SAMs and the other is better against heat-seeking missiles.

I think KC makes a good point re appearances. In the cost benefit analysis, the Russians have probably concluded that benefits of using their air power do not outweigh the combat losses plus the PR embarrassment of same.

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[kato13]

So strange they don't see losing 1000 men a day as not worth the PR.

I guess keeping that Ace always in the hole makes the UKR forces reticent to push when they have a slight advantage. Personally I am not sure Putin could survive the loss of Crimea, if that is threatened that is where I expect to see all cards go onto the table.

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

It is somewhat surprising that the Russians haven't made greater use of their air force during this war. In the lead up to the war, much was made of Russia's superiority in air power vis-a-vis the Ukranians.

That said, I have seen references to an uptick in Russian tactical air sorties during the recent fighting for Bakhmut. In fact, in a PR stunt, the Wagner PMC head challenged President Zelensky to an air duel after allegedly flying a SU-24 over the embattled city. That same SU-24 was damaged a day or two later by a MANPAD in the AO, but the aircraft made it to base safely.

Re helicopters, I recently read that the Russians have changed their tactics after losing up to a third of their KA-52 fleet so far. They are now pairing KA-52s with Mi-28s because their respective defensive countermeasures complement each other. I can't remember which is which, but one is stronger against radar-guided SAMs and the other is better against heat-seeking missiles.

I think KC makes a good point re appearances. In the cost benefit analysis, the Russians have probably concluded that benefits of using their air power do not outweigh the combat losses plus the PR embarrassment of same.

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I get the impression that there are a few factors comingling to result in the west not seeing the Russian Air Force in action.

First, we know that they are definitely still flying sorties, as you mention, Rae. Not only near Bakhmut, but there's stories (albeit few) that sorties continue over many areas of the front with quite some regularity. This is somewhat evidenced by Ukraine's fairly frequent claims of shooting down additional aircraft. So part of the impression we have may be simply due to lack of reporting on the number of Russian sorties that are actually happening.

Second, by all accounts, the Russians have lost quite a few aircraft already. Not that I would expect this to mean that their stocks are depleted by any measure, but it does mean that they may be running low on competent pilots. Training new pilots is a long process.

Next, we know the Russian logistical chain is a nightmare at present. A comparatively large portion of their air force may be grounded due to lack of parts/ammunition.

Not only the above, but given the increasing numbers of western AA systems operating in Ukraine, Russia may have done the math and figured that they would lose too many planes. As mentioned, this could result in a PR/morale issue for them, but also, it might just mean that Russian pilots and officers are reluctant to want to fly too deep behind Ukrainian lines.

Finally, I'm not as up on differences with Russian air doctrine as others here, but perhaps that's playing a part as well?

I'll end on this note - the fact that Ukraine even still has an Air Force, let alone one actively flying sorties, a year after the invasion began, is a portent of doom for this entire "Military Operation".

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Vespers War

According to a European acquaintance of mine, one of the rumors/theories/speculations going around Russian social media of people with an interest in military matters is that Ukraine is using RAAM (Remote Anti-Armor Mine) shells to re-fill minefields after Russian units clear them, and that is the reason for some of the recent videos of multiple vehicles getting taken out by mines. The theory is that Ukraine's laying a minefield, waiting for scout units to clear a path (and presumably observing where the path is from a drone), then using RAAM to re-deploy anti-tank mines into the cleared path before the main body of a formation can pass through. Each 155mm RAAM shell deploys 9 anti-tank mines with either a 4 hour or 48 hour self-destruct designed into them.

Seems we've had confirmation of the US M70 mines being used, which is indeed RAAM-deployed. I remember reading about FASCAM in the Big Yellow Book so many years ago and wondering about the system and its uses - it's interesting to actually see it being deployed for its intended purpose like this. It sounds as though we've provided Ukraine something like 10200 RAAM rounds since the start of the war.

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Heffe

Seems we've had confirmation of the US M70 mines being used, which is indeed RAAM-deployed. I remember reading about FASCAM in the Big Yellow Book so many years ago and wondering about the system and its uses - it's interesting to actually see it being deployed for its intended purpose like this. It sounds as though we've provided Ukraine something like 10200 RAAM rounds since the start of the war.

RAAM is one component of FASCAM. On the artillery side there's also ADAM (Area Denial Artillery Munition), which is like RAAM but with 36 anti-personnel mines instead of the 9 anti-armor mines. They also have either a 48 hour (M67) or 4 hour (M72) self-destruct mechanism, along with a battery that will discharge in 14 days so that even if the self-destruct fails, the detonator will be inactive after 2 weeks.

GEMSS and Volcano were/are the ground vehicle mine dispensing systems for FASCAM, while GATOR and Volcano were/are the aerial vehicle mine dispensers. GATOR was used in the Gulf War to inhibit Iraqi mobility, but had a rather horrendous dud rate, possibly because it was hotter than their designed limits. Its mines could be set (by a switch on the dispenser before take-off) to self-destruct in 4 hours, 15 hours, or 15 days, and the battery would be discharged in 40 days.