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#11
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Russian minefields have contributed greatly to slowing Ukraine's offensive operations this summer. From the articles I've read, it sounds like the UAF's main tactics to overcome the obstacle presented by AT mines is to rely on mine roller-equipped tanks or ARVs, or MICLICs, to clear lanes through minefields during an assault. According to a Ukrainian tanker interviewed by the BBC, a mine roller can usually handle, one at a time, up to four mines before it needs replacement, However, knowing this, the Russians have adapted by stacking multiple AT mines, thereby destroying rollers with one massive explosion. The Ukrainians are losing AFVs to mines at a pretty high rate- even their more advanced, better protected Western models- and have seemingly given up on attempts at a major mechanized breakthrough. They've largely reverted to smaller, more incremental (and slower) attacks led by relatively small formations of infantry. The Russians have even started to mine their own trench lines and remotely detonate them once they've been taken and occupied by UAF forces.
What I haven't read a single mention of in this current conflict is the UAF using combat engineers to prep attack lanes through mine belts by moving across minefields on foot, probing for AT mines, and removing them manually prior to a planned assault. I'm both surprised and not surprised by this. I'm not surprised because this procedure is slow and very dangerous to the mine clearing teams. Minefields, to be truly effective, need to be observed by the defending force and covered by fires (direct and indirect) to prevent what I just described. It sounds like, most of the time, the Russians are employing tactics that increase the effectiveness of their minefields. On the other hand, I am surprised because pretty much every book I've read about major WW2 ground offensives describe the attacker- both Axis and Allied- using the tactic of manual mine detection/removal (almost always at night) in the lead up to a big assault. This is especially true of the Eastern Front. In quite a few cases, this tactic was very successful in getting the attacking force through the first line of defense with much fewer tank losses to AT mines. I'm not advocating that UAF troops risk their lives by adopting this dangerous but potentially successful tactic. It's easy for me to sit here and suggest they give it a try. I'm just wondering why, AFAIK, they haven't. I suppose that improvements in and the proliferation of NODs and battlefield surveillance tech in the current era make manual demining in a combat area a lot more dangerous than it already was in earlier wars. Anyway, that was a bit rambling. I just wanted to share my thoughts and wonder if any of you have wondered the same thing or read/seen anything illuminating on the topic. -
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Author of Twilight 2000 adventure modules, Rook's Gambit and The Poisoned Chalice, the campaign sourcebook, Korean Peninsula, the gear-book, Baltic Boats, and the co-author of Tara Romaneasca, a campaign sourcebook for Romania, all available for purchase on DriveThruRPG: https://www.drivethrurpg.com/product...--Rooks-Gambit https://www.drivethrurpg.com/product...ula-Sourcebook https://www.drivethrurpg.com/product...nia-Sourcebook https://www.drivethrurpg.com/product...liate_id=61048 https://preview.drivethrurpg.com/en/...-waters-module |
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