OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Heffe]

Thanks again for the data. I went ahead and graphed it out to get a more visual representation of the tank losses over time. Not sure if this is helpful/useful or not, but I thought it was interesting to see how the assortment changed over time. I find it interesting to note how much the tank losses slowed during the second quarter, only to increase again with the Russian summer offensive before petering out during winter. I'm definitely super curious to see how it's further changed during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Q2 and Q3 of '23.

*disclaimer - this is only based on the data Vespers provided, meaning that it's Oryx's visually confirmed tank losses.

[kato13]

https://apnews.com/article/atacms-uk...b82d57d6ccab22

ATACMS which will always be “Assault Breaker” in my heart, have arrived and made a splash. 5 units taking out at least 9 helicopters.

What would be an estimate of what the US could provide in terms models available? The cluster versions seem like a given given that the US would not want the bad press of being a major power using them. Ukraine gets a pass as the plucky underdog.

[kcdusk]

The boards been as quite as i can ever remember for a number of weeks now.

If not Ukraine as a plucky underdog, i'll take Israel as the flavour of the month re cluster munitions.

Just devastating news re wars around the world (Ukraine and Israel). This may/may not be why its been quite here.

My own T2K work has progressed a bit in the last few weeks, having been made redundant again. Mixed feelings. Being out of work is never good. No longer working at my last place of work has been such a relief. There are great job prospects on the horizon so i am positive i will be employed again soon. In the mean time, my own solo T2K campaign is progressing using the FL rules, which i am enjoying.

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by kato13

https://apnews.com/article/atacms-uk...b82d57d6ccab22

ATACMS which will always be “Assault Breaker” in my heart, have arrived and made a splash. 5 units taking out at least 9 helicopters.

What would be an estimate of what the US could provide in terms models available? The cluster versions seem like a given given that the US would not want the bad press of being a major power using them. Ukraine gets a pass as the plucky underdog.

The best numbers I've seen:

M39 - 1,650 built for US, 411 expended
M39A1 - 610 built for US, 74 expended
M48 - 176 built for US, 58 expended
M57 - 513 built for US, 57 expended
M57A1 - 220 converted from M39/M39A1, 7 expended

There are another 900 M57A1 that have been purchased by international customers that would be converted, so out of 2,260 M39/M39A1 produced for the United States, 485 have been expended and 1,120 (at least) are scheduled to be converted, so at most 655 of those two models would be available for transfer to Ukraine.

With PrSM having entered LRIP, I would hope all the ATACMS could be considered available for transfer if needed.

[Raellus]

It's hard not to conclude that the Ukraine's summer 2023 counter-offensive might have been much more successful to date if ATACMS had been provided to the UAF prior to its commencement.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...u-k-intel-says

Russian rotary combat airpower was often cited as a key factor behind heavy early UAF AFV losses during said counter-offensive. Russian attack helos were able to engage successfully engage UAF AFVs from beyond the range of most available AAA and MANPADs. In most sources, the impact of Russian attack helos was assessed as second only to that of massive Russian AT mine belts. Heavy AFV losses resulted in a slower, more methodical scale, scope, and pace of UAF offensive operations.

ATACMS could have largely degraded the effectiveness of Russian attack helicopters, both by destroying them on the ground where they were based, and by pushing those rotary aviation bases further from the front lines, thereby reducing the combat range of their helos.

I'm peeved that the US didn't provide Ukraine with ATACMS much earlier.

-

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I'm peeved that the US didn't provide Ukraine with ATACMS much earlier.

-

Same. I feel similarly about just about everything we've provided so far. It's a damned shame that Abrams are only just now getting to the theater. And we should have been training their pilots on Falcons starting right when Russia crossed the border.

[Raellus]

Even the wisest cannot see all ends, but it looks like the war in Ukraine might be headed towards a strategic stalemate.

Apart from Javelin (and other ATGMs), various MANPADs, and HIMARS, the West has failed to supply Ukraine with the weaponry that could have had decisive effect on the battlefield in a timely fashion (MBTs, ATCMS, modern tactical fighters- the latter the UAF is still waiting on). Instead, it's usually been a case of too little, too late. I wonder if the strategic situation today would be markedly more in favor of Ukraine if those weapon systems had been provided to the UAF much earlier.

Perhaps most alarming is the growing reluctance of USA and a couple of its NATO partners to continue supporting Ukraine materially. It appears that the flow of foreign-supplied weapons and ammunition to the UAF will soon slow.

By the same token, reports of Russia running out of essentially weaponry and ammunition appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. Yes, attrition has been heavy, but Russia still retains enough firepower to prevent a decisive Ukrainian victory on the ground. Furthermore, although recent Russian offensive operations have been very wasteful (see Bakhmut and Avdiivka), the Russian military is still strong enough to simultaneously defend its territorial gains while support continued attacks on multiple fronts.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-zelensky-says

I was surprised to read that the younger end of the current UAF draft age is 27, and that plans to lower it to 25 have been held up by the congress. IIRC, 27 was the average age of all US servicemen in WW2.

Meanwhile, Russia shows no signs of running out of military manpower (however poor the quality thereof). Unlike the Ukrainian gov't, Putin shows very little reluctance to resort to conscription to backfill the Russian army in Ukraine.

I really hope the West doesn't lose its nerve. Despite years of hardship and loss, Ukraine doesn't have the luxury of doing so.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[LoneCollector1987]

While I agree with some of your points Raellus, I think that ONE point is now painfully clear.

The West is weak.

I went to Wikipedia: Cold War tank formations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War_tank_formations

Germany alone
1.200 M48
2.437 Leopard 1
500 Leopard 2
770 Kanonenjagdpanzer (cannon armed tank destroyer)
350 Raketenjagdpanzer (Missile armed tank destroyer)

We had ammunition for a world war.
We had a food reserve to feed the people of Germany in the event of a war.

And where did it go?

I can still hear the politicians saying after 1990: We are surrounded by friends.

What were they thinking?
Have they learned nothing?
A state has no friends, only shared interests. (Attributed to Bismarck and Charles de Gaulle)
Between states there is no friendship, just alliances. (Attributed to Charles de Gaulle)

We downgraded our armies (Germany from 500.000 West + 200.000 East to less thean 190.000 and about 225 MBT).
We believed McKinsey and Just-in-Time production and got rid of stockpiles.
The Emergency food reserve was shipped to Africa.

The last I heard that Germany has enough ammo for TWO days of fighting (World War style) and then the german manufacturers need SIX months to refill this stockpile.
Can you imagine that? Germany fights two days, then six months of cease fire, two days of fighting, ad infinitum.

What we need is to rebuild our industrial power to produce enough war material, ammo, etc. We have to go back to 1985.
We have to stop outsourcing because if we are dependent on another state (hint China, Taiwan) and they dont like us or go to war, then we are like the fish after the water went away.

[Heffe]

Rae: Things have definitely taken a pause for a while, and I think that a "strategic stalemate" is the correct moniker for what's happening right now.

There have been some recent items of note though -

• Ukraine getting ahold of ATACMs has forced Russia to pull helicopters back further away from the front, resulting in longer flight times and less loitering on the battlefield. This should result in fewer losses of Ukrainian heavy equipment (especially with those valuable western tanks).
• On the left bank of the Dnipro, Ukraine is continuing to force Russia into an untenable situation. Russia doesn't have the manpower to force Ukrainians out, and recently some Russian units are flat out refusing orders to engage.
• Recent polling has shown an increase in the number of Russians wanting out of Ukraine. I'd say this would effect the upcoming election, but let's be real, Putin won't allow himself to lose even if the vote is against him.
• The two major rail lines from China being taken out in the last week will slow things domestically for Russia, even when it comes to domestic industry, which will start to have more of an impact on the Russian day to day.
• The ruble, despite clawing back some value in the last month, has been on a downward slide for a year now, increasing pressure on the Russian citizenry.

The longer the war drags on...I'm not sure if it benefits Russia due to Russia's ability to lean on its higher population, or if it benefits Ukraine due to the continuing attrition of Russian heavy equipment. I imagine a lot will hinge on the west continuing to provide more tanks and equipment to Ukraine. And I do think that the upcoming elections in the states will likely have a pretty big impact on American financial and material support for Ukraine, which is a damned shame (we should be supportive no matter which party is in power).

[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Even the wisest cannot see all ends, but it looks like the war in Ukraine might be headed towards a strategic stalemate.

Apart from Javelin (and other ATGMs), various MANPADs, and HIMARS, the West has failed to supply Ukraine with the weaponry that could have had decisive effect on the battlefield in a timely fashion (MBTs, ATCMS, modern tactical fighters- the latter the UAF is still waiting on). Instead, it's usually been a case of too little, too late. I wonder if the strategic situation today would be markedly more in favor of Ukraine if those weapon systems had been provided to the UAF much earlier.

Perhaps most alarming is the growing reluctance of USA and a couple of its NATO partners to continue supporting Ukraine materially. It appears that the flow of foreign-supplied weapons and ammunition to the UAF will soon slow.

By the same token, reports of Russia running out of essentially weaponry and ammunition appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. Yes, attrition has been heavy, but Russia still retains enough firepower to prevent a decisive Ukrainian victory on the ground. Furthermore, although recent Russian offensive operations have been very wasteful (see Bakhmut and Avdiivka), the Russian military is still strong enough to simultaneously defend its territorial gains while support continued attacks on multiple fronts.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-zelensky-says

I was surprised to read that the younger end of the current UAF draft age is 27, and that plans to lower it to 25 have been held up by the congress. IIRC, 27 was the average age of all US servicemen in WW2.

Meanwhile, Russia shows no signs of running out of military manpower (however poor the quality thereof). Unlike the Ukrainian gov't, Putin shows very little reluctance to resort to conscription to backfill the Russian army in Ukraine.

I really hope the West doesn't lose its nerve. Despite years of hardship and loss, Ukraine doesn't have the luxury of doing so.

Slava Ukraini!

-

I'm afraid that's exactly what it's shaping up to be-a terrible bloody stalemate where Putin waits for the West to lose interest or at best a de facto ceasefire and each side adopts a policy of watchful waiting.

[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Even the wisest cannot see all ends, but it looks like the war in Ukraine might be headed towards a strategic stalemate.

Apart from Javelin (and other ATGMs), various MANPADs, and HIMARS, the West has failed to supply Ukraine with the weaponry that could have had decisive effect on the battlefield in a timely fashion (MBTs, ATCMS, modern tactical fighters- the latter the UAF is still waiting on). Instead, it's usually been a case of too little, too late. I wonder if the strategic situation today would be markedly more in favor of Ukraine if those weapon systems had been provided to the UAF much earlier.

Perhaps most alarming is the growing reluctance of USA and a couple of its NATO partners to continue supporting Ukraine materially. It appears that the flow of foreign-supplied weapons and ammunition to the UAF will soon slow.

By the same token, reports of Russia running out of essentially weaponry and ammunition appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. Yes, attrition has been heavy, but Russia still retains enough firepower to prevent a decisive Ukrainian victory on the ground. Furthermore, although recent Russian offensive operations have been very wasteful (see Bakhmut and Avdiivka), the Russian military is still strong enough to simultaneously defend its territorial gains while support continued attacks on multiple fronts.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-zelensky-says

I was surprised to read that the younger end of the current UAF draft age is 27, and that plans to lower it to 25 have been held up by the congress. IIRC, 27 was the average age of all US servicemen in WW2.

Meanwhile, Russia shows no signs of running out of military manpower (however poor the quality thereof). Unlike the Ukrainian gov't, Putin shows very little reluctance to resort to conscription to backfill the Russian army in Ukraine.

I really hope the West doesn't lose its nerve. Despite years of hardship and loss, Ukraine doesn't have the luxury of doing so.

Slava Ukraini!

-

Indeed. I wonder if parceling out 50 Abrams, 20 Challengers and so on doesn't make the already chaotic Ukrainian supply/logistics worse while only marginally improving a small portion of their Armed Forces.
I've also wondered if instead of penny packets of Western MBT's and MICV's if instead the West had "acquired" or shipped from dwindling stocks Warsaw Pact/East Bloc equipment AND ratcheted up Polish, Slovak and Romanian repair facilities who would still have older specialists who could repair Ukraine's largely Eastern Bloc/WP equipment?