In Defense of the Red Army

[natehale1971]

Originally Posted by chico20854

I'd like to say thanks to all the posters on this thread! I was so busy working on my post that I didn't skip out of the office early (no boss today) and catch an earlier train http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...l?hpid=topnews. (I go through there twice a day).

Thank God that he works in mysterious ways... There was an episode of "Crossing Jordon" where Nigel was on mass transit train, and gave his seat to a woman and the moment he left that car, it broke off the train and crashed. killing everyone onboard. He spent the entire episode dealing with survivors guilt.

But once more, thank God that you're okay.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I agree that U.S. airstrikes and conventional cruise missile strikes could seriously disrupt those lines of supply, I'm not sure they could cut them completely. That's some harsh territory deep in rather vast Soviet territory. At least for the roads, you would have to hit them round the clock to shut them down. Train tracks would take longer to repair.

There are historical precedents (unfortunately none which I can point at from memory) of rail lines cut by air strikes or partisan activity being repaired and back in operation in mere hours.
Also, looking at Vietnam, entire bridges (road, not rail) were often rebuilt to a standard capable of supporting trucks and other cargo vehicles in less than 24 hours.

Something else to consider is the Soviet land routes are usually DEEP within soviet territory so the locations the routes could be cut are actually quite limited (strike aricraft do have some limits on range and refueling tankers are seriously vulnerable). Cruise missiles might do it, but for a result that may only last a day or two, it's a seriously expensive proposition.


As Rae pointed out, it's written in canon that the WP left the top end aircraft in the west AND that they equalled what the Germans had in quality AND outnumbered them by a significant margin. Airpower was significantly in the WP's favour almost from the moment the first shots were fired.

My guess is the Germans miscalculated their offensive, wrongly believing that with the war in the east, they'd really only be facing Polish forces (Poland, particularly western Poland has been part of Germany on and off over the centuries. It is believable that they only intended to "retake" the western half of the country).

As the German offensive ground to a halt and they were threatened with a reversal of fortune, they called upon the rest of NATO. Since the outbreak of hostilities could in some views be seen as German agression, France and (and a few others I think) would have been justified in refusing their assistance. Once Germany received reinforcements (mainly US and British troops) the offensive continued, this time with the larger aim of actually defeating the Soviets (more countries, more national objectives).

And then the Soviets "won" against the Chinese freeing up numerous battle hardened units....

The tides of war turned against NATO, which had obviously struggled somewhat against the units they already been facing. As retreat turned to rout, NATO commanders made the decision to use tactical nukes in a desperate attempt to at least slow the greatly increased strength of the WP forces now swamping them.

The WP did not need to use nukes in the west - they responded in kind after NATO used them and only on a one for one basis.

The above is almost entirely canon. There may be a few small differences (due to me working from memory), but they're only minor. As the WP did not need nukes until after the NATO strikes, it can be assumed they had more than enough strength to at least significantly slow (it took several months to move from NATOs start lines to their limit in western Russia) while at the same time carrying out a large scale and very costly (in manpower and equipment, most of which can be assumed to be less than their best - see aircraft above) war against China.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

The WP did not need to use nukes in the west - they responded in kind after NATO used them and only on a one for one basis.

I remember the first nuke being used when a NATO unit touched Soviet soil. It is possible this was changed for V2


Page 25 referees guide

On July 9th, with advanced elements of the 1st German Army on Soviet soil, the Red Army began using tactical nuclear weapons. In the West, they were used sparingly at first, and for the first week were used only against troop concentrations no further than 50 kilometers from the Soviet border.

Sometimes the eidetic memory I had through my teenage years comes in handy. Of course reading it several dozen times probably helped.

[natehale1971]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

There are historical precedents (unfortunately none which I can point at from memory) of rail lines cut by air strikes or partisan activity being repaired and back in operation in mere hours.
Also, looking at Vietnam, entire bridges (road, not rail) were often rebuilt to a standard capable of supporting trucks and other cargo vehicles in less than 24 hours.

Something else to consider is the Soviet land routes are usually DEEP within soviet territory so the locations the routes could be cut are actually quite limited (strike aricraft do have some limits on range and refueling tankers are seriously vulnerable). Cruise missiles might do it, but for a result that may only last a day or two, it's a seriously expensive proposition.


As Rae pointed out, it's written in canon that the WP left the top end aircraft in the west AND that they equalled what the Germans had in quality AND outnumbered them by a significant margin. Airpower was significantly in the WP's favour almost from the moment the first shots were fired.

My guess is the Germans miscalculated their offensive, wrongly believing that with the war in the east, they'd really only be facing Polish forces (Poland, particularly western Poland has been part of Germany on and off over the centuries. It is believable that they only intended to "retake" the western half of the country).

As the German offensive ground to a halt and they were threatened with a reversal of fortune, they called upon the rest of NATO. Since the outbreak of hostilities could in some views be seen as German agression, France and (and a few others I think) would have been justified in refusing their assistance. Once Germany received reinforcements (mainly US and British troops) the offensive continued, this time with the larger aim of actually defeating the Soviets (more countries, more national objectives).

And then the Soviets "won" against the Chinese freeing up numerous battle hardened units....

The tides of war turned against NATO, which had obviously struggled somewhat against the units they already been facing. As retreat turned to rout, NATO commanders made the decision to use tactical nukes in a desperate attempt to at least slow the greatly increased strength of the WP forces now swamping them.

The WP did not need to use nukes in the west - they responded in kind after NATO used them and only on a one for one basis.

The above is almost entirely canon. There may be a few small differences (due to me working from memory), but they're only minor. As the WP did not need nukes until after the NATO strikes, it can be assumed they had more than enough strength to at least significantly slow (it took several months to move from NATOs start lines to their limit in western Russia) while at the same time carrying out a large scale and very costly (in manpower and equipment, most of which can be assumed to be less than their best - see aircraft above) war against China.

BUT you forget that Nukes didn't get used in the West UNTIL after NATO forces stepped foot on Soviet soil. That's when the first tactical nukes where used, and it was the Soviets that used them first against the First German Army when it was on Soviet Soil. It also stated that the Soviets and Chinese had been using nukes on the Far Eastern Front pretty liberally, while nuke use on the Western Front was pretty conservatively done.

[Legbreaker]

It's definately in 2.0 and 2.2 that Nato fired first, although nukes had been flying for a while over in the east. Not sure off hand who fired first there, although I believe (and could be wrong) it was the Chinese.

[natehale1971]

Page 12 of 2.2 Core Rule book that: "On July 9th the advanced elements of the First German Army on Soviet Soil, the Soviets begin using tactical nuclear weapons. In the West, they are used sparingly at first, and for the first week are only against troop concentrations no further than 50 kilometers form the soviet border." Straight from the book. I dont want to sound short or snippy... so i'm adding this. doing three things at once at teh moment. Sorry about that.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

Page 12 of 2.2 Core Rule book that: "On July 9th the advanced elements of the First German Army on Soviet Soil, the Soviets begin using tactical nuclear weapons. In the West, they are used sparingly at first, and for the first week are only against troop concentrations no further than 50 kilometers form the soviet border." Straight from the book.

I was just going to point out the same (aren't searchable PDFs wonderful). However it is quite possible that text somewhere else contradicts this.

There are lots of contradictory pieces of canon unfortunately.

[Legbreaker]

Ah, I see where I was wrong now.
Yes, the Soviets did use tactical nukes first however it was NATO that escalated to longer ranged strategic weapons.

In the west NATO begins deep nuclear strikes against communication hubs in Czechoslovakia and Byelorussia in an attempt to slow the Pact advance. The Pact forces respond with similar strikes against German industrial targets and major port cities. Throughout October the exchanges escalate but no ICBM’s are launched due to the fear of starting total global thermonuclear war.
First military targets are hit, then industrial targets vital to the war (including the first strikes against continental USA.) Then economic and support facilities such as oil refineries. Then the facilities of neutral countries are targeted to deny their use by the other side. The civilian command structure is first decimated then destroyed until the exchanges finally peter out in late November.

[natehale1971]

If i remember rigth the first use of Strategic nukes was the Thanksgiving Day Massacare surigical strike to decapitate the American leadership. Because the Deep Strikes you're refering to where made by NATO Air Assets, not ICBMs.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Ah, I see where I was wrong now.
Yes, the Soviets did use tactical nukes first however it was NATO that escalated to longer ranged strategic weapons.

Yep.

In the west, NATO air units begin making deep nuclear strikes against communication hubs in Czechoslovakia and Poland in an attempt to slow the Warsaw Pact advance. The Pact responds with similar strikes against German industrial targets and major port cities.

I am actually glad that I am re-reading this as it validates my opinion on the rubble on the T2k maps being nuke strikes.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

If i remember rigth the first use of Strategic nukes was the Thanksgiving Day Massacare surigical strike to decapitate the American leadership. Because the Deep Strikes you're refering to where made by NATO Air Assets, not ICBMs.

Yes, ICBMs were avoided in the beginning, but they had to have been used at some point to reach some of the more distant targets. Sure ballistic subs might reach some targets, but....

There is nothing I can see anywhere in canon that states the early deep strikes were delivered by aircraft. I would think it just as feasible they were missile borne.

Tactical strikes (in my view) are basically anything fired at less than say 100km - artillery shells, missiles and airstrikes. Anything greater than that is definately NOT in the scope of a tactical engagement as even the most widespread division would be thinly stretched and hard pressed to cover that sort of area, especially in the relatively crowded European theatre with strong enemy presence (different matter in wide open deserts against poorly trained and led troops such as in Iraq 1991-2).

As the actual "combat zone" might only be a few kilometres in depth (even though it's location might vary from hour to hour by miles, even tens of miles, depending on current operations) one might even say a divisional, perhaps even brigade rear area could be considered a "strategic" strike.

Just because an individual attack isn't carried out with an ICBM, doesn't mean it's not in the strategic category....

[natehale1971]

I just read that they did use Theater Missiles, but not strategic ICBMs until the TDM. But the 2.2 timeline said that NATO had used their Air Assets to make the deep strikes, and said that they had used Theater Missiles to hit troop concentrations and other military targets (industrial cities in German as well as the ports).

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

I just read that they did use Theater Missiles, but not strategic ICBMs until the TDM. But the 2.2 timeline said that NATO had used their Air Assets to make the deep strikes, and said that they had used Theater Missiles to hit troop concentrations and other military targets (industrial cities in German as well as the ports).

I'd like to know where it actually says that. I can't find it.

[kato13]

This is a tough one. It depends on what you mean with Strategic vs Tactical. For weapons systems it is pretty clear cut. But strikes are another matter. I would say you could use strategic weapons for tactical strikes and vice versa. A suitcase nuke going off in front of the White House is IMO a strategic strike.

[natehale1971]

Further on page 12.

The paragraph that starts "In the west, NATO Air Units begin making deep nuclear strikes against communication hubs in Czechoslovakia and Poland in an attempt to slow the Warsaw Pact advance."

Further in the paragraph it states.. "Fearful of a general strategic exchange, neither side targets the land based ICBMs of the other, or launches so many warheads at once as to risk convincing the other side that an all-out attack is in progres. Neither side wishes to cross the threshold to nuclear oblivion in one bold step, and so they inch across it, never quite knowing that they have done so until after the fact."

Then the paragraph after that has what they targeted.

[natehale1971]

Originally Posted by kato13

This is a tough one. It depends on what you mean with Strategic vs Tactical. For weapons systems it is pretty clear cut. But strikes are another matter. I would say you could use strategic weapons for tactical strikes and vice versa. A suitcase nuke going off in front of the White House is IMO a strategic strike.

the major powers had treaties where they would't target capitols on the belief that blowing off the head would do nothing but make it impossible for the other side to surrender if they wanted to stop the war.

[Targan]

Scuds have ranges of hundreds of klicks don't they? I'd consider a nuclear armed Scud to be a tactical weapon.

[avantman42]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I just finished Red Army by Ralph Peters, a fine novel of WWIII set in Europe. What sets this novel apart from contemporaries like Red Storm Rising and Team Yankee is that it is written entirely from the POV of its Soviet protagonists.

I read that book years ago, and thoroughly enjoyed it. The thing that really stood out for me was that it really did show a different point of view. Some examples that I can remember:

The political officers were respected and liked by the enlisted men (whereas they're generally portrayed as disliked or hated by the officers)

I've often read that Soviet soldiers performed well in WW2 because they were defending their homeland, and their performance in a war of conquest was likely to be less impressive. In Red Army, the soldiers believed that Germany had invaded (again), and so they were fighting to defend their homeland, as far as they knew.

Another thing that has always stuck in my mind was the general fighting to get fuel to the tank force that had broken through the NATO lines. He was much less concerned about ammunition, as long as they got fuel. His rationale was that if you see a tank, you don't know whether it's got 3 or 30 rounds for the main gun, so most people will react as though it's got a full load of ammunition.

Russ

[Legbreaker]

The first tactical use of nukes was by the Soviets on the 9th of July 1997.

The first Strategic (aka long range) attack was no earlier than the 15th of September 1997 (the date the siege of Warsaw was lifted). Exact date is not mentioned however it is stated "throughout October the exchanges continue, excallating gradually". We could take that to mean the first strike was either very late in September, or sometime in the first days of October.

Therefore, there is a gap of almost three months between the first "small" (aka relatively short ranged) nuke in Europe to the first long range or strategic strike.

The first nuclear airstrike of the war was however carried out by the Soviets against China in July (again, no exact date but it is mentioned in connection to the first tactical nukes in the west on the 9th).

It appears that the war in China was effectively over by mid to late July which allows approximately 3-4 weeks for the first units released from the east to reach the west. China isn't even mentioned again after the July 97 attacks in the timelines of any of the versions.


Scuds could be considered either. Any nuke could be used strategically, however the delivery method would really dictate the category they fall under. Provided they were armed with nukes, I would think any commander possessing them would take advantage of their relatively long range and not fire them at closer targets much more easily attacked with heavy artillery, shorter ranged missiles or aircraft.

As was seen in the attacks against Israel, conventionally armed scuds aren't likely to inflict a while lot of significant, war winning damage. They are however likely to annoy the recipients and provoke them into doing something stupid (exactly what was feared back in 91-92).

[chico20854]

The Soviets operated on three levels of combat operations: tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical focuses on winning the battle, operational on winning the campaign, and strategic on winning the war. They had formations and weapons for each stage. Armies and smaller operate on a tactical level, fronts & TVDs on the operational level, and nationally on the strategic level.

As far as nuclear weapons, tactical nukes were FROG & SS-21 missiles and artillery-fired munitions, along with gravity bombs from fighter-bombers. Range on these are out to about 100-150km at most.

Operational nuclear weapons are Scuds, Scaleboards and SS-20 SSMs, the Soviet land-based cruise missiles, gravity bombs and ASMs from Su-24 and Badger/Baackfire bombers, and SLBMs from older (Golf and Hotel-class) SSBs and SSBNs.

The strategic nuclear arsenal in the traditional ICBM, SLBM, sub-launched cruise missiles and long-range bombers (maybe Blackjack, plus Bears launching long-range cruise missiles).

Prior to the TDM, the Soviets (and NATO) are using tactical and operational-level nuclear weapons. (NATO called them Theater Nuclear weapons - ground-launched cruise missiles and US & German Pershing missiles).

Jason & I spoke last night about using conventional cruise missiles to cut the Trans-Siberian railroad. I argued that it was unlikely to occur prior to autumn of 97 (or possibly until after the TDM) for a number of reasons having to do with escalation. (And when you start into escalation & nuclear game theory things get a lot hairy and complicated) First, I assume that the Soviets would detect the incoming missile. The only way to tell if it has a conventional or nuclear warhead is to wait for it to reach its target and detonate - not a wise option for any commander. (Assuming too that it can't be intercepted). So a reasonable (here we go again with the game theory) Soviet commander might not want to wait to find out if he's being nuked and instead launch a counterstrike. As a result, the reasonable NATO commander might think real hard before launching a strike deep into the USSR with a nuclear-capable weapon armed with a conventional warhead, such as a cruise missile with a HE warhead against bridges on the TSRR. With Soviet SS-24 rail-mobile ICBMs roaming the rails, any strike on the Soviet rail network might also be seen in the same light as a strike on ICBM fields, which the v1 canon mentions as not occurring initially. (You can also turn this reasoning around to explain why Scuds and other Soviet SSMs with conventional warheads are not used against German airfields until after the beginning of the nuclear exchange, if you desire. On one hand, I'm not sure how credibly the Soviets took/believed all the Western analysis of escalation that occurred in the Cold War; on the other hand the v1 canon reads as if they basically did - else they would have nuked the German forces within hours of crossing the Inter-German Border!).

In the late Fall of 1997, however, the USAF starts flying "Golden Spike" missions over Siberian railroads. Using B-2s based out of Diego Garcia and Thailand and covered part of the way by American fighter aircraft operated by the New American Volunteer Group operating from airfields in Western China, the USAF started roving patrols of the Siberian railroad network. Priority targets are SS-24 ICBM trains (although very few operated in Siberia, preferring the much denser rail network west of the Urals) and troop trains transferring troops to the battlefields of Europe. Bomber crews tried to get "two for one", following a target train until it was on a bridge or emerging from a tunnel so that both the train and the infrastructure was destroyed by the weapon.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by avantman42

I read that book years ago, and thoroughly enjoyed it. The thing that really stood out for me was that it really did show a different point of view.

It certainly did, Russ. Another example I appreciated is how some of the junior officers portrayed in the book took it upon themselves to show significant tactical and operational innitiative. Too often, in the West, the Red Army has been portrayed as a blunt instrument which could be neutralized by NATO simply by taking out its general officers and command and control nodes. Junior officers and NCOs were portrayed as having little or no independent command authority. I think that, to some degree, this was wishful thinking and more a critique of the Soviet system in general than of the Soviet military.

On the other hand, the performance of the Russian army in the Chechnyan conflict seems to support detractors of the Soviet officer corps. But, as I've argued before, the Russian Federation military of the mid-'90s was a mere shadow of the Cold War Soviet military. Many within its bloated officer corps had been retired or cashiered as had many experienced junior officers in noncoms. What remained truly was a blunt instrument.

[Raellus]

As for the tactical/strategic nuclear discussion...

I agree that certain systems were designed and intended for certain purposes. There are definitely nuclear weapons systems that can accurately be termed tactical, operational, or strategic.

I think for the purposes of this debate, though, that the type of target must also be considered in deciding how to classify a particular nuclear strike.

For tactical strikes, I'm thinking about major troop concentrations close to the front, bridgeheads, static defense lines, major crossroads immediately behind the FEB, and, technically, enemy tactical nuclear assets.

For operational strikes: transportation, logistical, and communications hubs, corps and army level HQs, and enemy operational nuclear assets.

For strategic strikes: the enemy's strategic nuclear assets (i.e. ICBM silos and SSBN pens, strategic nuclear strike command and control centers), concentrations of raw materials essential to the war effort, oil refineries, major port facilities, industrial centers, and major population centers.

In canon, it seems that this progression was followed pretty closely.

Anything missing or misplaced?

[Legbreaker]

Is there any real reason why thanksgiving day (a date really only relevant to Americans) is so significant?
Sure it was the first day nuclear strikes were made on North America, but dozens, even hundreds (thousands might be pushing it) of nukes had been fired in the preceeding five months all across the world.
Thanksgiving day, although an important date of it's own, was not the first time long range strategic strikes were made. Neutral countries had already felt the scorching fire of attack by then, fire inflicted upon them by both sides of the conflict.

I'm not interested in provoking anyone, but I feel the increasing focus on what happened to, with, by and against the USA and it's forces is clouding the issue and ignoring the fact that many, many other countries have what could be considered to be more important dates on the "Twilight nuke calendar".

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by chico20854

We made some adjustments to the model Soviets in GDW's Third World War wargame. We made the T-90 (GDW T-90, not IRL upgraded T-72 that is now called T-90) on par with the M1A1.

I was thumbing through the v.1 vehicle guide and I have a little suggestion for you. The T-90 envisioned by GDW in the mid eighties seems to have appeared in some guise IRL as the T-95, a turretless MBT with a massive 152mm main gun (or a 135mm gun- reports differ).

By the time West Germany makes its move, the Soviets could have a regiment or two (or brigade) of these monsters stationed in E. Germany. I doubt they would send them to China when their T-80s and T-64s could handle any tanks the Chinese would be able to throw at them at that point.

GDW also imagined the T-86, an upgrade of the T-72 with an up-armored, slightly more angular turret. This both looks and sounds like the T-90 of our timeline.

Anyway, it's not a major issue or anything but I like to try to slip the newer tech into the v1.0 timeline, where plausible.

[TiggerCCW UK]

For information on post cold war operations in Chechnya can I again recommend "One soldiers war in Chechnya" by Arkady Babchenko. For him as an individual soldier the bullying in the army seems to have presented a much greater threat than enemy action. Its a hard brutal read, but it explains a lot of why the Russians performed so badly in that war.

[chico20854]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I was thumbing through the v.1 vehicle guide and I have a little suggestion for you. The T-90 envisioned by GDW in the mid eighties seems to have appeared in some guise IRL as the T-95, a turretless MBT with a massive 152mm main gun (or a 135mm gun- reports differ).

By the time West Germany makes its move, the Soviets could have a regiment or two (or brigade) of these monsters stationed in E. Germany. I doubt they would send them to China when their T-80s and T-64s could handle any tanks the Chinese would be able to throw at them at that point.

GDW also imagined the T-86, an upgrade of the T-72 with an up-armored, slightly more angular turret. This both looks and sounds like the T-90 of our timeline.

Anyway, it's not a major issue or anything but I like to try to slip the newer tech into the v1.0 timeline, where plausible.

I'm not getting too specific on how RL models of tanks translate over. The modeling system we're using (Third World War) basically (very broadly) rates tanks by gun caliber and armor. T-55, T-62, M-48, M-60 & Leo-1 all rate the same, as do T-64/72/80 and Chieftain. M1 and Challenger rate a little higher on defense due to their heavy armor (and in the case of M-1) mobility.

On the orbats, I'm trying to use the v1 tank progression. I'm using GDW's T-74 designation for RL T-72B and later models, T-86 for RL T-80U and BV variants, T-90 for RL T-95 & the enigmatic Black Eagle. As far as the modelling goes, the T-64/72/72/80/86 all come out the same, and the T-90 is equal to the M1A1. I took the RL 1990 tank assignments for Soviet forces and generally upgraded them one generation, as follows:

RL T-80 -> T-90
RL T-64 -> T-86
RL T-72 -> T-74
RL T-62 -> T-64
RL T-55 -> T-72
RL T-54 -> T-62

T-90 ends up mostly in Soviet forces in Germany and Poland. (Historically Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia had T-72 series, those in Hungary used T-64s until the late 80s, when they started getting early-model T-80s).

I prefer to leave it up to the GM as to what the exact RL (or fantasy!) vehicle a T-90 (and on the NATO side, the LAV-75/XM-8/AGS) is, since there are a few options. But I agree, there are some advanced Soviet monster tanks out there that throw NATO for a loop!

[chico20854]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Is there any real reason why thanksgiving day (a date really only relevant to Americans) is so significant?
Sure it was the first day nuclear strikes were made on North America, but dozens, even hundreds (thousands might be pushing it) of nukes had been fired in the preceeding five months all across the world.
Thanksgiving day, although an important date of it's own, was not the first time long range strategic strikes were made. Neutral countries had already felt the scorching fire of attack by then, fire inflicted upon them by both sides of the conflict.

I'm not interested in provoking anyone, but I feel the increasing focus on what happened to, with, by and against the USA and it's forces is clouding the issue and ignoring the fact that many, many other countries have what could be considered to be more important dates on the "Twilight nuke calendar".

I think there are three reasons that the Thanksgiving Strikes are important. First, its the first use of ICBMs and modern SLBMs (older Soviet & NATO SLBMs were tasked with theater strikes). Prior to that point, the nuclear exchange had been carried out with tactical and theater/operational weapons. IMHO, the Soviets had not used silo-based missiles prior to that point.

Second, the Thanksgiving Day strikes were the transition between the operational targets Raellus listed above and strategic targets (with the caveat, again IMHO, that I would consider major ports in Europe to be operational targets). This is a grey area, as there is no clear dividing line for the Soviets between tactical, operational and nuclear strikes when they all land on Soviet territory - but going along the progression of escalation laid out in canon I could see how it could be reasonably argued that NATO would not have struck strategic targets (ICBM fields in Ukraine, the Kharkov tank plant, early warning radars in Western Ukraine) in the USSR prior to the TDM, even though they could have using tactical or operational weapons. Likewise, while the UK may have been struck prior to the TDM (I don't have the Survivor's Guide to the UK with me right now) the strikes on the royal family (a decidely strategic target) occurred on Thanksgiving Day too, again implying that the targets changed from an emphasis to destroying forces in contact (tactical targets) and the means to support and control them (operational targets) to destroying the enemy's ability as a nation to make war (strategic targets).

Third, I disagree with your assertion that the nuclear conflict had spread worldwide, to both nuetral and belligerent nations, prior to the TDM. I think the importance of the TDM is that it is the date at which the conflict does become worldwide. When you look at the list of tactical and operational targets, there are very few of them that nuetrals possess that are useful to beligerants. (And the few are, again IMHO, mostly French - ports, Pluton missiles, transport facilities, all of which it could be reasonably argued France had cut off NATO's access to when they withdrew from NATO). And while canon states that both NATO and the Pact strike nuetral nations once things "go strategic", IMHO most of those strikes are by the Soviets simply because the USSR is essentially surrounded (except for possibly a tenuous supply line across the Mediterranean the Soviets face NATO or NATO-allied troops on the west, south, southeast and east, and the sea lanes from the north lead through NATO controlled waters) so they are unable to receive any war material from nuetral nations - the only beneficiery of nuetral nation's raw materials, energy supplies and export arms are NATO or NATO-allied nations. (Much of the vaunted imported crude oil coming to the US is imported by pipeline from Mexican and Canadian oilfields - so prior to the Mexican invasion the only nation with a reason to nuke Mexico would be the Soviets).

I'm sorry if we give the impression of being US-centric. There are a couple reasons for this. First, all the folks in the DC group are Americans and we prefer to work on things we know best, to avoid making blunders with assumptions about other countries - look at the reception that the Survivors Guide to the UK receives from the Brits here. Rainbow is doing a wonderful job with a more local perspective on things, and we're trying to coordinate our effort with his, and Deacon and Fusilier have provided us valuable input on Canada. Second, the amount of documentation that is available for us to research is greatest about the US, with the USSR a somewhat close second. This allows us to go into much greater detail.

[chico20854]

A pretty interesting source of info on what the Soviets can do (and what the US feared they could do!) is the declassified CIA national intelligence assessments from the 1980s. They cover much of the ground we have discussed here.

The search site is http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp.

Some interesting ones to browse through:

"SOVIET STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR MULTITHEATER WAR"
"TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES, 1985-2000 "
"SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST"
"SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT"
and much more...

[kato13]

Originally Posted by chico20854

A pretty interesting source of info on what the Soviets can do (and what the US feared they could do!) is the declassified CIA national intelligence assessments from the 1980s. They cover much of the ground we have discussed here.

The search site is http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp.

Some interesting ones to browse through:

"SOVIET STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR MULTITHEATER WAR"
"TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES, 1985-2000 "
"SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST"
"SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT"
and much more...

Well there goes my free time for the next few weeks

Seriously though, once again the more I hear from The DC group the more confident I am in the final product.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by kato13

Seriously though, once again the more I hear from The DC group the more confident I am in the final product.

I with you there, Kato. Although thay and I have had a couple of spirited (but cordial) debates in the past, I think it really speaks volumes about the DC Group that they are willing to address constructive critisism, accept input from others, and try to incorporate the work of other non-group contributors. Like Paul M., they are putting loads of time and energy into their product for this arcane (but brilliant) '80s-era RPG. Thanks, guys!