In Defense of the Red Army

[Webstral]

Calling a spade a spade is only political when you have a vested interest in having a spade called something else. Then it's vicious slander and muckraking.

[Raellus]

Here's an interesting article on the Soviet's nuclear-powered supercarrier that never was.

https://warisboring.com/ulyanovsk-wo...5af#.be8mvmv7u

I think that the rapid decline of the post-Soviet Russian Federation navy has clouded our perceptions of what the Red Fleet was capable of at the height of its powers. Similarly, I think that many westerners have overestimated the capabilities of NATO navies, especially the USN. That's been discussed here at length, earlier in the thread, but it bears repeating.

Much has also been made by critics of the inferiority the Red Air Force, in terms of technological capibilites and doctrine. The following article shows how a Soviet-made plane, using Soviet-made AAMs, and operating under Soviet doctrine (ground-based fighter direction) could be successful when flown by a competent pilot.

https://warisboring.com/who-shot-dow...df5#.j4nq0qmbv

Granted, I firmly believe that both NATO navies and air forces were superior in pretty much all but numbers (at least in air power) to their Soviet equivalents during most (if not all) of the Cold War, but I think the gap is not as wide as some have made it out to be.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Here's an interesting article on the Soviet's nuclear-powered supercarrier that never was.

https://warisboring.com/ulyanovsk-wo...5af#.be8mvmv7u

I think that the rapid decline of the post-Soviet Russian Federation navy has clouded our perceptions of what the Red Fleet was capable of at the height of its powers. Similarly, I think that many westerners have overestimated the capabilities of NATO navies, especially the USN. That's been discussed here at length, earlier in the thread, but it bears repeating.

I think the Soviets planned to build two Ulyanovsk Class nuclear powered aircraft carriers before the Cold War ended. How effective they would have been against NATO naval power is I think open to debate. From what we know about the current Russian Kuznetsov carrier it is riddled with engine and other reliability problems and is always accompanied by a deep sea tug because it breaks down so much. The Kuznetsov is also inferior in capabilities to all of the US Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers.

Would a slightly larger nuclear powered Soviet aircraft carrier be any more reliable or capable? I don't think so and I don't think their reliability would be enhanced by the fact that they would be powered by four KN-3 nuclear reactors which were designed for the Kirov Class missile battlecruisers, which would have been a maintenance nightmare and have taken up a lot of internal space. The larger US Navy Nimitz and Ford class carriers have two reactors. Also the Soviet had no experience in steam catapult operations at this time and their naval combat aircraft were not as good as US Navy aircraft.

Certainly the Soviet fleet was impressive and was more powerful than any European member of NATO. But I don't think they had anything to match a US Navy carrier battle group or an Iowa Class battleship. In wartime if we are talking about the Soviets in the Atlantic and its littoral regions then no Soviet carriers will be going toe to toe with US Navy carrier groups as they will lose. They will also avoid getting to close to NATO dominated coastlines as they will come into contact with NATO land based airpower which is (depending on the individual airforce) superior to Soviet naval aircraft. Also no Soviet warship is going to make it south of NATO's GIUK Gap in the North Atlantic, in fact most Soviet submarines probably wont breech it either.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Much has also been made by critics of the inferiority the Red Air Force, in terms of technological capibilites and doctrine. The following article shows how a Soviet-made plane, using Soviet-made AAMs, and operating under Soviet doctrine (ground-based fighter direction) could be successful when flown by a competent pilot.

https://warisboring.com/who-shot-dow...df5#.j4nq0qmbv

Granted, I firmly believe that both NATO navies and air forces were superior in pretty much all but numbers (at least in air power) to their Soviet equivalents during most (if not all) of the Cold War, but I think the gap is not as wide as some have made it out to be.

Certainly the Soviet Airforce was impressive although I think in air superiority its true strength lay in defending its own territory. I don't think the Soviets would have been too successful in establishing air superiority over NATO in Central Europe or anywhere to far outside of their home territory for a whole load of reasons; tactics, doctrine, pilot experience, command and control, technology etc. Remember that article was a one off incident were the Iraqis were defending their own airspace and got one US aircraft, not on the offensive over hostile territory. During the First Gulf War Iraq was considered to have the most advanced Soviet equipped air defence network outside of the Warsaw Pact, and US and Allied airforces overwhelmed it and shot the Iraqi Airforce out of the sky very quickly. Against NATO in Europe the Soviets would be on the offensive.

[rcaf_777]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I think that the rapid decline of the post-Soviet Russian Federation navy has clouded our perceptions of what the Red Fleet was capable of at the height of its powers. Similarly, I think that many westerners have overestimated the capabilities of NATO navies, especially the USN. That's been discussed here at length, earlier in the thread, but it bears repeating.

I think an overlooked aspect of Soviet vs NATO naval warfare is the ability of the surface fleet to get to sea (IE the open water) at the height of the Soviet Navy had fleets in the Baltic (Atlantic), Pacific, Black Sea(Med) and Arctic waters. All with the exception of the arctic have to pass through choke points where NATO could make hard for surface fleets to break out. This could also make it difficult for Soviet fleets to resupplied at sea and or returning to port for resupply.

[Raellus]

Fair point re defensive v. defensive aerial warfare. During an invasion of Western Europe, the Soviet air force, as the attacking force, would face some daunting challenges. On the other hand, aside from long-range interdiction strikes, really the SAF would only have to defend the forward edge of battle in order to prevent NATO aircraft from stopping the advance of Red Army armor.

Relating this back to T2K (v1.0, at least) though, the Soviets are initially on the defensive. Their AF would have been operating much as the Iraqi MiG-25 did in the article.

Regarding the Red [surface] Fleet, one must consider it's intended role in a conventional war with NATO. Soviet naval doctrine was different than that of the West. The Soviets liked to send their fleet elements on long-range cruises during peacetime as a way of showing off but, during a war, the surface fleets were to be kept close to home, to defend the Motherland. They would have had the advantages of the defender- air cover from land-based aircraft, interior lines of supply, etc. Granted, the Japanese enjoyed those advantages during WWII and it still didn't turn out so well for them.

A Soviet surface fleet sortie into the Atlantic would likely have been very costly, and the Soviets knew that. They had the capability to try, but their war plans did not envision their surface elements straying far from territorial waters.

Submarines, on the other hand- many would sortie prior to the commencement of hostilities. They would already be roaming the open seas- that was the plan, at least. I've said it before, but one thing I think many western analysts have grossly overestimated, is NATO's ability to quickly locate and eliminate these submarine commerce hunters. There's reams of anecdotal evidence about U.S. carrier groups being stalked and killed by "obsolete" submarines during exercises. NATO subs have collided with NATO ships, Soviet subs and ships, and even land. I think pundits focus too much on the theory of ASW tech/doctrine and forget about the messiness of reality.

[adimar]

It is true that the soviets didn't have aircraft carriers but truth be tolled is that they didn't need them as much as the US.
US aircraft are delicate flowers that require pristine airfields from which to operate. When operating you aircraft has such extreme requirements it makes sense to bring your airfield along with you where ever you operate. (i.e. an aircraft carrier)
Soviet planes could be operated from rough barely packed dirt roads. They don't need elaborate infrastructure or complex maintenance and as such can operate from anywhere. a small crew to refuel and rearm the plane which will depart farmer1's field go on it's mission and return to farmer2's field (support crew would drive by truck). A fixed airfield is not needed and thus the soviet air force is far less vulnerable to having it's runways taken out.
And as a result this makes the lack of Aircraft carriers less of a limitation.

Adi

[Draq]

And given the land available to the Soviets, they typically aren't very far from anywhere

[The Dark]

Originally Posted by RN7

I think the Soviets planned to build two Ulyanovsk Class nuclear powered aircraft carriers before the Cold War ended. How effective they would have been against NATO naval power is I think open to debate. From what we know about the current Russian Kuznetsov carrier it is riddled with engine and other reliability problems and is always accompanied by a deep sea tug because it breaks down so much. The Kuznetsov is also inferior in capabilities to all of the US Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers.

Would a slightly larger nuclear powered Soviet aircraft carrier be any more reliable or capable? I don't think so and I don't think their reliability would be enhanced by the fact that they would be powered by four KN-3 nuclear reactors which were designed for the Kirov Class missile battlecruisers, which would have been a maintenance nightmare and have taken up a lot of internal space. The larger US Navy Nimitz and Ford class carriers have two reactors. Also the Soviet had no experience in steam catapult operations at this time and their naval combat aircraft were not as good as US Navy aircraft.

A large part of the problems with the Kirovs were because the Soviet Navy never built land bases with proper support equipment for the KN-3 reactors, so the reactors had to be shut down in port. This perversely increased wear on components, because the shut-down/start-up cycle was more stressful than running the reactor at minimal levels. If they had a pair of Uylanovsks plus the Kirovs, increasing reactor numbers from 8 to 16, they might build in the necessary support equipment to allow the vessels to run at minimal power in port.

Four reactors sounds problematic, but recall that the Enterprise used eight. The Kirovs were also excessively complicated (in my opinion) due to their odd nuclear-and-oil combination, where the Ulyas would be nuclear-only. The Ulyas would have only slightly more power than a Nimitz (1200 MW to 1100 MW for the pair of A4Ws). Lack of electrical power might actually be an issue, like it is now on the Nimitz-class. The reactors were third-generation (with block cooling systems and improved control rods), but tended to run hot, so cooling would also be an issue, particularly as energy demands rose at high speeds.

Certainly the Soviet fleet was impressive and was more powerful than any European member of NATO. But I don't think they had anything to match a US Navy carrier battle group or an Iowa Class battleship. In wartime if we are talking about the Soviets in the Atlantic and its littoral regions then no Soviet carriers will be going toe to toe with US Navy carrier groups as they will lose. They will also avoid getting to close to NATO dominated coastlines as they will come into contact with NATO land based airpower which is (depending on the individual airforce) superior to Soviet naval aircraft. Also no Soviet warship is going to make it south of NATO's GIUK Gap in the North Atlantic, in fact most Soviet submarines probably wont breech it either.

I'm not sure the Soviets ever planned going toe-to-toe with an American carrier group. The surface fleet was primarily intended to keep enemy carriers out of range of the mainland with the threat of surface-to-surface missiles (at some point, advancing to using helicopters to provide over-the-horizon targeting), while the submarine fleet was a strike arm (ballistic missile subs) and a defensive arm that would be divided between striking at enemy carriers and protecting the boomers (attack subs). Honestly, even the "blue belt" theory espoused in the article doesn't make much sense, since a combination of hunter-killers, land-based aircraft, and missile-armed surface craft should be able to generate the same sort of bubble for boomers to vanish in.

Interesting, the Ulyas are mentioned in a book I have, Norman Polmar's Guide to the Soviet Navy of 1986. The expectation at the time was that the lead ship would be either Sovetskiy Soyuz or Kremlin, that it would use a combined nuclear and steam power plant like Kirov, that it would be complete by 1990, and that it would carry 65-70 fixed-wing aircraft from the Su-27 Flanker, MiG-29 Fulcrum, Su-25 Frogfoot, and possibly Yak-38 Forger families. However, even that would leave the Navy with a large majority of its aircraft being land-based. As of mid-1986, estimates were that the Soviet Navy had 155 carrier-based aircraft and 1,485 land-based aircraft, with 400 strike aircraft, 335 patrol/ASW aircraft, and 750 other aircraft.

I'm less sold on the utility of the Iowas against a Soviet carrier, since the only air defense on the BBs were the four Block 0/Block 1 Phalanx and five Stinger launch positions, since Sea Sparrow couldn't be carried due to the overpressure from the 16" cannon. The Iowa would need assistance from escorts for air defense. The Arleigh Burkes didn't start service until '91, so the best anti-air escorts would be the four dead admirals (the Kidd-class) with a pair of Standard launchers and a pair of Phalanx or the Ticonderogas (5 with the Mark 26 weapon system, 10 or 11 with the Mark 41 in 1990 [Monterey commissioned in June 1990]) with similar armament but with the Aegis radar. The main utility of an Iowa by the 80s will lie in its Tomahawk VLCs, and the Mark 41 Ticonderogas are Tomahawk-capable (but with almost four times as many launch cells as an Iowa has Tomahawk launchers). The composition of their battle groups tacitly acknowledged this, since they always had a Ticonderoga and a Kidd as part of their escort (along with a Spruance and three Perrys for ASW work). The ASW ships do have some anti-air capability, but it's limited.

An interesting what-if would be the pair of "battlecarrier" proposals from the 80s for the Iowas. Martin Marietta suggested replacing the aft turret with hangars and launch/recovery areas for 12 Harriers. Naval Institute Proceedings was more ambitious, and wanted to put an angled flight deck in the rear to operate F/A-18s from. They still wouldn't make the Iowas incredibly useful, but they'd open up the possibility of an Iowa being deployed somewhere that needed the potential for air cover, but didn't justify a full fleet carrier.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by The Dark

A large part of the problems with the Kirovs were because the Soviet Navy never built land bases with proper support equipment for the KN-3 reactors, so the reactors had to be shut down in port. This perversely increased wear on components, because the shut-down/start-up cycle was more stressful than running the reactor at minimal levels.

The ambitions of the Soviet Navy were not matched by enough thought into how to support and supply such ambitions. The Soviet Navy was also largely manned by conscripts unlike the volunteer US Navy, maintenance must have been a nightmare for them.

Originally Posted by The Dark

If they had a pair of Uylanovsks plus the Kirovs, increasing reactor numbers from 8 to 16, they might build in the necessary support equipment to allow the vessels to run at minimal power in port.

They might have, but probably might not have.

Originally Posted by The Dark

Four reactors sounds problematic, but recall that the Enterprise used eight. The Kirovs were also excessively complicated (in my opinion) due to their odd nuclear-and-oil combination, where the Ulyas would be nuclear-only. The Ulyas would have only slightly more power than a Nimitz (1200 MW to 1100 MW for the pair of A4Ws). Lack of electrical power might actually be an issue, like it is now on the Nimitz-class. The reactors were third-generation (with block cooling systems and improved control rods), but tended to run hot, so cooling would also be an issue, particularly as energy demands rose at high speeds.

Only one Enterprise was built between 1958 and 1961. The US Navy had originally planned to build five Enterprise Class carriers but wisely waited until the twin A4W nuclear reactors were ready to be fitted into the Nimitz.

Originally Posted by The Dark

I'm not sure the Soviets ever planned going toe-to-toe with an American carrier group.

They would have eventually had too as the US Navy espoused an offensive minded and controversial approach to dealing with the threat of Soviet submarines to NATO shipping from the 1980's, by deploying US aircraft carriers groups across the GIUK Gap into the Norwegian Sea to strike against northern Soviet bases. The Soviets may not have ever planned to have gone toe-to-toe with American carriers but they would have had to, or retreat!

Originally Posted by The Dark

The surface fleet was primarily intended to keep enemy carriers out of range of the mainland with the threat of surface-to-surface missiles (at some point, advancing to using helicopters to provide over-the-horizon targeting), while the submarine fleet was a strike arm (ballistic missile subs) and a defensive arm that would be divided between striking at enemy carriers and protecting the boomers (attack subs). Honestly, even the "blue belt" theory espoused in the article doesn't make much sense, since a combination of hunter-killers, land-based aircraft, and missile-armed surface craft should be able to generate the same sort of bubble for boomers to vanish in.

In my mind the Soviet surface navy was designed to protect their boomers in regards to conflict with the US Navy. The only effective offensive capability they had against the US Navy were submarines and land based Tu-22M Backfire bombers with AS-4 (Kh-22) long ranged anti-ship missiles. Once NATO put up the GIUK Gap across the North Atlantic Soviet submarines and ships could not break out into the Atlantic undetected. Land based NATO AWAC's and long ranged fighter squadrons in Iceland and the UK also increased NATO's ability to detect and intercept Soviet Backfire bombers. Its effectiveness forced the Soviet's to develop longer ranged missiles for their boomers, with sufficient range to launch from the Barents Sea.

Originally Posted by The Dark

Interesting, the Ulyas are mentioned in a book I have, Norman Polmar's Guide to the Soviet Navy of 1986. The expectation at the time was that the lead ship would be either Sovetskiy Soyuz or Kremlin, that it would use a combined nuclear and steam power plant like Kirov, that it would be complete by 1990, and that it would carry 65-70 fixed-wing aircraft from the Su-27 Flanker, MiG-29 Fulcrum, Su-25 Frogfoot, and possibly Yak-38 Forger families.

I think its original name was Kremlin, but was changed to Ulyanovsk as Vladimir Lenin was born there. The air group of the Ulyanovsk would probably have been 68 aircraft (44 Su-33 (Su-27K)/Mig-29K, 6 Ka-27 ASW helicopters, 2x Ka-27P rescue helicopters).

Originally Posted by The Dark

However, even that would leave the Navy with a large majority of its aircraft being land-based. As of mid-1986, estimates were that the Soviet Navy had 155 carrier-based aircraft and 1,485 land-based aircraft, with 400 strike aircraft, 335 patrol/ASW aircraft, and 750 other aircraft.

In 1990/91 the Soviet Navy had 186 carrier based aircraft including 74 helicopters. The total Soviet Naval Aviation fleet included 1,469 fixed wing aircraft and 545 combat helicopters excluding transport and training aircraft.

Long Ranged Bombers: 356 (160 Tu-22M bombers, 6 Tu-22, 190 Tu-16 bombers)
Fighter Ground Attack Aircraft: 645 (80 Yak-38, 350 Su-17, 110 Su-24, 75 Su-25, 30 Mig-27)
Fighter Aircraft: 155 (85 Mig-23, 70 Mig-29)
ASW Aircraft: 198 (53 Tu-142, 53 IL-38, 92 Be-12)
ASW Helicopters: 287 (79 Mi-14, 93 Ka-25, 115 Ka-27)
Maritime Patrol & EW Aircraft: 105 (35 Tu-95, 40 Tu-16, 5 Tu-22, 10 Su-24, 15 An-12)
Maritime Patrol Helicopters: 20 (20 Ka-25)
Mine-Countermeasure Helicopters: 15 (15 Mi-14)
Assault Helicopters: 25 (20 Ka-27, 5 Ka-29)
Tanker Aircraft: 10 (10 Tu-16)
Transport & Training Aircraft: 445

Originally Posted by The Dark

I'm less sold on the utility of the Iowas against a Soviet carrier

The Iowa's would likely be never deployed against a Soviet carrier as they are battleships, unless the Soviet carrier was stupid enough to come within range of its main guns or substantial battery of Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles.

Originally Posted by The Dark

since the only air defense on the BBs were the four Block 0/Block 1 Phalanx and five Stinger launch positions, since Sea Sparrow couldn't be carried due to the overpressure from the 16" cannon. The Iowa would need assistance from escorts for air defense.

Yes and the Iowa would always be accompanied by air defence escorts, and would probably be also protected by the CAP of carrier based aircraft and submarines.

Originally Posted by The Dark

The Arleigh Burkes didn't start service until '91....

The Twilight War starts in 1996/1997.

Also other than using a nuclear weapon it would take an awful lot of Soviet hits to even disable an Iowa.

Originally Posted by The Dark

An interesting what-if would be the pair of "battlecarrier" proposals from the 80s for the Iowas. Martin Marietta suggested replacing the aft turret with hangars and launch/recovery areas for 12 Harriers. Naval Institute Proceedings was more ambitious, and wanted to put an angled flight deck in the rear to operate F/A-18s from. They still wouldn't make the Iowas incredibly useful, but they'd open up the possibility of an Iowa being deployed somewhere that needed the potential for air cover, but didn't justify a full fleet carrier.

I think that would be a waste of a perfectly good gun turret.

[Silent Hunter UK]

Originally Posted by Draq

And given the land available to the Soviets, they typically aren't very far from anywhere

However, their enemies aren't very far from them. It is possible to hit Moscow with a nuclear missile from West Germany in 10 minutes; you can only do the same for Washington DC from Cuba.

[swaghauler]

I did a bit of research into what old Soviet ships would still be serviceable in 1997 and came up with this list of "Surface Combatants" for Russia in 1997 (based on units lost to former Pact members and decommissioning/damage). Excluding subs, the Russian Navy was of almost the size as the US Navy under President Clinton (although the US ships were FAR more capable). Russia had 208 total surface combatants to the US total of 157 surface combatants (this excludes supply or landing ship transports). Here is the list I compiled of OPERATIONAL (not decommissioned or dry-docked/refitting ships).

Russian Surface Combatant Ships:

Kuznetsov Class Carrier: 1
Kirov Class Battle Cruiser Guided Missile Nuclear: 3
Kara Class Guided Missile Cruiser: 5
Kresta Class Guided Missile Cruiser: 4
Slava Class Guided Missile Cruiser: 5
Kashin Class Guided Missile Destroyers: 7
Sovremennyy Class Guided Missile Destroyers: 19
Udaloy Class Guided Missile Destroyers: 11
Krivak Class Guided Missile Frigate: 30
Neustrashimy Class Guided Missile Frigate: 30

These comprise the Russian fleet elements that are large enough to operate independently during a "blue water cruise." The following ships have limited range and/or endurance and are used in squadrons or with coastal support.

The following ships would be called "Corvettes" in the West, but the Russians often refer to them as "Frigates."

Derach Class FFGA: 3
Grisha Class FFL: 30
Nanuchka Class FSG: 33
Parchim Class FFL: 11
Paulk Class FSG: 4
Tarantul Class FSG: 12

Unfortunately, I don't have as detailed a listing for US Naval Assets (yet).

US Surface Combatant Ships:

Carriers CVN: 12
Cruisers CCG: 30
Destroyers DDG: 56
Frigates FFG: 42
Command Ships CMD: 4

These are all of the capital surface combatants still sailing in 1997. Other ships would be in "mothballs" and need at least some refurbishment before sailing again.
The US Navy doesn't have any true Corvettes but the following "Patrol Ships" could qualify.

Patrol Ships PT: 13

This is the best estimate I could come up with to accurately reflect both sides Naval strengths in 1997 (based on historical evidence). What I found surprising was just how fast President Clinton "drew down" the US navy from a 1980's high of 303 Surface Combatants (and nearly 500 total vessels). Many of these ships were NOT "mothballed" either; they were either scrapped or sold to other countries.
This could explain the Russian's success on the Naval front. The US would be spread "paper thin" hunting Russian subs and commerce raiders. This wouldn't have left many task forces for offensive operations.

[The Dark]

For the US as of 31 December 1997:

Forrestal CV: 1
Kitty Hawk CV: 2
Kennedy CV: 1
Enterprise CVN: 1
Nimitz CVN: 7
Wasp LHD: 5

Raleigh LPD: 1
Austin LPD: 3
Cleveland LPD: 7
Trenton LPD: 2

Iwo Jima LPH: 2

California CGN: 2
Virginia CGN: 2
Ticonderoga CG: 27

Spruance DD: 31
Kidd DD: 4
Arleigh Burke DDG: 21

Perry FFG: 41

[swaghauler]

Originally Posted by The Dark

For the US as of 31 December 1997:

Forrestal CV: 1
Kitty Hawk CV: 2
Kennedy CV: 1
Enterprise CVN: 1
Nimitz CVN: 7
Wasp LHD: 5

Raleigh LPD: 1
Austin LPD: 3
Cleveland LPD: 7
Trenton LPD: 2

Iwo Jima LPH: 2

California CGN: 2
Virginia CGN: 2
Ticonderoga CG: 27

Spruance DD: 31
Kidd DD: 4
Arleigh Burke DDG: 21

Perry FFG: 41

Thanks for saving me the trouble of looking those up.

Another factor to consider when comparing the navies is the Age of the fleet in question. A LARGE number of Soviet Era ships were "scrapped/salvaged" between 1998 and 2003. I can imagine a number of the Udaloys and Sovremennyys have the equivalent of an 8 Wear Value. The US fleet was much newer with the exception of the gas powered carriers (Wear of 7 or 8?) and the OHP Frigates. The Perry class was designed in 1975 with a service life of 20 years as a cost-cutting measure (most ships are designed for 40-50 years with a 20-year upgrade) and most of them were on the verge of needing an upgrade.

[The Dark]

Originally Posted by swaghauler

Thanks for saving me the trouble of looking those up.

Another factor to consider when comparing the navies is the Age of the fleet in question. A LARGE number of Soviet Era ships were "scrapped/salvaged" between 1998 and 2003. I can imagine a number of the Udaloys and Sovremennyys have the equivalent of an 8 Wear Value. The US fleet was much newer with the exception of the gas powered carriers (Wear of 7 or 8?) and the OHP Frigates. The Perry class was designed in 1975 with a service life of 20 years as a cost-cutting measure (most ships are designed for 40-50 years with a 20-year upgrade) and most of them were on the verge of needing an upgrade.

The Spruance class were also old by this point - the first of them was laid down in 1972 (ordered in 1970) and none remained in service more than 30 years (7 Perrys served between 31 and 34 years). The Spruances and Perrys were the "high/low" escorts in Zumwalt's fleet plan. By the early 90s, the Burkes were a badly needed upgrade. The four dead admirals (the Kidd-class) were more capable, particularly after the New Threat Upgrade allowed the Ticonderoga cruisers to take over Kidd-launched missiles in mid-flight, using the superior Aegis arrays to improve performance. Aegis was a big reason for the accelerated disposal of the cruisers and destroyers not of the Ticonderoga and Burke classes, since the newer ships were considered far more capable than even upgraded older ships.

For the Soviet ships, there are a few old ones that will still be around:
Admiral Golovko - a Kynda-class cruiser, commissioned in 1964 and serving as Black Sea Fleet flagship from 1995-1997.
Krasny Kavkaz - a Kashin-class destroyer, commissioned in 1967 and decommissioned in 1998. One of the modified Kashins with rear-firing Styx (SS-N-2) launchers.
If the Soviet Union slows the decommissioning of ships due to tensions, there were still three Skoryy-class destroyers on the books until 1994, the Besposchadnyy (commissioned 1951), Besshumnyy (also 1951), and Svobodny (1952).

[Raellus]

In the alternate timeline of T2K v1.0, the Soviets would have had three fleet carriers- the two Admiral Kuznetsovs and the Ulyanovsk, plus four Kiev class light carriers flying the newer Yak-141. Still a paltry force compared to the USN's carrier fleet, but not inconsiderable when operating close to territorial waters with land-based air cover supplementing their air groups.

[The Dark]

After double-checking, I realize I made a mistake. The new unknown-class carriers in the book I'm referencing aren't the Ulyanovsks, they're the Kuznetsovs. The timing and tonnage are wrong for the Ulyas, since the first of them wasn't laid down until 1988, and the book says the first unknown carrier launched in December 1985.

That also shows how much Soviet priorities were misunderstood, since the estimate was the Kuznetsov would carry 60-75 fixed-wing aircraft, when the project specification was to carry 33. The discrepancy is likely due to the lack of expectation that Kuznetsov would have a heavy anti-ship missile battery.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

The Soviets don't, and never have, understood the first thing about full-sized carrier operations except what they could observe secondhand. The Uly classes would've been fitted with ASMs, the launching of even one would've obscured the flight deck with smoke for 10 minutes. It had a ski-jump and side deck catapult launch, which means while launching aircraft it couldn't have retrieved them. Their problems with naval nuclear power are equally storied and their one operational carrier recently had to shift its air wing to land-based, and goes nowhere without a powered tug, so frequent are her breakdowns.

Even in T2k 1.0 I wouldn't bother worrying about Soviet naval air power in terms of carrier aircraft. The YAK-38 was a terrible aircraft; a Dauntless SBD could carry a greater bomb load.

I know this is a rah-rah go USSR thread but come on, you might as well talk about the Soviets having mecha as having operational carriers and useful aircraft.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

I know this is a rah-rah go USSR thread but come on, you might as well talk about the Soviets having mecha as having operational carriers and useful aircraft.

Yeah, I think you are reading too much into my posts. We all know that comparing Soviet carriers and US supercarriers is like comparing a Ford Nova to a Ferrari GTO. I think we've been pretty clear about that. We've also pointed out that Soviet carriers wouldn't have been deployed or used like USN carriers. And navalized MiG-27s and SU-27s are not useless aircraft, especially when working with land-based Bears, Blinders, and Backfires carrying long-range, supersonic ASMs. Yak-141's on the other hand, I don't know. But, AFAIK, no one here claimed that the Yak-38 was useful.

[RN7]

During the Cold War the Soviet Union could build as many tanks, fighter aircraft and nuclear armed ballistic missiles as it wanted to compete with America and the Western world, but as sea it was just simply out classed by the US Navy no matter how hard it tried to compete with it.

The Soviet Union or Russia was never considered to be a leading naval power at any era over the past two centuries, and at best it was one of the following pack of major powers with a navy that was barely ranked among the top five or lower. In both world wars its naval contribution to the wars was meagre compared to its own army and the other powers. After WW2 the Soviet Union found itself as the second most powerful country in the world, but the so called rise of its navy was also due to the practical elimination of German, Japanese and Italian naval ambitions, and the contraction of the British and French fleets due to decolonisation and economic realities.

At no point in the Cold War was the Soviet Navy a match for the US carrier fleet and the accumulative decades of American naval experience and technology. In fact until the 1970's the British Navy could even be considered to be a major threat to it until Britain decided to wind down its own naval ambitions and practically scrap its aircraft carrier fleet. The only way the Soviets could try and neutralise the threat of US carriers was by following the same route that Germany tried in both world wars when it was also outclassed by Western naval powers; submarines, and also with long ranged bombers with supersonic cruise missiles.

The Soviet carrier fleet offered little threat to US Navy carriers, and its carriers were in fact ASW platforms with a few VTOL jets of limited capabilities. The reason why Soviet ships and carriers had so many anti-ship, air defence and ASW weapons was because the Soviets recognised and were intimidated by the threat posed by the US Navy and particularly US naval aviation.

[pmulcahy11b]

When I was in ROTC in the 1980s, we all believed that sometime in the late 1980s or early 1990s, we'd be fighting the Pact in Europe, their puppets in the Middle East and Africa and Southeast Asia, and the Russians and some assorted Eastern European units in the Pacific and Alaska. If we were lucky, we might have the PRC as an ally (they hated the Russians at the time), but probably they's sit it out and close their borders unless attacked. And we were all sure, based on the amount of troops, vehicles, and aircraft the Russians and her allies could put up, and what we could put up, we'd lose in Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. We'd be forced to go nuclear to stop the Russians et al, and that would lead to oblivion.

And yet we were patriotic, young, and ready regardless what might happen!

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by RN7

During the Cold War the Soviet Union could build as many tanks, fighter aircraft and nuclear armed ballistic missiles as it wanted to compete with America and the Western world...

What we had was a massive technological edge. Not just in ships, but almost every weapon we had. That's what finally crashed the Soviet economy -- trying to keep up with us technologically. They simply couldn't no matter how hard they tried. And they did try, and failed.

But we at ROTC all knew that our technological edge would not be enough. They'd overwhelm us with sheer numbers. They would throw chemicals around like cotton candy. And we would be forced to go nuclear. And we all know where that would have lead.

[recon35]

You're right, Paul. As a cadet at the Citadel from '86-'89, I fully anticipated things to go hot some time in the 90's. It didn't dampen my willingness to serve in the least. Frankly, I still have no love for the Russians...

[The Dark]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Yeah, I think you are reading too much into my posts. We all know that comparing Soviet carriers and US supercarriers is like comparing a Ford Nova to a Ferrari GTO. I think we've been pretty clear about that. We've also pointed out that Soviet carriers wouldn't have been deployed or used like USN carriers. And navalized MiG-27s and SU-27s are not useless aircraft, especially when working with land-based Bears, Blinders, and Backfires carrying long-range, supersonic ASMs. Yak-141's on the other hand, I don't know. But, AFAIK, no one here claimed that the Yak-38 was useful.

There were only four Yak-141 prototypes. If they'd gone into production, they'd likely have turned out to be roughly equivalent to the Sea Harrier, possibly slightly inferior. Russia had no intent to put them on Kievs because the navalised MiGs and SUs were superior aircraft. Proposed armament loadouts were:

Air to air:
4x R-77 Adder
2x R-77 Adder & 2x R-27 Alamo

Air to ship:
2x R-73 Archer & 2x Kh-35 Kayak
4x Kh-35 Kayak
2x R-77 Adder & 2x Kh-35 Kayak

Air to ground:
4x Rocket Pod (I think UB-13L, but I'm not sure)
6x 250kg bomb
2x R-77 Adder & 2x Kh-31 Krypton
2x R-73 Archer & 2x Kh-25 Karen
4x UPK-23-250 gun pods

Kayaks weren't available until 2003, so they would only have had the much lighter Krypton or much shorter ranged Karen for anti-ship strikes.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

More thread necromancy from me...

An article from an Australian newspaper that illustrates the thinking in the West in regards to the military of the Soviet Union. The article dates from 1983 and I point it out because I believe that this sort of information was likely a big influence on the game (the 1st edition being published in 1984) and quite possibly directly responsible for what we now view as the designers over-estimation of Soviet capabilities.
Like many of you probably do, I recall the anti-West protests that occurred every time one of the major NATO partners did something but how they staid curiously silent whenever the Soviets did the same thing. This article makes mention of that particular phenomena in light of the Soviet weapons build-up and the Soviet sponsored World Peace Council - Si vis pacem, para bellum indeed.

Overall an interesting window into the mindset in the 1980s and as mentioned, I link it here because I think it is a good illustration of what would have influenced the game designers at the time. Considering the lack of publicly available information they had back then, this sort of information would probably have been a significant contribution to the design process.
https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/a...74838/12937787

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by The Dark

Russia had no intent to put them [Yak-141s] on Kievs because the navalised MiGs and SUs were superior aircraft.

But the Kievs were too small to launch navalized MiG-29s and SU-27s, and the Yak-141 was a direct replacement for the Yak-38, carried by the Kievs.

@SSC:

I found this quote quite telling,

"Much of the new policy of the Americans in publicising the latest Soviet weapons systems and military strengths is aimed at maintaining
US levels of defence expenditure against an increasingly recalcitrant Congress."

I've often wondered if the Cold War overestimations of Soviet military technology capabilities were an honest mistake born of genuine fear, or a deliberate manipulation of the Pentagon, Congress, and the American public by what Eisenhower dubbed, the military-industrial complex. Regardless, as a kid, I found it all very convincing.

And not all Soviet-era weaponry was crap. Yes, most of it was crude compared to Western equivalents, but a lot of it was very capable- some of it superior. I've said it many times here, especially in this thread, but quantity is a quality all its own, and the Soviets' numerical advantage in most weapon systems should not be discounted. The Nazis learned, to their detriment, that superior German weapon systems (like the Tiger and mature Panther tanks) did not necessarily cancel out the numerical superiority of equivalent Allied weapon systems. In the end, it didn't matter that a Tiger could kill 4 Shermans for every Tiger lost when the allies could put at least 5 Shermans into the field for every Tiger. In a WWIII, the same would very likely be true of the relationship between, say, an M1 and a swarm of T-72s.

I digress. I agree with your point that the designers of the original T2K only had so much information to go on, and some of the information available to them was not particularly accurate. IMHO, for the most part, they did a heck of a job with what they had.

[ChalkLine]

There's also a lot of western myths about the Red Army that were strange to say the least. A lot of people seemed to think the USSR would adopt pre Operation Bagration human wave tactics from World War Two when the societs were desperate. Another was that there was still Kommisars in the Redd Army when they were actually removed in 1943 because they immobilised command procedures. Instead the second in command of a battalion was the automatic zampolit who had to give a lecture or two every now and then and organise the sporting timetable

The NKVD 'blocking troops' dated from a desperate time when the Nazis had to be made to buy every metre of the Rhodinya with blood and kit. They were never considered a good idea by anyone, just an emergency procedure and were never even considered for later actions.

In the 2nd Chechen War the Russian Army had shown that when reorganised, paid well and equipped well with new gear and special equipment and troops they could take the battle to the Chechens and win decisively. They adopted modern western concepts quickly and are now equal in capacity and technology (except night vision tech, which they steal) with the west. This might well have been what later war troops looked like.

What really defined the Red Army though was how it used artillery. In the west the emphasis has long been on precision strikes but in the east this is seen as unnecessary. Instead they just use a lot more tubes than the west would ever consider. This allows them to blanket sectors with rocket and tube artillery to deny movement and support.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Oh yes indeed. That particular quote - "Much of the new policy of the Americans in publicising the latest Soviet weapons systems and military strengths is aimed at maintaining US levels of defence expenditure against an increasingly recalcitrant Congress." - strikes me in the same way as you, was it a genuine mistake due to ignorance, over-estimation brought about by fear/paranoia or deliberate hyperbole to get more money for the military budget?

But yes, no matter what brought it about, that information was viewed in a particular way by the public and that seems to have worked in favour of a larger military budget.
I still have some of the aircraft books I bought from back in that time and when it came to the new unknown fighters (I believe they were identified as Ramskoye prototypes or something like that before they were found out to be MiG-29 and so on), the trend tends to be to overestimate their potential capabilities. But ultimately, the US strategy of forcing the Soviets to spend more of their GNP on their military worked. Was releasing these estimates/data about Soviet equipment part of that strategy? I certainly don't know but I can easily see that it could have been.

And I have no disagreements with you about Soviet equipment. The Soviets had a different mindset for their designs and sometimes this had significant advantages as witnessed by my post about T-34's mounted as memorials being brought back to driving capacity for use in parades and by The Dark's post about an IS-2 being recovered from a memorial and put into use during the Ukraine conflict. As the article I was referencing inferred, sometimes the simpler "cruder" designs are better for the end user than the more sophisticated, complex designs - particularly when it comes to who the end user is. A lot of Soviet equipment was designed specifically knowing that conscripts would be either operating it, or maintaining/servicing it.
Stalin's statement of "Quantity has a quality all its own" was better suited for the level of technical expertise expected from Soviet conscript troops.

The Soviets certainly had some outstanding areas of expertise, their knowledge of theoretical physics was apparently better than the West's, they were further advanced than the West in terms of supersonic thrust vectoring for aircraft although the counterbalance to a lot of those advantages was their lower levels of metallurgical knowledge (hence the use of titanium for aircraft where the West was using alloys).
So after all my blathering, my point is, like every organism that has ever existed, the Soviet Union was a more complex beast than the simplistic observation of "they make peasant weapons for use by a peasant army".

And further to that, my point is - it's easy now to criticise GDW's treatment of the Soviet threat and to note how much weaker the Soviets really were but back when GDW was designing the game, we were living under a cloud of the Doomsday Clock, "WW3 at any minute", "Reds under the bed", the Soviets being the largest exporter of weapons in the world, Soviet sponsored terrorism in the West and numerous proxy wars being fought between the great powers and so on.
Given the potential fear that that engendered, I believe we can give the GDW crew some leeway in designing a game that was built around the very real fears of the time.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by StainlessSteelCynic

Given the potential fear that that engendered, I believe we can give the GDW crew some leeway in designing a game that was built around the very real fears of the time.

Also, it's a GAME. The PACT forces NEED to be strong so as to bring about the situation we see in July 2000. Reality really doesn't have much place in T2K, at least not on the larger scale.

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by StainlessSteelCynic

Oh yes indeed. That particular quote - "Much of the new policy of the Americans in publicising the latest Soviet weapons systems and military strengths is aimed at maintaining US levels of defence expenditure against an increasingly recalcitrant Congress." - strikes me in the same way as you, was it a genuine mistake due to ignorance, over-estimation brought about by fear/paranoia or deliberate hyperbole to get more money for the military budget?

A large part of it was the 1976 creation of Team B, the outside "experts" (all of hawkish inclination) who were convinced that the National Intelligence Estimate was underestimating the Soviet threat and that detente was an existential danger to the United States. As an example of the quality of their work, one of their arguments was that the Soviets were working on a submarine that was acoustically undetectable, and the fact that we had no evidence of it was evidence that the system worked.

Post-collapse documents showed that the CIA was actually overestimating the Soviet military (from 1978-85, the low end of their range of estimates for the number of Russian nuclear warheads exceeded the actual number every year, and from 1974-86 the rate of modernization was overestimated every year). The Team B estimates were even higher - they claimed there would be 500 Backfire bombers by 1984. Fewer than 250 were in service in 1984, and less than 500 were built by the time production ended in 1997. Team B also overestimated the bomber's range. They believed Soviet missiles were more accurate than they were, and that the USSR was about to deploy a mobile anti-ballistic missile system. They anticipated wide deployment of the SS-16 (which never entered service) and conversion of the SS-20 to ICBM status (which never happened). They also anticipated the near-term entry into service of Soviet charged particle beam weapons.

As bizarre as it sounds now, the Soviet capabilities in T2K are actually less than what Team B was presenting to the government as official estimates (although probably slightly more than what the CIA's Team A was presenting).

[StainlessSteelCynic]

@ Vespers War - That's some interesting information. While I was vaguely aware of some of it, I didn't know the extent it influenced US military policy. I wonder what their motivation was, were they genuinely afraid the Soviets were beating the West, were they just so hawkish that they wanted to be the "biggest kid on the block" or were they motivated by the potential financial gain through R&D or manufacture of weapons & gear to "defeat" the Red Menace? Or perhaps something else?

Mind you, the Soviets certainly did not help to dispel the notion. They were happy to make some outlandish claims regarding their technology. Again, it's a complex situation and not something that should be dismissed simply as nationalist propaganda as I've read some anecdotal reports that the Soviets were worried about Western tech and thus allegedly became desperate to convince their own people & allies that they actually were superior to the West. So it wasn't always propaganda to be directed at the Western world, sometimes it was meant for their own allies.

The best example of that I know of is from a former co-worker of mine who was Czechoslovakian by birth. His mother had been a nurse for the Germans in WW2 and so they faced a bit of discrimination from the post-war government at times (and the family's Germanic name didn't help!). This convinced him to escape the country and move to Australia (which he and his wife did by taking a "holiday" in Yugoslavia). One tale he told was of his cousin who had apparently worked with the Soviet Army during his period of conscript service.

His cousin had told him that the Russians had laser weapons, apparently many Czechoslovak soldiers "knew" about them. These laser weapons were allegedly able to scorch a football field sized area from kilometres away. My co-worker firmly believed it was true, even when I presented evidence that the whole story was probably a massive exaggeration.

It doesn't matter now that it turned out to be all false or at best, greatly exaggerated. What matters is that at the time, some people actually believed it and some people found they could easily present those pieces of information to claim that the Soviets were a massive threat.
I'm reminded of what Chalkline mentioned in another thread - given the levels of info manipulation at the time and what would have made it's way out to the public, GDW's estimate of Warsaw Pact forces is on the lower end of the over-estimatations of Communist capability!