|
|
|
#1
01-21-2010, 10:09 PM
|
||||
|
||||
M-8 AGS Lives Again (Moved from archive)
TR 04-24-2004, 12:18 PM Something interesting I dug up on another board I frequent for the fans of the XM8 or M8 AGS. Thanks go to thatguy96 for posting this all in the first place.
For us Twilight/Merc fans it is interesting to see what is old is new again. Later, TR ________________ The Original Posting In some interesting news (I'll come back and post the link after class), the US Army, apparently in desperate need of more light armored vehicles for deployment in Iraq, has pulled the four XM8 AGS prototypes it has out of storage, and assigned them to the 82nd Airborne. Some may not remember the XM8 (now M8) AGS (which I believe was derived or led to the commerciall available Stingray light tank) was designed as a replacement for the M551 Sheridan airborne light tank. In the end the XM8 was cancelled and the M551 was retired, leaving the 82nd and 101st without any airborne armor (no matter how worthless). http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m8ags-001.jpg _______________ 2nd Confirmed Source (sans pictures) http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Qu...lighttanks.htm LIGHT TANKS & ASSAULT GUNS AT WAR: INFANTRY FIRE SUPPORT, FIRST THE FUTURE FROM 2004 ONWARD: 120mm main gun heavy tank firepower in a M8 "Thunderbolt" AGS light tank; what the U.S. Army needs BREAKING NEWS!!! Inside The Army March 15, 2004 Pg. 1 Army To Transfer Four Armored Gun Systems To 82nd Airborne Division The Army last week approved the transfer of four M8 Armored Gun Systems from contractor storage facilities to the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, NC, sources say, marking the first time the vehicles will be used by the service since the program was terminated in 1996. Proposed in the 1980s as a lightweight combat vehicle that could fit aboard a C-130, the AGS was canceled as the Army struggled to pay for other priorities. Contractor United Defense LP, which fought the cancellation decision, has five M8 AGS vehicles in stock -- four in York, PA, and one in San Jose, CA. The 18th Airborne Corps at Ft. Bragg recently passed along an "operational needs statement" to Army Forces Command that spells out the division's need for a rapidly deployable vehicle with firepower that could be dropped from an aircraft (Inside the Army, Feb. 16, p1). The Army's operations and plans office, or "G-3," has been reviewing the requirement with Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC completed its analysis on Feb. 19, and the G-3 approved the needs statement on March 8, authorizing transfer of the existing vehicles to the 82nd Airborne Division, sources say. By press time (March 11), the Army had not released a copy of the approval documents. According to one source, officials made it clear in the documents that the transfer in "no way should be construed as support for an AGS program." Instead, it is an attempt to meet the immediate requirement with an interim solution and allow the division to begin developing and refining tactics, techniques and procedures. The unit expects to receive the vehicles by the end of March, the source said. Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC), a member of the House Armed Services Committee whose district includes Ft. Bragg, said he is pleased with the decision, but does not want the transfer to be misconstrued as a move to revive the terminated program. "To be clear, I am not endorsing one system over another," Hayes told ITA in a March 12 statement. "I simply believe that, if these existing AGS are combat-worthy, then they should be fully utilized while we await the future technologies that are already in production. "My priority on this matter is simple -- what can we do to help our soldiers in the field the fastest?" he added. "If our soldiers can utilize these existing systems, then I want these systems in Baghdad rather than in a manufacturing facility in Pennsylvania." Hayes asked the Army last December to provide him information on the matter, including how much the transfer would cost and whether spare parts are available to maintain the gun systems. Last week, a spokesman for Hayes said the congressman was told government and contractor costs are estimated at approximately $1 million for one year of support for AGS. The funding, however, is not as much of a concern to the Army as the availability of parts for a system that was terminated eight years ago. Sources say UDLP can sustain the systems for a limited amount of time, but many of its components are now obsolete or unavailable. Supporting the system beyond one year poses high risk, sources said. Herb Muktarian, a spokesman for UDLP's ground systems division in York, said the systems are ready to go. "We have not received any official requests from the Army regarding AGS, but the four AGS vehicles stored in York remain in excellent condition and we're ready to provide support if asked to do so," Muktarian said. Maj. Rich Patterson, a spokesman for the 18th Airborne Corps, said officials at Ft. Bragg have been notified and are assembling the necessary manning documents, additional equipment and training plans, "with the intent to integrate the AGS into division operations as soon as possible." The vehicles will go to the 1st Battalion of the division's 17th Cavalry Squadron, Patterson said. AGS will provide its assault teams "mobility, firepower and shock effects" within the "drop zone," he added. "It gives us a capability we could deploy if we need it," Patterson said. AGS features a 105 mm cannon, an ammunition autoloader and options for armor protection. The division's requirement for an air-droppable platform has existed at least since the 1990s, when the division disbanded one of its battalions -- the 3rd Battalion of the 73rd Armored Regiment, which was equipped with an aging armored reconnaissance vehicle called the Sheridan. At the time, service officials thought other capabilities would become available to the paratroopers once the M551 Sheridan was retired. When the division deactivated the armored battalion in 1997, however, then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer had already terminated AGS, which had been regarded as the Sheridan's replacement. Eliminating AGS freed more than $1 billion over the service's outyear funding plan -- money that was badly needed for other cash-strapped programs, officials said at the time. Two years after the program was canceled, service officials said they continued to review options for all light forces that wanted more firepower. Vehicles reviewed included AGS, the Marine Corps' Light Armored Vehicle, the Pandur lightweight vehicles used by the Kuwait National Guard and a variant of the M113 armored personnel carrier (ITA, Oct. 4, 1999, p1; Sept. 27, 1999, p1). That effort, however, went nowhere, and the 82nd Airborne Division resubmitted its request for such a vehicle, eventually attracting Hayes' attention. "Let's find out as soon as possible if AGS can serve effectively as a short-term solution for an immediate operational need," Hayes told ITA last week. -- Anne Plummer While the fatally-flawed General Dynamics Land Systems "Stryker" armored car cannot even successfully mount and fire a 105mm gun, the tracked M8 Armored Gun System which the Army should buy is up-gunning to 120mm! Note that this vehicle is just a "proof of Principle" test bed not a full prototype. UDLP built it in 4 months and displayed it at the 2003 AUSA show in Washington because General Dynamics, Land Systems Division was telling (lying)to the U.S. Army that it was "not possible" to integrate a 120mm tank gun into a light combat vehicle. GDLS can't even get a 105mm gun to work on their Canadian-made Stryker MGS deathtrap armored car. This vehicle also has band tracks and a hybrid-electric drive instead of a conventional transmission. UDLP successfully fired about 50 x rounds of 120mm M866 TPFSDS and M831 HEAT-TPT, with an autoloader, stationary and on-the-move before the 2003 AUSA Show. On 9 December, UDLP fired 5 x M829A3 SLUG rounds obtained from PM TMAS since this is the highest impulse 120mm round in development, and the UDLP firing range does not permit firing DU. Thunderbolt's recoil severity is slightly less than that of the 105mm AGS firing the most powerful 105mm cartridge, the M900 APFSDS. The reason for this rather suprising result is that its impulse increase is less than the doubling of its recoiling mass. For comparison: Vehicle Severity Index M1 tank (105 &120mm) .2 Thunderbolt (120mm) .7 AGS (105mm) 1.0 M551 Sheridan (152mm) 2.5 M56 SPAT (90mm) 5.0 M8 Buford Armored Gun System (AGS) Overview: The Army's M8 Buford Armored Gun System (AGS) was designed for use by Airborne and Light Infantry/Cavalry forces and is C-130 and larger aircraft airland transportable and parachute air-droppable. The AGS fires the entire suite of 105mm munitions, from anti-personnel (beehive) to the M900 Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS-T-DU), which provides lethality equal to the M829 120mm round. Its main gun shoots-on-the-move day or night to defeat bunkers, buildings, point targets and all type of combat vehicles such as the BMP, BTR, BRDM, SPH, and T72 main battle tank. Status and Availability as of September 2003: Four AGS vehicles were reconditioned and fully prepared for deployment to Ft. Lewis in summer 2000. These four fully operational vehicles are located in York, PA. One additional vehicle and a spares package, including four complete sets of on-vehicle equipment, Basic Issues Items (BII) and level II armor, and 3 sets of level III armor (defeats RPG and 30mm medium caliber guns) are with the vehicles. This package is sufficient for deployment and can be quickly supplemented for prolonged operation. Technical manuals were developed and validated under the original AGS contract and are immediately available. A complete training package, including training aids, exists. Gunnery and maneuver training device are still in the Army system for AGS and a cadre of active and retired master gunners and trainers are available. These first four vehicles could be delivered within weeks of contract start date, immediately into the hands of Soldiers. In short, the people, equipment, support package, and the ammunition are in place to expeditiously train, deploy and support deployment of the existing M8 AGS assets. New M8 AGS production vehicles could be available within 18 months of contract award, assuming M35 cannon availability, since necessary production tooling exists for the system. Furthermore, the AGS design leverages many common components with the Bradley and M113 Gavin family of vehicles, which can be available through an already qualified vendor base. Thunderbolt: Armored Gun System (Block II) The M8 Armored Gun System can also be enhanced to bring Future Combat System technologies to the current force in the near term. Those advanced technologies include: hybrid electric propulsion, band track, improved ceramic/composite armor, Second Generation FLIR Night Vision technology, digitization, an 120mm main gun along with its 120mm auto loader - creating Thunderbolt: a Lightweight Silent Killer. This demonstrated system upgrade retains the M8's C-130 Hercules air transport capability, as well as the AGS 3-man crew. This spiral development approach leverages an existing platform, which results in tremendous time and cost savings. The AGS has a 1553 Digital Data Bus, which can support the insertion of additional electrical components and embedded training programs. As such, preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) processes can be instructed directly over the vehicle's communication and information system, so that tomorrow's Soldiers won't need to dig out the technical manuals in the rain and mud. The data bus also supports the advances in situational awareness and common operating picture that is critical to small unit success on the modern dispersed battlefield, adding to the Army's flexibility to network with multiple joint forces. Considerable experience has already been gained with hybrid propulsion in this class of military vehicles. Hybrid Electric Drive M113 Gavin's, Bradley's, and advanced reconnaissance vehicles (the U.S./UK TRACER) have been built and tested. Further, a Transformation Technology Demonstrator (TTD) called the Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light and based on a modified M113 Gavin with Hybrid Electric Drive and Band Track was presented over two years ago at the AUSA Symposium in Fort Lauderdale. Many senior Army officers, including the then Chief of Staff, have had a test ride in this vehicle and experienced its rapid acceleration, smooth ride, and stealth mode operations. Recently, the Future Scout Cavalry System/TRACER integrated demonstrator completed field-testing in the UK, further proving that a hybrid electric tank is right at our fingertips. The M8 AGS has a ramp door in the rear that lowers for the Engine/Transmission power train to be rolled out for easy maintenance. With the conversion to Hybrid Electric Drive and the flexibility of positioning drive train and suspension components, significant space is freed up in the existing propulsion system compartment for increased stowage and mission payload. One such configuration could include a crew compartment for a 4-Soldier fire team akin to the IDF's Merkava heavy tank. With the Hybrid Electric Drive's flexibility, a better center of gravity and space utilization is realized. Weight reduction and related mission equipment stowage improvements are also gained. With such a propulsion and power management system, Soldiers will have a long range, extremely fast, and silent killer, with a reduced logistics tail. ******************** shrike6 04-24-2004, 01:00 PM TR, You really need to read the board more often. Thunderbolt: http://forums.rpghost.com/showthread...threadid=16039 M8 AGS reactivation: http://forums.rpghost.com/showthread...671#post211671 ******************** ReHerakhte 04-24-2004, 09:14 PM This does bring up an interesting point though... the claim that tanks are no longer viable in this latest version of warfare. Personally, I can understand that there's not likely to be very many tank versus tank battles in the near future BUT I sure love having tanks in support even if they end up being just mobile artillery... and how many times in Iraq did tanks prove their usefulness supporting the PBI (Poor Bloody Infantry), especially against armoured targets. Unfortunately the debate gets clouded at times as can be seen in the article that TR reproduced, i.e. "While the fatally-flawed General Dynamics Land Systems "Stryker" armored car... ...GDLS can't even get a 105mm gun to work on their Canadian-made Stryker MGS deathtrap armored car." If the article came from the site I think it did, the guy who hosts it is a tank fanatic but, in my opinion, isn't as knowlegeable as he needs to be. For instance, he often describes the M113 APC as a light tank and he had earlier stated that New Zealand decided not to purchase the LAVIII (which the Stryker is derived from) because they were deathtraps when the reality is that the New Zealand government simply didn't want to spend the money but after involvement in East Timor went ahead with the purchase. Basically, if the Stryker had tracks instead of wheels, this guy would believe it is the best thing since sliced bread. He claims that the Stryker has very little armour protection, my first unit used M113s and one very sobering display always greeted us as we entered the vehicle compound, the personnel hatch from the ramp of an M113, it had been used as a range target for 7.62mmN ball ammo and was full of holes. The Stryker has, to the best of my knowledge, never been considered an armoured car but a family of vehicles based on a proven APC design and he ignores the fact that MOWAG have demonstrated a LAVII with a low recoil 105mm gun. And so the water gets a little muddier... **WARNING** Long winded rant ahead... Australia has decided recently to replace its aging Leopard 1 MBTs with a newer model because the government here (finally they actually took the military point of view into account!) feels that tanks are still a viable piece of gear. Unfortunately they ignored the Army's requests for a tank suitable for Australia's wide open spaces and chose a tank based on political considerations and so we're getting second-hand M1 Abrams. I'm not saying the Abrams is a bad tank but it is not suited to the Australian operating environment. Here we need something that can get the best distance on the least fuel and the Abrams is a thirsty beast. But anyway, onto my main point... it seems that the United Kingdom is reviewing their attitude to tanks, particularly in regards to light tanks. This is a short piece from the English magazine 'Classic Military Vehicle' February 2004. Any mistakes and any views expressed are the province of the authors of the magazine etc. "Mini-Tanks... Again 'What goes around comes around'...and the Ministry of Defence is once again predicting the demise of the main battle tank and proposing the development of heavily-armed mini-tanks that can be air-lifted to trouble spots around the world. The intention is to provide the firepower and protection of a conventional heavy tank combined with the manoueverability of a lighter vehicle. The outline scheme proposed by the DPA [I think this is the Defence Procurement Agency but if anyone from the UK could enlighten me I would be grateful] includes gun tank, APC, rocket launcher, battlefield recovery vehicle, ambulance, command vehicle, etc...but, hold on, this isn't new, don't we already have such a mini-tank in the shape of the FV100 Alvis Scimitar family? Last time we went round this loop, 70 or 80 years ago, so-called 'light tanks' were supported by 'medium tanks'... both types swiftly putting on weight to end up as infantry tanks, cruiser tanks and heavy cruiser tanks, each with its own - theoretical - role. It was the discrediting of this 'horses for courses' approach that led to the development of the 'universal tank' and the modern main battle tank. The new mini-tank programme - currently being fought over by Alvis and the US company General Dynamics - will provide 1500 vehicles by the end of the decade." So, for turretheads like me this means a new vehicle might be showing its face sometime in the next ten years but as a turrethead I also know that there are some damned good designs already in existence (either as fully/partially developed or prototype forms) that could already do the job. The Australian government did a feasability study sometime in the 1980s to see if Australia could produce armoured vehicles for our own use, their conclusion was that it was simply too expensive and not worth the effort when we could just as easily buy them from other nations and Holy S**t, now we have Australia producing the Bushmaster wheeled APC for domestic use and the Shorland vehicle designs for export. My point being, the government should NEVER be allowed to play in the sandbox that the Army plays in, the Army knows what it needs and I have never met a politician yet that knew what the government needed let alone the Army. In the opinion of a turrethead, i.e. me, the original aim of having lightweight, air-deployable tanks so as to get armour rapidly to the battlefield is just as viable now as it ever was and like the US Army had decided in the 1970s I think it was, light armour goes in first then the ships bring in the heavy armour to sustain the fight. This concept worked before and there is still nothing worng with it, the Soviet Union proved it so how come the politicians can't see it... oh that's right, they're only looking at the next election... Cheers, Kevin P.S. Hey TR, I might not be able to beat you with the firearms info but I reckon I might be able to in the vehicle category  Only 'cause I probably got a good head start!  ******************** TR 04-24-2004, 09:29 PM I always have thought that the Airborne units really need something... they had been using the M-551 Sheridan which wasn't fantastic but it was something to give them a punch in their operations. When the AGS was being developed years back it was the politics of the day to cancel the program and make the Airborne make do without light tanks and force upon them upgraded Hummers and the like. So for me the news about the M8 AGS being pulled from storage and actually being deployed for combat operations was of interest. The need IS there for certain units and applications of course. Of course I have been reading of the discussions in Australia on what to replace their Leopards with... kind of interested to see what they decide to go to next. There you go Kevin, you can see my interests clearly... Small Arms first and Tanks second... what can I say I never got to play around with tanks growing up!  Firearms of various kinds... oh yes. Until Later TR ******************** Webstral 04-29-2004, 01:33 AM The great irony of the tank decisions is that the M8 AGS procurement program represents a mere fraction of the cost of the F-22 and/or grossly unnecessary B-2 program. Cut B-2 acquisition by a third, and all the money necessary to develop, purchase, and maintain an M8 fleet for XVIII Airborne Corps would be available. Of course, this would be unthinkable in the real world. Funds simply don't get transferred between the forces like that. Webstral ******************** 
|
|
#2
04-05-2015, 07:31 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Not to sure about the current status
Just looking at Goggle Earth and the previous report that the 4x XM-8 AGS are in storage in York, PA at the BAE might be over stated.
Apparently from the google earth shot that shows 2015 data, there is just two sitting in the yard with a third hull in the north east scrap yard. See for yourself.
|
|
#5
04-06-2015, 06:00 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
I was talking with my father (a retired Steel Worker) and my friend Eric about the effects of a Third World War on the US industrial base and discovered a very disturbing fact that might seal the fate of several older armored vehicles.
During the altered timeline in Twilight, the US had already decommissioned and sold off several steel mills to China and our domestic steel production had fallen to just 40% of our post WW2 production. With China under Soviet attack, steel in the US would become scarce (especially if the Pact naval strength were acting as "commerce raiders"). Additionally, the remaining mills were primarily "specialty mills" which used "preproccessed (scrap) steel" as a base for new steel. It takes a Blast Furnace or Bessemer Converter to make liquid metal for the production of new steel from only a mineral base. Most of our Blast Furnaces & Bessemer Converters were shipped to China (today we only have about 28% of our post WW2 capacity). We can still make new steel products using Electric Furnaces, Open Hearths, and Basic Oxygen Furnaces but these require scrap to make steel. These mills also tend to be smaller (due to their Specialty Steel origins). I think that most of the older armored vehicles (and probably the contents of every junk yard) would have been "sacrificed" in the production of "New War Materiel" along with a number of other materials in short supply (copper, lead, tin, nickle & petroleum come immediately to mind).
|
|
#6
04-07-2015, 08:23 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
The US still has more than sufficient capacity to produce armor plate as that base was kept intact. We were getting in armor plate at BAE to support
M88A2 production and MRAP's consistently during the war as was General Dynamics for the tanks, Oshkosh for their MRAP's, etc.. You have to keep in mind that US armored vehicle production is nothing like it was in WWII - there we were making tens of thousands of armored vehicles of varous types per year - here even with the war start US production would have never reached those levels Plus the older armored vehicles would have been needed as the US converted the training divisions to infantry divisions to give them some kind of armor. Not top of the line but a lot better than using improvised armored cars from bank cars. And if you use the original timeline (as I do) then the Cold War never really goes away - and thus the US keeps more industrial production dedicated to the military.
|
|
#7
04-07-2015, 11:02 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Same here. I prefer the original timeline anyway, minus the invasions of Alaska and the Southwest.
As for the M-8 itself, it's a vehicle that could've proven very useful in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Too bad Slick Willie canceled it to pay for the Bosnia peacekeeping force.
__________________
Treat everyone you meet with kindness and respect, but always have a plan to kill them. Old USMC Adage
|
|
#8
04-09-2015, 06:40 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
and maintenance programs. This would probably be the primary reason Russia would be "emboldened" to try and rearm. To catch up with the US (who demonstrated their technological edge in the 91' Gulf War) while they were "resting on their laurels." The second primary problem is with resources. We would have lost nearly 40% of our steel supply (the amount coming from China since 1992). The Russians would not let China continue to ship product from China or continue to receive product from other countries in order to cripple China's economy. The Russians know that this would hurt the US economy and could be hoping to cause a large enough "negative effect" on the US economy to reduce their ability to assist China in their war effort. The attacks on shipping in the China Sea "war zones" would be a major reason for increasing US involvement in the Russo-Chinese War. By the time we become fully embroiled in WW3 on all fronts; our major steel mills will have been dismantled and shipped to China for more than 10 years (the major US Steel corps began dismantling US mills in 82'). While they have the capacity to produce plate during the most recent conflicts; could they continue to provide that plate WHILE the US was forced to build dozens of oil tankers, trains and rail cars (to meet war transportation needs after years of neglect), and container ships (to replace commercial shipping losses). These items would place a huge drain on the base metal (blast furnace) production needed to make new steel. The other steel furnaces can make finished metal but ONLY by using scrap steel of the appropriate quality for the finished metal being made. The M60's would have been used for certain training (mainly driver's training) along with added digital simulators for the other tasks (because you really need to train on the actual equipment your going to use). I still believe that all of those pieces of military equipment you see parked all over America would be consigned to the local BOF or Electric Furnace for use in NEW Armored Vehicle Construction. Also keep in mind that this would not be limited to steel; I imagine rubber, plastic, oil, coal, wood and a number of other resources would also be in short supply with the war and a reduction in shipping. On a added note for anyone who thinks the US isn't stupid enough to "not plan ahead" for a world war. In 2012 the US finished a deal to sell off a significant chunk of our strategic stockpiles of Helium and Argon gasses to the private sector. About 8 Billion cubic feet of Argon was practically given away. Argon is the only gas that can be used to weld certain aluminum metals. Since Argon is not a naturally occuring gas; that may come back to haunt us in a future conflict.
|
|
#9
04-10-2015, 08:32 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Swag
Given the relatively short length of the conflict the US may not have had time to ramp up building tankers, railcars, etc..- while the war lasted a long time till Omega, the vast majority of it was after the TDM - meaning that the issues associated with building up may have just been starting to be felt when the nukes hit and ended much of US war and civilian production Also keep in mind that much of the shipbuilding industry in the US by that time was gone as well as to civilian ships - tankers by then were almost exclusively products of South Korea and Japan as for China - until the war start with the US and even afterward the Soviets wouldnt have been able to do much to stop Chinese steel from coming to the US - thats one part of the game that is definitely portrayed wrong - the US Pacific Fleet's advantage over the Soviets was so huge that basically they would have destroyed their fleet within months, possibly weeks - and Chinese steel could have been one way they "paid" for all the equipment the US sent them before the war start with the Soviets in Europe
|
|
#10
04-10-2015, 05:35 PM
|
||||
|
||||
|
Let's give "Slick Willie" a rest. This is a gentlemen's club, not a place to air one's grievances through name calling. "President Clinton" works just fine for a dispassionate and professional discussion of the pros and cons of defense decisions made by the respective Administrations.
__________________
“We’re not innovating. We’re selectively imitating.” June Bernstein, Acting President of the University of Arizona in Tucson, November 15, 1998.
|
|
#11
04-10-2015, 07:02 PM
|
||||
|
||||
|
Quote:
Were the Soviet Union still in existence after Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the potential of Western military prowess, the Kremlin would have been forced to shed some mass in order to make qualitative gains. The Soviet leadership would have seen itself as being obliged to strengthen its qualitative position whether the West was resting on its laurels or not. There were plenty of good lessons to be learned from Operation Desert Storm. Russia made a concerted effort to learn them, but the Russian economy went into a tailspin in the 1990’s in real life. Had the Soviet leadership successfully instituted some reforms in the interests of staving off collapse, which I have posited in some of my work on the subject, the Soviet military would have been in a significantly better position to fight in the West, the Middle East, or the Far East. While an overhaul of a military on the scale of the Soviet military would have been completely out of the question given the time and the means between 1991 and 1995, a reallocation of resources could have yielded real fruit in terms of manpower readiness. Quote:
However, cost-benefit calculations would be reason for pause. Let’s remember that the initial Soviet invasion was not intended to conquer China. The Soviets responded to a border incident. They mobilized nothing like the required number of troops for the conquest and occupation of China. Like most wars, the Sino-Soviet War was launched by the aggressor for the purpose of adjusting the status quo. The Soviets would have announced that this was a limited war intended to redress certain specific injustices, etc. for the purpose of managing international opinion. The Soviets expected quick victory. Within this paradigm, establishing a blockade of the Chinese coast would have carried certain real costs. Sinking merchant vessels flagged under any of the Western powers would have caused a very significant reaction in the West. Freedom of navigation is a cardinal tenet of American naval policy. The Soviets know this. They would also know that a blockade of the Chinese coast by the RBPF would be very difficult to maintain against the concerted efforts of Chinese and US naval assets operating from bases on the coast of China and southern Japan and the ROK, respectively. At the very least, a naval war against the US in the western Pacific would be a major distraction for the RBPC. If the object of the war was a quick victory over the PRC in Manchuria, what would be the gain in dragging the US into a related but separate naval war? Ideally, the war would be over before any significant quantities of materiel arrived in Chinese ports. Once the Chinese counteroffensive of late 1995 (Operation Red Willow) put an end to any thinking about a short, decisive war, the question of a blockade would come up again. However, the problems associated with sinking Western shipping would still be in effect. Mining would not be a viable solution because the Western powers would see little difference between sinking ships by torpedoes or mines. I believe that the Soviets would have tried to get around the problem of sinking ships as a means of blockading China by attacking the port facilities. Stand-off PGM delivered by the Soviet strategic air arm would have a better chance of hitting and destroying the bottleneck assets in Chinese ports than at any time in the past. A dozen on-target strikes against the cranes at a major port would seriously restrict the ability of the port to load and offload materiel. Persistent lethal agents dispersed over the port facilities would greatly slow the operations of the surviving cranes until decon had run its course. Relating this to naval operations, the Soviets would not want a major US presence off the coast China. I believe the Soviets would want to keep the sea approaches to Chinese ports open for use by their bombers and support aircraft. Bombers could fly from Vladivostok through the Korea Strait, then dogleg to whatever East China Sea port they wanted to hit in the early stages of the strategic bombing campaign (Operation Tchaikovsky II). War with the US would obviate the use of this passage. Granted, it would go without saying that the Allies (US, ROK, Japan) would notify China of the passage of Soviet aircraft through the Korea Strait, but notification of the Chinese air defenses along the East China Sea would be far preferable to interception by Allied air power. Even with warning passed to the Chinese defenders, Soviet bombers and support aircraft would have the luxury of hitting targets along a great length of the coast at a time of their choosing (within the limits of the endurance of the aircraft involved, of course). I would expect Chinese ports on the East China Sea to be hit hard and kept out of action during the first half of 1996. The ports on the South China Sea would be a different issue. Reaching them would require a much greater effort on the part of bombers based on Soviet soil. Basing strategic bombers in Vietnam would be really, really important to the Soviets. Air power capable of knocking out port facilities in southern China would be far more lethal if based in Vietnam, where they would have the range to go out to sea around China’s land-based defenses, then dogleg in to hit a specific target. I haven’t done any thinking on the political dimensions of this option. To get back to addressing the original point, I agree that the Soviets would see the value in blockading China once the war became protracted. However, I don’t believe they would exchange a temporary blockade for the cost of bringing the Western Allies into the fight—even if the fighting could be contained in the western Pacific. Rather, I think the effort would be on attacking Chinese industry, transportation hubs and choke points, and ports. A successful campaign in this regard would cripple Chinese war industry and economy, plus blocking imports of raw materials and finished products, while keeping the US and her Western allies sidelined. One correction has to be issued: argon is the third most abundant gas in the Earth’s atmosphere, after nitrogen and oxygen. Separating argon from other gases requires cryogenic distillation, which is not something every country can do at the moment. Giving it away is rather like providing arms to a country that can’t make its own F-16s or nuclear energy equipment to countries that can’t produce the components domestically. Quote:
Quote:
__________________
“We’re not innovating. We’re selectively imitating.” June Bernstein, Acting President of the University of Arizona in Tucson, November 15, 1998.
|
|
#12
04-21-2015, 07:42 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Ironicly; I have no real problem with the most hated President in US history. President Obama has had a hand in passing some laws I don't agree with (ObamaCare), but has done a fair job overall. I think he has received some unfair blame for issues he inherited.
|
|
#13
04-21-2015, 07:57 PM
|
||||
|
||||
|
Quote:
__________________
 "It is better to be feared than loved" - Nicolo Machiavelli
|
|
#14
04-21-2015, 08:37 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
The problem with assuming that the US would use force to prevent Russia from attempting to blockade China is a political one. In the Version 2.2 history of the conflict it clearly states that China is the aggressor by demanding "border adjustments" from Russia. Chinese Nationalist officers provoke increasingly violent border incidents (similar to what's happening in the South China sea right now?). Russia is an "old pro" at the international politics game. when hostilities commenced Russia probably would have asked for a UN Resolution against said "Chinese aggression." In addition to her allies, Russia would most likely have the support of Japan, Vietnam (who had their own violent border conflict with China), Taiwan (to weaken China), India (to weaken China and because they were buying arms from Russia), The Philipines, France (to weaken China's economic standing in Asia) Cuba, and several Eastern European Countries. This could easily result in the implementation of sanctions against China. It would be a small blessing to Russia though. At this point in time; Russia would be involved in Serbia, "at war with the Chechens," in addition to China's border incursions.
The US would never openly oppose a UN Resolution in the 90's. This is a good (political) reason for why the US couldn't just "stomp" the weakened Russian Navy to the bottom of the ocean (until open war occurs anyway). Another issue I have with the old cannon that can be corrected would be with the US entering the war after Germany appeals for help. 1996 was an election year in the US. If at least some of the timeline in the US mirrors actual history; then you have a Democratic President in a fight for his political life after the Democrats lost Congress in the 1994 elections. No President would even consider going to war in an election year. The premise given in the original Cannon is also suspect. I doubt a conservative Germany would act that way. There is a spark that does make more sense though. Poland breaks out in a sort of "civil war" between the Communist Government and the Solidarity Movement in 1996. The country devolves into open war (kind of like the Ukraine). Throughout 1996, the NATO countries clandestinely assist the Solidarity Movement in making gains. The Communist Government calls on Belarus and Russia for assistance. They commit full force. The Solidarity Movement calls on NATO and Germany answers the call. This pulls NATO into the fray. France, Belgium, Italy, and Greece withdrawl from NATO in protest, seeing this as German aggression in a Polish "internal matter." This withdrawl (and the loss of French and Belgium ports)creates a logistical "choke point" for supplies arriving from the US. This supply "choke point" explains why the qualitatively superior NATO forces don't just "steamroll" the PACT forces. You just continue the timeline from here. it is now December of 1997. This time line also explains why so many cities in Poland are often friendly to the characters. They may have been Solidarity strongholds during the war.
|
|
#15
04-21-2015, 08:39 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
|
|
#16
04-21-2015, 08:59 PM
|
||||
|
||||
|
I should have been specific. I only use the v1 chronology.
__________________
“We’re not innovating. We’re selectively imitating.” June Bernstein, Acting President of the University of Arizona in Tucson, November 15, 1998.
|
|
#17
04-21-2015, 09:02 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
|
 |
| Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests) | |
|
|
Linear Mode
