Real-life question for those who were in

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Perhaps pertinent to the "Red Bear Rising" thread...

A buddy of mine was in from the early to mid 80's, groundpounder. Anyway, before our biweekly AD&D game he and I were chewing the fat and I asked him how at the time the general morale was, and what the general feeling was about NATO's prospects if a non-nuclear shooting war had started. His response was (essentially) that at the time, he and his fellow soldiers felt it'd be bad, but ultimately a big win for NATO (again, assuming no nukes fly), but that looking back with what we know now about how bad the damage the Walkers and others had done, yeah, it'd have been more like Dunkirk all over again: trade space for time and when you get to the channel, jump.

Anyone else want to share?

[Abbott Shaull]

You know that part of the reason why many units spent so much time training. It was always hoped that you had trained enough that you wouldn't need time to think while on the battlefield and training would see you through. Along the way it was hoped that enough right decisions on our part and bad decision on the other side part with luck going our way.

Yeah we all thought about it form time to time, but it didn't help to dwell upon it.

[pmulcahy11b]

The time I felt it most acutely was when I was stationed in Korea. I worked at G3 and had a good idea of what North Korea's capabilities were, and in a war it was going to be grim for a while until reinforcements could get in.

[Dog 6]

From the late 80's, call it 1988, NATO would have won hands down. a toss up in the mid 80's and a WP win in the early 80's imo. I worried most about air cover and heavy artillery. if it would hit us and not the enemy,How long our big guns would last, if we'd have any air support, ect I never did trust the Airforce . Nukes would have sure changed things to the point of no one winning at any point imo

[Webstral]

There are a lot of unknowns about this. The Russians who have been willing to talk about the issue can’t agree. The Russians planned to be on the invading side of things for reasons that are well-documented elsewhere. I think the most germane questions revolve around issues like the effectiveness of ECM and ECCM, the state of the opposing sides when the balloon actually went up, and the ability of the Soviets to withstand deliberate attacks on their chain of command and choke points. For what it’s worth, one of the documents that came to Huachuca in the early 90’s collected feedback from a number of Russians on the question. They claimed that the attack was supposed to include a preparatory nuclear bombardment because the Soviets didn’t believe they could reach their stop line without nuclear fires from the beginning of the operation. Therefore, it was important to keep the operation from being necessary. For what that’s worth…


Webstral

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Webstral

There are a lot of unknowns about this. The Russians who have been willing to talk about the issue can’t agree. The Russians planned to be on the invading side of things for reasons that are well-documented elsewhere. I think the most germane questions revolve around issues like the effectiveness of ECM and ECCM, the state of the opposing sides when the balloon actually went up, and the ability of the Soviets to withstand deliberate attacks on their chain of command and choke points. For what it’s worth, one of the documents that came to Huachuca in the early 90’s collected feedback from a number of Russians on the question. They claimed that the attack was supposed to include a preparatory nuclear bombardment because the Soviets didn’t believe they could reach their stop line without nuclear fires from the beginning of the operation. Therefore, it was important to keep the operation from being necessary. For what that’s worth…


Webstral

So in other words they willing to use nukes at the outset of their invasion. Why does this not surprise me? Helps explain why their Frontal HQ against the NorthAG were locate so close to West Berlin.

Either way, it would be short time regardless who the aggressor would of been, it would of been matter of time before things got out of hand. Even today, with Russia continuing opposing the expansion NATO into it former territorial holds under the Soviet Union.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by Webstral

They claimed that the attack was supposed to include a preparatory nuclear bombardment because the Soviets didn’t believe they could reach their stop line without nuclear fires from the beginning of the operation. Therefore, it was important to keep the operation from being necessary. For what that’s worth…


Webstral

They were that convinced we could stop them with conventional arms?

[pmulcahy11b]

The Russians were also more willing to sacrifice troops to radiation and irradiated areas than NATO.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

They were that convinced we could stop them with conventional arms?

More like they were that convinced that their planning would well fall apart right after their first round being fired. They knew that first echelon forces would have to carry most of the objectives with what they had. Otherwise, it would turn into a flipping nightmare as it would take longer for units to adjust to operational standards and supplying their units would be skitty at best of times under their system.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

They were that convinced we could stop them with conventional arms?

Given the guiding philosophy of the Soviets, I think it's safer to say that they didn't care for the odds. Western propaganda of the day aside, the Soviets were more concerned about a third Western invasion of Russia in a century than they were interested in expanding westward. Their experience in WW2 showed them that wars are best fought on the enemy's territory on terms that can be dictated by the attacker. Therefore, the best way to protect the Motherland against the Germans and their Western allies would be a victory over Germany on German soil using the procedures of the strategic offensive so thoroughly ingrained into Soviet military thinking after 1942. The offensive into Germany had to work in order to be worth the investment. Given the scale of Western resources, it would be very important to bring offensive operations in Germany to a successful conclusion quickly. The nature of the terrain in the American sector might preclude rapid victory in southern Germany. A north-to-south roll-up of CENTAG by Soviet forces operating along the Rhine might not be practicable within the desired timeframe. Therefore, a nuclear opening offered the best prospects for the kind of early success the Soviets needed. Of course, a nuclear opening might very well render the whole point of winning the war moot. Therefore, though it was useful to have a powerful conventional army on-hand to provide offensive security for the Soviet Union, its use posed problems that were best avoided.


Webstral

[Abbott Shaull]

Yeah I have to agree Webstral. They would be operating from plans for operation they have time to honed since 1942. The problem was when they tried to used them to put down revolts in Hungrary and then Czechoslavkia they ran into problems when they calling up Cat B/2 and Cat C/3 units as well as moving troops to their correct location. In fact, if I remember correctly both time there were units who jumped the gun or were lated getting out of the starting points. Even in 1980 and 1981 when their was plans to pacify Poland, to many Generals who had been junior officers during those two operation in STRAVKA were playing devil advocate on whether or not it would be worth the cost. Especially since they already had moved units from the Western Military Districts within the Soviet Union to replace units in the 40th Soviet Army currently in Afghanistan. They really didn't want the NATO spies in the sky to realize any weakness that might be exploited later.

The Soviet Union for all it worth is much like Germany and her allies had found out during two World Wars. They aren't quite strong enough to function on multiple war Fronts. The only reason UK and the US were able to so was that the UK relied on drawing troops from it Empire holdings and Commonwealth members to help. Much like the Soviet Union for two years traded ground and lives to build up a force that could take on the Germans. UK Empire could do the same thing as long as they had supply line. Only thing was that the UK supply line also had to supply the US Military, with trickles going to China and Russia as a side note too.

The US was far enough where the fighting was on the ground in Europe and in the Pacific they were insulated for the most part. With the exception of the territory in Pacific that Japan was able to take right after the start, and some islands in Alaska, as well as the attack on Pearl Harbor, the US mainland was left untouched by the war for the most part. From Germany the only thing that was pain were German Subs, which when the US Atlantic Fleet and British Atlantic Commands joined forces in hunting subs in 1942, weren't quite able to eliminate the German Submarine Force, but did dwindle it down to a point where they were getting less and less effective. The question is if the Japanese had been half as effective at Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Pacific. Or if the German/Italian/Axis Fleet in Mediterranean Sea had been able to gain control of and cause larger losses to the Royal Naval there.

There were plenty of lessons that all sides still remember. It is one of the things that many Germans on both sides of the Inter-German Border and the Inter-Korea Border realized. Any war would probably take a change going nuclear fairly early in hostilities. For Korea add the fact that Seoul is easily with Artillery range of the North Korea Field Artillery too.

Both sides did lot of chest pumping. The DMZ in Korea and the Inter-German Borders as well as the West German/Czech border were some of the most dangerous places to patrol. Both sides were guilty of testing the reactions. Soviets and North Korea always got nervous when there operations when troops were moved into Europe and South Korea. Understandably so, since even though these were annual operations they could be used as disguise for the US and her allies to start something. Much like when the US used to send forces on the yearly basis to Egypt would have everyone near by watching intently. Same thing for the few years we sent troops to Honduras too.

Some of the few things that didn't alert the Soviet too much were the exercises where we would reinforce Norway. In many cases this didn't bother the Soviets as much as it did Swedes who would have kittens when Soviet subs were found operating in along their coast that were operating with fishing fleet that was monitoring the UK and US Fleets as they landed their respective Marine forces into Norway. Finnish seem to get bother too by this a bit. In my opinion the troops needed by the Soviet to take Norway and hold it would be about the same as them invading Alaska.

If it came right down to it Finland, Sweden, and Norway would be much better for the taken once you control West Germany and Denmark. Just my opinion.

Like I said it one of those thing you always might have questions, but you always try to fall back in training and put those doubts out of your mind.

As pointed out some of the best times for the Soviet/Pact to initiate a War would of been during Christmas due to number of troops on leave. Also when US made a habit of transferring entire Divisions and Regiments would of been a good time as any. UK had done this one regular basis at Battalion/Regimental level and still do.

Now the main problem with the Soviets was their twice yearly intake of conscripts that needed to be trained, Sergeants needed to be trained, and getting their Lt and junior Lt trained. Remember in the Soviet Army, their junior officers took duties many duties that NATO NCO's would do. In many cases it was crime in the Soviet Army for NCO to squad leaders to know how to read maps and use compasses, and why in many cases the most effective way to stop a Soviet unit was to kill it officers first. In many cases, their junior officers were thinking the same thing as many or the troops in NATO were thinking for different reasons. By the time these units if they were in intensive training would of been able to do anything, the next semi-annaul intake and releasing of troops was ready to happen.

Just some thoughts.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Of course, a nuclear opening might very well render the whole point of winning the war moot.


Webstral

Yes once you invade a country you tend to want to be able to take it over and have it in state to add value to you. If you nuke everything where there are hot zones all over the place and make it where you can't occupy it, then why start the war to begin with. One of several factors that keep the places like India and Pakistan, even the North Korean from using them. In many case, that have kept the NATO in check even when it provoked, regardless if it was the old Soviet Union or Russia.

It is nations like Isreal and France who more or less have the weapons out of self-defense that are more worrisome at times. Where they have more or less have the spoken/unspoken threat out there. Which is kinda of the standpoint the Soviets had for use of the nukes in the open acts of war if it came to a point where they felt the Soviet Union was threaten enough where they had to go to war.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Didn't AbleArcher '83 scare the living crap out of the Soviets?

[Legbreaker]

Apparently so. I believe they weren't all that far away of launching an attack in response to what they were seeing and hearing.
And Nato didn't have a clue until after the exercise was concluded.

[Abbott Shaull]

Yeah there were plenty times where they were scared.

[Legbreaker]

There was plenty of times when both sides were scared. Fortunately nobody blinked when they shouldn't have, otherwise there's a good chance we'd all be glowing right now, those few of us still survivng anyway.

[Abbott Shaull]

Yeah thankfully no blinked too soon.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Yeah there were plenty times where they were scared.

I recall reading or hearing something that one of the more surprising things gathered from the two phone taps we put - one on the sea of Ohktosh's trunk line (that one was compromised by the Walkers) and one in the Arctic that was never discovered - was that as cavalier as they might have seemed the Russians were concerned that with a revitalized military and a hawkish president (Reagan) that NATO was on the verge of launching an attack and as a result they (the Soviets) moved their ballistic missile fleet under the northern ice pack.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

I recall reading or hearing something that one of the more surprising things gathered from the two phone taps we put - one on the sea of Ohktosh's trunk line (that one was compromised by the Walkers) and one in the Arctic that was never discovered - was that as cavalier as they might have seemed the Russians were concerned that with a revitalized military and a hawkish president (Reagan) that NATO was on the verge of launching an attack and as a result they (the Soviets) moved their ballistic missile fleet under the northern ice pack.

Yup! Ole Ron sure kept the Soviets guessing as to just what the Americans were up to. His eight years were perhaps the closest that either side ever came to pushing the button since the Cuban Missile Crisis. And being on border patrol duty during most of this time, I can testify to just how hairy things were. Nothing like sitting in your jeep, watching a Mi-24 Hind do a slow flyby, just so you could see that the rockets and missiles on the racks were war-shots.

Of course that's when one of us would pull out a copy of the latest Playboy and show off the centerfold! Always good for a round of applause from the Soviets!

[Abbott Shaull]

LOL yeah, I know going to Infantry training at Benning in 1988 they still place emphasis how much we needed to learn regardless, especially those of us active duty that may have to pull stints in Germany or Korea. Even once I got to the 82nd there was Staff Sergeant Ackers or something like that who served in and would add stories at times how they would get rounds fired over their heads every so often while on patrol near the border. Many of the stories got around quite a bit.

[Sanjuro]

I came upon this thread on a work-related website and thought it was interesting:
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...fulda-gap.html

[Abbott Shaull]

It was interesting Reading. Like they stated, it one of those thing you thought about, and had to deal with. It was interesting to see in couple post that the Pact allied Air Force seem to think they would be thrown away at worse, or kept to safe areas.

Also I can see where they would think their ground units wouldn't be used since many of them had obsolete equipment. I still think these units would be press forward. Especially in Northern Germany after the start of the way. After the 3rd Shock Army had spent itself it wouldn't really matter how good the next string equipment was, they were only the their grind down what was left of what was there until the Soviet units from Baltics and Belorussia got to the front to continue to Channel.

Would it take them 36 hours, unlikely 10 days more realistic.

When and who would use nukes is something that will always be debated.

Thought of Soviet enlisted personnel shooting their officers and not going forward, well yeah it possibility but then they have to deal with the KGB and again very few enlisted personnel knew how to read maps and other things that where in the West they train on almost since basic training.