Some Historical Ramblings

[dragoon500ly]

I love a good book, one is "The Last Valley, Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam". Now some may wonder that the events of 1948-1955 have to do with T2K...it struck me in my reading that some info on the French forces may have an impact, especially in the discussions of how units were being reorganized and equipped, useful for a GM sort of thing.

The Corps Expeditionnaire Francais en Extreme-Orient (here after CEFEO) was a massive undertaking for the French who were also rebuilding most of their infrastructure following World War Two; at its peak, it numbered 228,000 men in 90 infantry, 20 artillery and 8 engineer battalions. It was also an organization run on a shoestring, a very tight shoestring.

During the opening phase (1945-1951), CEFEO was equipped with a miscellaneous array of clothing and equipment. The troops fought the early years in a assortment of British, US, French and local made clothing. Personnel equipment (packs and webbing) ranged from French leather sets of World War One origin to 1940s British and US, supplemented by locally made equipment.

CEFEO was equally cursed in its weapons. By regulation the troops were to be armed with MAS36 7.5mm bolt-action rifles, supported by FM24/29 7.5mm automatic rifles with MAT49 SMGs. The reality is that the troops were litterly armed with anything and everything. The 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion in 1948 is one example: One squad of this crack intervention unit started out with one FM24/29, five MAS38 7.65mm SMGs (police weapons), and four CR39s (the airborne version of the MAS36). By March 1949 all of the rifles and all but one of the SMGs were non serviceable. They were replaced by 8mm Berthier M1907/15 rifles. These World War One relics were so awkwardly long that they had to be dropped in supply bundles, leaving the paratroopers unarmed until they located their rifles. The Berthiers also had three-round magazines and the users had no ammunition clips, leaving the legionnaires to load the rounds singly. In 1950, the squad was rearmed with ex-German MP-40 submachine guns, but with 9mm British-made ammunition, a poor match that led to frequent stoppages and accidental discharges.

The shortage of medium machine guns was also critical, with CEFCO being forced to use machineguns stripped from the casemates of the Maginot Line (7.62mm Reibel M1931A) crudley mounted on US tripods and feed from a hugh, clockwork drum; to add insult to injury, spare drums were rare, leading the crews to reload their single drum multiple times during a firefight. So serious was the machine gun shortage that infantry battalions were considered well equipped if they had ten rifle-caliber mgs.

Mortar support was equally lacking, with battalions issued with 6-8 mortars, usually the 60mm version.

So severe was the weapons shortage that ten different calibers were "official" issue: French 7.5mm, 7.62mm, 7.65mm and 8mm, Chinese 7.92mm, US .30 long (rifle/MMG) and short (carbine), US .45, and British .303 and 9mm.

Not only were the troops poorly equipped and armed, their rations were not of the highest caliber. A popular (and true) story was of rations dating back to the 1920s being issued.

Not until 1953, with the flow of US military aid was increased was the weapon situation finally fixed with the MAS36 rifle, MAT49 SMG, FM24/29 LMG, US M-1919A4 MMG and M-2HB HMGs as well as M-1 81mm mortars for the battalions and the introduction of the French 120mm mortar. Additional heavy support came from the US M18 57mm and M20 75mm recoilless rifles.

One can almost picture some frazzled US QM officer trying to make sure that the 5.56mm goes to A Company, B Company gets the 5.45mm and C Company gets the 7.62 and 7.92mm....

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

I love a good book, one is "The Last Valley, Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam". Now some may wonder that the events of 1948-1955 have to do with T2K...it struck me in my reading that some info on the French forces may have an impact, especially in the discussions of how units were being reorganized and equipped, useful for a GM sort of thing.

The Corps Expeditionnaire Francais en Extreme-Orient (here after CEFEO) was a massive undertaking for the French who were also rebuilding most of their infrastructure following World War Two; at its peak, it numbered 228,000 men in 90 infantry, 20 artillery and 8 engineer battalions. It was also an organization run on a shoestring, a very tight shoestring.

During the opening phase (1945-1951), CEFEO was equipped with a miscellaneous array of clothing and equipment. The troops fought the early years in a assortment of British, US, French and local made clothing. Personnel equipment (packs and webbing) ranged from French leather sets of World War One origin to 1940s British and US, supplemented by locally made equipment.

CEFEO was equally cursed in its weapons. By regulation the troops were to be armed with MAS36 7.5mm bolt-action rifles, supported by FM24/29 7.5mm automatic rifles with MAT49 SMGs. The reality is that the troops were litterly armed with anything and everything. The 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion in 1948 is one example: One squad of this crack intervention unit started out with one FM24/29, five MAS38 7.65mm SMGs (police weapons), and four CR39s (the airborne version of the MAS36). By March 1949 all of the rifles and all but one of the SMGs were non serviceable. They were replaced by 8mm Berthier M1907/15 rifles. These World War One relics were so awkwardly long that they had to be dropped in supply bundles, leaving the paratroopers unarmed until they located their rifles. The Berthiers also had three-round magazines and the users had no ammunition clips, leaving the legionnaires to load the rounds singly. In 1950, the squad was rearmed with ex-German MP-40 submachine guns, but with 9mm British-made ammunition, a poor match that led to frequent stoppages and accidental discharges.

The shortage of medium machine guns was also critical, with CEFCO being forced to use machineguns stripped from the casemates of the Maginot Line (7.62mm Reibel M1931A) crudley mounted on US tripods and feed from a hugh, clockwork drum; to add insult to injury, spare drums were rare, leading the crews to reload their single drum multiple times during a firefight. So serious was the machine gun shortage that infantry battalions were considered well equipped if they had ten rifle-caliber mgs.

Mortar support was equally lacking, with battalions issued with 6-8 mortars, usually the 60mm version.

So severe was the weapons shortage that ten different calibers were "official" issue: French 7.5mm, 7.62mm, 7.65mm and 8mm, Chinese 7.92mm, US .30 long (rifle/MMG) and short (carbine), US .45, and British .303 and 9mm.

Not only were the troops poorly equipped and armed, their rations were not of the highest caliber. A popular (and true) story was of rations dating back to the 1920s being issued.

Not until 1953, with the flow of US military aid was increased was the weapon situation finally fixed with the MAS36 rifle, MAT49 SMG, FM24/29 LMG, US M-1919A4 MMG and M-2HB HMGs as well as M-1 81mm mortars for the battalions and the introduction of the French 120mm mortar. Additional heavy support came from the US M18 57mm and M20 75mm recoilless rifles.

One can almost picture some frazzled US QM officer trying to make sure that the 5.56mm goes to A Company, B Company gets the 5.45mm and C Company gets the 7.62 and 7.92mm....

Shoot Company hell. Platoon level...lol

It was one of the problems they ran into numerous time when US units were attached to UK Army Group in the North or UK/Allied unit was assigned to the US Army Group (sorry don't remember their numeric designation off the top of my head). Same happen to some extent when in the South the US and French units were intermixed too from time to time in the 6th Army Group.

[dragoon500ly]

Its like when the 82nd and 101st were left under British control following the failure of Market Garden. Left to secure the south bank of the Rhine while the British withdrew units to higher ground.

Already exhausted by the heavy fighting to hold the corridor open, now left in an area that the Germans were getting ready to flood, no armor support, their only artillery support aside from the 75mm pack hows of the division artillery was a regiment of worn out 5.5-inch guns and dependent upon all supply from the British.

Accounts from both divisions testify to the heavy artillery fire that they had to endure. It was only when Eisenhower demanded the release of his airborne divisions that Monty finally released them back to reserve...just in time to be thrown into the Battle of the Bulge.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Its like when the 82nd and 101st were left under British control following the failure of Market Garden. Left to secure the south bank of the Rhine while the British withdrew units to higher ground.

Already exhausted by the heavy fighting to hold the corridor open, now left in an area that the Germans were getting ready to flood, no armor support, their only artillery support aside from the 75mm pack hows of the division artillery was a regiment of worn out 5.5-inch guns and dependent upon all supply from the British.

Accounts from both divisions testify to the heavy artillery fire that they had to endure. It was only when Eisenhower demanded the release of his airborne divisions that Monty finally released them back to reserve...just in time to be thrown into the Battle of the Bulge.

Yeah well both those units and the British/Allied Airborne units up until this point had longer rest due to operation running faster then expected, all of them were left in the field way longer than were originally planned. It one of those mistakes I am sure that will be made in the T2K war too in which Light units would be pressed into service much longer to the breaking point before being relieved and then needing extra long time to reconstitute and reorganized.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Yeah well both those units and the British/Allied Airborne units up until this point had longer rest due to operation running faster then expected, all of them were left in the field way longer than were originally planned. It one of those mistakes I am sure that will be made in the T2K war too in which Light units would be pressed into service much longer to the breaking point before being relieved and then needing extra long time to reconstitute and reorganized.

The problem with Light units and modern warfare, is that they will simply get more chewed up, faster...

[Abbott Shaull]

Yeah it was their problem back in 1944... The only reason in 1945 wasn't much of issue was that Germany was in rapid collapse. It one of the reason why the British has only on Brigade designated as Air Assault/Airmobile operation with two of the three regular Battalions of the Para Regiment.

[95th Rifleman]

It's always been the damocles sword of light units. They can hit hard and hit fast but can not hit for long.

The Germans proved the effectiveness during Blitzkrieg because they where able to get regular troops in to consolidate and expand the gains made by airbourne troops. It's telling that when the German's started to lose momentum the fallschirmjager where turned into foot infantry units.

I think we'd see the same with both NATO and WP airbourne assets, gradualy they will become foot infantry used as "fire brigades" to try and blunt enemy breakthroughs in much the same way the fallschirmjager where used in Normandy and Italy.