#1
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US Army T2K
Hello all,
This will be a quick post, just found this interesting and would probably find interest and/or spark discussion...... Prior to the end of the Cold War, the Army’s force requirements were daunting. For example, intelligence estimates credited the Soviet Army with more than two hundred divisions, eighty of which were manned at more than 50 percent strength and ready for operations with minimal mobilization and training. To address this kind of threat, the JCS developed a “Minimum-Risk Force” intended for a “high assurance of success” general war. In 1987, this force required 66 Army divisions: 40 for assignment to the European Command (EUCOM), 10 for the Central Command, 12 for the Pacific Command (PACOM), 2 for the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and 2 for defense of the continental United States (CONUS). Lacking the resources required to provide U.S. troops to all contingencies simultaneously, the Joint Staff reduced force levels to those of a “Planning Force,” which could meet U.S. strategic objectives with “reasonable risk.” Planning Force requirements were 36 Army divisions in 1987: 26 EUCOM, 6 CENTCOM, 2 PACOM, 0 SOUTHCOM, and 2 CONUS. The Army’s actual “Current Force” for that year was somewhat smaller: 18 active divisions (5 of which had reserve component “round-out” brigades) and 10 Army National Guard divisions. This “Current Force” obviously accepted increased risk, especially in lower priority theaters. Based on risk analysis and political priorities, it apportioned the twenty-eight existing Army divisions to the regional combatant commands as follows: 19 EUCOM, 5 CENTCOM, 2 PACOM, 0 SOUTHCOM, and 2 CONUS. The whole book is here: http://www.history.army.mil/catalog/browse/title.html Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping, 1987-1997 I also found this an interesting read, especially about the 5 H-series ARNG Divisions and how the seperate Heavy & Light Brigades fit in....... http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA269724 (or google Army of Excellence) Enjoy, Louie Last edited by Louied; 08-14-2011 at 12:29 AM. Reason: addition |
#2
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Thanks for the links. I keep forgetting to look there, and the second book sounds familiar. I suspect Romjue has been on my to-read list for years. Now that my wife has a Kindle, reading PDFs might get easier for me.
Not having read them yet, those 66 divisions: they were counting NATO's contribution, right? Was that considered a proper number to merely hold off the USSR and Pact, or conquer?
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My Twilight claim to fame: I ran "Allegheny Uprising" at Allegheny College, spring of 1988. |
#3
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I'm still making my way through the file, but it looks like this may have been a planned US mobilization. When I first saw the 66 divisions my thought was this had to include NATO, but the PACCOM totals don't include the South Koreans...
Still, its an intresting read. Thanks for the link!
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
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Those kind of things are really useful. Even when I do things like take my mother to the commissary to shop for the month, my Blackberry has a PDF app, and I just follow along with one of the carts...I've read whole books at the commissary, not bothering noticing what my mother was putting in the cart.
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I'm guided by the beauty of our weapons...First We Take Manhattan, Jennifer Warnes Entirely too much T2K stuff here: www.pmulcahy.com |
#5
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The document is only talking about US Army divisions. Can't recall the name of the book now but I have also read that the JCS (in 1987) believed that in order to adequately cover all contigencies they needed a minimum of 23 active Army divisions & 4 active Marine divisions.
If anyone is having trouble with the TRADOC PDF please let me know & I'll upload it from my computer. I'll give everyone a quick look though: 1) The AOE study concentrated on fielding 5 Corps. Each Heavy Corps (III, V, & VII) would field 2 Mech & 2 Ard. Div.'s.plus 1 ARNG Infantry Div. These would consist of (after reformation) 2 Ard., 2 mech, & 6 Inf. (Air Assault TO & E) which was at first considered the configuration with the greatest Tactical flexibility. However they settled on a 3 Ard. 3 Mech 3 Air Assault & 1 TLAT formation (shades of the '90's Medium Div). 2) Each Corp would field 1 Light Sep Bde for rear area security (33, 39, 73, 41, & 45. My guesses) and 2 Heavy Sep Bde.'s ( 30, 31, 116, 163, & 194 Ard. 30, 32, 157, 197, 218 Mech., again my guesses) This was thrown in disarray when the 116 went to the 4ID in 1989 as it's RO. As for the remaining Sep Bde's, there would be 6 RO (27 & 205 Light, 48, 81, 155, & 256 Heavy) along with 7 what was termed as "Theatre Defence" Bde's (Berlin, 29 Light= Hawaii, 92 Light= Puerto Rico, 187 Light=Iceland, 193 Light= Panama, 53 Light= Carribean Basin, & 207 Scout= Alaska. Again my guesses) 3) The 2 contigency Corps were a little more vague. XVIII was definetly going to CENTCOM with the 82, 101, an ARNG Div., the 3 Sep Bde.'s and if possible the 9th (which also had a mission in Denmark) , the 24th (which also had a NATO mission in a general war but would go to CENTCOM in a regional one !!!) Along with a Light Div. (Supposedly to hold the passes in the Zagros Mountains againt Soviet armour !!!!). To me it seemed I Corp would swing between Korea or NATO . (My guess, that depended on if IX Corp was reformed for Korea.) Additionally there is a mention of a Div. To Turkey, I believe this was the 10th but by the late 80's it was going to Norway, can anyone clarify this ? 4) 2 ID in ROK had 2 each Ard., Mech, & Air Assault. I know KATUSA troops were integrated into all these units in 2 ID. However there is a mention of KATUSA "Bn.'s" reinforcing. Was this some kind of planned RO to the 2nd ? Louie Last edited by Louied; 08-21-2011 at 10:19 PM. |
#6
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Quote:
Although the KATUSAs trained alongside their counterparts in whatever unit they were assigned to and had essentially the same training, they went to ROK Basic Training and we usually had to retrain the new KATUSAs in some basic skills. However, a KATUSA's primary role in an American units is not to be simply another joe -- it's to be a translator, liaison between us and ROK units, smooth over rough spots between us and the Korean locals, and (very important) give us insight into the Korean mind and culture. Unfortunately, KATUSA jobs are also a political football, typically given to the sons of the spoiled rich upperclass families, since even they cannot escape the national draft. The ROKs are HARD on their troops. It's probably part of why ROK troops and Marines are incredibly tough. Being made a KATUSA puts you into an American unit, which is a veritable paradise compared to a ROK unit. The most of the upperclass have political connections that can get their sons into a KATUSA job. That doesn't automatically make all KATUSAs bad, but they do tend to have an attitude problem from day one. You will hear of virtually NO KATUSA who goes on to a second term in the ROK military, because you can only serve your first term as a KATUSA and if he stays in, he goes back to a regular ROK unit and is immediately tagged as "soft." It is in fact, more common to see KATUSAs who want to be career military for some reason to join the US Army -- KATUSAs can choose a special super-fast-track option towards US citizenship and also do not have to go to American Basic, or AIT unless they want to change MOS. They basically do a small mountain of paperwork starting about a month before they ETS from the ROK Army, then they get the same sort of reenlistment options that any US soldier would have.
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I'm guided by the beauty of our weapons...First We Take Manhattan, Jennifer Warnes Entirely too much T2K stuff here: www.pmulcahy.com Last edited by pmulcahy11b; 08-16-2011 at 10:21 PM. |
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