1997 hypothetical

[Adm.Lee]

I spent last week at a wargaming convention. Since this convention focuses on long WW2 games, we have a lot of time to debate issue big and small. One dinnertime topic sprang from, "Were the Germans insane to invade the USSR in 1941?"
One held forth that if you looked at history, the Russians were the great losers of Europe: anyone and everyone had defeated them, time and time again. By 1941, even the Finns had beaten them off. The Germans could especially look at their own experience in 1914-1918, when they had ended up overrunning Ukraine and the Baltic coast. Also, we have Hitler's famous quote that the Communist regime was fragile, and a strong push would collapse it, and the peoples would not contest German dominance.
My opinion was that yes, one could defeat the Russians (Soviets), but that's not the same thing as conquering Russia. It's too big, and there is always another Russian army. Whether or not the Germans mistreated the populace, Russia is too big to conquer in a short time. After all, it took the Russians centuries to do it.

That said, this week, I wondered about NATO and 1997 in the T2k timeline. NATO's armies, fully mobilized and well-supported by air, had crossed Poland by late summer, and stood at the Soviet border. Presumably, the flank facing Czechoslovakia was guarded by some forces. Now what? Follow the path of Napoleon? Sit tight? Find someplace defensible and dig in? Ask for terms?

We "know" that NATO advance forces crossed the Polish-Soviet frontier, but was it a full invasion, or patrol actions? Reconnaissance in force? Was NATO surprised by the strength of the Soviet riposte?

It's something to sit around the fire in the cantonment and jaw about. I'm interested in opinions, informed or otherwise. I'm not sure what I believe just yet.

[Webstral]

I have maintained for a few years that the NATO plan (meaning the official policy of the White House) was in keeping with the proposed NATO war aims of General Sir John Hackett’s The Third World War. Specifically, the goal was to occupy the USSR west of the Dvina-Dnepr line, effectively knocking the Soviet Union out of the war whether they came to terms or not.

Theoretically, this plan had a number of advantages. By occupying the westernmost slice of the Soviet Union, NATO effectively would liberate all of Eastern Europe (whether the other members of the Warsaw Pact wanted to be liberated or not). Much Ukrainian grain would be denied to the Soviets, along with the industry and raw materials of the occupied areas. All this said, the Soviet Union would not be destroyed outright. Moscow would not be threatened with occupation. The regime could continue to rule the vast Soviet territory; they would be unable to wage offensive war against the West or China in the future, however—especially if a reunited Germany and the liberated Warsaw Pact signatories maintained a military presence in Belarus and the Ukraine.

Of course, reality evolved rather differently. The regime in power in the Kremlin in mid-1997 was worried about a coup or revolution. They were right to worry about these things. Also, no matter how rational the scheme put forth by NATO might have been, it was foolish to allow any German units to cross the Soviet border.

[Benjamin]

I've always assumed that events unfolded in such a way that they became unmanageable to NATO high command. To me crossing the border into the Soviet Union herself always seemed a bit of a death wish.

Back in college, about 20 years ago, I worked on an alternate V1 timeline where NATO high command wises up a bit.

SIGINT and HUMINT gives NATO the heads up that crossing into the USSR, especially by Germans, would trigger a nuclear release. Thusly, they halt just 10-20km west of the border and put forth peace feelers though Sweden and Switzerland. Unfortunately the Italian invasion of Austria and Germany throws this idea into disarray. Backed by limited use of chemicals the Soviets launch a counter attack, but this bogs down and is never able to get more than a toe hold over the Wisla.

Come fall the majority of the fighting focuses around the Med as NATO moves to knock Italy, Greece and other Warsaw Pact allies out of the war. By the end of November 1997, Greece is wracked by civil War and northern Italy is now the pro-NATO nation of Padania. The Soviet Union too is played out but finds itself unwilling, or unable, to withdraw from China and the Middle East. The ball finally goes up on December 7th when Russian MRBMs strike multiple targets in China, including command and control bunkers outside of Beijing. NATO scrambles to avert disaster in the West and much of China and the eastern Soviet Union is irradiated.

In the West a cease-fire is reached in mid-Febrauary, and Soviet forces are withdrawn back to the USSR. Unfortunately, a coup to overthrow the Communist regime is bungled and instead sparks another Russian Civil War. The year long death throws of the Soviet Union will see a further dozen nuclear weapons used along with millions more dead. A final peace treaty isn't signed until June 15, 2000, thus bringing to an end the most destructive war in human history.

Sorry got off topic a bit there.
Benjamin

[Raellus]

Perhaps NATO had reason to believe that Ukraine and Byelorussia were looking for an excuse to secede from the Soviet Union. Perhaps NATO intended to give them a fait accompli by crossing the Soviet frontier, purportedly as "liberators". As it turned out, NATO clearly underestimated the Soviet government's response to such a move.

[Marc]

I’ve always imagined that the crossing of the Polish-Soviet border by Germans units was caused by a too eager commander on the field trying to exploit the success of a previous tactical engagement. I have not a real base to suppose this. But I always felt attracted by the concept of how uncontrollable can became the evolution of the events once war machinery is fully activated. A tactical decision taken by one individual trying not to lose the momentum to achieve a major victory in the face of a nearly collapsing enemy force. Perhaps a right decision in the field, but the worst decision once known the consequences.

On the other side there’s a nice void to be fill when talking about all the diplomatic movements of the warring and neutral countries once the war breaks out.

[The Rifleman]

Think historically. In WW1, Germany faced a 2 front war. The internal problems in Russia caused and early collapse and allowed the Germans to change from a 2 front war to a 1 front war, which resulted in their ability to mount the 1918 Offensive. However, in WW2, Germany faced a 2 front war where both fronts were not going to collapse until completely conquered. Germany was unable to even "dig in" and wait because they did not have the forces to do so. Their only hope of success was to stay on the offensive and knock nations out of the fighting.

In our WW3, its the Soviets that are fighting the 2 front war. We keep talking about Nato, but no one is thinking about the fact that the USSR is also fighting in China, Korea, Iran. Granted, in Korea and Iran there are US/Nato forces there as well, but in China the Soviets are facing a large army that is tying up lots of assets. Even trying to later supress partisians is going to take a lot of forces.

My belief is that the Nato commanders would feel that they were dragged into a war they didn't want. The goal would be, as stated above by some of the better thinkers in this forum, to make a limited attack to liberate eastern european countries, seize some important economic territory like grain producing regions, the limited warm weather seaports, and manufactuering centers. Under attack from two fronts, the USSR would be "starved out" and would settle for terms early.

Going one step further, my thought is that the NATO commanders never believed that they would completely overun all of the USSR. However, the USSR believed that they would overrun Europe, and when NATO actually started to invade their home territories, the USSR assumed that NATOs goal was complete conquest, (as that was there goal) and thus the nukes came out.

[Olefin]

One thing to keep in mind is that NATO may have thought a successful invasion of the Soviet Union would bring PACT countries like Hungary, Poland and the Czechs over to their side and thus adding to their forces. That is one thing that the timeline I feel fails to address by having the vast majority, if not all of the forces of those PACT countries stay loyal to the Soviets thru most of the war.

I can understand the Poles not wanting the Germans on their territory and fighting as they did but the Hungarians and Czechs stayed a little too loyal to the Soviets. Neither of those countries were invaded in the initial offensive yet none of their units went over to NATO as NATO pushed thru Poland and into the Soviet Union.

I think the writers very heavily overestimated how loyal the Czechs and Hungarians would have been - given that kind of offensive, where the Russians are kicked right back to their border you would have to figure you would have had significant defections of whole units over to NATO.

[dude_uk]

Perhaps NATO's factional behaviour takes a hand in this? The group seems to be divided into 3 camps.

1) The Germans who want re-unification. But want they to be without question.

2) The Americans and British. Who are also thinking outside of Europe and long term. Use this as an opportunity to liberate Eastern-Europe. Cut the Soviet's down to size without them unleashing Armageddon.

3) Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark,and Turkey who are want the war over ASAP and but are rather reluctant to do anything without Uncle Sam.

[Benjamin]

Another aspect that I believe is often overlooked is evidence, in Boomer, the Vehicle Guides and elsewhere, that the Soviet Union invaded Norway before US, UK and Canada crossed the IGB. I imagine this occurred as Soviet intelligence realized NATO was perhaps preparing to enter the fray and the Soviets decided to preempt this move by interdicting the North Atlantic sea lanes.

While I still think it was a foolish move to enter the Soviet Union, it may have been part of the rational used to justify such an advance. Taking Murmansk along with other portions of Belorus and Ukraine surely would made it very difficult for the USSR to continue the fight.

With hindsight its very easy to see that had NATO forces entered Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary the people there would have risen up against their Soviet occupiers. Heck even without hindsight, the events of 1956, 1968 and 1980 should have clued the developers into the fact that the Warsaw Pact was a house of cards held together only by the presence of Soviet troops. A more realistic approach may have been to have the Soviet Union fall into Civil War in mid-1997 which then turns into a nuclear exchange as the hardline faction exacts revenge on the West.

Benjamin

[Raellus]

If the writers had PACT nations turning their coats, the T2KU would look and feel very differently. In essence, the game world that all of us know (and most of us love) would be thrown out of balance. Yes, they certainly underestimated the level of anti-Soviet feeling in most of the PACT nations, but I think, as westerners, we tend to overestimate it a bit. We also have to take into consideration the effect that a pre-emptive German attack on two WTO nations would have had on public opinion in the others. Poland, for one, has an almost atavistic fear of Germany. The Czechs too suffered from Germany's attempts at "reunification" in 1938. I don't think that a lot of eastern European nations would have welcomed an aggressive, reunified Germany. To the contrary- it's possible that their collective fear and indignation would have bound them together and more tightly to their Soviet patrons.

My tastes run towards finding ways to make the established gameworld work, rather than tearing it down and starting over again.

[Olefin]

Having a few units changing their coats back in 1997 wouldnt appreciably change the game balance - and it could add a reason for the huge Russian counterattack and the use of nukes - i.e. you have a couple of Polish units suddenly go turncoat and the Polish General Staff tells the Russians that unless something is done right now and in a big way they cant guarantee the rest of the army staying loyal - going nuclear and sending in a huge counteracttack to push NATO back on their heels would definitely have made and units thinking of defecting change their minds

especially if any defecting unit got vaporized as part of the nuclear strikes

And it does go to making the game work - i.e. the Germans and US went for broke, but misunderestimated the extent of anti-German feeling in Eastern Europe. Still some units turned to NATO and pushed the Russians, already feeling cornered after the Germans crossed into their territory, into a situation where its either go nuke or go home

so adding a few defecting units that get decimated by the Russians as part of their strikes fits right into the game - and could explain where some of the Poles, Czechs, etc.. that are in NATO units came from - i.e. the 100 or so survivors of a Polish infantry brigade that went turncoat and got nuked and joined up with the US as they retreated


the Russian Civil War motif is also a good idea to work into the game - i.e. the Germans crossed the border and the leaders in the Kremlin were ready to surrender or ask for a cease fire - but hardliners in the KGB or military, who couldnt face that prospect, nuked Moscow or another city where they had moved to since Moscow was too obvious a target for a nuke to take out their leaders and then blame the attack on the US and away we go with nuclear retaliation and an all out offensive against NATO

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Olefin

Having a few units changing their coats back in 1997...

You mentioned entire nations in your previous post.

[Olefin]

actually I said 'That is one thing that the timeline I feel fails to address by having the vast majority, if not all of the forces of those PACT countries stay loyal to the Soviets thru most of the war"

not saying that whole nations go over to the US or NATO - but at least some units of significant size - i.e. brigades to divisions - should have gone over to NATO in 1997 during their drive thru Poland - a division or two is a lot of men but not saying an entire nation would do so

i.e. more like what happened in Russia in WWII where men did go over to the Germans (especially among the Balts) - but in this case the Russians put a stop to it by a combo of the successful counterattack and using nukes on those units to make any further possible defectors think twice about it, realizing the cost the previous units had just paid

As for the Czechs - the two halves of that country are very different in their outlooks - the western part was always much more pro-West versus the eastern part - so having at least some Czech units from the west - i.e. the current Czech Republic - defect to NATO makes sense in the game

and again provides for where former PACT soldiers came from that are in NATO units by 2000 - i.e. they are what is left of the defecting units from 1997 that have now been absorbed by the NATO units

[Raellus]

My apologies, Olefin.

Some of the former PACT troops serving in NATO units in 2000 certainly could have switched sides as early as '97.

[Webstral]

The timing of the first Soviet actions against Norway deserves some attention, I think. Frankly, I’ve always chalked it up to editorial error. Nonetheless, the idea merits discussion.

Let’s assume for the moment that the timing of the Soviet offensive into Norway, the initial stages of which predate the first US Army unit crossing into the DDR, is not an editorial error. If the Soviets invade Norway prior to the war with Germany widening into a general war with NATO, what do the Soviets expect to get out of such an action? I believe but can’t reference at the moment that the Soviet invasion of Norway is supposed to begin after 20 NOV 96.

The obvious answer is that they expect to open the door to the North Atlantic so that the Northern Red Banner Fleet can interdict the trans-Atlantic supply route. By invading Norway, the USSR threatens to bring all of NATO into the Pact-German War. At the very least, NATO can be expected to react very strongly. Let’s look at the trans-Atlantic sealift first.

We know that the US Army already has activated REFORGER. Several divisions and independent brigades fly in their personnel, marry up with their equipment in POMCUS sites, and get into the field in good order. The Soviets have missed their opportunity there. Nonetheless, we have good reason to believe that massive resupply for the West Germans takes to the Atlantic as soon as the balloon goes up. Whether the West Germans win or lose, they are going to need major replenishment. By mid-November, we should expect that the Atlantic is full of shipping carrying military cargoes bound for North Sea ports. I wonder whether this shipping is moving in convoys, which would indicate a war footing, or as single ships, which would indicate that the US does not expect to become a belligerent. Either way, the Soviets have a major interest in breaking out into the Northern Atlantic to start sinking ships.

Of course, the Soviets keep a third of their nuclear attack boats at sea at all times in the 1980’s. The Soviets might change this policy somewhat as their economy suffers in the early 1990’s. Also, subs might get concentrated in the Pacific once the Sino-Soviet War gets underway. Still, it’s not unreasonable to believe that a substantial number of Soviet subs are in the North Atlantic in October, 1996. The Kremlin might find cause to up the number of Soviet subs on patrol in the North Atlantic throughout November just in case the US does exactly what the US does. I can’t say how many of these Soviet subs will be tracked and tailed by NATO attack boats and other ASW forces. If the Soviets already have a large number of subs in the North Atlantic by the time the situation on the ground in East Germany begins to turn in favor of the Pact, one wonders what they think they might gain by invading Norway compared to the near certainty of bringing the rest of NATO into the fight—even if only (for the time being) in support of Norway.

We should bear in mind that France, Belgium, Italy, and Greece all denounce the West German invasion of the DDR. We don’t know what Spain and Portugal think of the matter, but I’ve always cast them with France and Italy. If the Soviets invade Norway before France breaks with NATO, then the USSR forces France to live up to her treaty obligations. There’s a chance, of course, that France will renege anyway. However, even for France there’s a difference between pulling out of NATO over active Anglo-American support for a West German war of aggression and failing to come to the defense of a fellow member of NATO who is clearly a victim of Soviet aggression.

We can’t know what diplomatic maneuvering is going on in October and November, 1996. Surely, though, someone in the Soviet chain of command is going to point out to that by mid-November the West Germans are starting to run out of steam. The correlation of forces is working more and more in favor of the Pact in Germany. Several members of NATO are wondering what happened to the defensive organization they joined. Why answer the question for them—above all, France—just to get control of Norway? Until 01DEC 96 (or thereabouts), NATO is not involved in the Pact-German War. Is possession of Norway really worth war with the rest of NATO, which is obliged by treaty to come to Norway’s defense? Does anyone in the Kremlin believe the Soviet-NATO fighting will be limited to Norway? Air and sea operations over Norway inevitably will bleed over into German air and sea space; and then the rest of NATO will be dragged into the fighting in Germany. Someone is going to argue that until the situation in Germany is completely lost, the gain-loss ratio of bringing the rest of NATO into the war is distinctly unfavorable for the Soviet Union.

Someone else is going to argue that the trans-Atlantic pipeline of materiel has to be closed if the Pact forces in Germany are to fight on the best possible terms. There is logic to this. However, balanced against a medium-term (and not guaranteed) throttling of the supply line running from North America to Western Europe is an almost certain entrance of strong, fresh NATO air and ground forces into the fighting in Central Europe.

A good deal depends on the particulars, it must be said. If there ever was a chance to attack the North Atlantic with strategic surprise, by the second week of October the Soviets have missed that opportunity. Nevertheless, we don’t really know what the disposition of NATO naval forces in the North Atlantic is as October turns to November. It’s hard to believe that the US Atlantic Fleet does nothing. At the same time, there isn’t much justification for going to a full war footing. Mobilization and deployment of naval assets probably is somewhere between the two extremes. It’s hard to imagine that the US Navy fails to observe the growing number of Soviet subs in the North Atlantic or fails to implement countermeasures that would amount to putting more ships to sea. Given all this, is the potential gain of a late November offensive in Norway worth the potential cost? I’m inclined to think not.

[Bullet Magnet]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The timing of the first Soviet actions against Norway deserves some attention, I think. Frankly, I’ve always chalked it up to editorial error. Nonetheless, the idea merits discussion.

I believe but can’t reference at the moment that the Soviet invasion of Norway is supposed to begin after 20 NOV 96.

Now that it's been brought up, I'd guess it is either the editorial error as you suggested, or deliberate, to have a canon source to keep the Soviets the "bad guys" by having them invade a NATO nation's territory first. It was the 1980s after all, and we couldn't have the US being the aggressor party.

Just a theory.

[Apache6]

- Not recorded in canon, but records have been found that indicate that the 3d Panzer Div went to the assistance of Lithuanian locals who were beseiged by Soviets.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Apache6

- Not recorded in canon, but records have been found that indicate that the 3d Panzer Div went to the assistance of Lithuanian locals who were beseiged by Soviets.

It was a bad call, Ripley. It was a bad call.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Webstral

It was a bad call, Ripley. It was a bad call.

At least you don't see the Lithuanians f**king each other over for a percentage?

[Jason Weiser]

Originally Posted by Apache6

- Not recorded in canon, but records have been found that indicate that the 3d Panzer Div went to the assistance of Lithuanian locals who were beseiged by Soviets.

What records were these?