OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[swaghauler]

I see your point, but you've presented a false dichotomy (die fighting, or surrender and die anyway). Of course, surrender isn't without risk- it's one of the riskiest things a soldier at war can do. However, in this war, there have been documented surrenders of Ukrainian troops without summary executions, and prisoner exchanges. Bucha was very bad, but it was mostly civilians that were killed, not surrendered soldiers. That's not to say that Russian troops can't or won't take their frustrations out on surrendering troops, but such an outcome isn't a given.

That said, for many, "perception is reality", and if the defenders believe they'll be tortured and killed if they surrender, it makes sense that they've decided not to.

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Not quite a "false dichotomy." Are you not listening to Putin's speeches? Did you not see what has already happened to the AZOV Battalion fighters who were captured? Putin swore on national TV in December that he would try and convict everyone in the AZOV Batallion as a Nazi. The images are gone from GOOGLE now but did you see what the Russians did to those 8 members of the battalion in the first week of the war? Crucified right in Maripol then lit on fire and burned.

[swaghauler]

Here's a video from Operator Starsky. Take what you see here with a grain of salt. It is a Ukrainian war video.

https://youtu.be/c1gs2cQ9lhg

Swag

[Raellus]

Are you not listening to Putin's speeches?

I am not. I don't trust anything he says, so I tend to ignore him.

Did you not see what has already happened to the AZOV Battalion fighters who were captured? The images are gone from GOOGLE now but did you see what the Russians did to those 8 members of the battalion in the first week of the war? Crucified right in Maripol then lit on fire and burned.

I did not and, from your description, I'm glad that I didn't. That's awful.

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[Targan]

It's exactly the sort of conflict that turns really, really ugly in terms of the behaviour of the troops on the ground. Exacerbated by the well-understood Russian doctrine of using brutality against the civilian populace to break the will of the opposing side to fight on. Except in many cases it makes the opposition fight even harder, and engage in brutal tactics as well.

[Fallenkezef]

It's exactly the sort of conflict that turns really, really ugly in terms of the behaviour of the troops on the ground. Exacerbated by the well-understood Russian doctrine of using brutality against the civilian populace to break the will of the opposing side to fight on. Except in many cases it makes the opposition fight even harder, and engage in brutal tactics as well.

I never understand why people think this crap works. Germany pounded London and we never broke. The RAF flattened every German city and the German people did not break. The nazis tried this with Ukraine in WW2 (look up the bastards of the Dirlewanger brigade) and the Ukrainians did not break back then.

Russian tactics did not break the Afghans back in the 80's.

All it does is make every person a potential enemy combatant and none of your troops are safe, anywhere in theatre.

[Raellus]

I think it's more about driving civilians out of targeted settlements so that the artillery can level potential defensive positions, than efforts to break the will to fight of the Ukrainian populace. The demoralizing effect of random shelling and missile attacks is a "bonus", rather than the primary objective of said strikes. Do the Russians really care about civilian casualties? Clearly not, but I think they're trying to maintain the facade that they do.

The Russians have a long institutional memory. They learned how difficult MOUT is 75 years ago during the battles for Berlin, Danzig, Konigsberg, etc. Their attempts at a decapitating "Thunder Run" during the first battle of Grozny and, again, during the Battle of Kiev, were costly, abject failures, so they've reverted back to just shelling cities into rubble before trying to seize territory.

"Light", preliminary bombardment prompts evacuations of civilians. Then the Soviets can go hard. Or maybe they just don't give a crap about civilian casualties, I don't know.

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[Trooper]

Aselsan is a Turkish manufacturer. They make an airburst round with tungsten pellets as the payload. NAMMO also manufactures ammo in 35x228mm, although I'm not sure where, given their multinational nature. And Rheinmetall makes some types of rounds in that caliber. I think Romarm in Romania also manufactures high explosive rounds (and training rounds), but not the more advanced rounds.

Nammo is marketing 35 mm ammo for Oerlikon. So far, they have only managed to sell training rounds to Turkey.

History goes something like this. In early 90s Finland bought seven Marksman SPAAGs. Finnish policy was during that time that Finland should have production capacity to all calibers we have in use.

Only weapons that used 35 mm Oerlikon rounds were sixteen Oerlikon GDF guns and those Marksman tanks. Anyway, Vihtavuori made one batch of 35 mm ammo and that didn’t go too well. Oerlikon rounds are not easy to manufacture. Rounds should have small dispersion and high velocity. After some embarrassing incidents armed forces stopped using Finnish ammo and relied in Swiss quality.

Probably Vihtavuori (part of Nammo group) still have some capacity to manufacture 35 mm rounds, but probably it would be better that some “international arms dealer” just happens to find Swiss ammo for Gepard.

[swaghauler]

These drone strikes are being done by the Ukrainian made 8-motor quadcopters that they assemble from kits. The "bombs" are plastic bodies (to reduce loaded weight) with fixed plastic fins (made from sheet plastic found in craft stores), with a metal nose cone and "percussion/striker" detonator. The bomb's payload is 1/2lb of explosive and 2lbs of fragmentation material (everything from gravel to small metal fragments). The smaller drones can carry one or two bombs but the larger one Ukraine has started to make is capable of carrying up to 6 bombs. The control range is a few kilometers and the controller is a STANDARD (ie commercially sold) controller.

https://youtu.be/XQ4HxpQQ3Sg

Swag

[kcdusk]

Russian T-90 tank destroyed in Ukraine.


I'd love to know the story behind how this happened. Did the T90 rumble into view, & surprise an anti-tank crew who took an opportunistic shot?

Or was it seen a few days ago, and a Ukraine crew stalked it through the woods, before the kill shot?

Was it a one shot kill? Or many?

Did a soldier, or group of soldiers, have to act as bait?

So many backstories that fit our T2K world, and would be interesting to know.



https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russia-just-lots-its-most-advanced-operational-tank-in-ukraine

[swaghauler]

Russian T-90 tank destroyed in Ukraine.


I'd love to know the story behind how this happened. Did the T90 rumble into view, & surprise an anti-tank crew who took an opportunistic shot?

Or was it seen a few days ago, and a Ukraine crew stalked it through the woods, before the kill shot?

Was it a one shot kill? Or many?

Did a soldier, or group of soldiers, have to act as bait?

So many backstories that fit our T2K world, and would be interesting to know.



https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russia-just-lots-its-most-advanced-operational-tank-in-ukraine

According to YouTube, it was killed by one of the OLDEST weapons on the modern battlefield! The Ukrainian military hit it with a Carl Gustaf Recoilless Rifle!

[Vespers War]

Russian T-90 tank destroyed in Ukraine.


I'd love to know the story behind how this happened. Did the T90 rumble into view, & surprise an anti-tank crew who took an opportunistic shot?

Or was it seen a few days ago, and a Ukraine crew stalked it through the woods, before the kill shot?

Was it a one shot kill? Or many?

Did a soldier, or group of soldiers, have to act as bait?

So many backstories that fit our T2K world, and would be interesting to know.



https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russia-just-lots-its-most-advanced-operational-tank-in-ukraine

Just to clarify, it was a surprise because it was the first known T-90M Proryv lost in Ukraine. Russia's lost at least 19 of the T-90A, which are an earlier variant (first ordered in 2005, while the Proryv was first delivered in 2020).

The best estimate of what happened that I've seen so far is that the Carl Gustaf shot hit one of the fuel tanks and started a fire in the rear of the tank, which spread until it set off the ammo carousel.

And here's where I note that Paul doesn't have the T-90M on his page, because of course I went to go check, and noticed the T-72B3 and T-72B3M are also not listed. (Also, the writeup on the T-90 implies the T-90A existed first and then the T-90S was a derived export version, when it's the other way around - the T-90S was sold to India in 2001, and then Russia bought the "export version" for themselves as T-90A in 2005).

[pmulcahy11b]

And here's where I note that Paul doesn't have the T-90M on his page, because of course I went to go check, and noticed the T-72B3 and T-72B3M are also not listed. (Also, the writeup on the T-90 implies the T-90A existed first and then the T-90S was a derived export version, when it's the other way around - the T-90S was sold to India in 2001, and then Russia bought the "export version" for themselves as T-90A in 2005).

I've been busy updating EV pages; I haven't been paying attention to other vehicles; I guess I need to upgrade at least some of Russian Tanks...and US tanks, and British tanks, and US APCs, and British APCs, and International APCs, and Russian APCs, and Russian LAVs...I could go on, but I'll give myself a panic attack.

[kcdusk]

Paul: the way the "best way to travel overland" thread is going, your best bet is to prioritise a whole page on horse stats!

[pmulcahy11b]

Paul: the way the "best way to travel overland" thread is going, your best bet is to prioritise a whole page on horse stats!

The way I do things is:
1) Updates, by category and alphabet, Right now, that's Wheeled EV
2) Stuff I want to do for fun
3) Corrections I receive in PM and email and forum
4) Requests

The last two may blend together, sometimes

[Vespers War]

I've been busy updating EV pages; I haven't been paying attention to other vehicles; I guess I need to upgrade at least some of Russian Tanks...and US tanks, and British tanks, and US APCs, and British APCs, and International APCs, and Russian APCs, and Russian LAVs...I could go on, but I'll give myself a panic attack.

Yeah, it's going to be a project without end since there are always odd updates being done, even excluding the introduction of entirely new vehicles. At least everything I noted wouldn't be in use in a tradition T2K scenario - the T-90M was first publicly shown in 2017, while the T-72B3 dates to 2010 and the T-72B3M to 2016.

And on the theme of odd updates, the Polish T-72M1R that were sent to Ukraine have been fitted with mounts for Kontakt-1 ERA, with the armor blocks being provided by Czech Republic. The M1R has a thermal imaging camera for the gunner, improved radios, a new fire control system, and a battlefield management system. As a quick and dirty stat-up, I'd just use the T-72M1 with Fire Control increased to +3, Thermal Imaging, and a second PKT. The gun mount isn't mentioned as receiving any upgrades, so Stabilization remains at Fair. The Kontakt-1 ERA would add 80 to AV against HE only to the front and sides, and doesn't protect against top-attack munitions or mines.

[Raellus]

It's hard to believe that any Ukrainian helicopters got in or out of there during the siege. IMHO, those aircrews deserve Ukraine's highest decoration for bravery.

Inside Ukraine’s Daring Helicopter Missions Into Russian-Occupied Mariupol:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/exclusive-details-of-ukraines-daring-helicopter-missions-into-russian-occupied-mariupol

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[Bestbrian]

The gear comes with a learning curve.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-advanced-weapons-training.html

[Raellus]

The gear comes with a learning curve.

Thanks for the link. I've long been wondering how the UAF has been keeping up with the profusion of donated weaponry (especially artillery and combat vehicles), and am concerned that a lot of this "new" gear will be rushed into the field before its crews know how to use it effectively. This concern has only grown with reports of Western AFVs and artillery arriving in Ukraine in increasing quantities. A week ago, it was reported that Norwegian M109s SPGs had arrived in Ukraine. A couple of days ago, the Russians posted video of a battery of said M109s being hit by rocket-deployed cluster munitions. That's a quick turnaround, with unfortunate results. It's one thing for the Ukrainians to employ systems with which they have familiarity and experience (like T-72 variants and Buka SAMs), but quite another when it's HIMARS and Leopard 2s (gracias, España!)

I posted this link over in the Out of Mothballs thread already, but it's worth sharing here as well.

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembe d%7Ctwterm%5E1532282866293518336%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon %5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.militaryimages.net%2Fthr eads%2Fukrainian-forces-2022.10408%2Fpage-10

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[ToughOmbres]

Earlier in the conflict the Russian Army seemed to have forgotten most of the lessons of World War II or even 1995 Grozny at least as far as Command and Control decisions.
This also seemed to apply to logistics-logistics stopped as many Red Army offensives as the Wehrmacht during World War II. Russian logistics seemed to be in really pitiful shape.
Fast forward to late June-the Russians seem to have rediscovered massive artillery pulverizing everything to perdition ala World War I or the Artillery divisions of World War II.
We'll see.

[kcdusk]

Russia version of the last submarine. Pun intended.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russias-only-pump-jet-kilo-class-submarine-is-back-to-attack-ukraine

[Raellus]

Lysychansk fell to the Russians:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-russian-forces-expand-hold-on-the-donbas

The Russians abandoned Snake Island:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-plants-flag-on-snake-island-russians-claim-deadly-response

Ukraine might get replacement MiG-29s (from Slovakia) after all:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-may-finally-get-slovakias-mig-29s-thanks-to-czech-air-patrol-deal

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[swaghauler]

While I usually avoid PowerPoint presentations, Perun is a great presenter of information and he goes into great detail here about artillery. He covers one thing that NEVER gets mentioned, but that we 13Bravos are constantly on guard for... Barrel life. It is what doomed the railgun and (in my own opinion) is the Achilles heel of the M777 and the Hawkeye 105mm howitzers. Sadly, my concerns seem to be born out in Ukraine.

https://youtu.be/EMEpxX7rS5I


Here is another good video as well...

https://youtu.be/7CmXz8Qd9yw

Swag

[pmulcahy11b]

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-russian-forces-expand-hold-on-the-donbas



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It seems that the Ukrainians believe that UK support may be in question (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-unhappy-boris-johnsons-resignation-support-russia-war-rcna37237) due to Boris Johnson and his party falling out of favor. Input?

[Rainbow Six]

It seems that the Ukrainians believe that UK support may be in question (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-unhappy-boris-johnsons-resignation-support-russia-war-rcna37237) due to Boris Johnson and his party falling out of favor. Input?

The UK Government is committed to supporting Ukraine so I doubt if there will be any significant changes. Although it may be done with less showboating than the current incumbent has practiced so there may be a perception in some quarters that it reduces.

[Raellus]

Callback to post #140 and counterpart to St. Javelin.

Militaryimages.net has a subforum dedicated to the war in Ukraine.

https://www.militaryimages.net/forums/the-ukraine-war-photo-and-video-forum.95/

And a bump for this Twitter feed:

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembe d%7Ctwterm%5E1532282866293518336%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon %5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.militaryimages.net%2Fthr eads%2Fukrainian-forces-2022.10408%2Fpage-10

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[Targan]

It feels like at the moment that if you're an active duty, combat arms Russian general you're more likely to die in a precision artillery/rocket strike in Ukraine than have the opportunity to retire quietly at home.

[Raellus]

Looks like Russia's going to get some foreign military aid- "hundreds" of drones from Iran, likely including some kamikaze models.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russia-getting-iranian-attack-drones-would-be-a-very-big-deal

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[Raellus]

The Institute for the Study of War- an American thinktank, it appears- posts daily briefs (including annotated maps) on the course of the war in Ukraine, focusing on the strategic and operational level of warfare.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12

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[pmulcahy11b]

This is an excellent video about what just about what everyone has supplied to Ukraine. Also, you will be helping a good poster who is getting squeezed out.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDKYT2pikFw

[Raellus]

Nice piece, Paul. Thanks for posting.

Let's add the A-10 Warthog to that list!

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/giving-a-10-warthogs-to-ukraine-isnt-off-the-table

Elements in the USAF and Congress have been trying to get rid of the A-10 for decades. What better send-off than allowing them the opportunity to go out doing what they were designed to do- take out Russian armor.

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[pmulcahy11b]

Let's add the A-10 Warthog to that list!


Elements in the USAF and Congress have been trying to get rid of the A-10 for decades. What better send-off than allowing them the opportunity to go out doing what they were designed to do- take out Russian armor.

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I think that if someone can come with something better than the Warthog, they should put up or shut up. The A-10 is like the B-52 -- there's nothing that can fill it's shoes.

They need to warm up production lines for the A-10C.

[swaghauler]

I think that if someone can come with something better than the Warthog, they should put up or shut up. The A-10 is like the B-52 -- there's nothing that can fill it's shoes.

They need to warm up production lines for the A-10C.

I wonder If that will happen but for a singularly different reason. The Army is trying hard to abolish or circumvent the Key West Agreement and really does want the A10. There are something like 160 operational airframes and the Army would need them all to fill in the gaps in CAS that they have with the Apache.

All that being said, the A10 would be a good idea for three reasons...

It can operate from "austere airfields."

Its cost of operation per flight hour is the lowest you can get in a combat jet.

Its tech is very Cold War meaning you do NOT NEED lots of high-tech gear to maintain or fight with the jet.

Sadly though, it won't solve Ukraine's most pressing need... CAP (Combat Air Patrol)... Ukraine needs something to stop high-altitude bombers and standoff attacks from Russian jets.

I STILL believe that the easiest route to take is to have all our former Pact members give up their older Mig 29s, SU22s, and even their Mig 21s and then replace THOSE NATO aircraft with F16s.

[swaghauler]

Perun has done an analysis of the use of helicopters in Ukraine.

https://youtu.be/qnoKpXvj41A



Swag

[pmulcahy11b]

Here's an interesting counterpoint to the A-10s for Ukraine idea:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAEQwlNeL0s

[Raellus]

Those are fair points, and if the Ukrainians don't want A-10s, we shouldn't try to foist our unwanted Warthogs on them. I'm kind of surprised that the Ukrainians aren't interested, though, given that they're using SU-25s on a regular basis, but I get that the supply of trained, experienced pilots is limited, and that the greater need is for fighter aircraft.

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[bash]

Those are fair points, and if the Ukrainians don't want A-10s, we shouldn't try to foist our unwanted Warthogs on them. I'm kind of surprised that the Ukrainians aren't interested, though, given that they're using SU-25s on a regular basis, but I get that the supply of trained, experienced pilots is limited, and that the greater need is for fighter aircraft.

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I am not some sort of A-10 hater or anything but I find the mythology around it a little tedious. It's got a relatively short combat radius, little air-to-air capability, and is fairly slow. In an environment without air superiority and little in the way of SEAD from friendly forces it would be a sitting duck.

For the Ukrainians in particular it would be nearly useless. It can't mount any weapons they might have in stock. The moment it supplied ammo is spent the jets are just taking up a hangar. The A-10 also has no sensors besides what comes in attached pods. Unless the US is going to also send those then the A-10 is a gun and dumb bombs aimed with iron sights. Ukraine would be much better off getting resources to keep their SU-25s operational.

The A-10 as part of US forces can be formidable because other weapon systems exist to let it do its job. It would be far less effective in other militaries that don't have as deep of a weapon systems bench as the US does.

[pmulcahy11b]

For the Ukrainians in particular it would be nearly useless. It can't mount any weapons they might have in stock.

This is probably true of the Ukrainian supply chain in general. Ukrainian logistics officers must be having nightmares about supplying their troops -- particularly spare parts. Western aircraft would turn that into fever nightmares.

[swaghauler]

Here's another video on the employment and also the logistical aspects of the cruise and ballistic missile use in Ukraine.

https://youtu.be/_F7mt4rNVY0


Swag.

[Raellus]

North Korea might be sending 100k "volunteers" to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-army-of-north-korean-volunteers-reportedly-ready-to-help-russia

US AG-88 HARM ARMs have made an appearance in Ukraine.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u-s-confirms-air-launched-anti-radiation-missiles-sent-to-ukraine

I was under the impression that Cold War era Soviet combat aircraft would require significant modifications to employ advanced US/NATO weaponry.

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[kato13]

I was under the impression that Cold War era Soviet combat aircraft would require significant modifications to employ advanced US/NATO weaponry.

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Same here I was in a discussion where I thought the only really effective ARM option was Israeli autonomous drones (or the secret DARPA/Skunkworks/CIA equivalent I am sure exists). "Death finds a way" Paraphrasing Ian Malcolm.

[Targan]

It is sort of addressed in the article.

The AGM-88 could work with relatively minimal integration, potentially leveraging a federated interface, such as e-tablet, for very basic functionality. Ukraine's fighters are Soviet-era machines and totally lack the right interfaces, including the basic bus architecture, for modern NATO-compatible weaponry. But it's possible a relatively crude modification could have been adapted for this single weapon. There is also the possibility of a clandestine transfer of Soviet-era aircraft from NATO states that have been upgraded with NATO-standard bus architecture and adaptable avionics that could provide an interface for the HARM.

[Vespers War]

Apparently an Under Secretary of Defense mentioned that we sent anti-radiation missiles that could be fired from Ukrainian aircraft.

https://twitter.com/OstapYarysh/status/1556696165760081926

ETA: Also, Russia apparently lost a second BMO-T recently. Not many of those were built to begin with. They're a T-72-based Heavy APC intended for use by flamethrower troops, with 32 RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launchers carried for use by the dismounts.

[swaghauler]

Armorcast has a video on the T90 that is pretty close to reality. I wasn't going to post this because it roasts the T90 pretty badly but it is kind of accurate. Enjoy!

https://youtu.be/4Q83AIJCGaQ


Swag

[swaghauler]

Here's Cappy breaking down the newest US aid bill to Ukraine (the 53 Billion dollar bill) and it looks like the winner here is going to be the US...

https://youtu.be/sLkgRJqij4k

Swag.

[swaghauler]

Perun has now downloaded a presentation on Ukrainian mobilization and it is certainly worth watching.

https://youtu.be/cVx3Nlifo4Q

Swag.

[swaghauler]

Here's Taiwan's gift to Ukraine... The Revolver Drone capable of holding EIGHT 60mm Mortar rounds...

https://youtu.be/kOHgVBtV3MQ

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here is a very Twilight2000 Ukrainian Technical...

https://youtu.be/onroLhwyj0o

Swag

[Raellus]

Finally!

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-gepard-anti-aircraft-systems-now-in-the-fight

I've long thought that an SPAAG of some sort would make an interesting PC vehicle- it strikes me as a bit more versatile, and less OP- in terms of armament- than an MBT. And what T2ker hasn't run across a Shilka or equivalent on campaign.

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[swaghauler]

Finally!

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-gepard-anti-aircraft-systems-now-in-the-fight

I've long thought that an SPAAG of some sort would make an interesting PC vehicle- it strikes me as a bit more versatile, and less OP- in terms of armament- than an MBT. And what T2ker hasn't run across a Shilka or equivalent on campaign.

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My one issue with any AA is the fact that TWILIGHT2000 really didn't address the radars that many AA Gun Systems & Missile Launchers have installed in them. Without those rules, the GM is left to fumble about trying to figure out what each radar can actually detect.

[swaghauler]

The MK6 Patrol boat is finding its way into the Black Sea. Here's a video on the MK6...

https://youtu.be/1Dxt0XX_330

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here's another presentation from PERUN on the effect of Ukraine on the Russian defense industry...

https://youtu.be/73hBbONvCN0

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here's an easy-to-digest update on the war from June till now.

https://youtu.be/WS0D0X8V6rg

Swag

[Ursus Maior]

My one issue with any AA is the fact that TWILIGHT2000 really didn't address the radars that many AA Gun Systems & Missile Launchers have installed in them. Without those rules, the GM is left to fumble about trying to figure out what each radar can actually detect.

Back in the 80s that was information impossible to come by. And even today with the Gepard SPAAG out of service in the Bundeswehr for 12 years, this is still obscure data and securely guarded data. From what I hear, the source is a former Gepard commander and officer, the latest Gepard could easily detect small drones ot to a couple of kilometers and successfully engage them.

[Ursus Maior]

Finally!

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-gepard-anti-aircraft-systems-now-in-the-fight

It's just incredibly sad our conservatives dumped the Gepards, under the screams of the AA community, and sold them off across the world. This is one hell of a big cat.

[pmulcahy11b]

My one issue with any AA is the fact that TWILIGHT2000 really didn't address the radars that many AA Gun Systems & Missile Launchers have installed in them. Without those rules, the GM is left to fumble about trying to figure out what each radar can actually detect.

That is a problem, but the solution (other than an RF bonus) would range from cumbersome to nightmarish -- radar detection and ranging is incredibly complicated, which is why the first production stealth designs didn't appear until the late 1970s. I've been trying to come up with something coherent for decades.

[The Zappster]

Has any checked if the traveller house rules has anything that can help ?

[Homer]

Everything over and above a simple search radar or ranging radar gets complex quickly. I think GDW took three approaches to simplify things: first, radar/lrf/ballistic computer, etc are rolled into a single modifier; second, remove most air assets from the game due to cannon circumstances; finally, limit availability of complex systems using availability and judgement.

That said, much of AD in the 90s was moving towards networked systems. This included linking forward search and cueing systems into non radar equipped fire units, using bridging data structure to merge the air and AD pictures, and expanding engagement envelopes to include non-air breather threats. Most of this structure is probably destroyed or needing repair by 2000, but allowing certain items to remain could help replicate the search and cue capabilities.

[Raellus]

The convenient thing about SPAAGs in the T2k-verse is that players/Ref's probably won't ever have to figure out/use radar rules, as aerial targets are few and far between by the late stages of the war. However, those auto-cannons are still useful against ground targets. A SPAAG has a good chance of knocking out anything short of a modern MBT.

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[Homer]

Against an MBT their volume of fire would probably have a pretty good chance of getting a suppression or a mission kill by crazing vision blocks, hitting primary sights, destroying exposed portions of FCS (wind sensors, rangefinders), and knocking off antennas and exposed machine guns. The tank and crew will survive, but they may need to fight degraded or pull off for repair. Against anything less they’d be absolutely deadly.

[pmulcahy11b]

Against an MBT their volume of fire would probably have a pretty good chance of getting a suppression or a mission kill by crazing vision blocks, hitting primary sights, destroying exposed portions of FCS (wind sensors, rangefinders), and knocking off antennas and exposed machine guns. The tank and crew will survive, but they may need to fight degraded or pull off for repair. Against anything less they’d be absolutely deadly.

That might again take new rules!

This reminds me the story out of Vietnam about a Cobra crew who needed to stop a PT-76. Unfortunately, they only had HE rockets, which did not penetrate the PT-76. But they kept firing, and the tank was stopped -- not by destruction or a mobility kill, but by the concussion from the HE explosions on the PT-76 killing the crew.

New rule?

[Homer]

I don’t have my rules handy, so I’m winging it. That might be able to be replicated by rolling for hit and location then allowing for judgement on a non-penetrating hit. The 1st Edition rules with their more detailed vehicle damage would probably be easier to work with. Otherwise you’d need to have a copy of janes handy!

Artillery, especially HE/VT, is the same way. Even 60mm mortar fragments can effect an armored vehicle by chopping off antennas, damaging external weapons or sights, shredding external stowage (esp crew gear), etc.

[swaghauler]

That might again take new rules!

This reminds me the story out of Vietnam about a Cobra crew who needed to stop a PT-76. Unfortunately, they only had HE rockets, which did not penetrate the PT-76. But they kept firing, and the tank was stopped -- not by destruction or a mobility kill, but by the concussion from the HE explosions on the PT-76 killing the crew.

New rule?

For overpressure damage in V2.2, I take the Concussion Damage dice and subtract the vehicle's armor protection from that number. If the number is positive, that is the number of D10s you roll for occupant damage. This "blast damage" (like my actual concussion damage) is divided up and applied to ALL the locations with extra damage being applied to specific locations as follows...

Head first
Chest second
Abdomen third
Limbs (start with the arms) last

Personal body armor (other than a bomb suit) DOES NOT work for Concussion Damage.

Vehicle Damage:

I put electronics on the outside lines of my vehicle charts. So you can hit radio antennas, electronics, and optics by rolling that line on my location charts (these resemble the charts used by BATTLETECH the mech game).

[swaghauler]

That is a problem, but the solution (other than an RF bonus) would range from cumbersome to nightmarish -- radar detection and ranging is incredibly complicated, which is why the first production stealth designs didn't appear until the late 1970s. I've been trying to come up with something coherent for decades.

I have been kicking around a chart like my Observation and Spotting Chart (yes I have posted that chart in this forum) where a DETECTION radar would have a Skill Difficulty column for...

Large Aircraft above NOA (Nap of Earth)
Large Aircraft at NOA or small aircraft (drones)
Large Ground Targets
Small Ground Targets

Non-Doppler Radars would give range and bearing (with two units needed for altitude triangulation).

Doppler Radars would give a range, bearing, and altitude. It's hard to believe, but before Doppler Radar (and now ESA) everyone needed two radars scanning to pinpoint exact range and altitude.

In addition to DETECTION RADARS, you'd also have a TARGETING Radar that could direct weapons fire. By the '70s, you could combine BOTH Radar types into one unified system.

[Raellus]

Kind of silly, kind of clever: In this parody mashup, HIMARS, representing Ukraine, makes an appearance on America's Got Talent.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKJw1K3PA8Y

I read that the HIMARS video was created by the same folks that did the Sir David Attenborough BBC Planet Earth parody about the Javelin Missile.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_INS-96zgNE

-

[bash]

I found this video today, it's an American foreign fighter in Ukraine recording his first mission on a helmet mounted GoPro. I found it pretty interesting. Also game-wise I see this as basically the day to day life of T2K characters.

https://youtu.be/5_HupFPE3io

Normal combat footage warnings apply, NSFW etc.

[pmulcahy11b]

The Ukrainians have integrated HARMs onto their MiGs, with mixed success:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SqY9CDsOpvk

[bash]

The Ukrainians have integrated HARMs onto their MiGs, with mixed success:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SqY9CDsOpvk

I have been really amused by coverage about adapting US/NATO systems to Ukraine's equipment. Commentators act as if adapting NATO weapons to WP equipment is some brand new concept no one has ever tried before. Former Soviet satellites have been working to integrate old WP tech and NATO tech for thirty years.

I don't say that to disparage the Ukrainians at all, they obviously have the tech talent to do the work. I'm 100% sure they've gotten a lot of advice from all their Eastern European NATO neighbors about sticking NATO systems on their WP equipment. Between such advice and their own ingenuity they've pulled some impressive feats. I'm just amused at the breathless commentary from YouTubers.

[pmulcahy11b]

One of the interesting items I noticed from the cockpit shots was the use of a Garmin commercial GPS receiver in a jury-rigged mount.

As far as mixing the use of Russian and Western equipment, look to the Indians, who do that on a regular basis. They buy systems from everyone, and mix and match as they see fit.

[swaghauler]

Here's Perun's weekly PowerPoint on the Ukraine War discussing logistics and other issues.

https://youtu.be/ce5TR-qWCk4

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here is Peter Zeihan's take on the strategic goals of the counter-offensive. While I don't always agree with Mr. Zeihan, he does make a lot of valid points and his economic expertise is far beyond my own.

https://youtu.be/Tb3U9Ydiw64

Swag

[kcdusk]

The body go pro footage was a good watch. Even without direct enemy contact, every minute was on edge.

Also, theres been a bit of talk about how far away you can see the enemy (contact ranges) on the FL site. And this video showed me, that even if you can see a T-62 tank at range 500m. Whose is it? Ours (Ukraine) or theirs (Russian). My main point being sometimes range is short, and even then identifying friend or foe can be hard.

[Raellus]

And this video showed me, that even if you can see a T-62 tank at range 500m. Whose is it? Ours (Ukraine) or theirs (Russian). My main point being sometimes range is short, and even then identifying friend or foe can be hard.

Especially when both sides are using the same gear.

Reports out of Ukraine claim that Ukrainian military personnel are claiming to be hot young women on Russian social media platforms. When Russian military personnel in Ukraine respond to said catfishing posts, Ukrainian cyber-war personnel use the geo-location data in the Russian responses to target those troops with artillery and drone strikes.

-

[swaghauler]

The body go pro footage was a good watch. Even without direct enemy contact, every minute was on edge.

Also, theres been a bit of talk about how far away you can see the enemy (contact ranges) on the FL site. And this video showed me, that even if you can see a T-62 tank at range 500m. Whose is it? Ours (Ukraine) or theirs (Russian). My main point being sometimes range is short, and even then identifying friend or foe can be hard.

This is exactly why I broke my Observation & Spotting Chart (before someone DMs me and asks, YES it is posted on this website) in a chance to spot people and a chance to spot vehicles by "range bands" [for the spotting chance]. Keep in mind that SPOTTING and IDENTIFYING are two separate tasks.

[Raellus]

So Ukraine's counteroffensive seems to be going quite well, especially in the northeast. Russia's suffered another major defeat. I'm not ready to count Russia out yet, but Ukraine's recent successes are worth celebrating.

What's next? I saw one breathless headline today suggesting that Putin's days in power are numbered. That's rather sanguine, and probably naively hopeful.

I'm quite surprised that I haven't seen any dire predictions of what an increasingly humiliated and desperate Putin might do in the coming days and weeks. In the first few weeks of the war, as the Russian drive on Kiev sputtered to a halt, a lot of news outlets presented the possibility that Putin might resort to tactical nukes to regain momentum and achieve his strategic goals. As more Western aid appeared in Ukraine, Putin rattled his nuclear sabre.

At present, it seems like no one's particularly worried about potential use of nuclear weapons anymore. It seems to me that if Putin were ever to authorize/order tactical nuclear strikes, it would be now, with Ukrainian forces at the border in the northeast. Is Putin going to gracefully accept defeat? He missed his opportunity to declare victory a couple of months ago. Any such declaration now would ring hollow, and a strategic withdrawal or peace overture would appear to signal defeat. That doesn't strike me as Putin's style at all.

What do you think the coming weeks will bring?

-

[Tegyrius]

Has Putin made many public appearances lately? The past months have seen repeated speculation that he's in poor health, with photos over the summer seeming to bear that out. His reported COVID-19 paranoia also has kept his face-to-face contact with advisors and staff rather circumscribed.

- C.

[Heffe]

I think any predictions being made right now in this regard would be little more than guesswork, all being predicated on the idea of whether or not Putin is behaving as a rational actor any longer.

In my opinion, it's only a matter of time until Kherson falls back into Ukrainian hands - the Russians there are surely running short on fuel and ammunition, with no way to resupply other than by hand across the Antonivka bridge. When they're dry on ammo, I don't see them as having much other choice than to retreat across the bridge or surrender, leaving their heavy equipment behind.

As for Putin, how will he take the situation in the northeast and in Kherson when the above scenario comes to pass? If he's behaving as a rational actor, he'll sue for peace. He'll recognize that the war has failed, his military will take a generation to rebuild, and that the entire endeavor was a waste of time and resources. He'll try to keep the Donbas region through negotiations, though I think that by now he's lost the chance to hold onto the Crimean Peninsula.

If Putin isn't a rational actor (anymore) or is getting super desperate because his own life is on the line? I think there's a lot of things he might try, including but not limited to targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure (power plants, water processing facilities, etc), calling up the Russian reserves, instituting a draft, etc. I don't think he'd actually resort to using nukes, but so much depends on how far gone he is.

As for him potentially targeting civilian infrastructure, Russia wants people to support Russia. If he starts going after power plants just as winter is starting, he'll lose the possibility of holding Donbas as the people there will see him for the monster he is. As for the draft or calling up reserves, it's clear that his equipment stocks are on the path to depletion, which means any reserves would likely just be light infantry. Does he risk sacrificing a ton of Russians into a meat grinder and risk losing what popular support he has in Russia? I don't think he'd want to go that route either, but again, who knows?

[Targan]

As for the draft or calling up reserves, it's clear that his equipment stocks are on the path to depletion, which means any reserves would likely just be light infantry. Does he risk sacrificing a ton of Russians into a meat grinder and risk losing what popular support he has in Russia? I don't think he'd want to go that route either, but again, who knows?

Russian leaders sending vast waves of young Russian soldiers to their doom is standard operating procedure though, isn't it? At least for the last couple of centuries.

[Heffe]

Russian leaders sending vast waves of young Russian soldiers to their doom is standard operating procedure though, isn't it? At least for the last couple of centuries.

It certainly is, and maybe we’ll see it again? I genuinely don’t know the internal situation in Russia right now. I know a large portion of the population aren’t fans of Putin, and surely a lot of them are willing to protest. The old timers and more conservative elements of the population though? I don’t know if they’d support a draft or not. And how heavy a hand would Putin take with his own people if the protesting gets bad? Just a lot of unknowns there.

[Rainbow Six]

I'm quite surprised that I haven't seen any dire predictions of what an increasingly humiliated and desperate Putin might do in the coming days and weeks. In the first few weeks of the war, as the Russian drive on Kiev sputtered to a halt, a lot of news outlets presented the possibility that Putin might resort to tactical nukes to regain momentum and achieve his strategic goals. As more Western aid appeared in Ukraine, Putin rattled his nuclear sabre.

At present, it seems like no one's particularly worried about potential use of nuclear weapons anymore.
-

The Times carried an article on the above subjects on Friday

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/will-putin-use-nuclear-weapons-these-are-his-options-t7k2vsgc5

I'm not sure if you'll be able to view it as I think it's behind a paywall (I have a subscription and checking without logging in would suggest you can't but it may be different outside the UK). Options mentioned in the article were

1. Detonate a nuclear weapon over the Black Sea as a demonstration of intent and see what happens

2. Intensified conventional attacks on major population centres, e.g. Kyiv

3. Blow up the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant

4. Tactical nuclear attack on Ukrainian armed forces

[bash]

The Times carried an article on the above subjects on Friday

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/will-putin-use-nuclear-weapons-these-are-his-options-t7k2vsgc5

I'm not sure if you'll be able to view it as I think it's behind a paywall (I have a subscription and checking without logging in would suggest you can't but it may be different outside the UK). Options mentioned in the article were

1. Detonate a nuclear weapon over the Black Sea as a demonstration of intent and see what happens

2. Intensified conventional attacks on major population centres, e.g. Kyiv

3. Blow up the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant

4. Tactical nuclear attack on Ukrainian armed forces

The problem with rattling a nuclear saber is it's only scary once unless you actually use a nuke. After nothing happened after Putin's nuclear talk back in February I think it's apparent he has no intention of ever using nukes.


Putin has a decent enough lock on power within Russia. Even if Russia pulled out of Ukraine tomorrow the internal spin would just say "Mission Accomplishski" and the majority inside Russia would cheer.
People outside of Russia don't care about Russia. Russia only is concerning to some ex-Soviet satellites that are now backed up by NATO. Russia won't invade them. Russia is also ruined economically and militarily for decades now. Putin will be gone before they're able to threaten anyone again.
The US likely has a pretty good handle on Russia's nuclear arsenal and isn't worried about them using it. Like the rest of Russian equipment it's been rotting since the 90s. Hydrogen bombs need constant maintenance (tritium expires) lest they become just low yield fission bombs.
Putin nuking anyone runs a very real risk one of several nuclear armed powers says "screw it" and drops a ground burst on whatever dacha he spends the most time at. The rest of the world would probably give that country a mulligan and a sternly worded letter of thanks.

[Raellus]

The problem with rattling a nuclear saber is it's only scary once unless you actually use a nuke. After nothing happened after Putin's nuclear talk back in February I think it's apparent he has no intention of ever using nukes.

So if a dictator doesn't immediately follow through on a threat, that threat should no longer be taken seriously?

That seems like a very risky maxim to follow.

The saber rattling continues, with both sides issuing veiled threats.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-biden-warns-putin-on-nuke-use



Putin has a decent enough lock on power within Russia. Even if Russia pulled out of Ukraine tomorrow the internal spin would just say "Mission Accomplishski" and the majority inside Russia would cheer.
People outside of Russia don't care about Russia. Russia only is concerning to some ex-Soviet satellites that are now backed up by NATO. Russia won't invade them. Russia is also ruined economically and militarily for decades now. Putin will be gone before they're able to threaten anyone again.
The US likely has a pretty good handle on Russia's nuclear arsenal and isn't worried about them using it. Like the rest of Russian equipment it's been rotting since the 90s. Hydrogen bombs need constant maintenance (tritium expires) lest they become just low yield fission bombs.
Putin nuking anyone runs a very real risk one of several nuclear armed powers says "screw it" and drops a ground burst on whatever dacha he spends the most time at. The rest of the world would probably give that country a mulligan and a sternly worded letter of thanks.


1. You might be right. Putin's control of information within Russia is pretty tight.

2. Sweden and Finland don't seem to agree with that assessment; Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Moldova definitely don't. Russia's invasion of Ukraine turned what's been a looming threat for the past 20 years or so into a present-day reality for former Soviet republics no longer aligned with the Russian Federation. To say that Putin wouldn't launch a military action against another former SSR flies in the face events since February of this year. That said, can Russia invade another SSR, given it's massive recent losses in Ukraine? Probably not.

3. The US isn't worried about Russia's nuclear arsenal? Where did that conclusion come from? I haven't come across that assessment from any reputable military analyst, so if you have a reliable source that back's that up, I'd be very interested to see it.

4. Would Russia allow a decapitation nuclear strike on its own soil, without, at the very least, retaliating in kind? That's a huge gamble.

-

[bash]

So if a dictator doesn't immediately follow through on a threat, that threat should no longer be taken seriously?

That seems like a very risky maxim to follow.

The saber rattling continues, with both sides issuing veiled threats.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-biden-warns-putin-on-nuke-use


Launching nuclear attacks takes preparation, if for no other reason than to make sure your forces can absorb a retaliation. Russia hasn't changed their posture to one that is preparing for nuclear retaliation. So the threats (to me) ring pretty hollow.



2. Sweden and Finland don't seem to agree with that assessment; Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Moldova definitely don't. Russia's invasion of Ukraine turned what's been a looming threat for the past 20 years or so into a present-day reality for former Soviet republics no longer aligned with the Russian Federation. To say that Putin wouldn't launch a military action against another former SSR flies in the face events since February of this year. That said, can Russia invade another SSR, given it's massive recent losses in Ukraine? Probably not.


Russia won't attack another former SSR even if they could specifically because they're in NATO. They wouldn't have moved on Ukraine if they were a NATO member, likely not even if they were just an EU member. The EU is as much a defense pact as a trade pact. Sweden and Finland are joining NATO because membership guarantees safety from Russian aggression.



3. The US isn't worried about Russia's nuclear arsenal? Where did that conclusion come from? I haven't come across that assessment from any reputable military analyst, so if you have a reliable source that back's that up, I'd be very interested to see it.


I should clarify my assertion to not suggest the US isn't concerned with Russia's nuclear arsenal to instead say they're not so worried that Russia has the devastating first strike capability they might have had forty years ago. It costs a lot of money to maintain nuclear weapons. We spend just on our nukes about what Russia spends on their entire military. The level of support given to Ukraine, despite nuclear threats from Putin, infers NATO's intelligence says he's not about to use nukes anywhere.



4. Would Russia allow a decapitation nuclear strike on its own soil, without, at the very least, retaliating in kind? That's a huge gamble.

-
My point is that if Putin decided to use nukes in Ukraine there would be no political fig lead to hide behind. He personally doesn't want to open the can of nuclear works because he knows he's unlikely to personally live to regret it. With Putin gone how much of the leadership wants to follow him in a suicide pact?

[Raellus]

Thanks for clarifying. For what it's worth, I agree with you on most points.

Launching nuclear attacks takes preparation, if for no other reason than to make sure your forces can absorb a retaliation. Russia hasn't changed their posture to one that is preparing for nuclear retaliation. So the threats (to me) ring pretty hollow.

To clarify my counter-point, I don't think, at this stage, anyone in places of power is overly concerned about a Russian strategic nuclear attack on Ukraine or any NATO member nation. The concern at present seems to be about Russian use of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil.

Battlefield tactical nukes require much less preparation than strategic nuclear weapons do. They're reasonably easy to deploy and conceal, and launch-warning is minimal. AFAIK, there's no way to differentiate between the release of a nuclear-armed air-launched missile and a conventional one (of which the Russians have used hundreds so far). The Russians have a sizeable arsenal of tactical weapons, some of them of quite recent vintage, with several means of delivery at their disposal.

If Putin decides to avoid a major operational/strategic defeat in Ukraine by the application of one or more TBNs, would he be particularly concerned about retaliation in kind? Probably not. Ukraine is not a NATO member, so NATO would not be obligated to respond directly, or with nuclear weapons. NATO's not going to nuke Russian forces on de jure ally Ukraine's home soil, and it's probably not going to risk an escalation with Russia by nuking Russian troop concentrations on Russian soil. Putin's a cunning fellow, and we all know he's willing to take big risks to achieve his geo-political goals. Who, in the Russian hierarchy, is likely to stop him? At this point, he's surrounded by yes-men. That's a real worry.

What's the red line for Putin? No one knows, but I think some analysts believe that any threat to Putin's grip on power in Russia, a particularly destructive attack on Russian soil, or the impending loss of Russian territory (read: Crimea), could provoke a [tactical] nuclear response. Desperate people, take desperate measures.

A not un-reasonable fear is that if and when the Pandora's box of tactical nuclear weapon use is reopened, things could quickly spiral out of control. The USA does not have an established post-Cold War nuclear doctrine/strategy, so there's no playbook.

-

[bash]

Thanks for clarifying. For what it's worth, I agree with you on most points.



To clarify my counter-point, I don't think, at this stage, anyone in places of power is overly concerned about a Russian strategic nuclear attack on Ukraine or any NATO member nation. The concern at present seems to be about Russian use of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil.

Battlefield tactical nukes require much less preparation than strategic nuclear weapons do. They're reasonably easy to deploy and conceal, and launch-warning is minimal. AFAIK, there's no way to differentiate between the release of a nuclear-armed air-launched missile and a conventional one (of which the Russians have used hundreds so far). The Russians have a sizeable arsenal of tactical weapons, some of them of quite recent vintage, with several means of delivery at their disposal.

If Putin decides to avoid a major operational/strategic defeat in Ukraine by the application of one or more TBNs, would he be particularly concerned about retaliation in kind? Probably not. Ukraine is not a NATO member, so NATO would not be obligated to respond directly, or with nuclear weapons. NATO's not going to nuke Russian forces on de jure ally Ukraine's home soil, and it's probably not going to risk an escalation with Russia by nuking Russian troop concentrations on Russian soil. Putin's a cunning fellow, and we all know he's willing to take big risks to achieve his geo-political goals. Who, in the Russian hierarchy, is likely to stop him? At this point, he's surrounded by yes-men. That's a real worry.

What's the red line for Putin? No one knows, but I think some analysts believe that any threat to Putin's grip on power in Russia, a particularly destructive attack on Russian soil, or the impending loss of Russian territory (read: Crimea), could provoke a [tactical] nuclear response. Desperate people, take desperate measures.

A not un-reasonable fear is that if and when the Pandora's box of tactical nuclear weapon use is reopened, things could quickly spiral out of control. The USA does not have an established post-Cold War nuclear doctrine/strategy, so there's no playbook.

-

TBNs are definitely easier to deploy than strategic weapons but the posture of the Russian forces would still need to change. They would need to distribute MOPP gear to their forces and prep border cities (on the Russian side) for the inevitable literal fallout. As we've seen Russian OpSec is terrible so any such preparations would be broadcast on Telegram immediately.

But in terms of danger to Russia, them using even a single TBN would likely see "the west" taking the gloves off for assistance to Ukraine. I would imagine a naval blockade and no-fly zone would be the minimum response. There would also be little reason not to give Ukraine long range weapons.

If Russia pulled out of Ukraine tomorrow there's a number of countries that would drop sanctions against them by the end of the week. While the lower classes in Russia are screwed for the next few decades the oligarchs would be back on their yachts by October.

Even these Russia agnostic (if not friendly) countries would not be so forgiving if Russia used nukes in Ukraine. This would mean the post-war economic pain would affect Putin and the oligarchs.

The threat of being in range of Ukrainian weapons and a total destruction of their wealth might finally be enough to turn the Russian ruling class against Putin. I think he's well aware as long as he only inflicts pain on poor Russians and minorities he doesn't need to worry about falling out of a window onto some bullets.

[Heffe]

Lot of rumors today about Putin preparing for a mobilization of some kind. We'll see how much the Russian people tolerate, but this seems like a serious gambit for him if true.

[Vespers War]

In the "that belongs in a museum" category and the "hey Paul, I found something obscure that's not on your site" category, Slovenia is transferring the remaining 28 of its M-55S tanks to Ukraine. What's the M-55S? It's a T-55. A heavily, heavily upgraded T-55.

First, replace the D-10T with a British L7 105mm gun with 36 rounds of ammunition. Then add Super Blazer ERA to the tank. Give the gunner a two-axis stabilized sight with a laser rangefinder, and give the commander a similar sight with hunter-killer capability. Give the driver a combined day/night periscope. Add a laser detector that's linked to the smoke launchers so they can be set to automatically obscure the tank if it's lased. While you're at it, modernize the radio and the running gear, and increase the engine's horsepower from 520 to 600. And for all of that, it gains only two tonnes in weight.

[Targan]

It's an exciting time for Ukraine, with Russia commencing deliveries of T-90M MBTs to Ukrainian forces.

[bash]

It's an exciting time for Ukraine, with Russia commencing deliveries of T-90M MBTs to Ukrainian forces.

Russia has been Ukraine's #1 arms supplier in the war. Discount tanks, never fired, only dropped once.

[swaghauler]

Here is Perun's update from last week

www.youtube.com/watch?v=B93tLs39pQo&featui

[swaghauler]

This one is DEFINATELY worth watching guys. The Chieftain and Perun are teaming up for this presentation.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNLTE75B0Os&feature

[swaghauler]

Here's an update from the kings & Generals channel. I like the movement of the units to give us a clearer idea of just how the battles are progressing so I'm posting this here. Keep in mind, these guys give monthly updates so you can go back and watch the entire war as a series of maneuvers from this channel's perspective.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=2hZoQ4xebGw&feature

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here is a "suicide UAV" for the Ukrainian Navy using a Starlink receiver, a commercial marine thermal imager, and a kayak or canoe.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8CeJ3QUeHs&feature

Swag

[Raellus]

A brief piece on the growing possibility of Russia using a battlefield tactical nuke in Ukraine.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/the-looming-worry-of-russia-using-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine

The gist of it is, Russia probably won't use nuclear weapons to try to win the war (i.e. defeat the UAF)- although that's still a possible Russian goal. Instead, Putin might employ tac-nukes in an effort to quickly "freeze the conflict", and secure a stronger position at the bargaining table.

-

[swaghauler]

Here's another update with a tactical display of Ukraine's offensive.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=gJRjKuss_Co&feature=sh

Swag

[swaghauler]

A brief piece on the growing possibility of Russia using a battlefield tactical nuke in Ukraine.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/the-looming-worry-of-russia-using-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine

The gist of it is, Russia probably won't use nuclear weapons to try to win the war (i.e. defeat the UAF)- although that's still a possible Russian goal. Instead, Putin might employ tac-nukes in an effort to quickly "freeze the conflict", and secure a stronger position at the bargaining table.

-

I highly doubt Russia will use a nuke. The UN and international community would come down on Putin so hard that it would destroy Russia as a member of the international community. In addition, any strike on Ukrainian soil becomes Russia's problem if she wins. The fallout would also be an issue and Russia's troops don't even have basic kit let alone MOPP gear.

That being said, I worry more about a non-persistent chemical weapon. The effects of such a weapon would be gone in just a few days and chemical defense is much easier to deal with than radiological defense. There are also indicators in the international community based on their use in places like Syria that the UN members consider them "less of a sin" than a nuke. Putler also has a history with them. During the Second Battle Of Grozny, he asked about using Chemical Weapons but was told the "political fallout" would be too great. So the Chechens got free cremations instead. Since Russia is already under sanctions, the use of a non-persistent agent really wouldn't harm her economically. I don't think that they would have much impact tactically, but I see them used as a "terror tool" to break Ukrainian civilian morale.

[Heffe]

Looks like Lyman is now encircled, along with the 208th Separate "Cossack" Motorized Rifle Regiment (LPR) and the pro-Russian Kuban Regiment (militia). Curious to see what this does to already terrible Russian morale in the theater.

[swaghauler]

I guess this Russian "demining robot" did technically clear those mines.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=U4ynRbsr8_Y&feature=

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here's Perun's take on mobilization. As an Australian logistics expert (I find that just a little ironic), he really does put the Russian mobilization into perspective. I love all the Australians in the comments talking about annexing NZ too. I didn't know the Aussies were so into planning on "absorbing" the Kiwis. :tank:

https://youtube.com/watch?v=6hXnQNU8ANo&feature=

Swag

[swaghauler]

As many of you know, I have always espoused a "come as you are" war for Twilight2000 based upon a much shorter time frame. As we enter the 6th month of the War In Ukraine, it looks like my assumptions about material expenditure and the worldwide adoption of "Lean Manufacturing" are coming true. Russia is now issuing T62s to her new MRDs. Here's an attempt to count Russia's remaining tank reserves.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=ZNNoaRp5lz0&feature=

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here's Laserpig's take on Russia's tank forces.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=kT_ljkO3adY&feature=

I'd also recommend his video on the Moskva's sinking as it has some seriously scary details about Moskva's condition, including the lack of firefighting gear and the fact that her SAM systems DIDN'T WORK and the Russians KNEW IT!

Swag.

[bash]

I'd also recommend his video on the Moskva's sinking as it has some seriously scary details about Moskva's condition, including the lack of firefighting gear and the fact that her SAM systems DIDN'T WORK and the Russians KNEW IT!


I guess to be fair to the Russians, their chosen method for firefighting on the Moskva did eventually put out the fires.

[pmulcahy11b]

I guess to be fair to the Russians, their chosen method for firefighting on the Moskva did eventually put out the fires.

Did they put out the fires by letting them burn to the waterline? :D

[bash]

Did they put out the fires by letting them burn to the waterline? :D

They just promoted the cruiser to single-use submarine. All the fires went out. The same tactic also solved their air defense problem. Let's see a Bayraktar target the Moskva now!

[Vespers War]

As many of you know, I have always espoused a "come as you are" war for Twilight2000 based upon a much shorter time frame. As we enter the 6th month of the War In Ukraine, it looks like my assumptions about material expenditure and the worldwide adoption of "Lean Manufacturing" are coming true. Russia is now issuing T62s to her new MRDs. Here's an attempt to count Russia's remaining tank reserves.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=ZNNoaRp5lz0&feature=

Swag

I'm still a little surprised they haven't tried to swap T-62s for the newer tanks of their puppets in Donetsk and Luhansk. The T-62 has a different caliber gun from everything else Russia uses, complicating logistics that Russia already has problems with, and with no autoloader it needs an extra crewmember, exacerbating Russia's manpower shortages.

Even Ukraine hasn't reactivated their ~300 T-62, sticking to the T-64, T-72, and T-80/84 from domestic stocks (and donations), along with captured T-90 and donated PT-91 and M-55S.

[swaghauler]

I'm still a little surprised they haven't tried to swap T-62s for the newer tanks of their puppets in Donetsk and Luhansk. The T-62 has a different caliber gun from everything else Russia uses, complicating logistics that Russia already has problems with, and with no autoloader it needs an extra crewmember, exacerbating Russia's manpower shortages.

Even Ukraine hasn't reactivated their ~300 T-62, sticking to the T-64, T-72, and T-80/84 from domestic stocks (and donations), along with captured T-90 and donated PT-91 and M-55S.

As far as I've seen in the news, both Republics are using T62s, just like Syria has been getting. In fact, when I first saw them (T62s), I thought they were DPR tanks until they showed up with Russian units that appeared in late August. I do have a theory though. I'm wondering if they aren't using T62s because they bought ammo from North Korea. NK has only a handful of T72s with the 125mm, but they have THOUSANDS of T62s. Maybe Russia is "buying time" with untrained conscripts and second-line tanks until they can get their T72s refurbished and rearmed?

Why this theory? Multiple sources inside Russia as well as open source video intel suggest that up to 1,000 T72s have been pulled from mothballs and are being "reconditioned" by Russia at her tank factories. T90 production has stopped (probably because of sanctions). If sources are correct, Russia has lost HALF of its tank force in Ukraine to everything from casualties to simple breakdowns. Heavy logistical supply is pretty suspect according to POWs who have been interviewed and many tanks are deploying with less than HALF of a combat load of ammo. Could Russia rebuild its force structure? I don't see why not. There are something like 3k "deadlined" T72s and another 3k that are basically scrap at this point. Using the scrap to relife the deadlined units seems like a no-brainer to me.

[swaghauler]

I'm still a little surprised they haven't tried to swap T-62s for the newer tanks of their puppets in Donetsk and Luhansk. The T-62 has a different caliber gun from everything else Russia uses, complicating logistics that Russia already has problems with, and with no autoloader it needs an extra crewmember, exacerbating Russia's manpower shortages.

Even Ukraine hasn't reactivated their ~300 T-62, sticking to the T-64, T-72, and T-80/84 from domestic stocks (and donations), along with captured T-90 and donated PT-91 and M-55S.

I heard that there was some discussion about pulling the 300+ T62s out of Ukraine and rebarreling them with the 105mm and new fire controls. The T55S tanks are already equipped with NATO 105mm cannon, so that would allow new units to transition to NATO tank ammo without having to pull out and retrain tank crews on NATO equipment. Ukraine really wants Leopard II though.

[Vespers War]

As far as I've seen in the news, both Republics are using T62s, just like Syria has been getting. In fact, when I first saw them (T62s), I thought they were DPR tanks until they showed up with Russian units that appeared in late August. I do have a theory though. I'm wondering if they aren't using T62s because they bought ammo from North Korea. NK has only a handful of T72s with the 125mm, but they have THOUSANDS of T62s. Maybe Russia is "buying time" with untrained conscripts and second-line tanks until they can get their T72s refurbished and rearmed?

Why this theory? Multiple sources inside Russia as well as open source video intel suggest that up to 1,000 T72s have been pulled from mothballs and are being "reconditioned" by Russia at her tank factories. T90 production has stopped (probably because of sanctions). If sources are correct, Russia has lost HALF of its tank force in Ukraine to everything from casualties to simple breakdowns. Heavy logistical supply is pretty suspect according to POWs who have been interviewed and many tanks are deploying with less than HALF of a combat load of ammo. Could Russia rebuild its force structure? I don't see why not. There are something like 3k "deadlined" T72s and another 3k that are basically scrap at this point. Using the scrap to relife the deadlined units seems like a no-brainer to me.

That makes some sense, although North Korea's more split on ammunition caliber than a raw reading of their tank numbers would suggest. They've upgraded some T-62 to the 125mm (Chonma-ho V), while the Pokpung-ho has both 115mm and 125mm variants and the Songun-ho is 125mm only.

For the Ukrainian T-62, an upgrade to 120mm might be more effective overall. Egypt did that with the RO-120 Mark III, which uses an FSUE-developed 120mm gun that's compatible with NATO standard ammunition. A decent modern ERA would probably also be helpful, given that the T-62 is modestly armored at best and only Kontakt-1 was adapted to it. The M-55S is the only thing they've received that uses the 105mm round, and I doubt it will remain in Ukrainian service for long, given its obsolescence in other tank forces. With only 28 vehicles using that caliber, there's not much momentum in its favor.

[bash]

Why this theory? Multiple sources inside Russia as well as open source video intel suggest that up to 1,000 T72s have been pulled from mothballs and are being "reconditioned" by Russia at her tank factories. T90 production has stopped (probably because of sanctions). If sources are correct, Russia has lost HALF of its tank force in Ukraine to everything from casualties to simple breakdowns. Heavy logistical supply is pretty suspect according to POWs who have been interviewed and many tanks are deploying with less than HALF of a combat load of ammo. Could Russia rebuild its force structure? I don't see why not. There are something like 3k "deadlined" T72s and another 3k that are basically scrap at this point. Using the scrap to relife the deadlined units seems like a no-brainer to me.

I don't doubt Russia will try refurbishing their deadlines T-72s but it will be very interesting to see how well they actually perform. Between sanctions and thirty years of grift I'd bet those warehoused T-72s are going to lack optics, radios, and basically anything resembling modern kit. Combined with their piss poor combined arms it seems like they'll just be fodder for St. Javelin.

Russia has lost thousands of tanks that were supposedly mission capable and used by supposedly capable units. More tanks aren't going to do much good if they're used as poorly as all the ones they've already lost. We're however many months into their three day special operation and Russia still hasn't figured out pallets, fork lifts, or combined arms.

I hope Ukraine's booster club keeps up with the ATGMs, they've done a great job blunting Russia's tank advantage thus far.

[Heffe]

For T-62s, a Javelin seems like a bit of an overkill. Just drop some 40mm HEDP on the top of the turret from a tiny quad-drone and call it a day.

[Raellus]

For T-62s, a Javelin seems like a bit of an overkill. Just drop some 40mm HEDP on the top of the turret from a tiny quad-drone and call it a day.

Especially early on in the war, I used to get rather frustrated with the "wasting" of Javelins on BTRs, BMPs, and other light AFVs. I've even see video of them being used against soft-skinned trucks. Seems like a misuse of a very expensive weapon system to me- but that's easy for me to say from behind the screen of a my very distant-from-the-battlefield, very safe home computer. As long as we can keep making/shipping Ukraine said Javelins, whatevs, right?

-

[Vespers War]

Especially early on in the war, I used to get rather frustrated with the "wasting" of Javelins on BTRs, BMPs, and other light AFVs. I've even see video of them being used against soft-skinned trucks. Seems like a misuse of a very expensive weapon system to me- but that's easy for me to say from behind the screen of a my very distant-from-the-battlefield, very safe home computer. As long as we can keep making/shipping Ukraine said Javelins, whatevs, right?

-

I also think the math's not quite that simple. Is the cost of a Javelin greater than a light armored vehicle plus the value of any Ukrainian lives saved plus the cost to Russia to replace any crew or passengers lost? It's not just the hardware cost that needs to be evaluated, but the wetware cost as well.

[Raellus]

I also think the math's not quite that simple. Is the cost of a Javelin greater than a light armored vehicle plus the value of any Ukrainian lives saved plus the cost to Russia to replace any crew or passengers lost? It's not just the hardware cost that needs to be evaluated, but the wetware cost as well.

That's a good point and, you're right, I wasn't thinking about it in those terms. That said, it still seems a bit wasteful when a less modern, capable, and expensive anti-armor weapon system could achieve the same ends v. light AFVs and soft-skins. My concern was that, if Javelins are expended on the afore-mentioned types of vehicles, they might not be available to tackle the Russians' better-protected, heavier AFVs (like MBTs). Apparently, though, my worry was ill-founded, given Russias' staggering MBT losses to date.

-

[pmulcahy11b]

There is a small, nagging part of my mind that's saying that the Russians may be retreating so they can deploy a nuke. Hopefully its just the paranoia part of my illness trying to get out.

[bash]

There is a small, nagging part of my mind that's saying that the Russians may be retreating so they can deploy a nuke. Hopefully its just the paranoia part of my illness trying to get out.

Nuking somewhere around Kherson would make life in Crimea difficult and may very well drop fallout on all the dachas on the eastern coast of the Black Sea including Putin's mansion. Nuking around Kharkiv is similarly problematic.

In fact pretty much anywhere they nukes in Ukraine would end up dropping fallout on Russia.

[Heffe]

Same here with regard to seeing such an expensive weapon wasted on a truck. But as you say, if it's scoring kills then it's scoring kills. I suppose the good news is that they'll at least have options with the T-62.

As an aside, this whole endeavor tells us a great deal about how fast ATGM stocks would be depleted in the Twilight War. Soldiers clearly won't save the expensive gear for the expensive targets, and will instead target whatever they can.

[pmulcahy11b]

Nuking somewhere around Kherson would make life in Crimea difficult and may very well drop fallout on all the dachas on the eastern coast of the Black Sea including Putin's mansion. Nuking around Kharkiv is similarly problematic.

In fact pretty much anywhere they nukes in Ukraine would end up dropping fallout on Russia.

Hitler and his generals knew better than to use weapons of mass destruction (the ones they had at the time), so hopefully Putin and his generals know better as well.

[pmulcahy11b]

Same here with regard to seeing such an expensive weapon wasted on a truck. But as you say, if it's scoring kills then it's scoring kills. I suppose the good news is that they'll at least have options with the T-62.


I guess whether a truck is a worthwhile ATGM target depends on what is in the truck.

[swaghauler]

Here's a report from DW news about the bombing of the Kursk Bridge to Crimea.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=MajtcfaAaZk&feature=

Swag

[bash]

I guess whether a truck is a worthwhile ATGM target depends on what is in the truck.

I think part of the issue with the use of NLAWs and Javelins was they were the only decent long range firepower some Ukrainian units had at that point in the war. A lot of units were defending with few artillery assets so they couldn't call in a fire mission nor did they have CAS or really any air support.

Even if a Javelin is overkill on a truck, Russia's lack of sane logistics actually means a truck is fairly high value compared to other militaries simply because there's so few available. Hitting Russian logistics was high value because it meant their front couldn't expand much past the Russian border. It also limits opportunities for break throughs since there's not enough fuel for the advance.

[swaghauler]

I'm still wondering about the truck bomb angle. There are control points at each end of the bridge that scan for HAZMAT and explosives (we do that here in the US too). So how did the truck skirt these checks?

The explosion has a large volume of fire (more than ANFO/C4 produces) which looks like a napalm or fuel-air type of explosive. So why did the chemical sniffers at the checkpoint not detect those?

How were the box rails on that bridge section cut by that blast so cleanly (the section dropped intact)?

I do have some demo training, but I'm neither a combat engineer nor EOD. But that explosion looks like a burning charge combined with some type of cutting charge. A combination of differing explosives from different blast points/locations maybe?

[Raellus]

The report on War Zone indicates that train cars on the bridge are burning, so perhaps whatever generated the explosion managed to detonate whatever the train cars were carrying (fuel, most likely)?

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/explosion-rocks-russias-prized-kerch-strait-bridge-leading-to-crimea

-

[swaghauler]

The report on War Zone indicates that train cars on the bridge are burning, so perhaps whatever generated the explosion managed to detonate whatever the train cars were carrying (fuel, most likely)?

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/explosion-rocks-russias-prized-kerch-strait-bridge-leading-to-crimea

-

Everything's on the table but I was watching this video by Denis and now I have even more questions!

https://youtube.com/watch?v=Zhe0xpk_qTw&feature=

Some questions I now have...

How did the fallen road deck survive the blast without even being blackened or the paint being burned off?

Why did the road deck drop intact with even the guardrails intact if a truck detonated right next to those guardrails?

Why does the blast look "directional" from the sea instead of "up" from the road deck?

How did the driver's *body survive the blast and follow-on inferno if he was at "ground zero" for the blast? *Russia claims they recovered the driver and two other motorists from the water.

[bash]

Guys, it's no mystery. Just like the Saky airbase in Crimea and all those exploding ammo depots: it's just careless soldiers flicking cigarettes. I mean bridges blow up all the time! It was bound to happen. I think in one of the videos you can see the cigarette butt land right before the explosion.

[swaghauler]

My weekly guilt pleasure, PERUN has posted his weekly PowerPoint featuring retired General Ben Hodges. I'm torn between who has the better sarcastic humor, Perun or Drach. I think Drach still beats Perun by a hair...

https://youtube.com/watch?v=RWq-ngg7JC8&features=

Swag

[swaghauler]

Guys, it's no mystery. Just like the Saky airbase in Crimea and all those exploding ammo depots: it's just careless soldiers flicking cigarettes. I mean bridges blow up all the time! It was bound to happen. I think in one of the videos you can see the cigarette butt land right before the explosion.

LoL!:rolleyes:

[swaghauler]

LoL!:rolleyes:

I guess there are knuckleheads on both sides of the fight though...

https://youtube.com/watch?v=AUUZ6pcu-Ig?feature=share

The Russians just need someone like AC to keep them focused:

https://youtube.com/watch?v=3DxgkUBo44M&feature=s

[Vespers War]

Same here with regard to seeing such an expensive weapon wasted on a truck. But as you say, if it's scoring kills then it's scoring kills. I suppose the good news is that they'll at least have options with the T-62.

As an aside, this whole endeavor tells us a great deal about how fast ATGM stocks would be depleted in the Twilight War. Soldiers clearly won't save the expensive gear for the expensive targets, and will instead target whatever they can.

This would also depend on how the ATGMs were issued. The AT4 and SMAW would likely see wider issue than Javelin in "typical" Twilight War timelines (or Dragon for the earlier timeline, since Javelin wasn't introduced until 1996 and Dragon remained in service until 2001). An alternate for AT4/SMAW would be the Viper (https://forum.juhlin.com/showpost.php?p=93019&postcount=452) rocket that was canceled in 1983 in the real-world timeline but might have been introduced if GD had any cost-control talent.

For Dragon, it had been 1 launcher per infantry squad in the 80s, but in the 90s that got shuffled. Mechanized infantry had 2 launchers per squad, while light infantry had 6 launchers per company and Rangers had 3 per company. Marines had a dedicated platoon of 32 launchers per battalion, divided into 4 sections of 4 squads of 2 teams each. The ideal when Viper was under development was that everyone who didn't have a Dragon would have a Viper.

[swaghauler]

Sub Brief has posted a video on the Kursk Bridge attack. I think I agree with him based on the totality of the evidence.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=9tQ1jYbhxNc&feature=

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here's Perun's weekly upload. This week he discusses the air defense issues in Ukraine.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=xCEzEVwOwS4&feature

Swag

[swaghauler]

Here's a 6-month overview of the war by the King & Generals channel.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=4mJT452uDDc&feature=

Swag

[swaghauler]

The Kings and Generals channel has put out a new video.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=S7usqwT-ty4&feature=

Swag

[swaghauler]

Perun discusses the sinking of Moskva.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=YrgCPsock6w&feature=

Swag

[Raellus]

So now Russia's claiming that Ukraine is preparing to employ a dirty bomb. :rolleyes:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russias-growing-dirty-bomb-threat-narrative-is-highly-concerning

What's Putin playing at now? Is Russia preparing to launch a false flag operation? If so, to what ends?

This may a worst-case scenario, but if Russia is planning on employing tac-nukes in Ukraine, this "report" could be a cover story to explain increasing its troops' NBC threat readiness.

-

[Raellus]

NATO-trained ex-Afghan army SOF are apparently being sent, by Iran, to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ex-afghan-commandos-fighting-for-russia-in-ukraine-last-afghan-army-boss

Would said Afghani troops be considered mercenaries?

-

[kcdusk]

Foreign fighters fighting on behalf of a different country. Are they being paid? If so, I'd say yes to mercenaries.

If the soldiers are there representing Iran, still being paid, then i'd say not mercenary.

Different argument now. I always thought of mercenaries as individuals being paid to fight. Not really in large groups, or sent by a country. Being sent by a country makes them "legit" fighters in my view rather than mercenary.

[shrike6]

Hawk gets dusted off for Ukraine.
https://eurasiantimes.com/designed-to-fight-ussr-us-could-now-arm-ukraine-hawk/?amp

[Targan]

Interviews with recent Russian "mobilisation" conscripts suggest they're being issued rusty AKMs that have been poorly stored and in many cases won't fire, but that's a moot point anyway as apparently many of them aren't being issued 7.62 x 39 ammunition. What a total sh*tshow.

[kato13]

they're being issued rusty AKMs that have been poorly stored and in many cases won't fire

Given I have always been under the impression you could bury an AKM in mud and still fire it, this is world class neglect.

[kcdusk]

this is world class neglect.

Neglect of untrained soldiers being sent into battle with no bullets? Or of the AKM?

Apologies for the poor taste in joke. Nobody here is laughing.

[shrike6]

Russia adds former US allies to the mix.

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/11/01/us-trained-afghan-commandos-join-russian-campaign-in-ukraine/

[Vespers War]

The next batch of aid to Ukraine will include 90 upgraded T-72 tanks from Czech Republic, half paid for by the US and half by the Dutch. Reuters claims they'll match the T-72 Avenger upgrade from earlier this year. 26 are supposed to be delivered by the end of 2022, with the remainder being delivered next year.

[Ursus Maior]

The Avenger upgrade looks very good on paper. The Czechs already did well with their own M4 upgrade of the T-72, too. So they know what they're doing and what can be done to a T-72 in general.

[Vespers War]

Avenger is a much less expensive upgrade than M4CZ, based on the allocated funds. Each Avenger is around $1 million to upgrade, while the M4CZ was around $5.2 million when the work was done almost 20 years ago (~$7.5-8 million in today's dollars), and they spent another $47 million a couple years ago replacing obsolete parts in the 30 tanks and 3 recovery vehicles. The outlay to upgrade the 90 T-72 to Avenger status would, as a very rough guess, be about enough to upgrade 12 tanks to T-72M4CZ.

[pmulcahy11b]

Avenger...that's a new one on me. New one to research...

[Ursus Maior]

@Vespers War
As you said, the M4CZ upgrade is around 20 years old, that alone makes prices incomparable, because of inflation on the one side and R&D on the other. What was terribly expansive in the early 2000s is now readily available. Also, if I remember correctly, the M4CZ upgrade included development of a new 125 mm APFSDS round, which would still be useful, but needs no money spent on R&D.

Avenger...that's a new one on me. New one to research...

The Avenger upgrade is very similar to the early upgrade called "Scarab", also done by the company named "Excalibur Army". Avenger T-72s include 196 ERA tiles with an alleged equivalent of 400 mm RHA, modernized night vision for all crew, a new LRF, fully passive night vision without the need for active IR (probably just for the gunner), a thermal sight with a ballistic computer, periscopal optics with laser protection, a new 840 HP power pack, a new digital driver's cockpit, a new fire protection system and new internal and external communications, including an encrypted digital radio.

I also presume, the 12.7 mm NSVT machine gun in a remotely controlled weapon station, which the Scarab fields, would be present with the Avenger, too. Also, the ERA bricks on the turret are hidden under a clean metal bodywork, altering the appearance of the turret significantly. The turret rear and sides, directly adjacent to the frontal ERA protection, are covered with SLAT armor bars, giving at least some protection against handheld AT systems, such as the ubiquitous RPG-7.

So, it's completely refurbished on the inside, including a new power pack, but the main weapon system seems to remain pretty standard.

[Vespers War]

I'm currently unconvinced about the ERA protection amount. That 400mm RHA equivalent would be Kontakt-1 levels of protection. Scarab mounted DYNA, which is closer to 600-650mm RHA equivalent on a T-72M1 hull. They certainly could be using Kontakt-1 if Ukraine requested it for logistical reasons, but Ukraine already imports Kontakt-1 from STV Group in Czech Republic, so either ERA system would require importing replacement tiles.

[Ursus Maior]

Yes, I was surprised about the rather low number of 400 mm RHA. It just seems so little today.

[pmulcahy11b]

Here's an interesting look at WWII weapons in use in Ukraine:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yDd8NFftuXI

[Raellus]

Back in March, who would have predicted Ukrainian forces liberating Kherson?

Although I'm very happy for the UAF, I am doubtful that they can seize a sizeable bridgehead on the east bank. The Russians have spent the past few weeks digging in there, and any crossing attempt would be pounded by Russian artillery. This may be the high water mark of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the region. Still...

Slava Ukraini!

-

[Targan]

Back in March, who would have predicted Ukrainian forces liberating Kherson?

Although I'm very happy for the UAF, I am doubtful that they can seize a sizeable bridgehead on the east bank. The Russians have spent the past few weeks digging in there, and any crossing attempt would be pounded by Russian artillery. This may be the high water mark of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the region. Still...

Slava Ukraini!

-

Cross the river elsewhere and bypass and encircle the entrenched Russian forces. The Ukrainians seem to be very proficient at flanking maneuvers and interdiction of supply lines. Isolate Russian pockets and let them wither on the vine.

[Heffe]

This seems to be the clear path forward. If Ukraine ends up attacking into Crimea, they'll have to do it through the Melitopol path. Unless Ukraine has some magical way of instantly transporting huge numbers of Ukrainian soldiers across the Dnipro, it seems like that part of the front is going to become static for now. I imagine this will open up a number of forces on both sides however as it will be easier for both sides to defend the Dnipro with fewer troops. I don't see Ukraine making much headway in the south anytime soon as it gets reinforced with all of these soldiers from Kherson, but there might be a path up in the north.

[Raellus]

Cross the river elsewhere and bypass and encircle the entrenched Russian forces. The Ukrainians seem to be very proficient at flanking maneuvers and interdiction of supply lines. Isolate Russian pockets and let them wither on the vine.

That would be good, but any UAF attacking force would have a long, exposed flank and the Dnipro bisecting their MSR (we've seen how that impeded Russian resupply operations during the successful Ukrainian counter-offensive); the Russians, meanwhile, would have the interior lines of supply.

This seems to be the clear path forward. If Ukraine ends up attacking into Crimea, they'll have to do it through the Melitopol path. Unless Ukraine has some magical way of instantly transporting huge numbers of Ukrainian soldiers across the Dnipro, it seems like that part of the front is going to become static for now. I imagine this will open up a number of forces on both sides however as it will be easier for both sides to defend the Dnipro with fewer troops. I don't see Ukraine making much headway in the south anytime soon as it gets reinforced with all of these soldiers from Kherson, but there might be a path up in the north.

This seems the most likely next phase.

-

[Ursus Maior]

Although I'm very happy for the UAF, I am doubtful that they can seize a sizeable bridgehead on the east bank. The Russians have spent the past few weeks digging in there, and any crossing attempt would be pounded by Russian artillery. This may be the high water mark of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the region. Still...

-

The Ukrainians of course are already on the Eastern side of the Dnipro, since Russia never took the North of Zaporizhia oblast (including Zaporizhia itself) or indeed the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Hence, the Ukrainian forces are now in the comfortable position to either shift their forces in Kherson to Donbas or cross the Dnipro at Kherson, which is risky, because it's a wide river and the enemy is entrenched. However the enemy is also on the run and his forces consist mainly of untrained and inexperienced mobilized men.

A third option would be, to move through Zaporizhia oblast and cut into Melitopol in the South, where partisans have been fighting the Russians for months now. This would cut of southern Kherson and Crimea from Donbas and Southern Russia (Rostov-on-Don). Since the Kerch bridge will likely be down for month to come, that would necessitate to supply Crimea by sea, which likely means that support in any meaningful way is out of the question.

Personally, I think that the Ukrainians will want to pressure the Russians on as many fronts as possible at the same time, keeping them guessing on what happens next. If the Russians don't rally their troops soon in southern Kherson, their entrenchments will be useless and the Ukrainians can cross the river to establish a bridge head either at Nova Kakhovka or across from Nikopol.

Either way, the Russians are screwed and have been for a long time now. But the Kremlin has no way out. Basically, I think the Kremlin power circles will keep throwing their male population under the bus for as long as the current power structure remains in place.

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375

[Ursus Maior]

This seems to be the clear path forward. If Ukraine ends up attacking into Crimea, they'll have to do it through the Melitopol path. Unless Ukraine has some magical way of instantly transporting huge numbers of Ukrainian soldiers across the Dnipro, it seems like that part of the front is going to become static for now. I imagine this will open up a number of forces on both sides however as it will be easier for both sides to defend the Dnipro with fewer troops. I don't see Ukraine making much headway in the south anytime soon as it gets reinforced with all of these soldiers from Kherson, but there might be a path up in the north.

The Russians have few good troops left and even less equipment to reequip these forces. Melitopol seems the way to go for the Ukrainians I think, unless they assess the situation of the Russians on the other side of the Dnipro as so dire that crossing the river seems viable. I lack information on that, obviously.

But taking Melitopol would cut of southern Kherson and Crimea from the rest of Russian GLOCs and put the UAF in a position to encircle Russian forces or hit them in the rear (again) as they flee into Crimea. By then, Crimea would be yet another dead end, however, since the Kerch bridge remains out of operation. Also, taking Melitopol would allow Ukrainian forces to strengthen it's forces in Donbas.

This winter will bring a lot of action and as far as I read it, the Russians don't have enough winter equipment for their forces. Oh, the irony.

[Heffe]

The Russians have few good troops left and even less equipment to reequip these forces. Melitopol seems the way to go for the Ukrainians I think, unless they assess the situation of the Russians on the other side of the Dnipro as so dire that crossing the river seems viable. I lack information on that, obviously.

But taking Melitopol would cut of southern Kherson and Crimea from the rest of Russian GLOCs and put the UAF in a position to encircle Russian forces or hit them in the rear (again) as they flee into Crimea. By then, Crimea would be yet another dead end, however, since the Kerch bridge remains out of operation. Also, taking Melitopol would allow Ukrainian forces to strengthen it's forces in Donbas.

This winter will bring a lot of action and as far as I read it, the Russians don't have enough winter equipment for their forces. Oh, the irony.

I don't disagree at all, but targeting Melitopol is such an obvious move right now that I have to imagine Russia is reinforcing that direction as we speak, likely with troops from the Kherson Oblast (there and in the east near Bakhmut).

Some other observations -

This is the first time in the war that the front has become just a static line without the Dnipro cutting it in half. and it's also reduced the length of the front line significantly. Any movement from either side at this point is going to be taxing that side's supply lines heavily while the other side will be free to respond largely without impediment.
Ukraine is likely suffering more losses than any of us actually know. Paired with them having a far smaller military than Russia at the start of the invasion means that they have to play it much more conservatively with any attacks.
Attacking Melitopol or pushing south will be a really hard campaign. Russia has had months to reinforce the direction, add mines and defensive fortifications, etc. Ukraine would need to have a resounding opportunity there to try for it since it would be such a big risk to their own units getting surrounded/cut off.
Russia moving forces from Kherson east is going to increase pressure on their already taxed logistics hubs, and reduce the number of targets for HIMARs, which will only help Ukraine.
Totally agreed that Russia is in big trouble with regard to winter approaching. If the rumors are true about their lack of cold weather gear, the first cold storm of the season is going to see Russians getting frostbite and taken out of action. This could definitely open some opportunities for Ukraine, especially once the ground freezes.


Overall, I see the war as being like a boxing match - an old heavyweight champ against a spry young fighter. The younger boxer took a couple of mean hits in the beginning of the fight, but has since been guarding, trying to wear the older fighter out. He's patient and smart - jabbing to the stomach, and then baiting the older fighter with feints and ducking in with heavy hits anytime the champ makes a mistake. This preserves his own energy while sapping the older boxer's energy. The young fighter's already won on points at this stage of the fight, but the older champ is still holding out hope for a stray knockout.

In this analogy, I don't see things changing a whole lot in the immediate future. Zelensky has done a really admirable job of restraining his own desires to push harder and risk his own forces on unnecessary assaults. I think Ukraine continues to hold for now and keeps hitting Russian logistics nodes while keeping its defenses tight, and then strikes hard when Russia makes mistakes. In short, anyone hoping for a big sudden push from Ukraine anytime in the near future is probably in for a disappointment. But once winter hits and parts of the Russian front begin to fall apart from lack of morale/winter clothing/supplies, we might see some great movement. Since Russia seems most intent in the east (that's where they claim they're making the most gains) they'll probably continue to reinforce the east to the detriment of the other directions -> future Ukrainian pushes will likely be up in the north near Svatove, or like you say, down near Melitopol. Personally I think we'll see a hard drive for Svatove first, but I'd be happy to be wrong if its in the south.

[Vespers War]

Between regular military units and the Territorial Defense Forces, Ukraine is pretty rapidly approaching a million uniformed personnel. That's at least in the ballpark of what Russia can mobilize without a formal declaration of war, and might well exceed what Russia can actually deploy to Ukraine, even if neither can completely ignore their other neighbors. The TDFs are light motorized infantry, which aren't really suited for offensive operations without significant regular army support, but they can hold territory to free up other units for offensives.

They did have a far smaller military at the start of the war, but they also had a lot of veterans with recent experience because of their policy of rotating units in and out of the Donbas. There were reports that recruiters were being bribed to take people into units that had already met their recruiting quotas, the opposite of Russia where large numbers of conscription-aged men are fleeing the country to avoid service.

Russia does have a vast number of untapped reservists, but given how they've been scraping the bottom of the barrel to re-equip from recent losses and how they've re-formed training units into front-line forces to replace manpower losses, how they would train and equip those reservists would be a mystery even if they had the political will to declare war to make them eligible for call-up. Last week Ukraine captured a T-62 Obr.1967, which is pretty much as old as the name suggests (the Obr.1972 was the next model). No fittings for ERA (1983), no active protection system (1983), too old to have a laser rangefinder (1975) or even a pintle-mounted gun for air defense (1972). By this point I half-expect the next set of replacements to show up with Berdan rifles and tachankas with Maxims because they've already issued everything newer that wasn't looted for parts to sell on the black market.

Russia's still dangerous, to be sure, but their infantry and armor are showing severe shortfalls in capability, with the dangers coming from artillery (both tube and rocket/missile) and air support (both drone and crewed). If those can be suppressed through anti-air and counterbattery provisioning, I think it will largely mitigate Russia's advantages and allow Ukraine to exploit their advantages in having forces with better training and better morale.

[Targan]

One, maybe two stray missiles landing in Poland... not good. If it turns out they were fired by Russia, it'll be largely irrelevant that they were off-target. If they were Ukrainian ADA munitions, much of the world will still make the point that Ukraine wouldn't need to fire anti-missile missiles if they weren't being attacked by Russia.

Hello, Article 4. With Article 5 waiting quietly nearby.

[Heffe]

Even beside the recent news that the missiles were likely Ukrainian in origin (which I'm only half convinced is true in any case), I don't think NATO has any interest in escalation over what was, in all likelihood, an accident.

I saw an interesting analysis last night that the GPS coordinates of the explosion in Poland, when reversed, would target a train junction near Lviv, which could also be a potential explanation for what took place. If it happens again on the other hand, well let's just hope it doesn't happen again.

[Raellus]

I wonder what this [errant?] strike on Polish soil- regardless of who launched the offending missiles- will do to Poland's resolve to continue its support of Ukraine. It could go either way. This incident could either strengthen Poland's resolve (now we're really in this together!) or it could weaken it (why continue to support a combatant next door if it's leading to collateral damage here at home?). The Polish government is putting on a brave face, ATM. In a democracy, however, popular sentiment usually prevails in the end.

Does anyone have a sense of popular opinion in Poland re the war?

-

[Targan]

Does anyone have a sense of popular opinion in Poland re the war?

I know nothing about what the people of Poland currently think of the war next door, but I do know that Poles in general remain DEEPLY p*ssed off regarding their treatment by the Soviet Union since 1939. And successive Polish governments in recent times seem to take military readiness pretty seriously.

[ToughOmbres]

Between regular military units and the Territorial Defense Forces, Ukraine is pretty rapidly approaching a million uniformed personnel. That's at least in the ballpark of what Russia can mobilize without a formal declaration of war, and might well exceed what Russia can actually deploy to Ukraine, even if neither can completely ignore their other neighbors. The TDFs are light motorized infantry, which aren't really suited for offensive operations without significant regular army support, but they can hold territory to free up other units for offensives.

They did have a far smaller military at the start of the war, but they also had a lot of veterans with recent experience because of their policy of rotating units in and out of the Donbas. There were reports that recruiters were being bribed to take people into units that had already met their recruiting quotas, the opposite of Russia where large numbers of conscription-aged men are fleeing the country to avoid service.

Russia does have a vast number of untapped reservists, but given how they've been scraping the bottom of the barrel to re-equip from recent losses and how they've re-formed training units into front-line forces to replace manpower losses, how they would train and equip those reservists would be a mystery even if they had the political will to declare war to make them eligible for call-up. Last week Ukraine captured a T-62 Obr.1967, which is pretty much as old as the name suggests (the Obr.1972 was the next model). No fittings for ERA (1983), no active protection system (1983), too old to have a laser rangefinder (1975) or even a pintle-mounted gun for air defense (1972). By this point I half-expect the next set of replacements to show up with Berdan rifles and tachankas with Maxims because they've already issued everything newer that wasn't looted for parts to sell on the black market.

Russia's still dangerous, to be sure, but their infantry and armor are showing severe shortfalls in capability, with the dangers coming from artillery (both tube and rocket/missile) and air support (both drone and crewed). If those can be suppressed through anti-air and counterbattery provisioning, I think it will largely mitigate Russia's advantages and allow Ukraine to exploit their advantages in having forces with better training and better morale.

It looks like the UK is sending more air defense aid to Ukraine in addition to another US military aid package. While neither side can control the air the additional assets make it more risky for Ivan to fly anything other than cruise missiles over Ukraine.

[bash]

It looks like the UK is sending more air defense aid to Ukraine in addition to another US military aid package. While neither side can control the air the additional assets make it more risky for Ivan to fly anything other than cruise missiles over Ukraine.

And hopefully neuter Russia's cruise missiles at the same time. Ukraine will be much better off if Russia can't keep terrorizing civilians with cruise missiles.

[Vespers War]

I'm curious what the 100+ anti-aircraft guns will end up being, since I think the last new piece of AAA adopted by the British Army was the QF 5.25-inch Mark II in 1942. There were a few prototypes of systems after that, but they introduced missiles for land-based air defense in the late 1950s and never looked back.

[ToughOmbres]

I can't imagine what AAA would be either unless the UK is purchasing guns from a third party to ship to Ukraine-a run of Swiss or Swedish Oerlikons? Surely nothing captured from Argentina would still be held.

Wonder if quantities of Blowpipe missiles are still in inventory that could be reconditioned and fitted with new batteries? The Blowpipe had a questionable reputation in Afghanistan but seemed perfectly good elsewhere.

[kato13]

I'm curious what the 100+ anti-aircraft guns will end up being

Ma Deuce?? (L111A1 in UK)

If that particular term "anti-aircraft" was used by anyone in politics or media rather than the military, I could see it.

[Rainbow Six]

I wonder what this [errant?] strike on Polish soil- regardless of who launched the offending missiles- will do to Poland's resolve to continue its support of Ukraine. It could go either way. This incident could either strengthen Poland's resolve (now we're really in this together!) or it could weaken it (why continue to support a combatant next door if it's leading to collateral damage here at home?). The Polish government is putting on a brave face, ATM. In a democracy, however, popular sentiment usually prevails in the end.

Does anyone have a sense of popular opinion in Poland re the war?

-

This may be of interest to you

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/19/eastern-poland-putin-war-russian-aggression-poles-ukrainians-history

[Raellus]

Thanks for that piece, Rainbow. That's reassuring. I was worried that Poland's far right would be sympathetic to Putin's brand of populist authoritarianism.

As I watched yet another video clip of UAF ATGM teams engaging in a game of Russian tank turret toss, it struck me that I've only seen one or two videos- and those from early in the war- of more than a couple of Russian tanks operating together- it's almost always singletons or pairs. Also, in said clips (I've watched at least 100 by now, I'm sure), Russian armor is never supported by dismounted infantry.

Both are big tactical errors, and are assuredly big contributors to Russian AFV losses. I keep wondering why the Russians continue to deploy their armor piecemeal. Perhaps all those [Cold War] years of imagining masses of Soviet tanks and IFVs swarming across the fields of the Fulda Gap have conditioned me resulting in cognitive dissonance.

By the same token, in the terminal phases of the Twilight War, armor would nearly always be tactically deployed in very small numbers, so that's helpful.

-

[bash]

Thanks for that piece, Rainbow. That's reassuring. I was worried that Poland's far right would be sympathetic to Putin's brand of populist authoritarianism.

As I watched yet another video clip of UAF ATGM teams engaging in a game of Russian tank turret toss, it struck me that I've only seen one or two videos- and those from early in the war- of more than a couple of Russian tanks operating together- it's almost always singletons or pairs. Also, in said clips (I've watched at least 100 by now, I'm sure), Russian armor is never supported by dismounted infantry.

Both are big tactical errors, and are assuredly big contributors to Russian AFV losses. I keep wondering why the Russians continue to deploy their armor piecemeal. Perhaps all those [Cold War] years of imagining masses of Soviet tanks and IFVs swarming across the fields of the Fulda Gap have conditioned me resulting in cognitive dissonance.

By the same token, in the terminal phases of the Twilight War, armor would nearly always be tactically deployed in very small numbers, so that's helpful.

-

As I understand it Russian BTGs are very light on actual infantry, some 200 per BTG. If we assume they've got an offensive frontage a few km wide the density of infantry is super low even at full strength.

It seems to me (I'm no expert) that even modest combat losses to a BTG's infantry means they don't have enough men to cover their frontage and spare some to maneuver with the tanks. So tanks might have dismounted infantry in a well coordinated push but most of the time the tanks end up by themselves.

My understanding could of course be way off.

[Vespers War]

Jack Watling of RUTI isn't sure it's even worthwhile to discuss BTGs any more, that Russia's level of effective unit coordination has devolved down to the company level. If that's accurate, then in addition to the general infantry shortages, there's going to be relatively little sharing of assets of different types, since AFAIK Russia still generally has the old Soviet 3:1 ratio where armor units have 3 of an armored unit size to 1 infantry unit of the same size, and infantry is vice versa.

Assuming they can still do their usual split of the smaller unit, that means a company of tanks might be assigned a platoon of infantry or a company of infantry might get a platoon of tanks, but those platoons still report up to their company leader, not the company leader they're being loaned to. Russia's very hierarchical command structure and lack of promoting initiative among junior officers makes coordination slower and more difficult.

And there are likely still infantry shortages in general, since the small(ish) professional core of the Russian military tends to emphasize more technical roles, and there are probably still motorized rifle platoons where you've got 3 BMPs and only enough men to have 4-5 dismounts when accounting for the fact that the infantry platoon provides the IFV crews. So you might end up with a tank company of 10 tanks having their loaned platoon of infantry being 3 BMPs with their crews and a half dozen guys who actually fight on foot.

[Raellus]

sThanks. That helps explain the lack of infantry support.

I'm still baffled why Russian armor so often operates in such small groups. This video, assuming it's real, is a perfect example of what I'm talking about.

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1594383471874637826?cxt=HHwWhIC8zb_UsaAsAAAA

That Russian tank is completely on its own. What was it's crew, and unit commander, thinking?

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[ToughOmbres]

sThanks. That helps explain the lack of infantry support.

I'm still baffled why Russian armor so often operates in such small groups. This video, assuming it's real, is a perfect example of what I'm talking about.

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1594383471874637826?cxt=HHwWhIC8zb_UsaAsAAAA

That Russian tank is completely on its own. What was it's crew, and unit commander, thinking?

-

The thrashing elite Russian airborne units received in Chechnya seems to be all but forgotten. Indeed the Russian high command seems not to have remembered anything since 1943 with regard to planning and logistics. The one consistently Russian "thing" throughout the conflict is flinging artillery hard and heavy at Ukraine.
If supplies are so low Russia is buying ordnance from North Korea things must be incredibly bad. Suppose the plutocrats Putin placed in charge of defense industries supplied a few tens of thousands of shells and pocketed the rest. Wonder how many of the plutocrats and kleptocrats will have unfortunate "accidents"?

[chico20854]

An article from the Washington Post about the shellacking one Russian regular brigade has received.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/

[castlebravo92]

The Ukraine war is exposing how bad the Soviet/Russian model of war is against forces that are a generation or two ahead in only a few critical areas.

When Russia initially invaded in 2014, they pretty much wiped the floor with the Ukrainians, especially once the active Russian military units got involved.

Of course, Ukraine didn't have much of a military at that point, and the military it had was in disarray due to the Orange Revolution, and it was, at that point, still operating on the old ex-Soviet model.

Post Crimea/Donbas invasion, the US and the UK, among others, sent in quite a lot of technical and training assistance, and, apparently, unlike what happened in Afghanistan and the troops we tried to train there, the Ukrainians took to it seriously.

They also apparently were watching and learning from the Armenia-Azerbaijan war in 2021, where in the previous instance Armenia had pretty decisively defeated Azerbaijan, and then in 2021, with the acquisition of Turkish drones by Azerbaijan, the tables were turned and Armenia lost about 1/3 of it's tanks and artillery in a very short amount of time. This conflict was a real eye opener to the risk and deadliness of drone warfare and the utility of suicide drones.

Russia, on the other hand, wasn't apparently paying attention to anything except for how much vodka they could drink and how much stuff they could steal.

Logistically, they ran out of gas 100 km in (which, anecdotally, was one of my friend's experience with Russian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia - they were always running out of gas and having to be rescued). Apparently their plan was for their Spetsnaz teams to take out Zelensky, their armored columns would roll down the highway on a Sunday stroll and refuel at gas stations along the way, and that would be that. And there was no plan B.

When that failed abjectly, and unable to assemble overwhelming force against Ukraine like they did in Georgia, they resorted to the tried and true tactic they used sort of successfully in Syria - flatten everything with air strikes and artillery. Except Ukraine air defense was still effective, and Russian SEAD not so much, and so things devolved into artillery duels and standoff strikes with cruise missiles and - when those ran low - S300s re-programmed for ground attack.

It was reported that Russian artillery expenditure was/is such that they were using in 2 days the equivalent of the entirety of UK's munition stocks...the war has been going on for 10 months. Sort of puts an exclamation point on how all of NATO except for the US was not capable of sustained high tempo warfare even before letting their militaries rot after the end of the Cold War (this point was further proved in the NATO action against Libya, when a multi-nation NATO coalition was dependent on US munitions to attack a third-rate North African military involved in a civil war).

Based on real world Russian performance, I made the comment a while back to some friends that Russia would have trouble dealing with a single US National Guard division. Certainly the NG division would be trained better and equipped better than even the most elite divisional equivalent in Russia. I do believe that Poland would be able to decisively defeat Russia today (and once Poland takes delivery of all the advanced Korean tanks and HIMARS equivalents, they'll be the most powerful non-nuclear land force in Europe).

[Raellus]

The Ukraine war has proven pretty decisively that the modern Russian military kinda sucks.

It seems that every time the Russians attempt a "Thunder Run" type, "precision", go-for-the-jugular offensive, they fail miserably. Whenever they try to be like US military of 1991-2003, they just can't pull it off. Poor training, poor command structure, poor leadership, poor logistics, and piss poor operational planning and tactics. When the Russians employ Soviet era (1941-1989) brute force tactics (setting aside their COIN war in Afghanistan), they tend to do fairly well. When they stray from what they know- the old tried and true- they tend to struggle mightily. They make a much better nail-studded club than scalpel.

That said, I'd be careful about drawing conclusions about the Cold War Soviet military based on the current conflict in Ukraine. That would be like comparing the Dallas Cowboys of the 2000s with the Cowboys of the early-to-mid 1990s. Same ownership, but too many other variables in play for it to be true apples-to-apples. I still think a strong case can be made for significantly better Soviet performance in WWIII. So as not to drag this thread OT, I'll leave this here for those who wish to continue a discussion of the hypothetical.

https://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=897

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[Bestbrian]

Nice recap of the Ukraine debacle in today's Times: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/russia-putin-war-failures-ukraine.html?

[castlebravo92]

The Ukraine war has proven pretty decisively that the modern Russian military kinda sucks.

It seems that every time the Russians attempt a "Thunder Run" type, "precision", go-for-the-jugular offensive, they fail miserably. Whenever they try to be like US military of 1991-2003, they just can't pull it off. Poor training, poor command structure, poor leadership, poor logistics, and piss poor operational planning and tactics. When the Russians employ Soviet era (1941-1989) brute force tactics (setting aside their COIN war in Afghanistan), they tend to do fairly well. When they stray from what they know- the old tried and true- they tend to struggle mightily. They make a much better nail-studded club than scalpel.

That said, I'd be careful about drawing conclusions about the Cold War Soviet military based on the current conflict in Ukraine. That would be like comparing the Dallas Cowboys of the 2000s with the Cowboys of the early-to-mid 1990s. Same ownership, but too many other variables in play for it to be true apples-to-apples. I still think a strong case can be made for significantly better Soviet performance in WWIII. So as not to drag this thread OT, I'll leave this here for those who wish to continue a discussion of the hypothetical.

https://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=897

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There's a ton of caveats in everything ;-).

First off, my comments aren't intended as criticism for the T2K background. After all, it was written in the mid to late 80s, for the most part, and that was really just when the US started pulling away from the USSR in land warfare capabilities (naval and air power, of course, were always probably clearly in the US ledger).

Secondly, some of Russia's current problems are demographic. Russia has 144 million people to the US's 330 million people in 2022. But in 1988, the USSR actually had 2 million more people than the USA did...

Additionally, 2022 Russia has the economic profile of a developing country (exports natural resources, imports manufactured and high tech goods), whereas in the late 80s, it had the economic profile of an industrial economy (importing raw materials like food, exported manufactured goods).

And an obvious difference between today and 30-40 years ago is sheer throw weight and the numbers of men and equipment the USSR could throw at a problem.

But in the real world, their logistical and planning incompetence suggests that they never really had much in the way of non-nuclear offensive capability. I was personally shocked when the Russians did as bad as they did in Ukraine. I thought the Russians had a strong enough military to conventionally defeat the Ukrainians, but didn't think they mobilized enough forces to successfully occupy the country. I was right about the 2nd part, and very, very wrong on the first part.

[Raellus]

First off, my comments aren't intended as criticism for the T2K background. After all, it was written in the mid to late 80s, for the most part, and that was really just when the US started pulling away from the USSR in land warfare capabilities (naval and air power, of course, were always probably clearly in the US ledger).

I wasn't addressing your comments specifically. It was more of a general admonition and excuse to link to another thread. ;)

But in the real world, their logistical and planning incompetence suggests that they never really had much in the way of non-nuclear offensive capability.

I think Russia's military failings in Ukraine are largely the result of an overly sanguine Plan A, with no apparent Plan B in place when Plan A failed miserably. By the time the Russians pivoted, they'd lost nearly every advantage other than numerical superiority.

In a late Cold War era land war in Europe scenario (ie T2k), I imagine that the Soviets would have multiple contingency plans in place, all of which had been war-gamed out ahead of time. Likewise, I think their logistics would be a lot more squared away as well. They'd probably still be expecting a rather brief war, but this one on a massive scale, so they'd be prepared to move large quantities of men, fuel, and ammunition over long distances on a fairly broad front from day 1. In the Ukraine War, the Russian thinking was that they'd be in Kiev in less than a week and that, as they say, would be the end of that.

-

[castlebravo92]

I wasn't addressing your comments specifically. It was more of a general admonition and excuse to link to another thread. ;)



I think Russia's military failings in Ukraine are largely the result of an overly sanguine Plan A, with no apparent Plan B in place when Plan A failed miserably. By the time the Russians pivoted, they'd lost nearly every advantage other than numerical superiority.

In a late Cold War era land war in Europe scenario (ie T2k), I imagine that the Soviets would have multiple contingency plans in place, all of which had been war-gamed out ahead of time. Likewise, I think their logistics would be a lot more squared away as well. They'd probably still be expecting a rather brief war, but this one on a massive scale, so they'd be prepared to move large quantities of men, fuel, and ammunition over long distances on a fairly broad front from day 1. In the Ukraine War, the Russian thinking was that they'd be in Kiev in less than a week and that, as they say, would be the end of that.

-

The reason why I said the USSR probably would have struggled on the offensive...and forgive me, I forget where I read it, but there was some analysis that the USSR and Russia is hugely dependent on rail for their supplies, and they have _aways_ had insufficient truck transport at the divisional and corps level to supply offensive operations very far from an intact railhead (and by very far, I mean more than a hundred km). Interdict a rail supply line, and they logistics basically unravels in a hurry.

Additionally, overall truck capacity is something the USSR didn't have enough of (nor does Russia), which is why they resorted to stealing vehicles very early on in Ukraine and pulling civilian vehicles into military service for supply.

This logistical constraint is something that gets worse the more troops, tanks, and artillery you throw at an opponent. I think this is the fundamental problem holding back a Russian general mobilization right now. More troops doesn't fix their original core problem, which is insufficient logistical support to actually conquer Ukraine (of course, now that they have lost 100k of their best troops dead, and most of their modern AFVs, they have other problems).

Their current strategy of press-ganging men off the streets, handing them a gun and 1,000 rounds of ammunition and having them shoot for a day as their mobilization training is something you would expect to see in Berlin near the Fuhrer bunker at the tail end of the Nazi regime in terms of desperation.

[Ursus Maior]

Logistically, they ran out of gas 100 km in (which, anecdotally, was one of my friend's experience with Russian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia - they were always running out of gas and having to be rescued). Apparently their plan was for their Spetsnaz teams to take out Zelensky, their armored columns would roll down the highway on a Sunday stroll and refuel at gas stations along the way, and that would be that. And there was no plan B.


The absurd thing is that this has been known to be their limit for ages. The Soviet army was as much dependent on railways as the Russian is now. Of course, they had more trucks, but in the end, this has been their Achilles heel since Word War Two.

What's new, or let's say: what's more extreme than during the 1980s, is the rampant corruption and the mistrust Putin and his Kremlin junta have in the armed forces. Apparently, the WaPo article above reiterates that well, front line troops were made believe they went into their attack positions for an exercise. As is common in the armed forces of Russia, this meant, they sold off every drip of extra fuel and all extra supplies they were handed on the black market. Then, when they got the order to invade, which only happened on the day of the invasion (!!!) or the night before, they were already tight on fuel, food and spare parts.

Let's not kid ourselves: This alone makes such an endeavor impossible. Even the US and their coalition forces would have had much more difficulties beating Iraq in 2003 (or 1991 for that matter) had they gone in with - let's say - 50 percent POL, food and spare parts than 100 percent or 125 percent. Now, add to that all other Russian problems, logistical limits to around 100 km off the last railhead, bad leadership, unprepared troops, faulty tires from cheap Chinese suppliers and of course: a determined defender, and this absolutely has to end in a disaster.

Also, Russia had - as mentioned - not cared to develop a Plan B. Going into a country of 40 million people with less than 200.000 troops can only work, if you manage that decapitation strike. Otherwise, countries of that size and population, especially concentrated into huge cities, need millions of troops, not hundreds of thousands. The German Wehrmacht went for Kyiv with 544,000 men in 1941 and that attack was separate from the thrust along the coastline of the Black Sea, which was largely conducted y 14 Romanian divisions and supported by the German 11th Army (Operation München) for a further total of more than 325,000 men. And still the Axis forces lost upwards of 100,000 men between late June (start of Operation Barbarossa) and late September.

[Ursus Maior]

The reason why I said the USSR probably would have struggled on the offensive...and forgive me, I forget where I read it, but there was some analysis that the USSR and Russia is hugely dependent on rail for their supplies, and they have _aways_ had insufficient truck transport at the divisional and corps level to supply offensive operations very far from an intact railhead (and by very far, I mean more than a hundred km). Interdict a rail supply line, and they logistics basically unravels in a hurry.

Additionally, overall truck capacity is something the USSR didn't have enough of (nor does Russia), which is why they resorted to stealing vehicles very early on in Ukraine and pulling civilian vehicles into military service for supply.

This is what it boils down to. And that in an invasion, where the enemy - aka the Ukrainian defenders - can be counted on prepping bridges for demolition, plotting artillery strikes on them in advance and have a history of partisan warfare.

Russia never had enough trucks, not even during the 1980s in it's USSR-incarnation. The military system was always rotten, corrupt and ridden by false reports of readiness. These problems just enhanced by orders of magnitude during Putin's kleptocracy, which - unfortunately for the Russian soldiers - came after the complete and total collapse of the Yeltsin era, that already saw new orders of magnitude in corruption.

This is now way to win a war and we saw that already during World War Two. Western and Russian WW2-enthusiasts like to forget the sheer amount of logistical supply the USSR got from the US, UK and Canada. It's not so much the tanks and planes that saved their collectivist butts back then - though these helped a great deal - but the sheer amount of general supply items and especially trucks (which is exactly, what Russia lacks today!). Take this official list: https://ru.usembassy.gov/world-war-ii-allies-u-s-lend-lease-to-the-soviet-union-1941-1945/


400,000 jeeps & trucks
14,000 airplanes
8,000 tractors
13,000 tanks
1.5 million blankets
15 million pairs of army boots
107,000 tons of cotton
2.7 million tons of petrol products
4.5 million tons of food


The British delivered a further:


3,000+ Hurricane aircraft
4,000+ other aircraft
27 naval vessels
5,218 tanks (including 1,380 Valentines from Canada)
5,000+ anti-tank guns
4,020 ambulances and trucks
323 machinery trucks (mobile vehicle workshops equipped with generators and all the welding and power tools required to perform heavy servicing)
1,212 Universal Carriers and Loyd Carriers (with another 1,348 from Canada)
1,721 motorcycles
£1.15bn ($1.55bn) worth of aircraft engines
1,474 radar sets
4,338 radio sets
600 naval radar and sonar sets
Hundreds of naval guns
15*million pairs of boots


That's 30 million pairs of boots and over 404,000 trucks and ambulances no Soviet factory had to produce. The Soviet Army literally walked and drove to victory with Western help alone.

[Vespers War]

It's also worth noting that Lend-Lease locomotive supplies were a major factor in the USSR being able to switch its locomotive factories to tank production. The USSR built 354 locomotives in 1941. For the entire rest of the war, they produced 92. Lend-Lease delivered 1,911 locomotives to the USSR. Without those, their needs for rail logistics would have required them to keep locomotive factories building locomotives instead of tanks.

On the modern end of things, I think the return of trench warfare has been mildly surprising but makes sense. Both sides have large forces with significant differences in level of training within their forces, so lesser-trained soldiers can hold ground within fortifications to discourage opportunistic attempts to break through them, requiring more significant resource investment that is more likely to be spotted in advance. A TDF or a group of mobiks still might not be able to completely stop a determined attack on their own, but they can slow it down enough for units with more training and equipment to reinforce the position.

I think the US has done better with anticipating drones than Russia, but there are still some things that were missed. The low-end attack drones, like TB2 or Shahed or Orlan, are things that were mostly ignored on the US side in favor of more capable systems. But those drones have an additional effect in that a lot of the air-defense systems capable of taking them down use missiles that are more expensive than the drone. If it costs more to destroy a drone than to build a drone, over time the economics favor the cheap drone. I think the eventual counter to this will be smarter cannon rounds for air defense artillery, like some of the 30, 35, and 40mm rounds that have started entering service but (AFAIK) have not been provided to Ukraine. I also think we may see more SHORAD platforms that have a combined gun and missile armament like Tunguska and Pantsir (although hopefully more effective than Pantsir, which seems to have performed atrociously in this conflict). Something mounting a 30mm or 35mm autocannon with modern flak rounds and a 4 or 6 of whatever IR-guided missile replaces Stinger would be about what I'm thinking we may see around the end of the decade. SHORAD has been oriented towards taking down fast jets for the last few decades, and will need something extra to handle cheap, slow drones that cost less than a missile.

[Bestbrian]

I think the US has done better with anticipating drones than Russia, but there are still some things that were missed. The low-end attack drones, like TB2 or Shahed or Orlan, are things that were mostly ignored on the US side in favor of more capable systems. But those drones have an additional effect in that a lot of the air-defense systems capable of taking them down use missiles that are more expensive than the drone. If it costs more to destroy a drone than to build a drone, over time the economics favor the cheap drone. I think the eventual counter to this will be smarter cannon rounds for air defense artillery, like some of the 30, 35, and 40mm rounds that have started entering service but (AFAIK) have not been provided to Ukraine. I also think we may see more SHORAD platforms that have a combined gun and missile armament like Tunguska and Pantsir (although hopefully more effective than Pantsir, which seems to have performed atrociously in this conflict). Something mounting a 30mm or 35mm autocannon with modern flak rounds and a 4 or 6 of whatever IR-guided missile replaces Stinger would be about what I'm thinking we may see around the end of the decade. SHORAD has been oriented towards taking down fast jets for the last few decades, and will need something extra to handle cheap, slow drones that cost less than a missile.

Give it an all-weather target acquisition and tracking system while also integrating it in to the upper echelon air defense network, and Bob's your uncle. Fires ready available ammo, uses off the shelf components, requires minimal training, and can be mounted to a myriad of platforms. Instead, we'll probably wait ten years for Son of DIVAD. :)

[kato13]

Does the US still have cluster munitions for the MLRS/HIMARS?

When I am hearing stories of an upcoming force of 300k coming over the Belorussian border, I am remembering T2k talking about Assault Breaker system (precursor to the MGM-140_ATACMS) ripping up the Soviet units rolling into Chinese Territory.

I know the US , Ukraine, and Russia all have not signed the CCM (https://www.un.org/disarmament/convention-on-cluster-munitions/) and Russia used them early in the invasion.

I get why the world is against them, but this seems like a perfect opportunity for their use.

[Vespers War]

Does the US still have cluster munitions for the MLRS/HIMARS?

When I am hearing stories of an upcoming force of 300k coming over the Belorussian border, I am remembering T2k talking about Assault Breaker system (precursor to the MGM-140_ATACMS) ripping up the Soviet units rolling into Chinese Territory.

I know the US , Ukraine, and Russia all have not signed the CCM (https://www.un.org/disarmament/convention-on-cluster-munitions/) and Russia used them early in the invasion.

I get why the world is against them, but this seems like a perfect opportunity for their use.

The M26 cluster MLRS rockets were removed from service in June 2009 per an order signed in July 2008 by George W. Bush. The current Alternative Warhead rounds (M30A1 and M30A2) use tungsten fragments to get a similar effect without the risk of unexploded ordnance. There might be some that survived destruction by the time Donald Trump revoked Bush's order in 2017, but since the last of them were manufactured in 2001 and the shelf life for the rocket is 25 years, any survivors are getting pretty close to end-of-life.

The cluster ATACMS have all had their warheads replaced with unitary high explosive warheads. The older ones also had GPS added (M39A1 already had GPS, M39 did not, they're all now M57E1 standard).

More likely might be getting Korean KM26A2 rockets, which were license-built until 2011 (when the license expired and wasn't renewed, possibly because of the standing order from former President Bush).

[kato13]

More likely might be getting Korean KM26A2 rockets, which were license-built until 2011 (when the license expired and wasn't renewed, possibly because of the standing order from former President Bush).

Would be nice if that license was (possibly secretly) renewed. Know it will take some time to spool up but it would allow the Koreans to spare more of their current stocks (I have read that 288 were going to Poland early next year.)

Thanks for the info. Our denizens never disappoint me when I am looking for details on these types of subjects.

[Vespers War]

Would be nice if that license was (possibly secretly) renewed. Know it will take some time to spool up but it would allow the Koreans to spare more of their current stocks (I have read that 288 were going to Poland early next year.)

Thanks for the info. Our denizens never disappoint me when I am looking for details on these types of subjects.

Congress killed the last renewal attempt in 2015, I believe because of the desire to remain in line with the international community regarding cluster munitions even if we wouldn't ratify the actual treaty about them.

The 288 systems being sold to Poland are K239 Chunmoo launchers for delivery between 2023 and 2027. They're a heavy truck-based launcher with 2 rocket pods, so think an M270-sized HIMARS. Each pod can carry one of a set of payloads:
20x131mm rocket (unguided, 36km range)
6xKM26A2 (unguided, 45km range)
6x239mm rocket (guided, 80km range)
Also in development are a 2x400mm rocket pod (guided, 200+ km range) and a single tactical ballistic missile pod (guided, 290km range). Both of these were publicly announced this year as development projects, but I don't know how far along they are (e.g. was development work done before they were announced?). Poland is buying the 239mm rockets and the tactical ballistic missiles, with total numbers across the two ammunition types being reported as 23,000. I haven't seen it split out into how many of each type are being acquired. The Polish Chunmoo will be on a locally-manufactured truck chassis, a Jelcz 8x8, so they're getting at least some local industrial production out of the purchase.

There's not a whole lot of niche space for KM26A2 in that set of pods. The 131mm rockets have 80% of the range and enough numbers that they can saturate a target at least as well as the KM26A2, while the 239mm rocket has as much ammunition, nearly double the range, and is guided like GMLRS, as well as being in current production.

[Heffe]

Not to beat a dead horse, but there certainly were some other major differences between the Soviets in the 80s and the Russians of today, beyond what has already been mentioned.

Namely, that the equipment they were using at the time was far newer and NATO gear hadn't had 40 years to be purposefully designed to counter it. There was also far more of that equipment still in working order instead of thousands of systems rotting and rusting in empty fields. Plus, while the kleptocracy still existed, it's entirely possible that the other nations of the USSR would have supplemented additional organizational and logistical capacity beyond what we're seeing today in Ukraine. The Ukrainians themselves, for example.

Finally, IMO the T2k scenarios always depended pretty heavily on the idea of full mobilizations - millions of Soviets going into the field of battle, rather than the 300-400k the Russians have put into Ukraine thus far.

All in all, the T2k versions are all a bit far fetched, but it doesn't seem like an entirely fair comparison running the Soviets of the 80s up against the Russians of today.

[kato13]

US M2s to Ukraine.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=313DBV2knwQ (First 2/3rds its probably stuff everyone here knows M2 History etc)

This video suggests that if the US sends M2s to Ukraine, It will send the 89 M2A2 (ODS) versions which are scheduled to be sent to Croatia this year. In the authors opinion, these particular units should be used not as IFVs but as artillery spotting vehicles. Due to the fact that with their GPS/Laser RF systems can instantly transmit target data to allied high precision artillery.

I will admit I did not think of this application, but it seems like a very good use.

What are your expectations if the US starts to send M2s to Ukraine?

Added link about Croatia sale
https://militaryleak.com/2022/01/28/croatia-announces-deal-to-buy-bradley-m2a2-operation-desert-storm-ods-armored-fighting-vehicles/

[ToughOmbres]

US M2s to Ukraine.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=313DBV2knwQ (First 2/3rds its probably stuff everyone here knows M2 History etc)

This video suggests that if the US sends M2s to Ukraine, It will send the 89 M2A2 (ODS) versions which are scheduled to be sent to Croatia this year. In the authors opinion, these particular units should be used not as IFVs but as artillery spotting vehicles. Due to the fact that with their GPS/Laser RF systems can instantly transmit target data to allied high precision artillery.

I will admit I did not think of this application, but it seems like a very good use.

What are your expectations if the US starts to send M2s to Ukraine?

Added link about Croatia sale
https://militaryleak.com/2022/01/28/croatia-announces-deal-to-buy-bradley-m2a2-operation-desert-storm-ods-armored-fighting-vehicles/

Either as FV's or for FO vehicles, once they complete familiarization, the Armed Forces of the Ukraine are certainly capable of operating them.

Less than one hundred will not be enough to dramatically shift the battlefield calculus although it might be enough to tip a crucial small sector here or there.

From a logistics standpoint, Ukraine is slowly becoming a logisticians nightmare. Not completely WP nor NATO, not complete West nor East but a hodgepodge. France is apparently sending wheeled AMX 10's soon-another platform to support. Even with western/NATO technical help or contractors this is eventually going to be a challenge at least in my view.

[Raellus]

What are your expectations if the US starts to send M2s to Ukraine?

This piece offers a couple of different perspectives.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/this-is-what-bradley-fighting-vehicles-will-bring-to-the-fight-in-ukraine

From a logistics standpoint, Ukraine is slowly becoming a logisticians nightmare. Not completely WP nor NATO, not complete West nor East but a hodgepodge. France is apparently sending wheeled AMX 10's soon-another platform to support. Even with western/NATO technical help or contractors this is eventually going to be a challenge at least in my view.

I'm really curious as to how the AMX-10, a fairly unique late Cold War system (not many wheeled, gun-armed AT platforms out there), performs against Russian MBTs. To add to your point about logistical issues, TO, the AMX-10 isn't fitted with the NATO-standard L7 105mm gun (like Ukraine's new Slovenian upgraded T-55s is). Apparently, it uses "proprietary ammunition" instead of NATO standard.

I also read a piece fairly recently claiming that hundreds of captured Russian AFVs are sitting in Ukrainian warehouses because the Ukrainians don't have the spare parts to return them to operational status- and that's for PACT stuff that both countries have long operated! With its motley, polyglot collection of cast-off Western AFVs, I imagine that when one breaks down, it stays broken down for lack of spare parts (or until such time as another example can be cannibalized to provide said). I imagine that THIS would be a very common issue during the Twilight War.

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[Vespers War]

I'm really curious as to how the AMX-10, a fairly unique late Cold War system (not many wheeled, gun-armed AT platforms out there), performs against Russian MBTs. To add to your point about logistical issues, TO, the AMX-10 isn't fitted with the NATO-standard L7 105mm gun (like Ukraine's new Slovenian upgraded T-55s is). Apparently, it uses "proprietary ammunition" instead of NATO standard.

The AMX-10 RC uses a 105x527mm round instead of the NATO-standard 105x617mm. It's also an old round, with the APFSDS being of 1987 vintage, with a small penetrator even for that caliber and age, taking the existing dart from 90mm F3 ammunition and just putting that in a bigger shell. It'll penetrate a NATO Single Heavy Target at 1.2 kilometers and a Triple Heavy Target at 2.2 kilometers, with the latter designed to simulate shooting through an armored skirt, road wheel, and tank hull side. I don't think it will perform well against MBTs unless it ambushes them on a road march, but equipped with HE shells it should do nicely in an infantry support role while having some anti-tank capability if the right circumstances arise.

[Raellus]

The AMX-10 RC uses a 105x527mm round instead of the NATO-standard 105x617mm. It's also an old round, with the APFSDS being of 1987 vintage, with a small penetrator even for that caliber and age, taking the existing dart from 90mm F3 ammunition and just putting that in a bigger shell. It'll penetrate a NATO Single Heavy Target at 1.2 kilometers and a Triple Heavy Target at 2.2 kilometers, with the latter designed to simulate shooting through an armored skirt, road wheel, and tank hull side. I don't think it will perform well against MBTs unless it ambushes them on a road march, but equipped with HE shells it should do nicely in an infantry support role while having some anti-tank capability if the right circumstances arise.

If I haven't told you before, Vespers War, your wealth of technical knowledge is darned impressive. Thanks.

Since you posted, I've seen 3 or 4 headlines from major media outlets along the lines of, "France sends these tank killers to Ukraine" (in reference to the AMX-10 RC). I wish the media did more due diligence before publishing. Hyperbole gets views, but it can also be very misleading.

In other news...

It looks like we might soon see how the Leopard 2, arguably one of the best MBT designs of the late Cold War period, stacks up against Russian armor of the same era, and later. The UK is also considering giving Challenger 2s to Ukraine. With their 120mm smoothbores, both are definitely legit tank-killers.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/poland-is-ready-to-send-leopard-2-tanks-to-ukraine

There's no doubt that Ukraine will need these kinds of systems if it is going to continue to liberate its Russian-held territory. I do wonder how Russia will respond as more and more patently offensive-oriented heavy weapon systems continue making their way into Ukrainian hands. One can reasonably argue that towed artillery, AAA/SAM systems, and ATGMs are primarily defensive weapons. It's much harder to make that argument for M2 Bradleys, Marders, and Leo IIs. I worry that a flood of potent offensive weaponry will trigger Putin to threaten escalation, especially of the tactical nuclear variety, against what he perceives as a growing threat to Mother Russia's territorial integrity.

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[kato13]

The Leopards (I or II) will be a nice addition.

Odd discovery. I have been pronouncing the tank name wrong for 4 decades, as leh-paRd. However I heard General Petraeus (who I would think is light years better informed than I) says it as Lee-oh-pard.

Google and youtube confirm.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzT8mlh-jIU

[ToughOmbres]

The Leopards (I or II) will be a nice addition.

Odd discovery. I have been pronouncing the tank name wrong for 4 decades, as leh-paRd. However I heard General Petraeus (who I would think is light years better informed than I) says it as Lee-oh-pard.

Google and youtube confirm.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzT8mlh-jIU

That was certainly how the Bundeswehr officer and NCO's I was around pronounced it. They were slightly bemused when I pronounced it in the American "Leh-perd" or "Leh-pard".

The Austrian Bundesheer NCO's I was around had a similar pronounciation for the MBT.
Funny Fact-my (limited) northern accented German sounded so strange to the Austrians it was practically unintelligible to them. Their medic asked me if I was having a stroke.
They appreciated I was speaking German but couldn't understand much of it-another wondered if I was Swiss.

[Spartan-117]

Funny Fact-my (limited) northern accented German sounded so strange to the Austrians it was practically unintelligible to them. Their medic asked me if I was having a stroke.
They appreciated I was speaking German but couldn't understand much of it-another wondered if I was Swiss.

hehe... I've had conversations in India where English was being translated to English, because the accents of the primary speakers were so unintelligible to each other, it required a third party who had experience with both.

[ToughOmbres]

hehe... I've had conversations in India where English was being translated to English, because the accents of the primary speakers were so unintelligible to each other, it required a third party who had experience with both.

I can see (and hear) that. "One people, separated by a common language.":)

[Spartan-117]

I can see (and hear) that. "One people, separated by a common language.":)

TK... It is like that only...

(the Indian version of 'It is what it is')

[ToughOmbres]

The Leopards (I or II) will be a nice addition.

Odd discovery. I have been pronouncing the tank name wrong for 4 decades, as leh-paRd. However I heard General Petraeus (who I would think is light years better informed than I) says it as Lee-oh-pard.

Google and youtube confirm.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzT8mlh-jIU


US MLRS and M2 Bradley IFV's, UK Challenger's, FRG Leopard II's, French AMX-10's-the Ukraine is beginning to resemble a NATO composite battle group in equipment terms-minus the actual soldiers and support staff. A battlefield "slice" if you will of the Alliance.

[Spartan-117]

US MLRS and M2 Bradley IFV's, UK Challenger's, FRG Leopard II's, French AMX-10's-the Ukraine is beginning to resemble a NATO composite battle group in equipment terms-minus the actual soldiers and support staff. A battlefield "slice" if you will of the Alliance.

Like a 90's battle group...

We'd clean the Ruzzian's clock if NATO was unleashed on them with current equipment, professional troops, and unconstrained logistics.

[Targan]

We'd clean the Ruzzian's clock if NATO was unleashed on them with current equipment, professional troops, and unconstrained logistics.

Indeed. Were it not for the threat of armageddon, I'd love to see that happen.

[castlebravo92]

Like a 90's battle group...

We'd clean the Ruzzian's clock if NATO was unleashed on them with current equipment, professional troops, and unconstrained logistics.

I think a National Guard division like the 36th probably could have defeated the Russian invasion by itself. Much less an active duty division, much less a full corps with air supremacy.

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergence of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.

[Heffe]

I think a National Guard division like the 36th probably could have defeated the Russian invasion by itself. Much less an active duty division, much less a full corps with air supremacy.

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergency of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.

And given Poland's history, who could blame them?

Since we're all commanding from our armchairs, I'll go out on a limb here. The result of this war has already been decided, and Putin has lost. I just don't see a path forward for Russia where it becomes able to achieve it's operational/strategic goals, not with the losses they've already suffered.

Russia's best bet is to effectively force Ukraine to concede the land already occupied, but short of a major catastrophe, I don't see Ukraine agreeing to concessions anytime soon. As far as cards to play, Russia could and will resort to additional mobilizations, but without the supporting training, equipment, and leadership, those men are just being fed into a meat grinder. All accounts of Bakhmut are showing Russians using human wave attacks. That isn't a recipe for gaining operational momentum.

The west seems ready to keep supporting Ukraine with equipment for the long haul, and Russia's munitions are shrinking drastically. Reports are showing that they've already reached, and potentially surpassed, critical levels of long range missiles. Their armor forces seem to be gutted, with likely somewhere around 1800-2000 tank losses so far. Much the same with artillery systems. The aircraft situation seems nominally better, but Russia appears averse to flying sorties over Ukrainian airspace, probably doubly so now that Patriots are in theater. And Russia's ability to produce anything advanced has been cut off at the knees due to heavy sanctions and lack of microchips.

Anything can happen of course, but short of walking away with some of the already occupied territory (of god forbid, using nukes), I just can't see Putin achieving any kind of real victory in Ukraine.

[Raellus]

Broadly, I agree with your assessment, Heffe. I do, however, think it really depends on how long Putin is willing to fight this war. Russia has a significantly larger pool of fighting age men. Even if the Ukrainians produce 3 casualties for every 1 sustained, they'll run out of soldiers first. Can Russian gov't, econ., and society hold out long enough for that to happen? Probably not, but the possibility can't be discounted.

This piece does a pretty good job of analyzing demographic trends in relation to the war.

https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-demography-of-war-ukraine-vs-russia

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[Heffe]

Broadly, I agree with your assessment, Heffe. I do, however, think it really depends on how long Putin is willing to fight this war. Russia has a significantly larger pool of fighting age men. Even if the Ukrainians produce 3 casualties for every 1 sustained, they'll run out of soldiers first. Can Russian gov't, econ., and society hold out long enough for that to happen? Probably not, but the possibility can't be discounted.

This piece does a pretty good job of analyzing demographic trends in relation to the war.

https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-demography-of-war-ukraine-vs-russia

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That's very fair, but at some point the lack of equipment will result in casualties far in excess of 3:1. You can't just have men with rifles running in against combined forces in well entrenched positions forever.

I kind of suspect the reason why Leopards and Challies are currently on offer is because Ukraine knows that in order for their own forces to go on the offense, they need better armor support, and have communicated that to friendly western nations. If Russia sustains another major defeat or two, Putin risks losing the support of the mil-bloggers, and then that of the people. We'll have to see how that all plays out.

[Raellus]

That's very fair, but at some point the lack of equipment will result in casualties far in excess of 3:1. You can't just have men with rifles running in against combined forces in well entrenched positions forever.

Agreed. Your example cuts both ways, though, when it comes to offensive operations. The Russians have just captured Soledar after weeks of heavy fighting. Can the Ukrainians afford to sustain a 3:1 casualty ratio to retake it?

And Ukraine is running out of ammunition too, in particular for its artillery. Although local production has recently ramped up, it can't keep up with demand. Recent reports are that artillery fires have diminished from both sides. NATO is having a difficult time providing enough fresh shells and rockets to keep up with Ukrainian expenditures. They've been outsourcing resupply to "unaligned" countries (like Pakistan), but that supply is going to dry up soon as well.

I kind of suspect the reason why Leopards and Challies are currently on offer is because Ukraine knows that in order for their own forces to go on the offense, they need better armor support, and have communicated that to friendly western nations. If Russia sustains another major defeat or two, Putin risks losing the support of the mil-bloggers, and then that of the people. We'll have to see how that all plays out.

I hope that turns out to be the case. The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again. That's what Ukrainian intel is saying, at least. There's growing concern that said offensive will include another lunge at Kiev out of Belarus. There're also rumblings that the Belarussian military might be taking part in same. If that were to happen, the strategic calculus of Ukraine and NATO is going to have to change.

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[kato13]

The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again.
-

Human wave attacks vs US designed cluster bomb artillery shells from Turkey. This is going to be bloody.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/10/turkey-cold-war-cluster-bombs-ukraine/


I remember ICM-DP rounds being worth their weight in gold in T2k, weird how it seems to be that way again.

[Heffe]

Agreed. Your example cuts both ways, though, when it comes to offensive operations. The Russians have just captured Soledar after weeks of heavy fighting. Can the Ukrainians afford to sustain a 3:1 casualty ratio to retake it?

And Ukraine is running out of ammunition too, in particular for its artillery. Although local production has recently ramped up, it can't keep up with demand. Recent reports are that artillery fires have diminished from both sides. NATO is having a difficult time providing enough fresh shells and rockets to keep up with Ukrainian expenditures. They've been outsourcing resupply to "unaligned" countries (like Pakistan), but that supply is going to dry up soon as well.
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All good points. Regarding Soledar, my understanding is that Wagner is essentially throwing bodies at the town in the interest of proving that Wagner is superior than the MOD. With vehicle kill counts on the Russian side being somewhat stagnant, that means Russian infantry losses have been absolutely atrocious. To your point though, maybe they really can absorb such tremendous losses. At least for now.

I hope that turns out to be the case. The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again. That's what Ukrainian intel is saying, at least. There's growing concern that said offensive will include another lunge at Kiev out of Belarus. There're also rumblings that the Belarussian military might be taking part in same. If that were to happen, the strategic calculus of Ukraine and NATO is going to have to change.
-

Belarus is a really interesting scenario. You have to know Luka is looking at NATO's military build up on his border, and he doesn't have the nukes to scare NATO off, despite his closeness to Russia. NATO's calculus is going to be "Can we take out Belarus without triggering Russia's nukes?" It'll be a really dangerous game if Belarus ends up sending troops across the border. The Belarussian people as well, from what I understand, aren't quite as interested in the war as Russia's, and they're arguably more eager to see Luka be ousted.

[Raellus]

All good points. Regarding Soledar, my understanding is that Wagner is essentially throwing bodies at the town in the interest of proving that Wagner is superior than the MOD. With vehicle kill counts on the Russian side being somewhat stagnant, that means Russian infantry losses have been absolutely atrocious. To your point though, maybe they really can absorb such tremendous losses. At least for now.

It's almost certain that Russia sustained heavier losses during the battle, possibly much heavier. Against dug-in positions, especially in MOUT, the defender usually has the advantage and the attacker usually sustains more casualties. I'm worried that Russia can sustain heavier casualty rates longer than Ukraine can. I just hope Russian willpower runs out before their manpower, armor, and ammo do.

Wagner had always been build as an elite PMC. Apparently, now they are employing large numbers of ex-Cons, many recently released specifically for the war.

Belarus is a really interesting scenario. You have to know Luka is looking at NATO's military build up on his border, and he doesn't have the nukes to scare NATO off, despite his closeness to Russia. NATO's calculus is going to be "Can we take out Belarus without triggering Russia's nukes?" It'll be a really dangerous game if Belarus ends up sending troops across the border. The Belarussian people as well, from what I understand, aren't quite as interested in the war as Russia's, and they're arguably more eager to see Luka be ousted.

Luka doesn't need nukes. Belarus is under the Russian nuclear umbrella. I may be overstating this a bit, but Luka is essentially a Russian puppet. If Putin orders him to jump, I don't see him saying no. In fact, I'm kind of surprised Belarus hasn't joined the invasion. Surely, Ukraine's "gay nazi demons" are a threat to Belarus as well. :rolleyes:

Early in the war, Luka went on record as saying that Belarus would not participate, despite allowing Russian land and air forces basing and transit rights. Then there was the infamous "map slip", so maybe there was a plan to do so at some point.

In early summer, reports emerged indicating that Belarus was surreptitiously giving some of its T-72 tanks to Russia, to make up for heavy Russian losses.

Since at least autumn, Russia has been shifting forces to Belarus, despite simultaneously losing ground in Ukraine. Russia claimed it was just to conduct joint maneuvers with the Belarussians. AFAIK, those RF forces are still there, and reports indicating they're continuing to be reinforced. Some analysts believe this is to pressure Ukraine to maintain significant forces in the Kiev area, to defend the capital from potential second lunge at Kiev. I'm not so sure.

Do you think NATO will strike at Belarus if it joins the invasion of Ukraine? I don't.

-

[Targan]

Do you think NATO will strike at Belarus if it joins the invasion of Ukraine? I don't.

I don't think it will either, but it's possible. NATO won't attack Russian forces on Ukraine's behalf, but technically Belarus isn't Russia :D. So if NATO did give Belarus a slap, it would send a powerful message without instantly starting WWIII.

[kato13]

RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RE TRACTED***

UK to send Apaches to Ukraine

https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/britain-apache-helicopters-ukraine-war-28957065
RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RE TRACTED***

EDIT *** https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1614576434382528513

I have always thought NATO looked at the situation as the frog (Russia) in the stove pot (Ukraine), where they raised the temp slowly enough the frog never realized it was being boiled alive. Now they seem to be cranking the heat a bit (albeit with small numbers of tech).

EDIT *** I thought this was a RADICAL increase in quality of equipment. So back to the slow raising of the temperature in the pot.


This is going to be an incredible experiment in cross NATO platform C3I.

[LoneCollector1987]

I just found an article in the german newspaper WELT (unfortunately behind a paywall) where Wolfgang Ischinger says that Ukraine fires aso much ammunition in one day as Germany produces in 6 months.

Ischinger served as chairman of the Munich Security Conference from 2008 to 2022.

I think that following McKinsey (switching everything to just-in-time production), outsourcing nearly everything to the Far East and reducing stockpiles to nearly nothing was the wrong way to go.

Every country should have the production capability to produce at least 50% of its military needs (vehicles, ammunition, etc) on its own. And the stockpiles must be big.
I remember reading that in WWI the armies used up nearly all the ammo in a short time because nobody could imagine that artillery barrages would consume soo much ammo.

[Ewan]

I remember reading that in WWI the armies used up nearly all the ammo in a short time because nobody could imagine that artillery barrages would consume soo much ammo.
Years ago reading a book about WW1 logistics the British had to decide a year in advance what kind of war they were going for the following year (offensive or defensive) to get enough shells manufactured and stockpiled in time for the campaigns.

[kcdusk]

The latest warzone articles discuss Ukraine being supplied with Stryker, Marder, Challenger and potentially Leopod tanks. And questions how the associated countries will be able to keep up this level of spending.

If Nato/USA is struggling to keep up supply and spending, how will Russia ever be able to? And, they are potentially loosing more equipment than Nato.

[Raellus]

The latest warzone articles discuss Ukraine being supplied with Stryker, Marder, Challenger and potentially Leopod tanks. And questions how the associated countries will be able to keep up this level of spending.

If Nato/USA is struggling to keep up supply and spending, how will Russia ever be able to? And, they are potentially loosing more equipment than Nato.

A lot of the systems you mentioned are at or nearing the end of their service lives and were scheduled to be phased out of service over the next couple of years anyways. In effect donating them to Ukraine just gets them off the books a few years sooner. It's kind of like a kid starting to outgrow some old clothes and, before that happens, handing them down to a younger sibling (or giving them to a needy neighbor). That says, the donating countries are getting nothing for them (whereas they could sell these systems on the secondary market to recoup a portion of the loss).

NATO defense spending has gone up since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (it was already trending that way before said). Giving Ukraine mountains of military aid in the form of weapons systems and ammo gives NATO militaries a nice excuse to ask for bigger budgets and shiny new toys.

Transactionally, I'm less concerned for NATO than I am for Ukraine. Maintaining such a motley assortment of older, but new-to-them, vehicles and weapons systems is going to be extremely challenging, especially under wartime conditions. And, despite major similarities between analogous systems (say, for example, a Chally and a Leo), each system requires an adequate training cycle in order to be employed effectively.

-

[Ursus Maior]

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergence of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.
Their problem is that they don't have the people for such a force. And while they said they'd be increasing defense spending to 3 % of their GDP, that money needs to be found within their total budget. That's not an easy feat. Plus, their army would need a hell of a lot more maintenance, supply and infantry units just to support all those new tanks and have battle line in front of all those HIMARS artillery units.

This is going to be an interesting time for Poland, indeed. If they don't find the money, their reform and resizing implodes. If they find the money, a lot of other stuff won't get funded and even more deficit will be built up.

[Ursus Maior]

Human wave attacks vs US designed cluster bomb artillery shells from Turkey. This is going to be bloody.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/10/turkey-cold-war-cluster-bombs-ukraine/


I remember ICM-DP rounds being worth their weight in gold in T2k, weird how it seems to be that way again.

In addition, Turkey cloned the M26 rounds for MLRS and HIMARS systems. Those are even more devastating.

[Heffe]

A lot of the systems you mentioned are at or nearing the end of their service lives and were scheduled to be phased out of service over the next couple of years anyways. In effect donating them to Ukraine just gets them off the books a few years sooner. It's kind of like a kid starting to outgrow some old clothes and, before that happens, handing them down to a younger sibling (or giving them to a needy neighbor). That says, the donating countries are getting nothing for them (whereas they could sell these systems on the secondary market to recoup a portion of the loss).

NATO defense spending has gone up since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (it was already trending that way before said). Giving Ukraine mountains of military aid in the form of weapons systems and ammo gives NATO militaries a nice excuse to ask for bigger budgets and shiny new toys.

Transactionally, I'm less concerned for NATO than I am for Ukraine. Maintaining such a motley assortment of older, but new-to-them, vehicles and weapons systems is going to be extremely challenging, especially under wartime conditions. And, despite major similarities between analogous systems (say, for example, a Chally and a Leo), each system requires an adequate training cycle in order to be employed effectively.

-

Ukraine has proven remarkably adaptable when it comes to onboarding with new equipment, but you're undoubtedly correct in that it's got to be an enormous challenge managing the various logistical needs, especially in wartime. Regarding the crews, I recall hearing that Ukraine had, was it tens of thousands of soldiers training in the UK a few months ago? I feel reasonable sure at least some of those were some tank crews getting up to speed on the Chally 2.

[Raellus]

This is what I'm worried about. Ukraine may be able to pace, or even pull ahead, of the Russians in operational AFV and artillery numbers, but the manpower disparity is beginning to tell. 100k military casualties on both sides favors the Russians. Yeah, the replacements they're mustering are very poorly trained and equipped but, as Stalin once said, "quantity has a quality all its own". If Belarus joins the fight... :(

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-russian-casualties-significantly-well-over-100k-says-top-u-s-general

From the article,

"The foreign intelligence service informed security politicians in the Bundestag in a secret meeting this week that the Ukrainian Army is currently losing a three-digit number of soldiers every day in battles with the Russian invaders" in Bakhmut, according to Der Spiegel."

In all likelihood, the bulk of those casualties consist of Ukraine's more experienced troops.

-

[castlebravo92]

Does anyone have any recent numbers for Ukraine's mobilization?

I've read reports that they've sent a fairly sizable number of troops to NATO countries for training on various platforms, and they are clearly operating on more of a total war / full mobilization footing than Russia is, which suggests they'll be able to absorb battle casualties better than Russia can without a similar mobilization on their part.

There was a joke about this last round of conscripts and convicts Russia was sending to the front were getting more training this time around and were going to be much more formidable than the last wave - 2 days of training instead of 1!

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

[Ursus Maior]

This is what I'm worried about. Ukraine may be able to pace, or even pull ahead, of the Russians in operational AFV and artillery numbers, but the manpower disparity is beginning to tell. 100k military casualties on both sides favors the Russians.
The casualities are vastly discrepant and by now means the same for both. It's 100k KIA for the Russians plus countless WIA, MIA and POW. The Russian chain of rescue for WIA is abysmal, their hospitals ill-equipped.

On the contrary, Ukraine has around or likely above 100,000 total casualities, including KIA, WIA, MIA and POWs with Western support in later stage medical treatments, logistical help in getting first aid material and first aid training to the front. Their ratio of KIA and WIA will be far superior to Russia's and their abilities to regenerate combat effectiveness from WIA will be far better. Also, Ukrainians are likely to reenlist and volunteer for service. Russians more or less have to force their citizens into service and have been scraping the barrel for months.

Also, Belarus isn't going to join them. Despite the fact that Lukashenka has allowed Belarus to become essentially Russia's biggest training grounds.

[Ursus Maior]

Does anyone have any recent numbers for Ukraine's mobilization?
Latest official numbers by the Ukrainian - minister of defense Reznikov - government were from July and stated that:

"There are up to 700,000 people mobilized for the Armed Forces, up to 60,000 border guards, up to 90,000 National Guards, and up to 100,000 National Police. Today, we have more than 1 million people in uniform ensuring the security and defense sector," said Reznikov.

https://babel.ua/en/news/81183-the-minister-of-defense-named-the-number-of-ukrainians-mobilized-to-the-armed-forces

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

Both sides seem to mass troops around Zaporizhzhia and Russia claims it started an offensive their: https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1616779015422885893?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5 Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1616779015422885893%7Ctwgr% 5E0a0622e5832e22ee5b8437de817831835901ba22%7Ctwcon %5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld% 2Flive%2F2023%2Fjan%2F21%2Frussia-ukraine-war-ukrainians-to-train-on-leopard-2-tanks-despite-lack-of-agreement-on-supply-live

[Raellus]

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

The winter weather is undoubtedly miserable, but sub-zero conditions means the ground is frozen, which allows heavy AFVs to move off-road/cross-country. In the spring, when the ground thaws, Ukraine's infamous Rasputitsa makes it difficult, if not impossible, for heavy AFVs to operate off-road.

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/mud-in-ukraine-history-of-russian-army-and-rasputitsa.html

The almost clockwork arrival of the Rasputitsa in early spring makes Russia's decision to launch its invasion of Ukraine in February deliciously ironic.

-

[Vespers War]

The winter weather is undoubtedly miserable, but sub-zero conditions means the ground is frozen, which allows heavy AFVs to move off-road/cross-country. In the spring, when the ground thaws, Ukraine's infamous Rasputitsa makes it difficult, if not impossible, for heavy AFVs to operate off-road.

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/mud-in-ukraine-history-of-russian-army-and-rasputitsa.html

The almost clockwork arrival of the Rasputitsa in early spring makes Russia's decision to launch its invasion of Ukraine in February deliciously ironic.

-
Depending on where in Ukraine one looks, they haven't necessarily had sustained sub-zero temperatures. Kharkiv, sure, they've stayed below zero all month. In Kherson, the only days in January where the high temperature was at or below zero Celsius were the 8th and the 19th. In Melitopol, only the 19th and 20th had a high of zero, every other day this month has been above freezing. Zaporizhzhia has had 9 days above freezing and 13 at or below freezing. I've seen speculation that Ukraine's not moving much along the southeastern front because the ground's not frozen hard and mobility is worse than if it was colder.

[Ursus Maior]

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.
-
My take is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are getting to the point of being overstretched. Not necessarily is this the case in form of personnel, there are plenty of light forces in the Bakhmut area available (cf. https://militaryland.net/news/invasion-day-333-summary/ and here: https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/), but they begin to feel the lack of tanks, IFVs and ammunition. They have been pretty clear on that for months now: warning of coming Russian offensive operations and dire logistical situations, especially concerning Soviet type ammunition.

With the newfound attacks in the Zaporizhzhia oblast and front, there might not be enough of an armored relief force available as of now, in order to counterattack north of Bakhmut against Russian forces at Soledar.

I wouldn't be surprised, if Ukraine has to regroup to towns West of Bakhmut soon, maybe as far as Kostyantynivka. That's only 10 km to the Southwest and the city is pretty well fortified by now. But it'd still be a problem regarding the information warfare for some time.

[Raellus]

The casualities are vastly discrepant and by now means the same for both. It's 100k KIA for the Russians plus countless WIA, MIA and POW. The Russian chain of rescue for WIA is abysmal, their hospitals ill-equipped.

On the contrary, Ukraine has around or likely above 100,000 total casualities, including KIA, WIA, MIA and POWs with Western support in later stage medical treatments, logistical help in getting first aid material and first aid training to the front. Their ratio of KIA and WIA will be far superior to Russia's and their abilities to regenerate combat effectiveness from WIA will be far better.

Recent reports put Russian KIA and WIA, combined, at between 100-180k. Ukrainian losses- again, both KIA and WIA combined- are believed to be upwards of 100k. That's not even a 2 to 1 ratio in Ukraine's favor.

I'd like to see some POW figures from both sides. My impression is that more Russian troops have been captured, but what's the actual difference? Is it statistically significant?

Again, Ukraine is at or near full mobilization. Russia, on the other hand is not. They still have untapped manpower reserves. Yes, qualitatively, Russia's replacement troops are inferior but, quantitatively, Russia still has a decided edge.

Also, Ukrainians are likely to reenlist and volunteer for service. Russians more or less have to force their citizens into service and have been scraping the barrel for months.

True, but I worry about the psychological toll that almost a full year of near continuous combat operations is taking on the Ukrainian military. Combat exhaustion is real. Physical and psychological wounds tend to degrade combat effectiveness over time.

Also, Belarus isn't going to join them. Despite the fact that Lukashenka has allowed Belarus to become essentially Russia's biggest training grounds.

Why are you so certain?

-

[kato13]

I know the Russians have a history of coming back after unfathomable losses, but so many intangibles are working against them:
Return rate of WIA (after recovery)
Nearly 100k troops being trained outside of Ukraine up to NATO standards.
Equipment is shifting to more current generations rather than the opposite
New trucks daily, while Russia never really focused on them and is really scraping the barrel for anything to move equipment.
Ukraine has greater sources of Artillery rounds, yes both sides are going to need to curtail their usage, but unless China starts to supply Russia they will be hit much harder.
US/Nato Satellite Imagery and C3I.

[Raellus]

The floodgates have opened, it seems. Not only is Germany authorizing the transfer of several nations' Leopard II tanks to Ukraine, but the US is sending 30+ of its own Abrams MBTs as well.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-german-tanks-435da2221bf452a8aae9d2e58d23acae

I'm a bit concerned about the Abrams' logistical requirements (especially re their gas turbine engines). Apparently, that was one reason that the US initially balked at the transfer. It might end up being more helpful symbolically than militarily. The acquiescence may have been required to end Germany's reticence to authorize the transfer of the more numerous, less thirsty Leopards. Reports indicate that Ukrainian tank crews have been training on the Leopard in Poland for weeks now.

My biggest worry is what Putin's response will be. There's been saber-rattling before the transfers were even confirmed. He may try something desperate before the modern Western MBTs arrive on the battlefield. This could lead to the escalation the German government was worried about. We shall see.

-

[kato13]

Current MBT commitments and possibilities.

UK - 14 Challenger 2 battle tanks,

Germany - 14 Leopard 2 tanks (Arriving within 3 months),

Poland - 14 Leopard 2 tanks,

USA - 31 Advanced M1 Abrams tanks,

Portugal - 4 Leopard 2 tanks

Spain, Norway and Finland also said that they are going to send their own Leopard tanks but they are currently weighing the numbers.

Also, Netherlands is considering to buy 18 Leopard 2 tanks from Germany and providing them to Ukraine as they don't own any.

Funny after always looking at a minimum of battalion numbers(40-58), these counts do look like T2k Division MBT numbers.

[Raellus]

Also, Netherlands is considering to buy 18 Leopard 2 tanks from Germany and providing them to Ukraine as they don't own any.

This is particularly ironic being that, during the Cold War, the Dutch did own/field the Leopard II. They got rid of them in around 2010, essentially because Russia was no longer perceived to pose a threat to Europe (resulting in budget cuts and force restructuring). :rolleyes:

Funny after always looking at a minimum of battalion numbers(40-58), these counts do look like T2k Division MBT numbers.

So true! :D

-

[Vespers War]

Current MBT commitments and possibilities.

UK - 14 Challenger 2 battle tanks,

Germany - 14 Leopard 2 tanks (Arriving within 3 months),

Poland - 14 Leopard 2 tanks,

USA - 31 Advanced M1 Abrams tanks,

Portugal - 4 Leopard 2 tanks

Spain, Norway and Finland also said that they are going to send their own Leopard tanks but they are currently weighing the numbers.

Also, Netherlands is considering to buy 18 Leopard 2 tanks from Germany and providing them to Ukraine as they don't own any.

Funny after always looking at a minimum of battalion numbers(40-58), these counts do look like T2k Division MBT numbers.

The 18 from the Netherlands are tanks they're currently leasing with an option to buy.

Spain's Leopard 2 apparently will be whatever can be repaired within 2 months from the 53 Leopard 2A4 currently in storage at Zaragoza. They have 108 total of that model, but the other 55 are in Spain's North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. They also have a bunch of Leopard 2E/2A6, but those are in active service and (AFAIK) not being discussed as potential transfers.

[Homer]

I’d be interested to know the spares, maintenance, sustainment, and recovery package going with the tanks. I read that there are some M88s being sent, anyone heard anything else? Going off the density of tanks alone there should be a couple Forward Support Companies worth of tools, trucks, etc.

[Trooper]

This is particularly ironic being that, during the Cold War, the Dutch did own/field the Leopard II. They got rid of them in around 2010, essentially because Russia was no longer perceived to pose a threat to Europe (resulting in budget cuts and force restructuring). :rolleyes:


Dutch sold their Leopard 2A6 tanks to Finland.:)

Last tanks were delivered after Russian invasion to Ukraine. There was minor uproar in Holland about their defense policy…

[kato13]

Apparently due to tech export restrictions the US M1 will need to be new builds, delaying them until 2024. I have read that the Australians have retired essentially the same versions (no advanced armor package) as they are getting the newest versions as part of our unified defense against China.

Has there been any talk of Australia donating these lower tech units to the cause? I know the US is trusting Australians with the holy grail of our tech (nuclear sub stuff), so lets do this swap out early and get the M1A1a moving to Europe.

[Heffe]

My biggest worry is what Putin's response will be. There's been saber-rattling before the transfers were even confirmed. He may try something desperate before the modern Western MBTs arrive on the battlefield. This could lead to the escalation the German government was worried about. We shall see.
-

Word has it that the past couple of days have seen increased levels of combat, particularly in the south near Donetsk and Zaporizhia. ISW at least perceives these assaults as spoiling attacks, presumably in preparation for a large increase of Russian troop numbers along the Svatove direction that they believe precludes a looming Russian offensive.
While it makes sense from a domestic propaganda perspective for Russia to try to reclaim the lost territory near Kharkiv, I can't help but wonder how much metal they still have available to try such a large offensive.

To your point Rae, I also wonder if this is Russia realizing that with western tanks inbound, their time to make big moves may be coming to an end. While a couple of battalions of western tanks won't win the war on its own or anything, it would be enough to put the war's initiative back into Ukraine's hands. And as we saw previously with HIMARs transfers, these MBT offerings from the west may be just the beginning. The floodgates are opening, and I'm not sure I see a path back for Russia, despite their manpower advantage.

[Vespers War]

Apparently due to tech export restrictions the US M1 will need to be new builds, delaying them until 2024. I have read that the Australians have retired essentially the same versions (no advanced armor package) as they are getting the newest versions as part of our unified defense against China.

Has there been any talk of Australia donating these lower tech units to the cause? I know the US is trusting Australians with the holy grail of our tech (nuclear sub stuff), so lets do this swap out early and get the M1A1a moving to Europe.

Ukraine is allegedly (according to multiple anonymous sources) being provided with M1A2 (exact version unclear, but AFAIK only SEP v3 is currently in production, while older ones could be pulled out of mothballs). Army leadership said yesterday they're providing civilian leadership with a number of options on how to deliver those, since Lima has around 2.5 years of production backlog between Taiwan and (especially) Poland at current rates. I expect one option will be diverting new export builds, while another option will be taking old turrets and replacing the DU armor inserts with the FMS armor inserts. There might be other options as well, but those are the first two to come to mind.

[Ursus Maior]

Recent reports put Russian KIA and WIA, combined, at between 100-180k. Ukrainian losses- again, both KIA and WIA combined- are believed to be upwards of 100k. That's not even a 2 to 1 ratio in Ukraine's favor.
The big factor here would be the ratio between KIA and WIA and from what we know about the war - reliable sources are the biggest problem here - Ukrainian medical care is superior to Russian. That has several factors:


Russian (and Soviet) CASEVAC and care was always far worse than Western and Ukraine was trained close to Western standards,
supply issues regarding first aid and all other tiers of medical care are well documented for the Russian side in this war,
Ukraine is fighting on its own soil, so hospitals are closer at hand and
civilian volunteer forces are available, because defense of the nation is an accepted common goal,
Russia is fighting an invasion and occupying Ukraine after a very destructive conquest, so their own hospitals are further away from the frontlines, even those in territories of their proxies, and
critical infrastructure in occupied territories is often damaged, especially due to the destructive nature of Russian offensive warfare: where Russia goes, its forces can hardly use critical infrastructure or only in vastly diminished forms, also, local volunteers are hardly available.

None of these factors benefits Russian forces to regenerate its forces from MIA casualties. In fact, it all of these factors are detrimental to medical care, increasing the number of Russian casualties that decease after reaching rearward medical care as MIAs or become permanently invalid.

Next, permanently invalids of the Russian forces are lost for the war effort almost completely. They will receive a pension, at least nominally, but are unlikely to contribute meaningful to further force generations. Ukrainian invalids have started civilian efforts to further the war effort (humanitarian aid mostly) or can, in some cases, be of use to the armed forces in administrative positions. This allows the armed forces to free up certain personnel.

I'd like to see some POW figures from both sides. My impression is that more Russian troops have been captured, but what's the actual difference? Is it statistically significant?

That's a big blurry subject in open sources, yes. My impression from the few numbers released was that Ukraine is eager to get its people back, so they often made deals that released their own people in infavorable ratios: more Russians were released than Ukrainians. But that seems to have changed recently, this compilation at the end of the text tells me: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War#Prisoners_of_war

Again, Ukraine is at or near full mobilization. Russia, on the other hand is not. They still have untapped manpower reserves. Yes, qualitatively, Russia's replacement troops are inferior but, quantitatively, Russia still has a decided edge.

Ukraine is very far from total mobilization and I don't know where you get an otherwise impression. Ukraine has somewhere around 11 million men at an available age for service and around 6,5 to 7 million fit for military service. About 400,000-450,000 men reach mobilization age each year. Mobilization so far has brought the strength of the armed forces to around 700,000 soldiers.

Quantities don't matter unless they're exploitable. And Russia's junta has clearly refrained from exploiting the full quantities available. This partially thanks to dismembering the necessary infra structure and blatant corruption in the remaining structures of mobilization during the years of "reforming the army", i. e. building a professional, expeditionary force and largely abandoning conscription service. However, another big factor is that mobilization en masse would mean mobilizing in the metropolitan centers of Moscow and Saint Petersburg as well as other large cities. This would be hugely unpopular and would mean bringing large swathes of unhappy people from all across the country into these cities - because that's how large scale transport works in Russia - and arm them. That trick didn't work well in 1917 for the government in power at the time.

As long as Russia mobilizes by scraping barrels in the provinces and sending inmates to the front as mercenaries, their quantitative factor remains unexploited. And since they lost most of their experienced long term cadre, including a good chunk of school staff early in the war, their training is now hampered.

Ukraine on the other hand trains new troops by the thousands, including the core of two new armored/mechanized divisions in the UK, Poland and Germany (by German and American instructors). Their instructors are among the best in the world, training them in mechanized warfare to the standards that so far kept Ukraine free and were proven successful at least twice in Iraq.


True, but I worry about the psychological toll that almost a full year of near continuous combat operations is taking on the Ukrainian military. Combat exhaustion is real. Physical and psychological wounds tend to degrade combat effectiveness over time.

Combat exhaustion is a true problem and its effects remain to be studied in this war. However, it's not true that Ukrainian soldiers or Western volunteers don't get time off. Force regeneration is definitely important and Ukraine knows this.

However, what Ukraine's forces can do that Russia's cannot is transfer of experiences. Human wave tactics - as seen in Bakhmut recently - and the horrific losses during the early weeks around Kyiv and the Northeast of Ukraine, have destroyed previously prestigious Russian divisions, including the vaunted VDV, and prohibit learning lessons on an operational level.

Why are you so certain?

Lukashenka is good at one thing: Staying alive and in power. He gains nothing from joining the war. He can loose everything. First of all, it makes his nation a target. Second, he couldn't count on Putin defending Belarus, if NATO would take punitive actions against Belarus. The Belarusian armed forces are a joke. Their size was reduced to minimal forces, equipment is decrepit and their best tanks were given to Russia. Lukashenka did this on purpose. The armed forces are pro-Russian and were for a long time his most likely internal opposition with the means to oust him.

He built his own internal security troops to counter that inner threat to his power. Fortunately, this also made Belarus a military dwarf. The installations and barracks are still around, though. So he could offer Russia his help training Russian soldiers, similar to what Western armies do for Ukraine. The difference though is that Belarus has no high standards to train Russians too. They have no experience. So, most likely Belarussian soldiers guard the barracks and donate equipment, letting Russia do all the rest: bring trainers, curricula and recruits.

Next, Russia is clearly playing the long game in Belarus. ISW stated that for the foreseeable future, the northern attack vector through Belarus seems unlikely for a new Russian offensive. They neither have the troops nor the equipment ready there. Would Belarus join in an offensive in the next winter? Unlikely. Again, Lukashenka would have to expand his military for that and reequip it, too. That only gets him to have a well armed internal opposition. Should Putin win, they would be on his side and better experienced than Lukashenka's internal security force. Should Russia loose, they'd likely drag Belarusian troops with them, probably sacrificing them first. This would generate unrest in the forces, making a mutiny more likely. Who'd be guilty of getting Belarusians killed in Ukraine? Lukashenka! That's a good way to end up like Ceaușescu.

Lukashenka needs to fear the war on all layers and probably does so. But the new sanctions hit him hard too, so he needs Russia for his survival, too. Also, if Russia becomes chaotic, that's not good for him either. Should the war end with a Ukrainian victory, Belarusian fighters who volunteered for Ukraine, will return home and probably start to dismember his power, maybe even using direct action and guerilla warfare. So, a frozen conflict would be Lukashenka's best option. For that, he needs Russia to keep going, but not win.

[Raellus]

I confess that I've been largely playing devil's advocate in this debate, both as a foil of sorts to the more sanguine among us, and to temper my own expectations lest I be disappointed.

Your points are all well taken, Ursus. I shan't argue simply to argue. In actuality, I am very hopeful that Ukraine emerges victorious and territorially whole again. That said, I don't want to get my hopes up too high.

Also, since this is a T2k forum, I almost can't help myself from looking at the Ukraine War through a T2k lens- trying to extrapolate plausible ways that this regional conflict could escalate, spill over, and result in a much wider war, even WW3. I'm not too worried about this happening, IRL, any time soon but, to be totally transparent, the Cold War kid in me still fears nuclear Armageddon.

I guess you could say that I'd rather focus on closer-to-worst-case scenario and end up being pleasantly surprised at a more positive outcome than expecting a best-case scenario and be disappointed when things end up worse than anticipated.

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[castlebravo92]

I don't see a way Russia "wins" without resorting to nukes.

At this point, I think Russia being able to hold onto Crimea and the Donbass is suspect. They already lost the best of their mechanized forces, burned through most of their PGMs, and don't have the industrial capacity to re-generate their forces. Having to import drones from Iran and artillery shells from North Korea is a *really bad sign*. This would be like the US having to purchase ammo from Guatemala.

Yes, they can keep throwing people at the problem, but that just generates more bodies to bury. Hoping your opponent runs out of ammo before you run out of bodies isn't a great military strategy in this day and age.

And Ukraine doesn't need force parity to defeat the Russians. Two heavy mechanized divisions equipped, trained, and supplied to Western standards is going to be sufficient to route a bunch of paroled convicts and old conscripts with 1 or 2 days of training, no food, and suspect leadership.

And part of me can't shake the feeling that Poland is itching to get it on with Russia. I highly suspect that if it looked like Ukraine was going to fall now, that Poland would intervene. And then it gets real sporty.

The $64,000 question is whether or not China makes a military play for Taiwan (which, I don't think they will do without also getting North Korea to attack South Korea). That's the only non-nuclear wildcard that might give Putin some daylight.

[Targan]

Apparently due to tech export restrictions the US M1 will need to be new builds, delaying them until 2024. I have read that the Australians have retired essentially the same versions (no advanced armor package) as they are getting the newest versions as part of our unified defense against China.

Has there been any talk of Australia donating these lower tech units to the cause? I know the US is trusting Australians with the holy grail of our tech (nuclear sub stuff), so lets do this swap out early and get the M1A1a moving to Europe.

I haven't seen any discussion on this in the Australian media, it's mostly been trumpeting the donation of Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles.

[kato13]

Anyone have "Israel launches drones from inside Iran(or possibly Azerbaijan) to disrupt drone delivery to Russia" on their unexpected twists in this conflict bingo card?

We are serious amateurs/under appreciated professionals at making this kind of stuff up and this one still :eek: me.

[Vespers War]

Anyone have "Israel launches drones from inside Iran(or possibly Azerbaijan) to disrupt drone delivery to Russia" on their unexpected twists in this conflict bingo card?

We are serious amateurs/under appreciated professionals at making this kind of stuff up and this one still :eek: me.

I suspect disrupting drone delivery to Russia was an unintended consequence. Israel's interest is in disrupting Iran's production of weapons to prevent their distribution within the Middle East, with little concern (although probably not no concern) for how it affects things elsewhere on the globe. Their primary concern is Shaheds making their way to Hezbollah rather than Shaheds striking Kyiv.

[Raellus]

I suspect disrupting drone delivery to Russia was an unintended consequence.

Given that Israel has so far refused to provide military aid to Ukraine, despite direct pleas from the latter party, I'll second this VW's assessment. Nonetheless, these strikes may end up indirectly helping Ukraine so that's pretty cool.

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[kato13]

Given that Israel has so far refused to provide military aid to Ukraine, despite direct pleas from the latter party, I'll second this VW's assessment. Nonetheless, these strikes may end up indirectly helping Ukraine so that's pretty cool.

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It is a distinct possibility, but your and VWs assessment is the perfect cover to not get the Russians to escalate in Syria and make the US happier about their non action in regards to Ukraine. Maybe a 50/50 play?

[kato13]

Anyone else want to do a T2k campaign/adventure in Bakhmut, Ukraine, USSR now? I feel like I now know that area, just as well as I know the area around Kalisz or Krakow.

[Raellus]

It is a distinct possibility, but your and VWs assessment is the perfect cover to not get the Russians to escalate in Syria and make the US happier about their non action in regards to Ukraine. Maybe a 50/50 play?

Definitely a possibility.

Anyone else want to do a T2k campaign/adventure in Bakhmut, Ukraine, USSR now? I feel like I now know that area, just as well as I know the area around Kalisz or Krakow.

As far as Ukraine's war-torn urban scenery, the images will definitely be useful for Ref's attempting to set the scene for their players. The photos could work for pretty much any Eastern European urban setting, as pretty much all Bakhmut's distinct identifying features have been blasted beyond recognition.

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[Raellus]

Ukrainian forces have terminated their first Russian BMPT. Hopefully the other "Terminators" meet the same fate very soon.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/hasta-la-vista-baby-ukraine-kills-its-first-russian-terminator-combat-vehicle

It looks like the "Terminator" in question had been abandoned prior to the artillery strikes, as it makes no effort to evade or reposition after the first near miss.

If that is indeed the case, it highlights another major shortcoming of the Russian ground forces that's become very apparent since the invasion kicked off almost a year ago- the failure to recover disabled AFVs. Do the Russians simply lack sufficient numbers of ARVs with which to do so, or is this failure more a function of poor tactics and battlefield command and control? I tend to think it's more the latter, as like vehicles (i.e. another BMPT or AFV with sufficient horsepower) could conceivably taken its disabled sister under tow and drag it out of harms way.

Also, the footage could indicate that the BMPT was operating alone. This is a tactical blunder that we've seen repeated over and over by the Russian ground forces in Ukraine.

Bringing this back around to T2k, does the BMPT make an appearance in your T2kU? (It does in mine.)

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[Heffe]

Also, the footage could indicate that the BMPT was operating alone. This is a tactical blunder that we've seen repeated over and over by the Russian ground forces in Ukraine.
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I have to admit that Russia's absolute bonkers lack of viable armor doctrine has been one of the more shocking revelations of the war. It's been over a year now, and we're still continuing to see armor, completely unsupported by infantry, moving forward to assault entrenched positions. Not only are we still seeing this kind of activity on the Russian side, but it doesn't seem to be improving at all.

[Vespers War]

Ukrainian forces have terminated their first Russian BMPT. Hopefully the other "Terminators" meet the same fate very soon.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/hasta-la-vista-baby-ukraine-kills-its-first-russian-terminator-combat-vehicle

It looks like the "Terminator" in question had been abandoned prior to the artillery strikes, as it makes no effort to evade or reposition after the first near miss.

If that is indeed the case, it highlights another major shortcoming of the Russian ground forces that's become very apparent since the invasion kicked off almost a year ago- the failure to recover disabled AFVs. Do the Russians simply lack sufficient numbers of ARVs with which to do so, or is this failure more a function of poor tactics and battlefield command and control? I tend to think it's more the latter, as like vehicles (i.e. another BMPT or AFV with sufficient horsepower) could conceivably taken its disabled sister under tow and drag it out of harms way.

Also, the footage could indicate that the BMPT was operating alone. This is a tactical blunder that we've seen repeated over and over by the Russian ground forces in Ukraine.

Bringing this back around to T2k, does the BMPT make an appearance in your T2kU? (It does in mine.)

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It was reported as disabled before the indirect fire strikes. This might have been a strike to eliminate it before it could be dragged away for repairs. It was destroyed by the 140th Marine Reconnaissance Battalion, a relatively new unit that was stood up in 2019. The fighting was geolocated to a forest between Kreminna and Bilohorivka, Luhasnk Oblast.

A little further south, Russia lost 31 vehicles in Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, including 13 tanks (mostly T-72B3, at least one T-80BVM) and 12 BMPs.

Getting back to the game, I haven't used the Terminator. It's too new for the timelines I've run, with a single company of 9 vehicles formed last year. If I was going to use the BMPT concept, I'd probably go back to the late 1980s BMPT designs. Both were built on modified T-72B hulls in 1987.

Object 781 sb.7 used two independently rotating turrets, each with a 2A42 30mm autocannon and a coaxial PKT. Each turret could also have either a 4-pack of smoke grenades or a twin ATGM launcher (I've seen different sources claim it as either a Konkurs or Ataka launcher). There were also a pair of 30mm grenade launchers or a pair of PKTs in the front fenders, along with a pair of NSV machine guns to cover the flanks and rear from a low-profile "mini-turret" behind the main turrets. It carried 550 rounds for each autocannon, 2000 rounds for each machine gun, and 300 grenades for each launcher (inf installed). Crew was 7 - a driver and two gunners at the front of the hull, the commander and gunner in the middle, and two NSV gunners at the rear.

Object 781 sb.8 had a more conventional layout with a turret containing a 2A70 100mm gun from the BMP-3 and a coaxial 2A42 30mm gun with 50 and 500 rounds respectively, along with up to 4 Bastion gun-fired anti-tank missiles. It also had a pair of hull-mounted PKTs that could fire to the side or front, and the same fender-mounted automatic grenade launcher and PKT module as Object 781. It had 1,000 rounds for each PKT and 300 for each grenade launcher, and likewise had a crew of 7.

Allegedly there was also an Object 781 sb.9 with a 57mm gun, but I haven't found any solid information on that. The Soviet Union was more impressed with Object 781 sb.7 and planned to put it into production, and then the collapse happened.

[Vespers War]

According to a European acquaintance of mine, one of the rumors/theories/speculations going around Russian social media of people with an interest in military matters is that Ukraine is using RAAM (Remote Anti-Armor Mine) shells to re-fill minefields after Russian units clear them, and that is the reason for some of the recent videos of multiple vehicles getting taken out by mines. The theory is that Ukraine's laying a minefield, waiting for scout units to clear a path (and presumably observing where the path is from a drone), then using RAAM to re-deploy anti-tank mines into the cleared path before the main body of a formation can pass through. Each 155mm RAAM shell deploys 9 anti-tank mines with either a 4 hour or 48 hour self-destruct designed into them.

[Raellus]

According to a European acquaintance of mine, one of the rumors/theories/speculations going around Russian social media of people with an interest in military matters is that Ukraine is using RAAM (Remote Anti-Armor Mine) shells to re-fill minefields after Russian units clear them, and that is the reason for some of the recent videos of multiple vehicles getting taken out by mines. The theory is that Ukraine's laying a minefield, waiting for scout units to clear a path (and presumably observing where the path is from a drone), then using RAAM to re-deploy anti-tank mines into the cleared path before the main body of a formation can pass through. Each 155mm RAAM shell deploys 9 anti-tank mines with either a 4 hour or 48 hour self-destruct designed into them.

I seem to remember reading about a similar tactic, albeit drone-free, in Red Storm Rising or similar late Cold War military fiction.

On Friday, Reuters reported that Russia has resorted to the "tactic" of sending conscripts across minefields in the vicinity of Vuhledar to "clear" them in advance of the main effort. That might just be Ukrainian propaganda fed to the Western media, but I certainly wouldn't put it past the Russians at this point.

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