OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Vespers War]

I'd be surprised if there's just a single goal, since there are quite a few to choose from. Among the more likely ones:

1. Seize the initiative from Russia and force them to respond/adapt rather than following planned actions. Russia is improving on its early-war improvisational capabilities, but that improvement is from an abysmal starting point and they're still not good at it.

2. Strike at Russian logistics. Sudzha controls the main rail line supporting the Kharkiv front.

3. Strike into and occupy Russian territory for morale purposes (on both sides) and to strengthen Ukraine's position at any future negotiations.

4. Related to 3, strike into areas where conscripts are located. As long as the war is fought on Ukrainian territory where conscripts aren't deployed, casualties can be written off as "oh, they volunteered for it." Start inflicting casualties on conscripts and the level of unrest might increase as families lose children/spouses/parents that didn't volunteer for that risk.

I actually expect Ukraine to avoid the nuclear power plant as much as possible. Only half of it is operational, and there is probably more downside than upside to approaching it. Russia's shown an eagerness to use nuclear power plants to protect troops. If Ukraine were to damage it, it would be a propaganda coup for Russia. Even if Ukraine didn't damage it, I wouldn't put it past Russia to do so and claim Ukraine was responsible.

I also don't think it's just a feint since the 80th is involved. That's a top-tier unit in an army that doesn't have enough of those to easily spare one for a feint. Pulling Russian units away from the existing front is almost certainly a goal, but I doubt it's the only goal or even the primary one.

[Raellus]

I wonder how much of a strategic reserve, if any, Ukraine has. It seems that now would be a good time to launch a major counterattack at another point in the front line and either achieve another breakthrough- which would really ef the Russians ish up- or at least regain some territory lost over the spring-summer.

In terms of the possible Ukrainian strategic objective of gaining Russian territory to use as leverage in any upcoming peace talks, I just can't see Putin negotiating unless it's from a position of strength.

Last week, maybe, I read somewhere (wish I'd made note of the source) that something like 40,000 Ukrainian men have fled the country so far this year. If true, I'm not sure what to make of that. If this were a war of choice for Ukraine, I could understand- for example, if it was 40,000 Russian men that had left their country. But this war was forced upon Ukraine; for Ukrainians, it is very much an existential conflict, both on a national and a personal level. In the minds of these recent expats, is Ukraine- socially, culturally, politically, economically- simply not worth fighting/potentially dying for? I can only imagine what the Ukrainian troops on the front lines think of their countrymen who've fled the country.

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[Targan]

I actually expect Ukraine to avoid the nuclear power plant as much as possible. Only half of it is operational, and there is probably more downside than upside to approaching it. Russia's shown an eagerness to use nuclear power plants to protect troops. If Ukraine were to damage it, it would be a propaganda coup for Russia. Even if Ukraine didn't damage it, I wouldn't put it past Russia to do so and claim Ukraine was responsible.

I wonder how much of a strategic reserve, if any, Ukraine has. It seems that now would be a good time to launch a major counterattack at another point in the front line and either achieve another breakthrough- which would really ef the Russians ish up- or at least regain some territory lost over the spring-summer.

Okay, you two have officially freaked me out. In the days since each of you posted, Russia deliberately set fire to one of the cooling towers at Zaporizhzhia, and the Ukrainians punched another hole in the border and advanced into Belgorod.

[Ewan]

Last week, maybe, I read somewhere (wish I'd made note of the source) that something like 40,000 Ukrainian men have fled the country so far this year. If true, I'm not sure what to make of that. If this were a war of choice for Ukraine, I could understand- for example, if it was 40,000 Russian men that had left their country. But this war was forced upon Ukraine; for Ukrainians, it is very much an existential conflict, both on a national and a personal level. In the minds of these recent expats, is Ukraine- socially, culturally, politically, economically- simply not worth fighting/potentially dying for? I can only imagine what the Ukrainian troops on the front lines think of their countrymen who've fled the country.

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While it may not be the article you're thinking off, it presents a similar story
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz994d6vqe5o

[Raellus]

While it may not be the article you're thinking off, it presents a similar story.

Thanks, Ewan. That's a very insightful article on the mentality of Ukrainian draft dodgers.

War Zone, my go-to website for military-related news, posted this article in which a former Ukrainian senior officer shared his succint take on the likely objectives of Ukraine's recent Kursk incursion.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/kursk-invasion-plan-developed-by-lessons-learned-from-failed-counteroffensive-retired-ukrainian-officer

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[kato13]

Getting a little back on topic for the forum. Hummers in Russian territory. Who would have thunk it.

Could easily see this modded to a photo to pencil conversion in any of the rule books.

https://i.redd.it/4rymum4m8oid1.jpeg

[Tegyrius]

Could easily see this modded to a photo to pencil conversion in any of the rule books.

Here ya go.

https://de-fenestra.com/t2k/images/4rymum4m8oid1_sketch.jpeg

(Two-stage process in GIMP. Filters > Decor > Old Photo, then Colors > Desaturate > Color to Gray.)

- C.

[Raellus]

@Tegyrius, that's a dead ringer for v1-2.2 art.

Sadly, it looks like the Kursk incursion is not yet slowing Russian advances in Donetsk. Ukraine is preparing to evacuate the city of Pokrovsk as Russian forces close in.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-pokrovsk-df997d0f23bd7dcdfc6f20080ab133e7

The article includes this very succinct analysis of Ukrainian and Russian thinking re the expansion of the war into the Kursk region of Russia.

"Ukraine is wagering it can cope with the strain on its resources involved in the attack in Kursk without sacrificing Donetsk. Russia apparently reckons it can contain the incursion without needing to ease up in Donetsk."

I really hope Ukraine's gamble doesn't come back to bit it in the butt.

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[Raellus]

Russia's advance on Pokrovsk, a critical transportation hub on the Donetsk front is picking up steam. Apparently, Ukrainian defenses in the battle area are in disarray, ammunition is in short supply, reinforcements not readily available, and operational leadership is lacking.

One Russian analyst warned that Ukraine is giving up ground so easily this past week that the UAF must be setting a trap for Russian forces. I certainly hope that this is the case. Seen on a map, the Russians have pushed a pretty significant salient towards Pokrovsk. If strong mechanized Ukrainian forces were available to launch major counterattacks, the shoulders of the bulge are vulnerable.

But with so many upper-tier UAF forces committed to operations in the Kursk area, reports indicate that only recently stood-up brigades or battalions pulled from quiet areas on other fronts are available.

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[Vespers War]

Russia's advance on Pokrovsk, a critical transportation hub on the Donetsk front is picking up steam. Apparently, Ukrainian defenses in the battle area are in disarray, ammunition is in short supply, reinforcements not readily available, and operational leadership is lacking.

One Russian analyst warned that Ukraine is giving up ground so easily this past week that the UAF must be setting a trap for Russian forces. I certainly hope that this is the case. Seen on a map, the Russians have pushed a pretty significant salient towards Pokrovsk. If strong mechanized Ukrainian forces were available to launch major counterattacks, the shoulders of the bulge are vulnerable.

But with so many upper-tier UAF forces committed to operations in the Kursk area, reports indicate that only recently stood-up brigades or battalions pulled from quiet areas on other fronts are available.

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One additional potential factor that was brought up to me in another conversation is that Russia's currently advancing over open terrain. Their swift advance is across land that's pretty much impossible to defend in either direction. The open question is what Russia's rate of advance will look like once they hit terrain more suited to the defense, particularly since many of those recently stood-up units are motorized infantry rather than mechanized infantry or armor.

[Raellus]

Over the past couple of days, Ukraine has hit some big Russian ammunition depots in the Tver region with spectacular results. According to War Zone,

"Such was the power of the detonation that a light-magnitude earthquake was reported in the Tver region, registering at 2.8 on the Richter scale."

Why weren't these depots hit earlier?

Connecting back to T2k, the number of well-stocked arms depots in Russia speaks to the massive quantities of ammunition stockpiled during the Soviet era.

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[kato13]

Connecting back to T2k, the number of well-stocked arms depots in Russia speaks to the massive quantities of ammunition stockpiled during the Soviet era.

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Solidifies that the 2000 counter-attack makes sense, as it would take longer to deplete all the reserves.

[kato13]

Another story that seems right out of T2k

Russian aircraft carrier crew sent to frontline in Ukraine (https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/russian-aircraft-carrier-crew-sent-to-frontline-in-ukraine/)

[Targan]

Another story that seems right out of T2k

Russian aircraft carrier crew sent to frontline in Ukraine (https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/russian-aircraft-carrier-crew-sent-to-frontline-in-ukraine/)

Bizarre :confused:

[Heffe]

Over the past couple of days, Ukraine has hit some big Russian ammunition depots in the Tver region with spectacular results. According to War Zone,

"Such was the power of the detonation that a light-magnitude earthquake was reported in the Tver region, registering at 2.8 on the Richter scale."

Why weren't these depots hit earlier?

Connecting back to T2k, the number of well-stocked arms depots in Russia speaks to the massive quantities of ammunition stockpiled during the Soviet era.

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Could be a lot of reasons, but the one I had read that seemed most convincing was that these bases were hit by Ukraine's new domestic rocket drone, which was only recently unveiled. This one:

https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-discloses-details-of-secret-palyanytsya-missile/

If true, it could be that Ukraine simply didn't have domestic weapons capable, until recently, of hitting the facilities. Or alternatively they didn't feel that they had a solid corridor through Russia's AA net to make it work until now.

[Vespers War]

Could be a lot of reasons, but the one I had read that seemed most convincing was that these bases were hit by Ukraine's new domestic rocket drone, which was only recently unveiled. This one:

https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-discloses-details-of-secret-palyanytsya-missile/

If true, it could be that Ukraine simply didn't have domestic weapons capable, until recently, of hitting the facilities. Or alternatively they didn't feel that they had a solid corridor through Russia's AA net to make it work until now.

The UJ-25 Skyline would also have the range and is jet-powered, but even that was first shown to the public only a year ago and it allegedly has a much smaller warhead than Palianytsia (~10 kg versus ~50 kg). Regardless of type, it would take a while to build up the inventory for the 100+ drone salvo allegedly used for the first depot strike. Strizh would also have the range, but not the numbers, to strike the depot 300 miles from the Ukrainian border.

[Raellus]

Apparently, North Korea is sending troops to Ukraine to support Russian combat ops.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/north-korea-wading-deeper-into-russias-war-against-ukraine

So, according to Putin, NATO sending ground forces- even just as rear echelon support troops- to Ukraine to help it fight Russia is a "red line" that will trigger a nuclear response, but Russia can field DPRK troops in combat-support roles. As yet, neither Russia nor North Korea is bothering to pretend that these troops are independent volunteers or mercs. I wouldn't be at all surprised if North Korea starts sending ground combat troops to Ukraine.

Recent reports indicate that a few DPRK troops have already been KIA by UAF artillery/air strikes.

Russia already has a 10-to-1 advantage in troop strength v. Ukraine. DPRK support troops will allow Russia to employ even more cannon fodder on the front lines...

How does Ukraine stand a chance, long-term, when it is forced to fight with one hand tied behind its back and Russia can do whatever the hell it wants? Hopefully, this move by Pyongyang prompts Seoul to fast-track weapon transfers- especially artillery ammo and AFVs- to Ukraine.

Seriously, NATO needs to step up or Europe is going to end up with some very nasty neighbors.

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[kato13]

Again trying to pull game info from this war, this pdf gives a good primer on what is necessary to manufacture artillery shells in a limited resource environment.

https://static.opensourcecentre.org/assets/osc_ore_to_ordnance.pdf

Starting at page 37 I learned a bit about what would go into the Russians making new artillery shells and what manufacturing plants might be significant.

[castlebravo92]

Read an interesting thing yesterday. Apparently in all the US and all of Europe outside of the Ukraine and Russia, there is a SINGLE installation still making TNT that the ENTIRE West, including the US, is dependent on for making artillery shells, and that installation is in Poland.

[kato13]

Read an interesting thing yesterday. Apparently in all the US and all of Europe outside of the Ukraine and Russia, there is a SINGLE installation still making TNT that the ENTIRE West, including the US, is dependent on for making artillery shells, and that installation is in Poland.

Does that include South Korea? (As they are "Western" in everything but direction). I really hope RoK starts evening the playing field given the DPRK support of Russia.

[Raellus]

Bad News:

Recent reports claim that North Korea is sending combat troops to Ukraine. Some have already appeared on the front line in the Kursk bulge. On the plus side, there are already unconfirmed reports that some of the North Korean troops have already deserted. Considering how far they are from home, where these deserters are going off to is a big question. A better option would probably be defection (by surrendering to Ukrainian forces).

Good News:

Australia is sending 49 surplus M1A1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. Forbes reports that these vehicles will go to the 47th Mechanized Brigade, Ukraine's current M1 operator. About half of the first batch of Abrams have been destroyed or damaged/pulled from the fighting. Ukrainian Abrams are modified with Soviet-era reactive armor and anti-drone cages.

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[Drgonzo2011]

Read an interesting thing yesterday. Apparently in all the US and all of Europe outside of the Ukraine and Russia, there is a SINGLE installation still making TNT that the ENTIRE West, including the US, is dependent on for making artillery shells, and that installation is in Poland.

Source? I thought US military explosives were made at Holston.

[castlebravo92]

Source? I thought US military explosives were made at Holston.

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/02/06/us-army-hunts-for-explosives-to-meet-increased-munitions-output-goals/

Holsten manufactures IMX-104 but not TNT.

From the article:

"Currently there is no TNT production in the U.S. and the supplies come from allies such as Australia and India.

Poland is a major supplier, but with every country ramping up production to support Ukraine and meet their own demands, Bush noted late last year, the U.S. will need to onshore TNT production."

[Vespers War]

Bad News:

Recent reports claim that North Korea is sending combat troops to Ukraine. Some have already appeared on the front line in the Kursk bulge. On the plus side, there are already unconfirmed reports that some of the North Korean troops have already deserted. Considering how far they are from home, where these deserters are going off to is a big question. A better option would probably be defection (by surrendering to Ukrainian forces).

Good News:

Australia is sending 49 surplus M1A1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. Forbes reports that these vehicles will go to the 47th Mechanized Brigade, Ukraine's current M1 operator. About half of the first batch of Abrams have been destroyed or damaged/pulled from the fighting. Ukrainian Abrams are modified with Soviet-era reactive armor and anti-drone cages.

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While not a modification per se, the Ukrainian Abrams also have American reactive armor. What I've seen pictures of is Kontakt-1* on the glacis and M19 ARAT on the hull sides, with no ERA on the turret and no second layer of ARAT (M32) on the hull sides. Based on what I've seen written about them, using Paul's pages they'd be M1A1 SA, with an extra 80 AV vs Heat on the HF and 100 AV vs Heat on the HS**, using the book rules for ERA for everything other than the additional armor value. Normally I'd just consider a cage to add Sp to the relevant armor, but the Abrams already has that for TS, so all it would do is add Sp to TR.


*This could be Nizh instead of Kontakt. Ukraine has started loading Kontakt containers with Nizh modules because the Nizh containers were hard to reload. If it's Nizh, it only adds around 75 AV vs Heat, but also adds 25 AV vs kinetic penetrators, which Kontakt-1 doesn't help against at all.

**A Ukrainian write-up finally gave me the first estimate I've seen of ARAT's effectiveness, which was that M19 adds 500-550mm of RHA-equivalent protection against HEAT. I still don't have any estimates for M32, and I don't know how good that estimate for the M19 is, but it sounds plausible and is better than not having an estimate at all.

[pmulcahy11b]

Here's Simon Whistler's take on whether the Russians are pulling tanks out of museums.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4yqUwxddTY

[Raellus]

For the past couple of weeks, news hasn't been good for Ukraine and it keeps getting worse. I think Russia's use of an experimental IRBM armed with conventional warheads is interesting. Apparently, Moscow warned the US gov't beforehand. This is a dangerous precedent and will require a mutual trust that hasn't been earned and I don't think either side is particularly eager to give.

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[HaplessOperator]

For the past couple of weeks, news hasn't been good for Ukraine and it keeps getting worse. I think Russia's use of an experimental IRBM armed with conventional warheads is interesting. Apparently, Moscow warned the US gov't beforehand. This is a dangerous precedent and will require a mutual trust that hasn't been earned and I don't think either side is particularly eager to give.

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Probably unearned, but the trajectory of a ballistic shot becomes obvious fairly immediately on launch, and the launches themselves are trackable by FIRMS and more advanced national reconnaissance assets; a ballistic threat to the United States isn't exactly something that would go unnoticed,

Publicly, we're no longer launch on warning, with the stated doctrine being to launch following a confirmed detonation (again, something that would be detected immediately), but one imagines that this doctrine would go out the window if multiple launches were detected and the course tracks indicated deployments against strategic assets, which in and of itself is a straightforward mathematical exercise in firing solutions.

One assumes this is why we maintain launch on warning readiness and capability despite not officially maintaining it as policy. Sidelong observations being a full nuclear deployment would be rather difficult to miss, given the nature of how it must be conducted to have even a remote hope of knocking out enough assets to make such a gambit "worth it," and that a single delivery vehicle being launched would be madness, as it would precipitate a full strategic escalation without inflicting any serious damage to the United States; a half measure would be utter suicide, and a functional deployment would be the most obvious event imaginable.

Though this is entirely conjecture, it's also likely we knew about the launch prep even before they told us; our defense intelligence apparatus has flexed several times in the past two decades with detailed information about Russian test launches immediately prior to or immediately after the Russians have issued a bare public acknowledgement.

On another front, one wonders exactly what state their nuclear arsenal is in. Their entire defense budget (including nuclear readiness) amounts to roughly about what we spend on nuclear maintenance alone.