OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Heffe]

According to a European acquaintance of mine, one of the rumors/theories/speculations going around Russian social media of people with an interest in military matters is that Ukraine is using RAAM (Remote Anti-Armor Mine) shells to re-fill minefields after Russian units clear them, and that is the reason for some of the recent videos of multiple vehicles getting taken out by mines. The theory is that Ukraine's laying a minefield, waiting for scout units to clear a path (and presumably observing where the path is from a drone), then using RAAM to re-deploy anti-tank mines into the cleared path before the main body of a formation can pass through. Each 155mm RAAM shell deploys 9 anti-tank mines with either a 4 hour or 48 hour self-destruct designed into them.

Seems we've had confirmation of the US M70 mines being used, which is indeed RAAM-deployed. I remember reading about FASCAM in the Big Yellow Book so many years ago and wondering about the system and its uses - it's interesting to actually see it being deployed for its intended purpose like this. It sounds as though we've provided Ukraine something like 10200 RAAM rounds since the start of the war.

[Vespers War]

Seems we've had confirmation of the US M70 mines being used, which is indeed RAAM-deployed. I remember reading about FASCAM in the Big Yellow Book so many years ago and wondering about the system and its uses - it's interesting to actually see it being deployed for its intended purpose like this. It sounds as though we've provided Ukraine something like 10200 RAAM rounds since the start of the war.

RAAM is one component of FASCAM. On the artillery side there's also ADAM (Area Denial Artillery Munition), which is like RAAM but with 36 anti-personnel mines instead of the 9 anti-armor mines. They also have either a 48 hour (M67) or 4 hour (M72) self-destruct mechanism, along with a battery that will discharge in 14 days so that even if the self-destruct fails, the detonator will be inactive after 2 weeks.

GEMSS and Volcano were/are the ground vehicle mine dispensing systems for FASCAM, while GATOR and Volcano were/are the aerial vehicle mine dispensers. GATOR was used in the Gulf War to inhibit Iraqi mobility, but had a rather horrendous dud rate, possibly because it was hotter than their designed limits. Its mines could be set (by a switch on the dispenser before take-off) to self-destruct in 4 hours, 15 hours, or 15 days, and the battery would be discharged in 40 days.

[ToughOmbres]

I seem to remember reading about a similar tactic, albeit drone-free, in Red Storm Rising or similar late Cold War military fiction.

On Friday, Reuters reported that Russia has resorted to the "tactic" of sending conscripts across minefields in the vicinity of Vuhledar to "clear" them in advance of the main effort. That might just be Ukrainian propaganda fed to the Western media, but I certainly wouldn't put it past the Russians at this point.

-

Nor would I-could be disinformation but sounds very reminiscent of the NKVD penal units sent forward through minefields. Wouldn't surprise me a bit.

[kato13]

For what rainy day is Russia saving its air force?


Spring boarding an offensive
Exploiting a breakthrough
Stopping a UKR offensive (perhaps towards Mariupol?)
Punishing civilian targets if the war starts to sour
Last ditch effort to protect Crimea
Some form of complicated logistical interdiction (intercepting new NATO Equipment?)


I was expecting a bit more action from the Russian air force for the probing attacks and small scale advances that have been made in the last few weeks. But I have not heard of any tick up. When do you think they will make a major appearance?

[kcdusk]

I don't think the airforce will make an appearance. Its felt to me like loosing a helicopter or aircraft always resulted in more promotional advantage for Ukraine, that its not worth the risk to Russia to fly them. Too embarrassing to loose a single unit.

Or, aircraft require so much more maintenance that they are not fit to fly.

So i don't think its a case of saving the air force for a rainy day. Its either embarrassment or not in a fit state.

[Raellus]

It is somewhat surprising that the Russians haven't made greater use of their air force during this war. In the lead up to the war, much was made of Russia's superiority in air power vis-a-vis the Ukranians.

That said, I have seen references to an uptick in Russian tactical air sorties during the recent fighting for Bakhmut. In fact, in a PR stunt, the Wagner PMC head challenged President Zelensky to an air duel after allegedly flying a SU-24 over the embattled city. That same SU-24 was damaged a day or two later by a MANPAD in the AO, but the aircraft made it to base safely.

Re helicopters, I recently read that the Russians have changed their tactics after losing up to a third of their KA-52 fleet so far. They are now pairing KA-52s with Mi-28s because their respective defensive countermeasures complement each other. I can't remember which is which, but one is stronger against radar-guided SAMs and the other is better against heat-seeking missiles.

I think KC makes a good point re appearances. In the cost benefit analysis, the Russians have probably concluded that benefits of using their air power do not outweigh the combat losses plus the PR embarrassment of same.

-

[kato13]

So strange they don't see losing 1000 men a day as not worth the PR.

I guess keeping that Ace always in the hole makes the UKR forces reticent to push when they have a slight advantage. Personally I am not sure Putin could survive the loss of Crimea, if that is threatened that is where I expect to see all cards go onto the table.

[Raellus]

So strange they don't see losing 1000 men a day as not worth the PR.

I agree, but for the Russians, life is cheap. Literally. A SU-34, on the other hand...

-

[Raellus]

In the early days of the war, I saw a lot of stories about how the Switchblade loitering munition was going to make a big impact in the hands of the Ukrainian army. Aside from a couple of videos showing Switchblades in action (including one where it attacked a civilian sedan), I've not seen/heard any references to their use or effectiveness (or lack thereof).

On the other hand, the Ukraine Weapons Tracker Twitter feed regularly shares video clips of Russian Lancet loitering munitions in action. Although they appear pretty accurate, they don't seem to do much damage to hard targets- in many cases the target can be repaired and returned to action relatively quickly. I get the impression that the Lancet's warhead is not very powerful.

Is this evidence of the rare example of a Russian system (Lancet) that is more effective than a comparable NATO one (Switchblade), or is there another explanation?

-

[Vespers War]

In the early days of the war, I saw a lot of stories about how the Switchblade loitering munition was going to make a big impact in the hands of the Ukrainian army. Aside from a couple of videos showing Switchblades in action (including one where it attacked a civilian sedan), I've not seen/heard any references to their use or effectiveness (or lack thereof).

On the other hand, the Ukraine Weapons Tracker Twitter feed regularly shares video clips of Russian Lancet loitering munitions in action. Although they appear pretty accurate, they don't seem to do much damage to hard targets- in many cases the target can be repaired and returned to action relatively quickly. I get the impression that the Lancet's warhead is not very powerful.

Is this evidence of the rare example of a Russian system (Lancet) that is more effective than a comparable NATO one (Switchblade), or is there another explanation?

-

I think it's mostly that Switchblade 300 isn't all that visually impressive. There have been a few videos of their use taking out bunkers and tank crews, but because of how that version functions, they often look like failures. The 300 uses a directional fragmentation warhead roughly equivalent to a 40mm grenade that detonates ahead of the target and kills infantry or soft-skin vehicles. Particularly if the target's under cover, it looks like the system blows up short and nothing happened. The 600 isn't in full production, but would likely generate more video attention because it uses a warhead based on Javelin's.

As far as Lancet goes, the smaller Lancet-1 is a 5 kilogram drone with a 1 kilogram warhead, while Lancet-3 is 12 kilograms with a 3 kilogram warhead. Switchblade 300 is smaller (2.7 kilograms including its carrying case and launcher), while Switchblade 600 is much larger (54.5 kilograms). The debris from a destroyed Lancet included parts from Samsung, Semtech, Analog Devices, Infineon, NXP Semiconductor, and Mtech, all COTS bits, so the Russian electronics industry is as nonexistent as ever.

[Ursus Maior]

I agree, but for the Russians, life is cheap. Literally. A SU-34, on the other hand...

-

Currently any heavy gear, vehicle or airplane, is irreplaceable for the Russians. Men are just forced into service via the prison system - a knack the defense department has copied from Wagner now, apparently - or conscription. Material on the other hand cannot be repaired to pre-war standards, because Russia lacks western supplies or has sold of - often via corruption - parts. Also, planes are either old or extremely rare and sometimes external costumers have rights to being supplied. If Russia doesn't honor these contracts, they loose their last allies.

Als Gen. Miley put it the other day: "Russia has lost strategically, operationally and tactically."

Currently, Russia is thus loosing combatants in record tempo, but only a handful of tanks and armored vehicles per day. Alas, the Ukrainians seem to hunt down SAM vehicles and SPAAGs with priority now. Each day sees about two systems destroyed.

[Heffe]

It is somewhat surprising that the Russians haven't made greater use of their air force during this war. In the lead up to the war, much was made of Russia's superiority in air power vis-a-vis the Ukranians.

That said, I have seen references to an uptick in Russian tactical air sorties during the recent fighting for Bakhmut. In fact, in a PR stunt, the Wagner PMC head challenged President Zelensky to an air duel after allegedly flying a SU-24 over the embattled city. That same SU-24 was damaged a day or two later by a MANPAD in the AO, but the aircraft made it to base safely.

Re helicopters, I recently read that the Russians have changed their tactics after losing up to a third of their KA-52 fleet so far. They are now pairing KA-52s with Mi-28s because their respective defensive countermeasures complement each other. I can't remember which is which, but one is stronger against radar-guided SAMs and the other is better against heat-seeking missiles.

I think KC makes a good point re appearances. In the cost benefit analysis, the Russians have probably concluded that benefits of using their air power do not outweigh the combat losses plus the PR embarrassment of same.

-

I get the impression that there are a few factors comingling to result in the west not seeing the Russian Air Force in action.

First, we know that they are definitely still flying sorties, as you mention, Rae. Not only near Bakhmut, but there's stories (albeit few) that sorties continue over many areas of the front with quite some regularity. This is somewhat evidenced by Ukraine's fairly frequent claims of shooting down additional aircraft. So part of the impression we have may be simply due to lack of reporting on the number of Russian sorties that are actually happening.

Second, by all accounts, the Russians have lost quite a few aircraft already. Not that I would expect this to mean that their stocks are depleted by any measure, but it does mean that they may be running low on competent pilots. Training new pilots is a long process.

Next, we know the Russian logistical chain is a nightmare at present. A comparatively large portion of their air force may be grounded due to lack of parts/ammunition.

Not only the above, but given the increasing numbers of western AA systems operating in Ukraine, Russia may have done the math and figured that they would lose too many planes. As mentioned, this could result in a PR/morale issue for them, but also, it might just mean that Russian pilots and officers are reluctant to want to fly too deep behind Ukrainian lines.

Finally, I'm not as up on differences with Russian air doctrine as others here, but perhaps that's playing a part as well?

I'll end on this note - the fact that Ukraine even still has an Air Force, let alone one actively flying sorties, a year after the invasion began, is a portent of doom for this entire "Military Operation".

[Raellus]

Those are all good points, Jeffe.

This article does a decent job of explaining why Russia was unable to seize Kiev in the first days of the war, highlighting several persistent, systematic failings that continue to plague Russian forces nearly one year later.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64664944

Although, one year into the war, Russia is still struggling to achieve any of its strategic and operational goals, we shouldn't count them out just yet. First off, it appears that Russia is prepared to fight a long war of attrition. Economic sanctions have not had the desired effect and, despite heavy losses of manpower and ground vehicles, the Russians are showing no signs of calling it quits anytime soon.

At the same time, numerous reports over the past two weeks have lamented Ukraine's rapidly dwindling ammunition supplies. Reports from various fronts all cite critical shortages of all types of ammunition, but especially artillery shells and mortar bombs. Ukrainian forces have had to sharply decrease artillery fires due to these shortages, in some cases ceding local fire superiority to the Russians.

On the other side, earlier reports that Russia was running out of artillery ammunition (indicated by intel that Russia was buying ammo from North Korea and Iran) may have been exaggerated. Local ammunition shortages were probably caused by the destruction of ammo caches by HIMARS strikes and SOF raids. More recent reports suggest that the Russians have learned their lesson and are now placing ammo dumps beyond HIMARS range. At the moment, the Russians have enough artillery ammunition to launch daily H&I strikes near the Ukrainian border with Belarus, as well as supporting offensive operations in the east. Ukrainian intel believes the purpose of this daily shelling is to keep Ukrainian forces tied down in the north, away from the actual fighting in the Donbas and elsewhere.

-

[Heffe]

Those are all good points, Jeffe.

This article does a decent job of explaining why Russia was unable to seize Kiev in the first days of the war, highlighting several persistent, systematic failings that continue to plague Russian forces nearly one year later.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64664944

Although, one year into the war, Russia is still struggling to achieve any of its strategic and operational goals, we shouldn't count them out just yet. First off, it appears that Russia is prepared to fight a long war of attrition. Economic sanctions have not had the desired effect and, despite heavy losses of manpower and ground vehicles, the Russians are showing no signs of calling it quits anytime soon.

At the same time, numerous reports over the past two weeks have lamented Ukraine's rapidly dwindling ammunition supplies. Reports from various fronts all cite critical shortages of all types of ammunition, but especially artillery shells and mortar bombs. Ukrainian forces have had to sharply decrease artillery fires due to these shortages, in some cases ceding local fire superiority to the Russians.

On the other side, earlier reports that Russia was running out of artillery ammunition (indicated by intel that Russia was buying ammo from North Korea and Iran) may have been exaggerated. Local ammunition shortages were probably caused by the destruction of ammo caches by HIMARS strikes and SOF raids. More recent reports suggest that the Russians have learned their lesson and are now placing ammo dumps beyond HIMARS range. At the moment, the Russians have enough artillery ammunition to launch daily H&I strikes near the Ukrainian border with Belarus, as well as supporting offensive operations in the east. Ukrainian intel believes the purpose of this daily shelling is to keep Ukrainian forces tied down in the north, away from the actual fighting in the Donbas and elsewhere.

-

The ammunition situation for Ukraine is certainly a really major problem especially given that they seem to be raising additional brigades almost on a daily basis. That said, I don't get the impression that Russia is in a much better position. There's been quite a few reports that conventional Russian arty units are running very short on ammunition. And even more recently, some Wagner units have posted videos literally begging the Kremlin for artillery ammo - it's tough to say with this point though whether that's a result of scarce ammunition being prioritized toward army units, or if it's more related to the internal power struggles happening between Wagner and the MOD at the moment.

[Raellus]

And even more recently, some Wagner units have posted videos literally begging the Kremlin for artillery ammo - it's tough to say with this point though whether that's a result of scarce ammunition being prioritized toward army units, or if it's more related to the internal power struggles happening between Wagner and the MOD at the moment.

I get the sense that this is the case. Prigozhin seems to have gotten a big head and Putin's patience seems to have run out. Frankly, given some of Prigozhin's recent boasting re Wagners successes, whilst simulatenously loudly denigrating the regular army, it's a bit curious that it's taken this long for Putin to try bringing him to heel. I think that messing with Wagner's ammo is the way that Putin is doing that.

I really don't get Wagner any more. Their use by the Kremlin made sense in Syria and Africa, where plausible deniability was useful, but in Ukraine, it seems counter-productive. Prigozhin's private fiefdom reminds me a bit of Himler's early Waffen SS. I'm really surprised that Putin allows someone with such a big personality to amass that much hard power. I don't see any reason why the Russian army can't also empty the prisons for cannon fodder. I imagine it would be cheaper than paying Wagner to do it.

Given that most of Putin's vocal critics or troublesome allies have ended up dead or in prison, I'm kind of surprised Prigozhin is still alive.

-

[Heffe]

I get the sense that this is the case. Prigozhin seems to have gotten a big head and Putin's patience seems to have run out. Frankly, given some of Prigozhin's recent boasting re Wagners successes, whilst simulatenously loudly denigrating the regular army, it's a bit curious that it's taken this long for Putin to try bringing him to heel. I think that messing with Wagner's ammo is the way that Putin is doing that.

I really don't get Wagner any more. Their use by the Kremlin made sense in Syria and Africa, where plausible deniability was useful, but in Ukraine, it seems counter-productive. Prigozhin's private fiefdom reminds me a bit of Himler's early Waffen SS. I'm really surprised that Putin allows someone with such a big personality to amass that much hard power. I don't see any reason why the Russian army can't also empty the prisons for cannon fodder. I imagine it would be cheaper than paying Wagner to do it.

Given that most of Putin's vocal critics or troublesome allies have ended up dead or in prison, I'm kind of surprised Prigozhin is still alive.

-

I've also been pretty surprised at Putin's delay in reining Prigozhin in. From him him openly courting Russian milbloggers to talking shit about Russian regular forces, it makes me think that Putin still needs him for some reason. Or perhaps he has something/knows something that Putin needs/needs to not get out - which, given his past with the Internet Research Agency, wouldn't be super surprising. This is all speculation, of course.

As far as Wagner is concerned, I do wonder if there's still some domestic benefit to them being separated from the MOD in an official capacity. I mean clearly everyone knows that they're a part of Russian forces, but perhaps there's a legal component there. My understanding is that it's illegal for the Russian military to actually conscript from prisons, so perhaps Wagner has just evolved as a constitutional loophole to allow for an extralegal arm of the military.

[Raellus]

If you enjoy long-form print journalism, I highly recommend the Atlantic.

From the article:

"One year ago, Russia launched a war that many never expected it to wage and assumed it would quickly win against a cowed Ukraine and its allies. How and when will the conflict end? For a war that has defied expectations, those questions might seem impossible to answer. Yet I recently posed them to several top historians, political scientists, geopolitical forecasters, and former officials—because only in imagining potential futures can we understand the rough bounds of the possible, and our own agency in influencing the outcome we want."

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/02/forecasting-end-of-ukraine-war-one-year-later/673159/

-

[Targan]

Second, by all accounts, the Russians have lost quite a few aircraft already. Not that I would expect this to mean that their stocks are depleted by any measure, but it does mean that they may be running low on competent pilots. Training new pilots is a long process.

Next, we know the Russian logistical chain is a nightmare at present. A comparatively large portion of their air force may be grounded due to lack of parts/ammunition.

Not only the above, but given the increasing numbers of western AA systems operating in Ukraine, Russia may have done the math and figured that they would lose too many planes. As mentioned, this could result in a PR/morale issue for them, but also, it might just mean that Russian pilots and officers are reluctant to want to fly too deep behind Ukrainian lines.

Haha yeah forcing Ukraine into a war of attrition cuts both ways, doesn't it? Combat aircraft are expensive and difficult if not quite impossible for Russia to replace, and training combat pilots is expensive and time-consuming. Six months ago Russia's military command probably thought that grinding the Ukrainians down over a year or two was the best path forward. Now they're caught between a rock and a hard place. Can't pull together enough people, gear and skill to have big, successful advances; can't afford to slowly bleed away what half decent equipment they have left. As ye sow, so shall ye reap.

[Targan]

I thought this article was a pretty good summary:

The 8 Reasons Why Russia’s Much-Hyped Coming Offensive Will Fail Miserably (https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/8-reasons-why-russias-much-hyped-coming-offensive-will-fail-miserably)

[bash]

With respect to Russia and Wagner, it really seems like Putin wants to use them as a no-lose scapegoat. If Wagner performs well it'll be played up and Putin will be hailed by his media apparatus as genius for using them. If they fail then they'll get written off and stiffed on the bill and probably turn out the whole war was their idea in the first place and they bamboozled poor Putin.

Also, as I understand it (I'm no Russiaologist) there's very much two Russias, the predominantly Slavic and wealthiest hubs of Moscow and St Petersburg and pretty much the rest of the country. When most of us think "Russia" we're thinking of the former. As long as the general zeitgeist of the war in those areas is positive then to the Russian government the population's view of the war is positive as nowhere else matters.

The use of Wagner helps insulate Russian urbanites from even seeing the war. The Russian government can ignore laws around conscription and deployment by using Wagner as a buffer. They can also assign contract soldiers from urban regions to ditch digging in Belarus or the rear in Donbas so when they go back home they tell everyone the war is not so bad and international news is exaggerating if not lying about what's happening in Ukraine.

[Bestbrian]

Russki's still fighting dumb and getting wrecked. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tanks.html

[Raellus]

My concern is that The Russians might be able to afford to continue to "fight dumb and get wrecked" and still win. It's not just me.

https://www.npr.org/2023/03/02/1159671076/ukraine-war-donbas-russian-ukrainian-troops

The author of the piece spoke to a Ukrainian sniper named Andriy. Here's what Andriy has to say about Russia's raw conscript soldiers:

"'The Russian mobilizational reserve is pretty much infinite', says Andriy, 'which means that they have the luxury to make mistakes. They can lose a brigade or they can lose a platoon, and some of those people are going to survive and they can share experience with the new conscripts.'"

He's got a point. Regarding his own [Ukrainian military], Andriy says,

"'Most of the people that were ready to take guns and fight, they came in the first two months and those people care coming to an end.' He means that they are mostly dead. He says the quality of the new soldiers is much lower. 'Some of them, they don't know how to hold a rifle.'"

-

[Bestbrian]

My concern is that The Russians might be able to afford to continue to "fight dumb and get wrecked" and still win. It's not just me.

https://www.npr.org/2023/03/02/1159671076/ukraine-war-donbas-russian-ukrainian-troops

The author of the piece spoke to a Ukrainian sniper named Andriy. Here's what Andriy has to say about Russia's raw conscript soldiers:

"'The Russian mobilizational reserve is pretty much infinite', says Andriy, 'which means that they have the luxury to make mistakes. They can lose a brigade or they can lose a platoon, and some of those people are going to survive and they can share experience with the new conscripts.'"

He's got a point. Regarding his own [Ukrainian military], Andriy says,

"'Most of the people that were ready to take guns and fight, they came in the first two months and those people care coming to an end.' He means that they are mostly dead. He says the quality of the new soldiers is much lower. 'Some of them, they don't know how to hold a rifle.'"

-

That's the popular view of Russia that's been burned into our head since the Napoleonic Wars and WWII through the Cold War, but current Russian demography is pitiful(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia).

Pair that with an authoritarian system that's trying to fight a war while hiding it from its urban population centers (which precludes drafting large numbers from Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc) and there aren't endless waves of Ivans to throw at the trenches anymore, especially of 18-49 year old males from rural backwaters. They might very well run out of men to crew their mothballed T-62s long before they run out of the vehicles themselves.

Keep in mind that Ukraine's demographics aren't much better, but the circumstances of this conflict allows them to mass mobilize a military backed by a highly motivated civilian population with a direct stake in the outcome, which gives them a higher percentage of a smaller pool. We'll have a better idea where this is all heading when the Ukrainian counteroffensives begin.

[Vespers War]

That's the popular view of Russia that's been burned into our head since the Napoleonic Wars and WWII through the Cold War, but current Russian demography is pitiful(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia).

Pair that with an authoritarian system that's trying to fight a war while hiding it from its urban population centers (which precludes drafting large numbers from Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc) and there aren't endless waves of Ivans to throw at the trenches anymore, especially of 18-49 year old males from rural backwaters. They might very well run out of men to crew their mothballed T-62s long before they run out of the vehicles themselves.

Keep in mind that Ukraine's demographics aren't much better, but the circumstances of this conflict allows them to mass mobilize a military backed by a highly motivated civilian population with a direct stake in the outcome, which gives them a higher percentage of a smaller pool. We'll have a better idea where this is all heading when the Ukrainian counteroffensives begin.

It's also worth noting that Russia's other recent(ish) wars have been against much smaller nations. Chechnya has a total population of 1.4 million. Georgia's population is 3.7 million. Ukraine has a population of 43.8 million. There's a literal order of magnitude of difference in the scale of what Russia's attempting to do here, and while the geography and type of war is much different, the size of the population Russia is trying to break the morale of is roughly the same as the population of Afghanistan.

[bash]

It's also worth noting that Russia's other recent(ish) wars have been against much smaller nations.

It's additionally worth noting these countries were physically much smaller than Ukraine as well. A smaller front let Russia concentrate it's more capable units into a much smaller area. With Ukraine there's over a thousand kilometers of border plus the border with Belarus.

While it's a lot of border for Ukraine to defend it also means it's a lot of border for Russia to hold once the invasion starts.

[Raellus]

This guy knows more than all of us here so I wouldn't be too quick to dismiss his assessment.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-new-yorker-interview/how-the-war-in-ukraine-ends?utm_social-type=owned&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&mbid=social_facebook&utm_brand=tny&source=Paid_Soc_FB_0_BoostedPosts_0_NYR_US_Prospec tingBroad_CM_PAC_Facebook_Desktop_Feed_&utm_campaign=Paid_Boosted_Traffic_&utm_boosted-type=Soc_FBIG_DR_BAUCM_Traffic&fbclid=IwAR2DDtywNIuABTxHDCjjRYmdBYWw_JNAk-tSboUKnm2VqM0BhoDZFyvnOHI

Here's a taste:

Q: "Last year, you told me, at a very early stage of the war, that Ukraine was winning on Twitter but that Russia was winning on the battlefield. A lot has happened since then, but is that still the case?"

A: "Unfortunately. Let’s think of a house. Let’s say that you own a house and it has ten rooms. And let’s say that I barge in and take two of those rooms away, and I wreck those rooms. And, from those two rooms, I’m wrecking your other eight rooms and you’re trying to beat me back. You’re trying to evict me from the two rooms. You push out a little corner, you push out another corner, maybe. But I’m still there and I’m still wrecking. And the thing is, you need your house. That’s where you live. It’s your house and you don’t have another. Me, I’ve got another house, and my other house has a thousand rooms. And, so, if I wreck your house, are you winning or am I winning?"

It's not all doom and gloom, but the expert does throw cold water on the idea of Ukraine achieving its stated victory conditions. The whole article is definitely worth a read- it's definitely the best macro assessment of the war that I've seen to date.

-

[Vespers War]

Good news for T2K lovers! There's a Giraffe!

The bad news - it's this thing:
https://i.redd.it/z8wnauspljla1.jpg

It's an MT-LB with a 25mm 2M-3 naval turret welded on top.

[Raellus]

Bakhmut

Is the Ukrainian high command making a foolish mistake by continuing to defend Bakhmut, or is it laying a deadly trap for the Russians?

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-bakhmut-on-the-brink

I've been reading every reputable report on the battle that I can find and no one- outside of the Ukrainian high command, perhaps (and even that's not clear)- seems to know what's really going on there, strategically-speaking. Either the Ukrainians are being very clever, and luring the Russians into a trap, or they're being very foolish and wasting precious manpower and resources on a city with much greater symbolic than strategic significance.

It's a meat-grinder for both sides, but the Russians can better afford the heavy losses. In some ways, Bakhmut has become the Stalingrad of the 21st century. Is Ukraine going to make the same mistake that German high command made in 1942? Or are they setting the Russians up for a taste of their own Uranus?

What do you think is going on there?


Combat Aircraft

There's been speculation about if/when the West will provide combat aircraft to Ukraine since the beginning of the war. Recent reports have been all over the place, but the aggregate of reportage leans towards a qualified yes.

Yesterday, a local Tucson, AZ TV news station reported that two Ukrainian pilots are visiting Davis Monthan AFB (where USAF pilots train on both the A-10 and the F-16). Is this a sign or a red herring?

Do you think the west is going to provide combat aircraft to Ukraine any time soon?

-

[Spartan-117]

I think aircraft are a possibility...

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/05/ukraine-pilots-f-16s-00085556

...but I think as long as they have airframes flying, NATO will seek to do the retrofit thing, like HARMs, JDAMs, etc.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/28/us/politics/ukraine-weapons-russia.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/23/us/politics/ukraine-weapons-russia.html

I mean how far can this go? Who knows. UIA 737s loaded with AIM-120 AMRAAMs? Hellfires on Mi-8 Hip pylons?

Also, they are a year into the war and have airframes flying against what at one point was the 2nd largest air force in the world. That's crazy and baller.

[Vespers War]

Bakhmut
What do you think is going on there?


I think Ukraine is buying time. Time to train units, time to receive Western equipment, and time for rasputitsa to end so that they can engage in maneuver warfare. A lot of the Ukrainian losses at Bakhmut are second-tier units, the TDFs and light infantry that are useful fighting on defense from prepared positions but can't attack a kitten successfully. It sucks to be them, but the longer they hold out, the more Ukraine's offensive units can refit and train for an attack once the mud dries up.


Tangentially, piecing together numbers from Oryx and making some estimates based on proportions of known losses and differences between Oryx's visually confirmed losses and UA's estimated losses, Russia has lost somewhere around half of its modern tanks, defining modern as the T-72B3, T-72B3M, T-80BVM, and T-90M (the four models with the enlarged autoloader that allows use of Svinets-2 rounds). Russia still has a lot of tanks, but their tank forces are weaker now than at the start of the war. Because of shortages of imported thermal imager components, tanks are receiving thermal sights that are roughly equivalent to what the US had in Desert Storm. Allegedly even elite units like 1st Guards Tank Army are including T-62 tanks in their formations, which is slightly eyebrow-raising.

[bash]

Bakhmut

What do you think is going on there?
-

Ukraine has effectively fixed the front for the muddy season with Bakhmut. NATO's estimates are the Russians are suffering a 5:1 loss ratio of personnel, Ukraine claims 7:1. The Russians are also losing AFVs left and right as each of their attempts at encirclement have been huge failures.

Bakhmut isn't cheap to hold but it completely blunted Russia's big push they had planned. Ukraine has a solid GLOC protected by high ground they control. By all accounts they've been conducting an orderly withdrawal over the past week.

I don't think the point is to keep Bakhmut forever, just continue fixing the Russians and bleeding their forces in preparation for a Ukrainian counterattack elsewhere once the mud dries enough for move heavy AFVs freely over fields.

Keep in mind Bakhmut is now little more than rubble. Might as well make the rubble bounce there then fall back and have another city leveled.

[Heffe]

Bakhmut
You're right that no one beyond arguably Ukrainian high command and NATO/US military advisors have any idea what's really going on here. I did read recently (I forget where) that estimates are putting Russian losses in the area at 1:5-7 in favor of Ukraine, and that a going theory was that Ukraine is simply willing to trade favorably against Russian forces to bleed Russia down a bit until western assets arrive in theater. I have no idea whether that casualty estimate is accurate or not, and I certainly won't believe Ukrainian or Russian estimates on the matter, but if true it might help explain the thought processes involved.

The optimist in me hopes that Ukraine is planning to let Russia advance on the flanks and then cut them off/encircle their forward elements with Ukraine's reserves. The pessimist is convinced that Ukraine just doesn't have that many forces still available and will be forced to start pulling back due to overwhelming numbers of Russian forces despite their training and technological advantages.

The only things we know for sure are that Bakhmut is a meatgrinder for at least the Russian forces - we know that because Russia has been throwing attacks at the city since August at least, with shelling of it beginning back in May. The fact that the Russian army hasn't been able to take Bakhmut in nearly 7 months despite throwing huge numbers of men and equipment at the city indicates that Russia is having a very difficult time gaining any real ground in Ukraine. Especially when paired with what happened at Vuhledar. We know that Ukraine has now left the eastern part of the city, but it seems to have been an orderly withdrawal, and Ukrainian forces are keeping a corridor open to the west. Whether that indicates that Ukraine will continue hold the western part of the city, or counterattack, is anybody's guess. The fact that there's a risk of encirclement and Ukraine hasn't pulled out yet indicates that Ukrainian leadership is either making a mistake by holding the destroyed town at all costs, or that they're smart and know something we don't. So far in the war, Ukraine's been very effective in their decision making, while Russia has been flailing all over the place, so that gives me some hope that Bakhmut is no exception and that there's some kind of plan.

Aircraft
I will happily eat crow here, but I don't think the west is going to be sending F16s to Ukraine anytime soon. At least not the US. It would represent quite a heavy escalation of forces, and could lead to further escalation on Russia's side. Not only, but as others have mentioned, the prospect of getting planes, parts, maintenance crew, and pilots trained, is likely going to take a year or more. Even if the process starts now, we're looking at a 2024 rollout. While it's certainly possible the war could go on that long, the runway to implementation feels too long, so to speak.

[Raellus]

BakhmutYou're right that no one beyond arguably Ukrainian high command and NATO/US military advisors have any idea what's really going on here.

What concerns me is that numerous reports seem to indicate that the US is advising Ukraine to pull out of the city but the Ukrainians continue to insist that they can and will hold it. Some reports indicate an orderly withdrawal is underway; others that reinforcements are still being sent into the city. What's really going on there?

The optimist in me wants to believe that the Ukrainians are setting the Russians up for something like you described (a-la 1942's Operation Uranus v the German 6th Army salient at Stalingrad). The pessimist in me worries that Ukrainian leadership is stubbornly wasting troops for primarily symbolic reasons.

I did read recently (I forget where) that estimates are putting Russian losses in the area at 1:5-7 in favor of Ukraine, and that a going theory was that Ukraine is simply willing to trade favorably against Russian forces to bleed Russia down a bit until western assets arrive in theater. I have no idea whether that casualty estimate is accurate or not, and I certainly won't believe Ukrainian or Russian estimates on the matter, but if true it might help explain the thought processes involved.

I saw a figure today of 1:3. At that rate, Ukraine will run out of troops before Russia does.

So far in the war, Ukraine's been very effective in their decision making, while Russia has been flailing all over the place, so that gives me some hope that Bakhmut is no exception and that there's some kind of plan.

You're right, and I'm trying to take reassurance from that fact, but I too worry that maybe Ukraine is finally making a really bad call in Bakhmut.

To anyone who hasn't read it yet, I highly recommend this piece from the New Yorker about the war to date and likely long-term outcomes.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-n...M0BhoDZFyvnOHI

-

[Vespers War]

Just for funsies, I decided to compare The Military Balance 2022's estimates of Russia's active tank force to Oryx's visually confirmed losses of Russian tanks. This has the obvious gap of not accounting for reactivated tanks, but it gives at least an idea of how their losses compare to their original tank fleet. For the purposes of this count, I included derivatives (so a T-72B obr. 1989 is counted as a T-72B), but did not include other variants (so a T-72A loss is not counted at all because Russia had no active T-72A in February 2022), and also did not count the T-90S even though they're identical to T-90A because Russia stole them from India, they weren't part of the pre-war fleet.

Older (pre-Svinets) tanks
T-72B/BA - 650 in service - 354 lost - 54.5% fleet loss
T-80BV/U - 310 in service - 357 lost - 115.2% fleet loss
T-90/A - 350 in service - 35 lost - 10.0% fleet loss

Newer (Svinets-capable autoloader) tanks
T-72B3 - 850 in service - 294 lost - 34.6% fleet loss
T-72B3M - 530 in service - 209 lost - 39.4% fleet loss
T-80BVM - 170 in service - 71 lost - 41.8% fleet loss
T-90M - 67 in service - 14 lost - 20.9% fleet loss

What concerns me is that numerous reports seem to indicate that the US is advising Ukraine to pull out of the city but the Ukrainians continue to insist that they can and will hold it. Some reports indicate an orderly withdrawal is underway; others that reinforcements are still being sent into the city. What's really going on there?

Being mildly flippant, if we're not sure what's going on, imagine how confused the Russians must be!

[bash]

Just for funsies, I decided to compare The Military Balance 2022's estimates of Russia's active tank force to Oryx's visually confirmed losses of Russian tanks. This has the obvious gap of not accounting for reactivated tanks, but it gives at least an idea of how their losses compare to their original tank fleet. For the purposes of this count, I included derivatives (so a T-72B obr. 1989 is counted as a T-72B), but did not include other variants (so a T-72A loss is not counted at all because Russia had no active T-72A in February 2022), and also did not count the T-90S even though they're identical to T-90A because Russia stole them from India, they weren't part of the pre-war fleet.

Older (pre-Svinets) tanks
T-72B/BA - 650 in service - 354 lost - 54.5% fleet loss
T-80BV/U - 310 in service - 357 lost - 115.2% fleet loss
T-90/A - 350 in service - 35 lost - 10.0% fleet loss

Newer (Svinets-capable autoloader) tanks
T-72B3 - 850 in service - 294 lost - 34.6% fleet loss
T-72B3M - 530 in service - 209 lost - 39.4% fleet loss
T-80BVM - 170 in service - 71 lost - 41.8% fleet loss
T-90M - 67 in service - 14 lost - 20.9% fleet loss


Yeouch! I've been paying attention to the Russian losses but this is a great perspective. I'm just amazed the brightest military minds in Russia have settled on a Zapp Brannigan (https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XDWcg8dh930) strategy. Unfortunately for them it seems the Ukrainians upgraded to 32-bit unsigned integers, their kill limits aren't going to hit a limit any time soon.

I'm also amused at the idea that somehow Russia is just playing dumb and their real offensive will start any day now. Like they've got some secret competent army waiting to be let loose.

[kato13]

Zapp Brannigan (https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XDWcg8dh930)

Another line I expect Russian command has been uttering.
https://media.tenor.com/yZsZ9gs_C70AAAAC/stop-exploding-zapp-brannigan.gif

[Heffe]

Yeouch! I've been paying attention to the Russian losses but this is a great perspective. I'm just amazed the brightest military minds in Russia have settled on a Zapp Brannigan (https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XDWcg8dh930) strategy. Unfortunately for them it seems the Ukrainians upgraded to 32-bit unsigned integers, their kill limits aren't going to hit a limit any time soon.

I'm also amused at the idea that somehow Russia is just playing dumb and their real offensive will start any day now. Like they've got some secret competent army waiting to be let loose.

And to think, that's only the losses which have been visually confirmed with photographic or video evidence!

It's difficult to know what Russia has left, but with T-62s already having entered the field, they can't be terribly happy with their armor losses thus far. I'd wager that they've probably lost somewhere between a third and a half of all of their available tank capacity, nationwide. Who knows how fast they're able to manufacture new machines, but it can't be enough to cope with that kind of widespread destruction of forces.

What concerns me is that numerous reports seem to indicate that the US is advising Ukraine to pull out of the city but the Ukrainians continue to insist that they can and will hold it. Some reports indicate an orderly withdrawal is underway; others that reinforcements are still being sent into the city. What's really going on there?

IMO, these kinds of reports too unreliable to take very seriously - even if it's true that the US advisors have been saying this, for all we know it could just be an intel operation to draw in more Russian/Wagner units for summary destruction. I have a feeling that we're not going to know for sure until we know, if you get my meaning.

[Raellus]

It's difficult to know what Russia has left, but with T-62s already having entered the field, they can't be terribly happy with their armor losses thus far. I'd wager that they've probably lost somewhere between a third and a half of all of their available tank capacity, nationwide. Who knows how fast they're able to manufacture new machines, but it can't be enough to cope with that kind of widespread destruction of forces.

I've seen the figure of 20 new builds per month from one particular plant. A couple of other plants are "refurbishing" older models (like the T-62), and/or repairing battle-damaged tanks.

This recent piece gives some insight into Russian MBT production.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/02/17/the-russian-army-could-run-out-of-tanks-in-a-few-years-what-happens-then/?sh=27a19f812061

-

[Heffe]

I've seen the figure of 20 new builds per month from one particular plant. A couple of other plants are "refurbishing" older models (like the T-62), and/or repairing battle-damaged tanks.

This recent piece gives some insight into Russian MBT production.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/02/17/the-russian-army-could-run-out-of-tanks-in-a-few-years-what-happens-then/?sh=27a19f812061

-

Nice find. 20 new builds a month isn't going to be nearly enough, especially not with western sanctions and lack of quality optics. Russia's best shot, I imagine, is going to be pleading with China.

[bash]

Nice find. 20 new builds a month isn't going to be nearly enough, especially not with western sanctions and lack of quality optics. Russia's best shot, I imagine, is going to be pleading with China.

Yeah those production/refurbishment estimates are likely based on pre-war levels which means before sanctions came into play. While sanctions won't mean Russia can't build any tanks, they're just more likely to be more equivalent to export/older models than top of the line models.

As we've seen even their top of the line kit are vulnerable to ATGMs, drones, poor logistics, and shitty tactics. I haven't seen any evidence the Russian army has learned any lessons along those lines in the past year. Even if they can roll out 900 tanks a year it doesn't amount to much strategically if they're abandoned or destroyed a few miles past the Russian lines of control.

[castlebravo92]

Yeah those production/refurbishment estimates are likely based on pre-war levels which means before sanctions came into play. While sanctions won't mean Russia can't build any tanks, they're just more likely to be more equivalent to export/older models than top of the line models.

As we've seen even their top of the line kit are vulnerable to ATGMs, drones, poor logistics, and shitty tactics. I haven't seen any evidence the Russian army has learned any lessons along those lines in the past year. Even if they can roll out 900 tanks a year it doesn't amount to much strategically if they're abandoned or destroyed a few miles past the Russian lines of control.

The joke is that the newly raised Russian troops are receiving twice as much training as the last round of troops.

2 days of training instead of 1 day.

[Vespers War]

I've seen the figure of 20 new builds per month from one particular plant. A couple of other plants are "refurbishing" older models (like the T-62), and/or repairing battle-damaged tanks.

This recent piece gives some insight into Russian MBT production.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/02/17/the-russian-army-could-run-out-of-tanks-in-a-few-years-what-happens-then/?sh=27a19f812061

-

The "one particular plant" is Uralvagonzavod's plant in Nizhny Tagil. It also refurbishes around 8 tanks per month. Three other plants refurbish a total of around 17 tanks per month. One is Omsk Transmash, which works on T-72 and T-80 tanks, bringing them up to T-72B3, T-72B3M, or T-80BVM standard. Another is the 103rd Armored Plant near Chita, which upgrades T-62 to T-62M. I don't know what the third plant is.

[bash]

The joke is that the newly raised Russian troops are receiving twice as much training as the last round of troops.

2 days of training instead of 1 day.

What a country! /yakov_smirnoff

[Raellus]

The bad news:

Some western analysts believe UAF casualties in the fighting for Bakmhut could hamper plans for a spring counteroffensive. The UAF is reportedly running low on ammunition and trained soldiers.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/13/ukraine-casualties-pessimism-ammunition-shortage/

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64955537

The good news:

Ukraine is finally going to receive more MiG-29s! Multiple reports indicate that Poland and Slovakia will soon deliver MiGs to the UAF.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/slovakias-mig-29s-are-officially-heading-to-ukraines-air-force

By now, I think we can predict Putin's reaction to the combat aircraft deliveries. More nuclear saber-rattling and a fresh barrage of missile attacks on Ukraine's infrastructure, resulting in even more civilian casualties, to be sure.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[Vespers War]

I was reading a bit on the MiG-29, particularly impressions from NATO pilots when they got to fly East German examples after reunification, and the consensus seems to be "great knife-fighter, but good luck surviving to get there." In any of its Soviet-era configurations, it's a very head-down aircraft due to a lack of automation and the need to manually configure switches and knobs, and it's intended to be guided to a target by ground control. Its radar only has something like a 43 mile range.

Both the Slovakian and Polish Fulcrums should be more pilot-friendly, since they received upgrades with NATO-compliant electronics that more heads-up. Slovakia has 9 upgraded single-seat aircraft and 2 twin-seat (originally they had 10 single-seat, but one crashed during a training exercise). Some are apparently in fairly rough shape, and IIRC only 4 were still active immediately before they were retired last year. I believe Poland upgraded 16 aircraft. Neither received any sort of Western weapons integration as far as I know, so they're still going to need Aphid, Adder, or Archer missiles for air-to-air combat, and Slovakia was out of those by the time they retired their aircraft.

Ukraine does have some upgraded MiG-29, the MiG-29MU1 and MiG-29MU2. The MU1 has electronics upgrades, extending the radar range to ~60 miles, adding GPS to the navigation, and using a NATO-standard radio, while the single MU2 also integrates precision air-to-ground weapons (a bit questionable IMO since the Fulcrum has a pretty pathetic payload of 4 tonnes, slightly more than half an F-16's payload). I don't know how many were upgraded to MU1 standard, and there's just the lone MU2 (which has been serving in an air defense role because they need that more than a bomb truck).

Slovakia's also sending half a battery of Kub/Gainful SAM launchers out of the four batteries that they had retained for training purposes, along with 200 missiles for the launchers.

[Heffe]

The bad news:

By now, I think we can predict Putin's reaction to the combat aircraft deliveries. More nuclear saber-rattling and a fresh barrage of missile attacks on Ukraine's infrastructure, resulting in even more civilian casualties, to be sure.

Slava Ukraini!

-

Regarding the nuclear saber-rattling, Russia seemed to back off of that track a while ago as the international community, and particularly China, seemed displeased by the constant threats of nuclear war. Given Putin's need for China's support, especially now, I don't think he can risk pissing off Xi by making empty threats about nukes. I suppose we'll see though. Definitely agreed that we'll see more missile strikes on civvies though. :(

[Raellus]

I was reading a bit on the MiG-29, particularly impressions from NATO pilots when they got to fly East German examples after reunification, and the consensus seems to be "great knife-fighter, but good luck surviving to get there." In any of its Soviet-era configurations, it's a very head-down aircraft due to a lack of automation and the need to manually configure switches and knobs, and it's intended to be guided to a target by ground control. Its radar only has something like a 43 mile range.

Check out this article about Israeli pilots test flying Polish MiG-29s against their own IAF aircraft in the 1990s. The Israelis quoted in the piece were really impressed, at the time.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/israels-secretive-mig-29-fulcrum-test-program

Both the Slovakian and Polish Fulcrums should be more pilot-friendly, since they received upgrades with NATO-compliant electronics that more heads-up. Slovakia has 9 upgraded single-seat aircraft and 2 twin-seat (originally they had 10 single-seat, but one crashed during a training exercise). Some are apparently in fairly rough shape, and IIRC only 4 were still active immediately before they were retired last year. I believe Poland upgraded 16 aircraft. Neither received any sort of Western weapons integration as far as I know, so they're still going to need Aphid, Adder, or Archer missiles for air-to-air combat, and Slovakia was out of those by the time they retired their aircraft.

Ukraine does have some upgraded MiG-29, the MiG-29MU1 and MiG-29MU2. The MU1 has electronics upgrades, extending the radar range to ~60 miles, adding GPS to the navigation, and using a NATO-standard radio, while the single MU2 also integrates precision air-to-ground weapons (a bit questionable IMO since the Fulcrum has a pretty pathetic payload of 4 tonnes, slightly more than half an F-16's payload). I don't know how many were upgraded to MU1 standard, and there's just the lone MU2 (which has been serving in an air defense role because they need that more than a bomb truck).

One of the pieces I read suggested that the Ukrainians might need to pull the more advanced western avionics from the Polish and Slovakian MiGs because their own Fulcrums still use older, less capable Soviet-era avionics.

On the other hand, as the Ukrainians have been able to mount HAARM missiles on their own MiG-29s successfully, how difficult would it be for them to mod their Fulcrums in order to use AIM-9 Sidewinders and/or other Western AAMs? AMRAAM would be a game-changer for the Ukrainians, but the US has stated that it is not in the cards (citing concerns re escalation and advanced Western active radar homing AAMs falling into Russian hands).

Regarding the nuclear saber-rattling, Russia seemed to back off of that track a while ago as the international community, and particularly China, seemed displeased by the constant threats of nuclear war. Given Putin's need for China's support, especially now, I don't think he can risk pissing off Xi by making empty threats about nukes. I suppose we'll see though. Definitely agreed that we'll see more missile strikes on civvies though. :(

I hope Xi can talk some sense into Putin, but that's like the Wolf advising the Fox to take it easy on the henhouse. ;)

-

[Bestbrian]

I hope Xi can talk some sense into Putin, but that's like the Wolf advising the Fox to take it easy on the henhouse. ;)

-

I think a lot of Putin's nuclear comments were misinterpreted by the West as being directed towards them, when they were actually directed towards China. Remember, he has a giant, exposed, resource rich ass hanging out there right in China's face. There's no way he could keep China out, and there wouldn't be anyone on the planet willing to help him do it.

[Vespers War]

One of the pieces I read suggested that the Ukrainians might need to pull the more advanced western avionics from the Polish and Slovakian MiGs because their own Fulcrums still use older, less capable Soviet-era avionics.
-

About a third of Ukraine's Fulcrums received avionics upgrades over the last decade, so it's a mix of Soviet-era and modern equipment on Ukraine's MiG-29 fleet.

Particularly given that most of the Slovakian MiGs are allegedly in terrible mechanical shape, the upgraded avionics are practically the only reason to take them. I think it's more likely they'll cannibalize some of their un-upgraded MiGs to get the Slovakian ones back into flying condition, since that would probably be slightly easier than pulling the electronics to install in the Ukrainian jets, which would be the other way to get good systems into the air.

[Raellus]

I think a lot of Putin's nuclear comments were misinterpreted by the West as being directed towards them, when they were actually directed towards China. Remember, he has a giant, exposed, resource rich ass hanging out there right in China's face. There's no way he could keep China out, and there wouldn't be anyone on the planet willing to help him do it.


That's an interesting take. Your point about Russia's vulnerable east is well taken, but why would Putin want to risk antagonizing one of his very few allies, and by far the most powerful?

This latest threat was prompted by the UK's announcement that it would provide Ukraine with DI ammunition for donated Challenger II MBTs.

https://www.npr.org/2023/03/25/1166089485/putin-russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons-belarus

There seems to be a clear-cut cause and effect relationship between Putin's nuclear threats over the past year or so and actions taken by NATO nations to provide military assistance to Ukraine.

-

[Heffe]

That's an interesting take. Your point about Russia's vulnerable east is well taken, but why would Putin want to risk antagonizing one of his very few allies, and by far the most powerful?

This latest threat was prompted by the UK's announcement that it would provide Ukraine with DI ammunition for donated Challenger II MBTs.

https://www.npr.org/2023/03/25/1166089485/putin-russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons-belarus

There seems to be a clear-cut cause and effect relationship between Putin's nuclear threats over the past year or so and actions taken by NATO nations to provide military assistance to Ukraine.

-

I'm not so sure about that. It appears as though Russia may have been pushing to move nukes into Belarus for quite some time, as a measure of strengthening control over the puppet-state.

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-december-1-2021-%E2%80%93-january-11-2022

Plus, accusing the west of providing nuclear arms to Ukraine, despite those arms actually being entirely free of fissionable material as we all know, seems like the thinnest of possible justifications.

[Raellus]

I'm not so sure about that. It appears as though Russia may have been pushing to move nukes into Belarus for quite some time, as a measure of strengthening control over the puppet-state.

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-december-1-2021-%E2%80%93-january-11-2022

Granted, but my point still stands. Although the stationing of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus may have been planned for some time prior to the announcement, the timing of Putin's public statements re same are not coincidental. Even if the "warnings" are a fait accompli, the public pronouncements are calculated, purposeful, and directed at NATO (not China).

Plus, accusing the west of providing nuclear arms to Ukraine, despite those arms actually being entirely free of fissionable material as we all know, seems like the thinnest of possible justifications.

100%

-

[Vespers War]

Ukraine is apparently about to receive 15 Viktor self-propelled anti-aircraft guns manufactured by Excalibur Army in Czech Republic. These are...well, are they still technicals if they're made in a factory?

See, the Viktor is a Toyota truck with modifications. They put a ZU-2 in the bed of the truck, which is a twin 14.5mm anti-aircraft mount. It has a day and night anti-aircraft sight and a daytime anti-ground sight. It's rigged for remote operation from the cab of the truck, so the gun doesn't need a crew member physically operating it. Each gun has a box of 300 rounds, another 300 rounds on the gun mount, and more ammo in the bed of the truck.

They're moderately sophisticated systems to use simple weapons against drones and other low-end aircraft. They're also something that would be pretty useful in a Twilight War scenario, with a base vehicle that's pretty common and easy to find parts for and a useful gun system that's rugged and reliable and usable from inside the vehicle. Armor's going to be non-existent, but that's true of pretty much anything that can be kept fueled and maintained by a small group.

[Raellus]

Finland is now a NATO member. And on the 74th anniversary of the alliance's founding, no less! Who'd have thunk it?

Could anyone have predicted this turn of events during the waning of the [1st] Cold War? Or 30 years ago? Or 20? Or even 10?

https://apnews.com/article/nato-finland-russia-ukraine-membership-enlargement-c703d23a8423d89577d5b752d69d76eb

Putin goes to war in large part to prevent Ukraine from increasing its ties to the EU and NATO and the result is... NATO expands, and Russia's border with NATO nations doubles.

Way to go, Vlad.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[Tegyrius]

This is a very T2k article about the attrition of troops and vehicles in one Guards parachute regiment:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65179074

- C.

[Vespers War]

Apparently a former 27th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade T-90A that was captured at Kharkiv in September by Ukraine's 92nd Separate Mechanized Brigade was left at a truck stop in Louisiana when its hauler broke down (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russian-t-90-tank-from-ukraine-mysteriously-appears-at-u-s-truck-stop). So far, nobody's claiming ownership of it. I'm waiting for shenanigans to ensue.

[Raellus]

Apparently a former 27th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade T-90A that was captured at Kharkiv in September by Ukraine's 92nd Separate Mechanized Brigade was left at a truck stop in Louisiana when its hauler broke down (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russian-t-90-tank-from-ukraine-mysteriously-appears-at-u-s-truck-stop). So far, nobody's claiming ownership of it. I'm waiting for shenanigans to ensue.

I wonder why the UAF didn't keep it and put it to use. If it were given to the US gov't for intel purposes, that would make sense but, apparently, that is not the case. The War Zone writer believes it may now belong to a private owner. :confused:

-

[Tegyrius]

That's gonna be an awkward conversation with BATFE if those ERA blocks are still live. To say nothing of the main gun.

- C.

[Heffe]

That's gonna be an awkward conversation with BATFE if those ERA blocks are still live. To say nothing of the main gun.

- C.

This was my very first thought as well. I can't imagine the ATF is going to be thrilled to have a working MBT in the hands of a civvie roaming somewhere in the US.

[Tegyrius]

Update: looks like it was/is headed to Aberdeen, so it's unlikely to show up on eBay Motors any time soon.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/destination-of-russian-t-90-tank-left-at-truck-stop-comes-into-focus

- C.

[bash]

Update: looks like it was/is headed to Aberdeen, so it's unlikely to show up on eBay Motors any time soon.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/destination-of-russian-t-90-tank-left-at-truck-stop-comes-into-focus

- C.

Hmph, guess I'll retract those bids!

[Heffe]

There's something incredibly funny to me about the fact that no one had any idea where this thing was going until they decided to check a shipping label on the barrel.

[ToughOmbres]

Finland is now a NATO member. And on the 74th anniversary of the alliance's founding, no less! Who'd have thunk it?

Could anyone have predicted this turn of events during the waning of the [1st] Cold War? Or 30 years ago? Or 20? Or even 10?

https://apnews.com/article/nato-finland-russia-ukraine-membership-enlargement-c703d23a8423d89577d5b752d69d76eb

Putin goes to war in large part to prevent Ukraine from increasing its ties to the EU and NATO and the result is... NATO expands, and Russia's border with NATO nations doubles.

Way to go, Vlad.

Slava Ukraini!

-
I agree. Finnish public opinion following the Continuation War was to look West while balancing being wary of the USSR/Russian Federation. We know that as early as the 1950's there were quiet contacts between Finnish military officials and NATO. Then, Bad Vlad did what eighty years of the former Soviet Union and Russian policy could not do.
Even better the Finnish Defense Forces were not drawn down the way Sweden or even Norway's militaries were following the end of the Cold War. NATO has gained a very effective partner with a robust total defense concept. Can't think of a better dictator for it to happen to.

[bash]

NATO has gained a very effective partner with a robust total defense concept. Can't think of a better dictator for it to happen to.

There's also the new plan to have a new allied command for the Scandinavian air forces. This includes Sweden even if Turkey and Hungary keep blocking their NATO application. So now all of Russia's arctic routes to open ocean are covered by powerful air forces. You're doing great guys, keep up the fantastic work.

[Raellus]

This piece makes a strong case for Australia and other operators to send F/A-18 Hornets to Ukraine.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australias-mothballed-f-a-18-hornets-should-be-given-to-ukraine

I'm especially interested in our Aussie members' thoughts on this proposal.

-

[Heffe]

According to the Ukrainian MOD, it sounds as though some of the early work in preparation for the counteroffensive is already underway:

https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-complex-counteroffensive-already-underway-defense-minister-1795402

I'd take this next piece with a huge grain of salt, but there's also some rumors starting to float around that Ukraine has been starting some probing attacks all along the lines in the Zaporizhia direction.

[Raellus]

I have a feeling that recent UAF talk about Crimea and Zaporizhia is Maskirovka to focus Russian defensive preparations and reserves in that region, while the main counter-offensive takes place elsewhere. That said, I'm not sure where the UAF's new maneuver brigades, armed with superior Western AFVs is best suited to operate, but I'd hate to see them smash themselves to pieces against Russian fixed defenses. Maybe the salient around Bakhmut. If the UAF could punch through the front lines there, they'd have room for operational maneuvers and could precipitate a route than might result in Russian withdrawals from other regions as well. On the other hand, UAF statements re Crimea and Zaporizhia could be a double-bluff. The suspense is getting to me.

-

[Heffe]

I have a feeling that recent UAF talk about Crimea and Zaporizhia is Maskirovka to focus Russian defensive preparations and reserves in that region, while the main counter-offensive takes place elsewhere. That said, I'm not sure where the UAF's new maneuver brigades, armed with superior Western AFVs is best suited to operate, but I'd hate to see them smash themselves to pieces against Russian fixed defenses. Maybe the salient around Bakhmut. If the UAF could punch through the front lines there, they'd have room for operational maneuvers and could precipitate a route than might result in Russian withdrawals from other regions as well. On the other hand, UAF statements re Crimea and Zaporizhia could be a double-bluff. The suspense is getting to me.

-

I've had that same thought! Looking at the strategic map, pushing toward Mariupol or Melitopol makes the most sense. If they can isolate Crimea it would be an enormous strategic win. They could also do so without widening their own lines too much. But that's also so clearly the obvious move that Russia has to be anticipating it.

From a political standpoint, cutting off and retaking Bakhmut would be a crippling move to make against the Russians for morale and domestic propaganda purposes. Imagine Russia spends six months and tens of thousands of troops slowly trying to take over this non-important town in eastern Ukraine, only to have Ukraine go in over a matter of days and retake all of that lost ground? There's no way Russian milbloggers or the Russian MOD could spin that as a positive development, and it could seriously hurt Putin's ability to generate future support for the war effort.

Or as a third option, perhaps Ukraine is waiting to see how Russia reacts to their probes before deciding on which direction to send the counteroffensive. I'm really curious to see how this all plays out.

[Targan]

This piece makes a strong case for Australia and other operators to send F/A-18 Hornets to Ukraine.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australias-mothballed-f-a-18-hornets-should-be-given-to-ukraine

I'm especially interested in our Aussie members' thoughts on this proposal.

-

I'd welcome it. To be frank, I'm not in favour of any limits on what (legal) vehicles and weapons are sent to Ukraine.

[kato13]

Probing attacks across the Dnieper near Kherson were not the first thing I suspected to happen. (Contested river crossing, with too much artillery in the area)

Probably a feint to pull troops away from Melitopol, but if the Russians collapse and a bridgehead is formed, who knows.


edit added link
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/04/23/7399048/

Yesterday -> Today

[Raellus]

Yeah, the Ukrainians better have something else planned besides attacking well prepared defensive positions head-on.

I really hope that the UAF HQ staff has studied the failure of Operation Citadel, and don't end up making the same mistakes that the Germans did at Kursk back in 1943.

-

[Raellus]

Reuters did an awesome piece about Russian fortifications in Ukraine, featuring maps, satellite imagery, and really cool sketches (including cutaways).

https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/COUNTEROFFENSIVE/mopakddwbpa/

-

[bash]

Reuters did an awesome piece about Russian fortifications in Ukraine, featuring maps, satellite imagery, and really cool sketches (including cutaways).

https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/COUNTEROFFENSIVE/mopakddwbpa/

-

The illustrations are awesome and the piece overall was very good. I wonder though how well Russia's defenses are actually put together. I've seen a lot of videos of the fighting around Bahkmut and the Russian trenches are a far cry from the Platonic ideal of US trench warfare manuals.

Im sure not all Russian fortifications will be as bad as the more hastily dug ones in the Bahkmut region. However there's likely to be highly variable quality across the front. If Ukraine has some good intelligence on the quality of the defenses it will likely inform their avenues of attack.

All things being equal it seems you want to attack the area defended by the 401st Lazy Diggers instead of the 302nd Defensive Position Experts.

[Heffe]

I seem to recall an article a week or two ago about Cavoli stating explicitly that the US has been helping Ukraine with counteroffensive planning. Which I suppose is probably to have been expected, but it was nice to hear it called out so plainly.

As for the counteroffensive, assuming one really happens, I imagine it will be picking up speed before long.

In southern Ukraine, the soil will be dry from around mid-April, then two weeks later in the Donetsk region, and from mid-May in the Russian-occupied Luhansk region further north...

[Vespers War]

Ukraine looks like they're using the end of Mud Season to chip away at Russian logistics by striking oil depots with drones. Beyond limiting fuel availability for combat vehicles, it could also harm resupply by limiting the availability of trucks for final mile haulage from railheads to units. Logistics isn't flashy like a fighter jet or a new tank, but it's a critical function.

[Heffe]

The Ukrainian MOD has been reporting a fairly large daily uptick in destroyed Russian artillery and MLRS systems for the last couple of weeks. Seems like Ukraine is focused on counterbattery operations and destroying Russian supply lines at the moment.

There's also been reports of limited counterattacks / recon in force probes happening in various areas along the southern front, around Bakhmut, Vuhledar, and Avdiivka. Efforts are likely to help shape the battlefield as Ukrainian operations continue to ramp up.

[Raellus]

The UK is preparing to host a Ukrainian pilot training program, reportedly to prepare them to fly the F-16. Belgium is reportedly following suit. The latter makes more sense, as Belgium has operated Falcons since the 1980s. The UK, on the other hand, never operated the type, making their contribution somewhat curious.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/f-16s-will-be-focus-of-ukrainian-pilot-training-in-u-k

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/belgium-ready-to-train-ukrainian-pilots-to-fly-f-16s

It's still not certain that Ukraine will receive F-16s and, if so, what type and from whom. Even if the UAF is given F-16s, the transfer won't occur anytime soon- it will be several months, at the earliest- definitely too late to assist in Ukraine's long-awaited spring offensive.

-

[micromachine]

How many F-16 are available on the world market at the moment?

I know that Norway just retired theirs at the beginning of last year and I am sure that there a quite a few at Davis-Monthan AFB under the care of the 309th. My tally from Google Maps was in the vicinity of 284 airframes. I am not sure if these are included in the Flight Global, which was 922 airframes.

The balance of the world's users have (excluding Venezuela) is 1746 airframes, and I would look at the F-16AM/BM that have spread from the RNAF worldwide as a potential source such as Chile, Jordan and Thailand for small counts of airframes in the same configuration

The real need is for pilots and platforms to fly in a short amount of time.

[Raellus]

How many F-16 are available on the world market at the moment?

IIRC (although it could have been a different one), one of the pieces I linked to reported that Norway has already shot down the idea of donating its Falcons, which are presently being retired, to Ukraine. AFAIK, so far, no nation has come forth and definitively declared that it will be donating/selling Falcons to Ukraine. The answer to that vital question remains up in the air. That said, I doubt that NATO members would be preparing to train UAF pilots on the F-16 as they are if a plan to provide them with the aircraft isn't already more or less in place.

Yesterday, I read somewhere that the US has dropped any objections to third party nations passing their F-16s along to Ukraine, so that's a positive development. The piece linked below has some details about what a pilot training program might look like, and puts a surprising four month timeline on the process.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/basic-f-16-training-for-ukrainian-pilots-could-take-just-four-months

-

[Vespers War]

Norway only has 28 (retired) F-16 left, IIRC. They sold 12 to Draken for that company's DACT flights, and Romania bought 32 last year.

The Dutch are in the process of retiring their last 68 F-16 and have said they're open to providing aircraft to Ukraine.

Belgium is starting to retire their F-16s this summer, although that process will take until 2028 and they're not expected to sell them on because the airframes are extremely close to their maximum service lives.

The Danes were going to retire their F-16s next year, but have extended their service life through 2027.

I don't know of anyone else who's in the middle of retiring their F-16. Many (if not most) of the countries that have them don't have anything newer to serve as a replacement. Particularly for countries that aren't geographically close to the conflict, I have a hard time seeing them weakening their own defenses to bolster Ukraine without assured replacement of the provided aircraft.

[pmulcahy11b]

UAE is in the process of replacing part of their F-16s with F-35s. It may one of the reasons Zelinskyy is visiting the Arab League right now.

[micromachine]

I believe the UAE government cancelled the order for the F35 in favor of the Dassualt Rafale F4. This seems to make sense as they are already a high end F16 operator (Block 60, which they funded development of), and they have experience with the Mirage 2000.

[Raellus]

Prick-ozhin claims that Wagner forces have captured Bakhmut. The head of the UAF denies this.

https://apnews.com/article/bakhmut-russia-ukraine-wagner-prigozhin-da2fc05b818b3dcc39decd40b17d2d8b

Obviously, take Prick-ozhin's claims with a grain of salt. However, if what he says is true, that's not necessarily a bad thing for Ukraine, strategically-speaking. Reports earlier this week (confirmed) indicated that the UAF had gained ground on both Russian flanks, north and south of the city. If Bakhmut has indeed been captured, Wagner and the Russians may have laid a trap for themselves in the salient they've created. I'd love to see the long-awaited Ukrainian counter-offensive slice through the shoulders of the bulge, trap Wagner and the Russian forces now in the Bakhmut salient, and tear a huge hole in the Russian's lines. From what I've read over the past couple of months, the Russians haven't fortified the front lines around Bakhmut has much as they have the neck of the Crimean peninsula. If that is indeed the case, it makes a lot of sense for Ukraine to try to breach the Russian lines around Bakhmut and exploit same with deep penetrations where their new, Leopard II-equiped maneuver brigades can take advantage of the open ground.

-

[Vespers War]

Yeah, the UAE has 80 Rafale F4 on order for delivery starting in 2027. Reports from around the time the deal was signed in late 2021 were that the Rafale would replace UAE's remaining Mirage 2000 and serve alongside the F-16.

[Targan]

Reports earlier this week (confirmed) indicated that the UAF had gained ground on both Russian flanks, north and south of the city. If Bakhmut has indeed been captured, Wagner and the Russians may have laid a trap for themselves in the salient they've created. I'd love to see the long-awaited Ukrainian counter-offensive slice through the shoulders of the bulge, trap Wagner and the Russian forces now in the Bakhmut salient, and tear a huge hole in the Russian's lines.


This is precisely what I've assumed the Ukrainians are doing. Wagner are now in complete control of... what? A giant pile of rubble? Meanwhile they're about to be completely cut off from resupply and quite possibly wiped out to a man. Which will no doubt be thoroughly satisfying for both the Ukrainians and the Russian Army.

[Heffe]

The news around Bakhmut seems incredibly... dynamic, at the moment, so I'd take just about everything with a grain of salt. According to most every mapping group I've seen, Russia has indeed taken Bakhmut itself. But, there's also evidence that Ukraine is pushing in from no less than 4 different directions in local counterattacks on Bakhmut's flanks. You have Prigozhin stating that Russia is in control of Bakhmut, but then Ukraine claiming that Russia isn't, and even supposed videos of Ukrainian SpecOps just openly patrolling through areas of Bakhmut in the daytime. And Prigozhin is also claiming that Wagner is now going to leave Ukraine entirely? Indeed, dynamic.

In all likelihood, I do think Bakhmut has likely fallen to Russia. Whether or not it will stay that way will probably depend a lot on where the counteroffensive happens. There's a part of me that would love to see Ukraine slash in to encircle Bakhmut to further erode Russia's already terrible morale, but whether that's a higher priority target than places elsewhere - we'll have to wait and see.

[Ursus Maior]

So, pro-Ukrainian Russian combatants have entered the Russian oblast of Belgorod, meeting few initial resistance and capturing several border villages. Apparently, the Russians are still coordinating their resistance, but front line aviation, including jets and helicopters have been attacking the attackers. Currently, it looks like a raid to former US Army general Mark Hertling (https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1661038470037422080), who again laid out some thought on the operation today. Yesterday, he wrote that the operation is likely part of Ukrainian battlefield shaping, forcing Russian Armed Forces to react at a point along the front, which is unlikely to be the focus of upcoming Ukrainian counter offensive actions. It seems, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are trying to put their Russian counterparts into a bind, by either having to allocate precious forces from along their front in Ukraine or have a raiding party in their back, wreaking havoc on an oblast with major GLOCs running into Donbas.

The raiding party seems to consist mainly or solely of two detachments. One being the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC, sometimes also abbreviated RDK for Russian "Russkiy dobrovol'cheskiy korpus"), an organization with right-wing extremist influences allegedly still led (and founded) by neo-nazi Denis Nikitin. The other being the socially liberal oriented Freedom of Russia Legion (FRL, sometimes also abbreviated LSR for Russian "Svoboda Rossii"; hence also known as Svoboda). Both combat units allegedly are part of the larger movement named "Irpin Declaration", but only Svoboda openly commits to the cause.

So far, this raid looks like a text book operation in what 18th century warfare called "Kleiner Krieg" (petty warfare), i. e. operations conducted by small elements of troops in reconnaissance, sabotage, guerrilla, and terrorism in order to demoralize, confuse and exhaust the enemy, destroy specific goods, inhibit logistics, liberate POWs (probably not in this case), kill specific enemy personnel (unclear at this moment), gather intelligence and capture enemy assets.

Currently, several armored vehicles of the RuAF have been captured and repurposed by the raiders, with own losses kept disclosed. A single American made infantry mobility vehicle as been confirmed lost by OSINT. Traditional doctrine for a raid calls for the party to keep their operation short, bring all their supplies themselves or use captured supplies if need be and then egress behind friendly lines before heavier enemy reinforcements can be brought in to destroy the raiders.

Naturally, Russian social media is running hot. Especially since the raiders allegedly captured Russian police vehicles and uniforms and are now feared to extend their correctly flagged raid into possible false flag operations or in other forms might try to infiltrate and seep into the territory or even the security apparatus of the Russian Federation.

An interesting, and possibly thought-giving (at least for referees), operation!

[kato13]

I have a feeling we are going to be hearing a lot about the
Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant
in the next few days.

Multiple sources say it is destroyed.

It is
The source of water for the Crimean Peninsula
The reservoir for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
A major source of electricity in the Russian controlled regions.


The effects are massive for and against both sides of this conflict.

Slowing potential Ukrainian Advances
Adding difficulty to Dnieper river crossings
Flooding Russian defensive fortifications and mine fields
Losing power and water supplies to vast regions of Russian controlled Ukraine
Further disrupting nuclear plant operations.



And to complicate things even more it could be an engineering failure rather than as a result of a controlled demolition or attack. I am going to be watching this one closely.

[Raellus]

Yeah, both sides stand to both profit and lose by the destruction of the dam. Both sides are claiming innocence and blaming the other. Another possibility, although remote, IMHO, is that the dam somehow gave out on its own, without "help" from either side- either as a result of poor maintenance, age, previous damage, etc. Time will tell.

It looks like Ukraine's long awaited "Spring" offensive is finally getting underway. So far, no one in the Western media seems to know what's going on. Again, there are conflicting reports. The fog of war is thick today.

-

[Heffe]

Yeah, both sides stand to both profit and lose by the destruction of the dam. Both sides are claiming innocence and blaming the other. Another possibility, although remote, IMHO, is that the dam somehow gave out on its own, without "help" from either side- either as a result of poor maintenance, age, previous damage, etc. Time will tell.

It looks like Ukraine's long awaited "Spring" offensive is finally getting underway. So far, no one in the Western media seems to know what's going on. Again, there are conflicting reports. The fog of war is thick today.
-

All told, it seems like Ukraine is doing a pretty decent job with information management. We've heard they've been pushing in no less than three areas on the front, but there's very little information available about successes or failures short of what's coming from Russia, which is all highly suspect.

[kcdusk]

Ylthough remote, IMHO, is that the dam somehow gave out on its own, without "help" from either side- either as a result of poor maintenance, age, previous damage, etc. Time will tell.


-

Agreed, the dam may have failed from fatigue. But by starting a war, Russia prohibits any normal maintenance that may have taken place, and increases their responsibility to any dam failure.

If the dam had failed in an alternate timeline (ie no war), then responsibility would rest with Ukraine. My reading of the article is that Russia may have controlled "most" of the dam or at least been able to prevent any maintenance. So even if russia didn't deliberately blow up the dam, by having most of the control they inadvertently are responsible.

Whatever the cause, another tragic event.

[Heffe]

I'll carve out the possibility that the dam very well may have collapsed on its own, but the circumstances do seem highly suspect.

First, Russia has damaged the dam previously about six months back with mines, which means they're more than capable of something like this. Secondly, Russia allegedly turned off the flow recently which caused the reservoir to fill quite a bit. And third, the fact that this happened right as the counteroffensive gets underway...

They certainly seem to have both motive and opportunity here.

[Vespers War]

I'll carve out the possibility that the dam very well may have collapsed on its own, but the circumstances do seem highly suspect.

First, Russia has damaged the dam previously about six months back with mines, which means they're more than capable of something like this. Secondly, Russia allegedly turned off the flow recently which caused the reservoir to fill quite a bit. And third, the fact that this happened right as the counteroffensive gets underway...

They certainly seem to have both motive and opportunity here.

Fourth, Russia also blew up retention ponds near Peremozhne and Annovka to flood the M-14 highway between Kherson and Melitopol.

In other news, the Czech Republic will be refurbishing and modernizing Ukrainian T-64 tanks (https://mocr-army-cz.translate.goog/informacni-servis/zpravodajstvi/statni-podniky-vop-cz-a-ukroboronprom-zacnou-spolecne-opravovat-ukrajinske-tanky-t-64--ty-pote-zamiri-na-bojiste-244507/?_x_tr_sl=cs&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp). No specifics on upgrades, although optics and radios are mentioned in the article. I wouldn't be surprised if they get a power pack upgrade as well, since old T-64 will have a 5TD diesel that's no longer in production. Ukraine has managed to shoehorn T-72 engines into the T-64, and Czech Republic has more experience with T-72 engines.

[ToughOmbres]

Yeah, both sides stand to both profit and lose by the destruction of the dam. Both sides are claiming innocence and blaming the other. Another possibility, although remote, IMHO, is that the dam somehow gave out on its own, without "help" from either side- either as a result of poor maintenance, age, previous damage, etc. Time will tell.

It looks like Ukraine's long awaited "Spring" offensive is finally getting underway. So far, no one in the Western media seems to know what's going on. Again, there are conflicting reports. The fog of war is thick today.

-

During World War II Count Ciano of Italy observed in his diary "Every time the Germans issue a communique saying how well things are going on the Eastern Front, they get a thrashing."

I get a similar impression from Russian comments both from the Russian Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry. Tiny kernels of truth perhaps but mostly disinformation.

[micromachine]

Looks like the Russians are trying to bring back General Mud to slow the Ukrainian offensive down, and keep them fixed to roads at least in the mentioned regions.
Hopefully, the Russian Forces don't pull a 'Hail Mary" flank attack out of Belarus by Russian Forces, and take them from the rear, while the Ukrainians are fixated on the little green men of Wagner Group.

[kato13]

Latest theory is the Russian were placing charges for future use (perhaps this week or next) and there was an unintentional explosion. Explains the odd timing which did not isolate any Ukrainian units (I would have done it after a major crossing), and led to manned Russian positions getting flooded out.

Works well with the general incompetence the Russians have shown so far.

If this was semi planned and the Crimean implications were dismissed or ignored, the Russians seem to really be grasping at straws for the most minimal short term advantages.

[Raellus]

An accidental demolition would be hilarious, if civilians weren't affected. Russian incompetence seemingly knows no bounds.

I other finger pointing news, the Washington Post is reporting that, three weeks before the Nord Stream Pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea was damaged, a "close ally" informed US intel that the Ukrainians had a plan in place to sabotage it.

-

[bash]

An accidental demolition would be hilarious, if civilians weren't affected. Russian incompetence seemingly knows no bounds.

I other finger pointing news, the Washington Post is reporting that, three weeks before the Nord Stream Pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea was damaged, a "close ally" informed US intel that the Ukrainians had a plan in place to sabotage it.

-

I bet they used one of their submarines!

[Heffe]

Looks like the Russians are trying to bring back General Mud to slow the Ukrainian offensive down, and keep them fixed to roads at least in the mentioned regions.
Hopefully, the Russian Forces don't pull a 'Hail Mary" flank attack out of Belarus by Russian Forces, and take them from the rear, while the Ukrainians are fixated on the little green men of Wagner Group.

From my understanding, most of the border between Belarus and Ukraine is thick marshland. Between western satellite imagery available and the unfavorable terrain conditions on the border, I'm not expecting much of a push from the north anytime soon.

[micromachine]

Heffe...that is why it makes perfect sense....could be the Ardennes all over again and the Wehrmacht caught the Allies 1-1/2 times with that one during World War 2. This would also explain the lack of the top tier Russian gear in Eastern Ukraine as well (and yes I have read the casualty reports provided by the Ukraine).

[Raellus]

Heffe...that is why it makes perfect sense....could be the Ardennes all over again and the Wehrmacht caught the Allies 1-1/2 times with that one during World War 2. This would also explain the lack of the top tier Russian gear in Eastern Ukraine as well (and yes I have read the casualty reports provided by the Ukraine).

Given how badly the lunge towards Kiev went in the opening weeks of the war, I don't see a major Russian attack out of Belarus going particularly well in the future. That said, it's something the Ukrainians shouldn't sleep on.

@All: Does the war have an official name yet? As far as I can remember, I haven't seen anything presented as such. I would nominate Russo-Ukrainian War. Just googled it, and Wikipedia has an entry for it under that name, but there doesn't seem to be widespread use yet.

-

[kato13]

I personally am fine with "Russo-Ukrainian" as historically the second listed name is more likely to be the winner. When I was a very young war historian I actually thought that the names of the wars always listed the winner last (rather than being a product of media of the time). I think I thought it was similar to how the home team in a sport is listed at the bottom when showing scores (from baseball batting order)

From the below it was a reasonable suspicion when I only had partial information ("winners" in bold)
Austro-Prussian War
Franco-Prussian War
Russo-Turkish War
Sino-Japanese War
Spanish-American War
Anglo-Boer War
Russo-Japanese War
Arab-Israeli Wars

[Raellus]

That's really interesting. As a fellow historian, I'm surprised that this never occurred to me, or thatI haven't seen references to this apparent unwritten naming convention elsewhere.

I knew why most American Civil War battles have two names (the Union named battles after the nearest river; the Confederacy after the nearest town), regardless of who won but yeah, that's battles, not wars.

I joke with my students each year that the French & Indian War / Seven Years War is one of the worst-named wars in the modern era, because both titles are misleading.

-

[Raellus]

Here are a couple of recent articles that may be of interest here. The first is about the UAF Marines executing their version of a "Thunder Run" along the Mokri Yaly river.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/06/13/borrowing-tactics-from-the-us-army-the-ukrainian-marine-corps-is-thundering-through-russian-lines-in-fast-moving-columns/?sh=729f2cb35fb6

The second describes two weeks on the front lines in Eastern Donbass with the UAF.

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/05/29/two-weeks-at-the-front-in-ukraine

It's an illuminating piece but, in it, the author talks about a vehicle he calls a B.R.M. that has "...tracks and a cannon but was too lightly armored to qualify as a tank, and its inability to withstand direct fire had earned it a grim epithet: the Iron Casket."

It's not a BMP because, a little later on in the article, the author (an embedded journalist) describes a resupply operation involves BMP (clearly identified as such). Any idea what this "B.R.M" is?

-

[Heffe]

Here are a couple of recent articles that may be of interest here. The first is about the UAF Marines executing their version of a "Thunder Run" along the Mokri Yaly river.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/06/13/borrowing-tactics-from-the-us-army-the-ukrainian-marine-corps-is-thundering-through-russian-lines-in-fast-moving-columns/?sh=729f2cb35fb6

The second describes two weeks on the front lines in Eastern Donbass with the UAF.

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/05/29/two-weeks-at-the-front-in-ukraine

It's an illuminating piece but, in it, the author talks about a vehicle he calls a B.R.M. that has "...tracks and a cannon but was too lightly armored to qualify as a tank, and its inability to withstand direct fire had earned it a grim epithet: the Iron Casket."

It's not a BMP because, a little later on in the article, the author (an embedded journalist) describes a resupply operation involves BMP (clearly identified as such). Any idea what this "B.R.M" is?

-

Could it simply be a recon variant of the BMP? The BRM-1 is a thing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_BMP-1_variants#Combat_reconnaissance

[Raellus]

Could it simply be a recon variant of the BMP? The BRM-1 is a thing.

That's a likely suspect. I doubt a journalist could differentiate between a BMP and a BRM, but he's probably just going by what the soldiers are telling him.

-

[Heffe]

That's a likely suspect. I doubt a journalist could differentiate between a BMP and a BRM, but he's probably just going by what the soldiers are telling him.
-

That's what I thought as well. Though at one point in the article he mentions firing rockets? It's hard to tell if he's talking about some other vehicle entirely, or if it's a BRM with some kind of franken-launcher added on, or even if the author is calling the cannon ammunition "rockets".

[Vespers War]

That's what I thought as well. Though at one point in the article he mentions firing rockets? It's hard to tell if he's talking about some other vehicle entirely, or if it's a BRM with some kind of franken-launcher added on, or even if the author is calling the cannon ammunition "rockets".

Ukraine has fitted some BRM with the turret from a 2S9 Nona, which can fire RAP mortar shells. It wouldn't surprise me at all if some other BRM have been fitted with rocket artillery tubes.

[micromachine]

The BRM is fitted with the 2A28 Grom 73mm smoothbore which uses rockets as ammunition, which is also used by the SPG-9. This further confuses the issue.

[Raellus]

The BRM is fitted with the 2A28 Grom 73mm smoothbore which uses rockets as ammunition, which is also used by the SPG-9. This further confuses the issue.

That must be what the author was referencing. Thanks.

The very brief article linked below succinctly describes the challenges the UAF is facing during its Spring-Summer counteroffensive.

https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bubbles-and-ukraines-counteroffensive/

The last paragraph really drives the point home:

"In other words, Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary."

Also, the NYT reports that the destruction of the Kakhova Dam was likely perpetrated by the Russians by detonating explosives placed in an internal passageway, as "Nova Kakhovka dam on Dnipro river was designed to withstand almost any attack imaginable – from the outside."

War Zone reports that the Ukrainians might be taking advantage of one possibly unanticipated consequence of the dam's destruction- the lowering of the water level of the reservoir behind it- by staging landings on the left bank of the Dnipro.

-

[Heffe]

I've been following along with the war updates fairly closely - one of the tidbits that I've seen pop up a few times is that Ukraine has only committed two of it's nine new brigades to the counteroffensive thus far. If true, why do you all think they're holding so much in reserve?

A common theory that's been posited is that Ukraine is attempting to force Russia to commit its own reserves first and make Russian repositioning difficult before committing the bulk of their own forces in order to prevent the counteroffensive from getting flanked and cut off.

[pmulcahy11b]

The BRM is fitted with the 2A28 Grom 73mm smoothbore which uses rockets as ammunition, which is also used by the SPG-9. This further confuses the issue.

The 2A28's ammunition is based on the SPG-9's, but isn't exactly the same -- the ammunition isn't interchangeable.

[Raellus]

Thanks, Vespers and Paul. Paul, did you see that piece about the Cold War era experimental Polish assault rifle I posted in the Best That Never Was thread?

In other news, I bet Putin is really wishing he'd kept his dog, Wagner, on a much shorter leash.

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-russia-nuclear-647a545db4e4628676ff7db5b1bded34

First stop on Wagner's 2023 Mutiny Tour: Rostov

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-russia-nuclear-647a545db4e4628676ff7db5b1bded34

Slava Ukraini!

-

[pmulcahy11b]

Thanks, Vespers and Paul. Paul, did you see that piece about the Cold War era experimental Polish assault rifle I posted in the Best That Never Was thread?



Sounds interesting, if unfinished.

I'm on the Golo diet now. I have more energy now, and have already lost a little weight. I may work on that.

I just finished a major update to the F-15 Eagle. It's not posted yet, though.

[Raellus]

Glad to hear that you're feeling more energetic, Paul.

In mutiny news, just like that, it ended almost as soon as it began. The poll had been up all of 15 minutes when news broke that Prigozhin had ordered his troops to cease fire and turn back short of Moscow.

One really has to wonder what Prigozhin was thinking. Did he really think he could overthrow Putin? Did he believe, going in, that he could force Putin to the bargaining table? Wagner hadn't yet suffered a big defeat at the hand of Loyalist forces, so why did he decide to call it off?

This BBC article does a really good job explaining why this all most likely happened.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66013532

After all of this drama, I suspect that Prigozhin will not be dying of natural causes or old age.

-

[pmulcahy11b]

I agree that Prigozhin is a dead man walking. He might live longer if he gets out of Russia fast (and not to Belarus), perhaps to some Wagner safe haven, but probably not. Russia is quite adept at going out of country to assassinate people, even to the US and UK.

GEN Petreus seems to think that Prigozhin lost his nerve/came to his senses way too late.

[Targan]

Prigozhin was never going to "bring the Defence Ministry to justice" let alone topple Putin, but that doesn't matter. Putin has been shown to be weak, bordering on pathetic. These events have been hugely embarrassing for Putin. History may show this to be the beginning of the end for him.

[Heffe]

Prigozhin was never going to "bring the Defence Ministry to justice" let alone topple Putin, but that doesn't matter. Putin has been shown to be weak, bordering on pathetic. These events have been hugely embarrassing for Putin. History may show this to be the beginning of the end for him.

Completely agreed. The mafia lieutenant just made the don look like a weak old fool - it's not going to go well for anyone involved. Also Targan, your Machiavelli quote signature is particularly apt for a number of reasons on this one. :D

[ToughOmbres]

I agree that Prigozhin is a dead man walking. He might live longer if he gets out of Russia fast (and not to Belarus), perhaps to some Wagner safe haven, but probably not. Russia is quite adept at going out of country to assassinate people, even to the US and UK.

GEN Petreus seems to think that Prigozhin lost his nerve/came to his senses way too late.

Quite correct in my view. Even in Byelorussia, Prigozhin should avoid walking by open windows, riding on escalators or eating anything lest he suffer a dreadful "accident" like so many former Kremlin plutocrats have recently.

[Raellus]

Re Prig, he's probably a dead man walking. There's still a chance that Putin gives Prig an opportunity to redeem himself by allowing him to continue to direct Wagner forces from Belarus. That way, both parties can have their cake and eat it too.

It's really hard to see Putin keeping Prig around indefinitely, though. One article I read yesterday suggested that Prig might try to run as a candidate in the next presidential election. If Putin plans to run for reelection again (and I've seen nothing to suggest that he won't), I can't see him allowing that to happen.

Now, here's some good news:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-recaptures-territory-held-by-russia-since-2014/ar-AA1d6XhP?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=34a7a95020124701b87cb166bef42633&ei=17

Hopefully, this is the first of much more to come.

-

[Raellus]

I'm pleased to see the US finally acquiesce to sending DPCIM shells to Ukraine. The timing could have been a lot better, though. DPCIMs are more effective against trench systems than conventional artillery rounds; some versions are deadly for masses of armored vehicles in the open. If the Ukrainians had those thousands of pledged DPCIM rounds 1-2 months ago, I suspect their summer offensive would have made even more progress by now, with fewer UAF casualties. Better late than never, I guess.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-u-s-sending-hundreds-of-thousands-of-cluster-munitions

-

[kcdusk]

I think i'm against Ukraine using cluster munitions.

Yes, they help in the short term. But i worry that after the war, Ukraine is left with unexploded devices in their own yard. Causing civilian deaths or maimings for years to come.

[chico20854]

I think i'm against Ukraine using cluster munitions.

Yes, they help in the short term. But i worry that after the war, Ukraine is left with unexploded devices in their own yard. Causing civilian deaths or maimings for years to come.

I would generally agree except that the Ukrainians are going to dump those cluster munitions into Russian defensive lines that are already filled with unmarked minefields and UXO... that land is already going to have to be cleared before civilians enter it, whether or not there are unexploded bomblets in it.

On a practical side, DP-ICM are much more effective than HE rounds. Given that the supply of howitzer barrels is running out in the West, the cluster munitions allow the Ukrainians to keep their artillery going longer before their guns are shot out.

Just my opinion...

[Heffe]

I think i'm against Ukraine using cluster munitions.

Yes, they help in the short term. But i worry that after the war, Ukraine is left with unexploded devices in their own yard. Causing civilian deaths or maimings for years to come.

I felt that way for a bit as well, but I have to keep reminding myself that Russia's aims still haven't shifted from "total subjugation and absorption of Ukraine and her people". The way I see it, Ukraine has to weigh the risk of future injury to her population, vs. Ukraine simply not existing as an independent, sovereign nation. On top of that, Russia has shown numerous times so far in the war that they're more than happy to waste Ukrainian civilians themselves, and no doubt Ukraine is already going to have to spend many year de-mining their country after this is all over.

The ugliest of calculus here breaks down to "How many lives will be lost to future UXO explosions vs. how many lives might be saved by speeding up the end of this conflict through the use of cluster munitions?"

[Tegyrius]

I would generally agree except that the Ukrainians are going to dump those cluster munitions into Russian defensive lines that are already filled with unmarked minefields and UXO... that land is already going to have to be cleared before civilians enter it, whether or not there are unexploded bomblets in it.

I have a professional contact who's worked with demining and UXO teams in Syria. His analysis was much the same - any use of cluster munitions by Ukraine will be a minor incremental addition to the work already ahead.

- C.

[kcdusk]

I was thinking the long view success would be not to use them, but happy to defer to those more in the know. Its still a case of rock and hard place!

[Targan]

Ukrainian pilots will start training on the F-16 in Romania next month. Come March next year when F-16s tear into the Russian Air Force, the Russians are going to need to issue a whole lot of brown trousers.

[Ursus Maior]

The bridge over the Kerch has come under attack again. Currently, automotive traffic in both directions is down, due to the bridge having collapsed. The railtracks seem to hold, so far.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/traffic-stopped-crimean-bridge-due-emergency-russian-backed-governor-2023-07-17/

https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1680796880551178240

[Raellus]

The bridge over the Kerch has come under attack again. Currently, automotive traffic in both directions is down, due to the bridge having collapsed. The railtracks seem to hold, so far.

When I first saw the headlines, I assumed that something like Storm Shadow ASMs had been used to strike the bridge but apparently it was drone boats.

In other news, Ukrainian intel reports a build up of Russian forces (100k troops, hundreds of AFVs) near Kharkiv. This could be bad for Ukraine, as it threatens the flanks of some of their current offensive operations, and it will probably require the UAF to shift forces earmarked for, or already committed to said in order to meet the new threat. On the other hand, it might a positive for the Ukrainians as it will get a substantial number of Russians out of their fixed defensive positions and out into the open (where US cluster munitions could have a really big impact). At this point, I would bet on the Ukrainians to gain the upper hand in maneuver warfare.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-kyiv-claims-massive-russian-buildup-near-kharkiv

WARNING:
If you scroll down through the article, there are links to two video clips of Anti-Russian Chechen fighters, allegedly operating in Belgorod Oblast, ambushing a lone Russian military truck. They blur out the gore (thank goodness), but it doesn't leave a whole lot to the imagination, and some viewers may find it disturbing. I only mention it here because every T2k game I've ever been involved with (as player, Ref, reader, writer, etc.) has featured at least one ambush of a "Russian" convoy of some sort.

-

[Homer]

I only mention it here because every T2k game I've ever been involved with (as player, Ref, reader, writer, etc.) has featured at least one ambush of a "Russian" convoy of some sort.

Good single vehicle pickoff. There’s some extended footage of the patrol moving up, presumabley before passage of lines or leaving an harbor area, and movement to the ambush position. I got a rough count of 16, with 2x PKM, an RPG launcher, a radio, and a three or more guys with LAW or RPG18/22 type weapons. Looks like an overnight at least based on the assault packs everyone was carrying and the foam mats, etc.. Understandably not a lot of detail on establishing the ambush, but it did show the go-pro guy prepping a LAW; I think he set it down again when they saw the truck and ended up engaging with his rifle. Lots of fire on the truck, but it looks like it made it some ways through the kill zone before it was stopped.

For all the good of accomplishing the presumptive mission, if your PCs walk the roads, bunch up and lollygaggle when “assaulting” across the kill zone of their linear ambush, fail to secure the far side before they start searching, or aren’t moving expeditiously back to the ORP it’s a good opportunity for the ambushed to rally, counterattack, and teach them a lesson. It did look like there was a man on the road able to look down the curve in the direction the truck came from. Not sure if that was PKM man, LAW guy, or if the flank security man/element had collapsed already. If they don’t have flank security, anything can roll up on them.

[Heffe]

When I first saw the headlines, I assumed that something like Storm Shadow ASMs had been used to strike the bridge but apparently it was drone boats.

In other news, Ukrainian intel reports a build up of Russian forces (100k troops, hundreds of AFVs) near Kharkiv. This could be bad for Ukraine, as it threatens the flanks of some of their current offensive operations, and it will probably require the UAF to shift forces earmarked for, or already committed to said in order to meet the new threat. On the other hand, it might a positive for the Ukrainians as it will get a substantial number of Russians out of their fixed defensive positions and out into the open (where US cluster munitions could have a really big impact). At this point, I would bet on the Ukrainians to gain the upper hand in maneuver warfare.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-kyiv-claims-massive-russian-buildup-near-kharkiv

WARNING:
If you scroll down through the article, there are links to two video clips of Anti-Russian Chechen fighters, allegedly operating in Belgorod Oblast, ambushing a lone Russian military truck. They blur out the gore (thank goodness), but it doesn't leave a whole lot to the imagination, and some viewers may find it disturbing. I only mention it here because every T2k game I've ever been involved with (as player, Ref, reader, writer, etc.) has featured at least one ambush of a "Russian" convoy of some sort.
-

Nice link and an interesting read.

ISW has reported on the build up (though they haven't cited a number regarding personnel AFAIK), and have reported that at least some of it is penal battalions that don't have the experience, morale, or the cohesion to actually pull anything off other than light skirmishes. No matter the case, surely Russia is eager to try to regain the initiative here. It'll be interesting to see what happens.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2023

[Raellus]

This sobering, first-hand assessment of the Ukrainian military pulls no punches.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/a-sobering-analysis-of-ukraines-counteroffensive-from-the-front

The short of it is that the Ukrainian military currently isn't as good as their propaganda makes it out to be- it's just better than the Russians (and not by a very wide margin, at that).

The author of the report gives 16 reasons why the UAF's counteroffensive has not manage to achieve a major breakthrough, including, perhaps the most significant,

"2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense and IMO [in my opinion] is the main cause for slow progress."

-

[bash]

That's a good read. I think the multiple mentions of minefields teases a lede that's a little buried. Whatever other problems the Ukrainians have, the Russians basically mined the whole front. Even in the best cases it makes maneuver difficult and all advances will be measured in meters at a time. Artillery can only make so much progress if infantry can't take and hold the ground artillery just cleared out.

Massed assaults are constrained because minefields limit mobility and even a Mobik can figure out how to aim where the enemy if forced to bunch up.

I think one of the biggest lessons is air power has been a game changer in the century since it debuted. If you don't have air superiority, including clearing out ADA, you're stuck on the ground getting bombed to shit. Air superiority alone won't win a war but if you're going to "win" a war you need to at some point enjoy air superiority.

[Raellus]

A lot of potentially big news coming out of Ukraine the last couple of days. We'll start with the bad news first.

Russia has backed out of the Ukraine grain deal, started targeting grain silos with missile strikes, and threatened to impose a naval blockade in the Black Sea. Putin's essentially trying to hold the world hostage by potentially causing famine. Furthermore, Putin's been laying the groundwork for framing the Ukrainian navy for the sinking of any neutral ships in the Black Sea.

Putin is rattling his saber at Poland, accusing her of preparing to attack Belarus. Check out this revisionist history from the Russian dictator:

"I would also like to remind you what Poland’s aggressive policy led to," he said during a meeting Friday of the Russian Security Council. "It led to the national tragedy of 1939, when Poland’s Western allies threw it to the German wolf, the German miliary machine. Poland actually lost its independence and statehood, which were only restored thanks in a large measure to the Soviet Union. It was also thanks to the Soviet Union and thanks to Stalin’s position that Poland acquired substantial territory in the west, German territory."

Nowhere does Putin mention the Soviet Union's complicity in Poland's "national tragedy of 1939" (i.e. the Soviet invasion and occupation of the eastern half of the country), the murder of hundreds of Polish army officers, Soviet refusal to aid the Polish Home Army's uprising in Warsaw in 1944, or the USSR's interference in Polish affairs for the next fifty years.

Ukraine has started to use US cluster artillery munitions to good effect. According to Forbes, they are properly implementing the tactic of using an HE round to determine the height of the targeted ground so that the DP-ICMs can be set to distribute the sub-munitions at the ideal height above the target. The Russians, however, are already learning what a single round of HE presages.

The US has shifted its policy on the exporting of F-16s to Ukraine from its NATO allies, saying they are going to "push as fast as possible" and that the fighters should start to arrive in Ukraine "before the end of the year".

-

[Targan]

There has not been a declaration of war made by Russia, so any threat to target civilian shipping in the Black Sea is straight-up illegal. And I've said right from the start, Russia isn't going to launch nukes (not unless NATO tanks roll across the Russian border). Putin may be an A-grade dickhead and a megalomaniacal narcissist, but his generals aren't suicidal.

NATO needs to grow some nuts and (assuming Turkey didn't close the straits) escort grain freighters right through to Ukrainian ports. Dare the Russians to do anything about it.

[ToughOmbres]

This sobering, first-hand assessment of the Ukrainian military pulls no punches.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/a-sobering-analysis-of-ukraines-counteroffensive-from-the-front

The short of it is that the Ukrainian military currently isn't as good as their propaganda makes it out to be- it's just better than the Russians (and not by a very wide margin, at that).

The author of the report gives 16 reasons why the UAF's counteroffensive has not manage to achieve a major breakthrough, including, perhaps the most significant,

"2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense and IMO [in my opinion] is the main cause for slow progress."

-

I believe it. It took the Red Army a good three years to master combined arms during World War II and even with massive Lend-Lease aid there were still logistical problems sustaining offensives. The Ukrainian learning curve will probably be much quicker but with a terrible cost in casualties.

There is a greater problem here in my view. To really make Putin or Russia pay attention, a defender would need to inflict the same levels of casualties as the Finns 1939-40. Something on the order of 10:1 or thereabouts. The UAF have fought valiantly and won deserved admiration from much of the world. However there is simply not enough damage being done to the Russian military.

We don't have a clear picture of casualties on either side to be fair-but it's nowhere near the level to make the Russians come to the table or back off. Bear in mind I'm not criticizing the UAF nor am I in a position to criticize them.
Just my 2 cents.

[ToughOmbres]

There has not been a declaration of war made by Russia, so any threat to target civilian shipping in the Black Sea is straight-up illegal. And I've said right from the start, Russia isn't going to launch nukes (not unless NATO tanks roll across the Russian border). Putin may be an A-grade dickhead and a megalomaniacal narcissist, but his generals aren't suicidal.

NATO needs to grow some nuts and (assuming Turkey didn't close the straits) escort grain freighters right through to Ukrainian ports. Dare the Russians to do anything about it.


It's an interesting thought and brings back images of Kuwaiti tankers being escorted during the Iran-Iraq War. I believe there there is less than a 10% chance of NATO implementing such a program even for the best of purposes-bringing grain to a hungry world.

NATO's navies have suffered tremendously from Post-Cold War penury-our old Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates would have been ideal for this role. They are long gone. NATO, I suspect, would be loathe to strip STANAVFORATLANT to send them into the Black Sea on escort missions even if the political will existed.

I doubt Turkey would close the Straits-although I do see Erdogan notifying NATO that in the event of an attack on NATO forces as a result of their actions in the Black Sea-Turkey would sit it out.

Romania and Bulgaria would probably not risk their limited assets in such an operation leaving the other much larger maritime powers to try to send their slender resources into the Black Sea-which again, I don't think will happen. We'll see. Again, just my 2 cents worth.

[Raellus]

NATO's navies have suffered tremendously from Post-Cold War penury-our old Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates would have been ideal for this role. They are long gone. NATO, I suspect, would be loathe to strip STANAVFORATLANT to send them into the Black Sea on escort missions even if the political will existed.

I doubt Turkey would close the Straits-although I do see Erdogan notifying NATO that in the event of an attack on NATO forces as a result of their actions in the Black Sea-Turkey would sit it out.

I don't disagree with you but it's interesting to note that Turkey is still a user of the OHP class frigate. Their modernized version is known as the G-Class frigate and there are 8 of them in service with the Turkish navy.

-

[ToughOmbres]

I don't disagree with you but it's interesting to note that Turkey is still a user of the OHP class frigate. Their modernized version is known as the G-Class frigate and there are 8 of them in service with the Turkish navy.

-


That's true-Poland/ORP has a couple as well now I think? Australia built several as well if my memory serves me correctly.

[Raellus]

Russian minefields have contributed greatly to slowing Ukraine's offensive operations this summer. From the articles I've read, it sounds like the UAF's main tactics to overcome the obstacle presented by AT mines is to rely on mine roller-equipped tanks or ARVs, or MICLICs, to clear lanes through minefields during an assault. According to a Ukrainian tanker interviewed by the BBC, a mine roller can usually handle, one at a time, up to four mines before it needs replacement, However, knowing this, the Russians have adapted by stacking multiple AT mines, thereby destroying rollers with one massive explosion. The Ukrainians are losing AFVs to mines at a pretty high rate- even their more advanced, better protected Western models- and have seemingly given up on attempts at a major mechanized breakthrough. They've largely reverted to smaller, more incremental (and slower) attacks led by relatively small formations of infantry. The Russians have even started to mine their own trench lines and remotely detonate them once they've been taken and occupied by UAF forces.

What I haven't read a single mention of in this current conflict is the UAF using combat engineers to prep attack lanes through mine belts by moving across minefields on foot, probing for AT mines, and removing them manually prior to a planned assault. I'm both surprised and not surprised by this. I'm not surprised because this procedure is slow and very dangerous to the mine clearing teams. Minefields, to be truly effective, need to be observed by the defending force and covered by fires (direct and indirect) to prevent what I just described. It sounds like, most of the time, the Russians are employing tactics that increase the effectiveness of their minefields.

On the other hand, I am surprised because pretty much every book I've read about major WW2 ground offensives describe the attacker- both Axis and Allied- using the tactic of manual mine detection/removal (almost always at night) in the lead up to a big assault. This is especially true of the Eastern Front. In quite a few cases, this tactic was very successful in getting the attacking force through the first line of defense with much fewer tank losses to AT mines.

I'm not advocating that UAF troops risk their lives by adopting this dangerous but potentially successful tactic. It's easy for me to sit here and suggest they give it a try. I'm just wondering why, AFAIK, they haven't. I suppose that improvements in and the proliferation of NODs and battlefield surveillance tech in the current era make manual demining in a combat area a lot more dangerous than it already was in earlier wars.

Anyway, that was a bit rambling. I just wanted to share my thoughts and wonder if any of you have wondered the same thing or read/seen anything illuminating on the topic.

-

[Ursus Maior]

The difference between infantry clearing mines at night in 1943 and 2023 ist night optics and drones, I'd say. Also, clearing mines by hand in darkness is extremely dangerous and costly in terms of personnel.

[Raellus]

Here's the BBC piece that I referenced in the OP.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66306150

And another piece, in which a UAF sapper is interviewed. This one focuses a bit more on the threat of anti-personnel mines and the challenges faced by shorthanded Ukrainian sappers. The last line of the article offers a tantalizing, if vague, hint of new, more effective tactics to defeat Russian minefields.

"We are learning to improvise and to invent ways to make quick, safe paths through the minefields. But we are fighting a very vicious enemy," [the Ukrainian sapper] said.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66080652

I'm curious to learn what those innovative tactics are.

-

[Bestbrian]

Didn't we send these guys any mine clearing line charges?

[Vespers War]

Didn't we send these guys any mine clearing line charges?

Sure, Ukraine's been using them at least since November. But each launcher is limited to 200 meters of charge per hour (half an hour required between launches, each MICLIC clears an area 100 meters long and 8 meters wide). With the depth of some of the minefields, that's a minimum of 80 hours of continuous MICLIC use (and 160 charges) to clear 16 kilometers of mines. Meanwhile, the enemy has made targeting the launchers a priority because hitting one while it's carrying just under a ton of explosives causes a good bit of damage to anything in the general vicinity of the launcher. That makes using multiple launchers to speed things up a bit hairy, because hitting one is likely to take out multiple vehicles.

TL;DR version - MICLICs are great against shallow minefields or ones hastily put together. Against minefields that have been laid in depth over the course of months, they're still useful, but not able to cause total breaches quickly.

[Raellus]

When I was a kid, my friends and I would do something that we called "ghost-riding"*. We'd ride our bikes to pick up speed and then jump off without stopping to see how far our bikes would go without us, sometimes aiming the bike at a ramp or obstacle of some sort before un-assing. The Ukrainians attempted something similar recently, but with a BMP-1, and across a Russian minefield.

This is an... "interesting" way to detect enemy AT mines. The UAF reportedly sent an unmanned BMP-1 across a suspected Russian minefield. Improbably, it didn't "find" any and, curiously, the Russians apparently didn't bother to take it under direct fire as it approached their positions. It was finally stopped by an AT ditch.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/07/28/ukrainian-troops-apparently-sent-an-unmanned-fighting-vehicle-on-a-one-way-assault-across-a-suspected-minefield/?sh=1538fbed3769

*I'm not claiming that we invented this term. I'm sure it's pretty common. I included the anecdote in the hopes that you relate to it.

-

[Raellus]

The news from Ukraine over the past couple of weeks hasn't been great. Yes, there's been vague, tantalizing mentions of a supposed breakthrough at some point in the Russian main defense line, but those headlines have been outnumbered by those lamenting the size of Russian minefields, and their continuing effectiveness in slowing (or even stopping) Ukrainian offensive ops.

A couple of recent articles have claimed that the abridged Western-style training of Ukrainian forces was ineffective- that it was rushed, and didn't give the trainees enough time to absorb and internalize NATO tactics so that they could be implemented effectively. Additional articles have suggested that the UAF is giving up on NATO tactics and making up their own, essentially embracing slower paced attritional warfare. I don't have much confidence in the UAF achieving its stated victory goals if the fighting continues to skew towards attritional warfare. Regardless of any potential long-term outcome, the war looks like it will continue to drag on for some time. That, I believe, favors Russia more than the Ukraine. Will the West maintain the political will, and the popular support that it would require, to support Ukraine if the war drags on thru 2024 (not incidentally, a general election year in the USA)?

My biggest concern ATM, however, is Ukraine's use of drone warfare against targets of questionable military value inside Russian territory. I understand why it is important, strategically and diplomatically, for Ukraine to show Putin and the Russian people that the war is upon them, and not insulated within Ukraine. However, I think the cost of inflicting Russian civilian casualties could tug Zelensky down from the moral high ground he's occupied since February 2022, and reduce foreign support for the UAF (especially in the form of much needed combat aircraft and additional long-range strike weapons). Russian civilian casualties would also reinforce Putin's whole "we launched this 'special military op' to in self-defense against NATO-backed Ukrainian aggression" line that he's been shoveling since ordering the invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[castlebravo92]

The news from Ukraine over the past couple of weeks hasn't been great. Yes, there's been vague, tantalizing mentions of a supposed breakthrough at some point in the Russian main defense line, but those headlines have been outnumbered by those lamenting the size of Russian minefields, and their continuing effectiveness in slowing (or even stopping) Ukrainian offensive ops.

A couple of recent articles have claimed that the abridged Western-style training of Ukrainian forces was ineffective- that it was rushed, and didn't give the trainees enough time to absorb and internalize NATO tactics so that they could be implemented effectively. Additional articles have suggested that the UAF is giving up on NATO tactics and making up their own, essentially embracing slower paced attritional warfare. I don't have much confidence in the UAF achieving its stated victory goals if the fighting continues to skew towards attritional warfare. Regardless of any potential long-term outcome, the war looks like it will continue to drag on for some time. That, I believe, favors Russia more than the Ukraine. Will the West maintain the political will, and the popular support that it would require, to support Ukraine if the war drags on thru 2024 (not incidentally, a general election year in the USA)?

My biggest concern ATM, however, is Ukraine's use of drone warfare against targets of questionable military value inside Russian territory. I understand why it is important, strategically and diplomatically, for Ukraine to show Putin and the Russian people that the war is upon them, and not insulated within Ukraine. However, I think the cost of inflicting Russian civilian casualties could tug Zelensky down from the moral high ground he's occupied since February 2022, and reduce foreign support for the UAF (especially in the form of much needed combat aircraft and additional long-range strike weapons). Russian civilian casualties would also reinforce Putin's whole "we launched this 'special military op' to in self-defense against NATO-backed Ukrainian aggression" line that he's been shoveling since ordering the invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022.
Slava Ukraini!

-

I think most people realize that Ukraine can't really win a war of attrition with Russia long term, all other things being equal.

And in a realpolitik sense, Western leaders probably don't want a decisive Ukraine victory that destabilizes Russia and sees someone more unhinged than Putin taking over. Nor do they want a greater Russia that has a stranglehold on most of the world's wheat exports either, so they are trying to traverse the knife edge of keeping Ukraine in the fight and bleeding Russia but not so fast that Russia collapses and loses control of some of their nukes.

Interesting time to be alive.

[Ursus Maior]

UAF cannot fight Western type combined arms campaigns for three reasons:


We trained tactical leaders and soldiers (including vehicle crews etc.) in crash courses. That's all you can train in the available time. What we could not train were officers and especially staff officers. Some battalions in the UAF are commanded by literal privates or corporals. People who have distinguished themselves in battle, but never gotten any formal training. Those people do not have the ability to think combined arms. There is a reason, we send staff officers to college, military academies, army colleges and institutions of higher learning and then polish them for 10+ years before they become majors or even battle captains. UAF personnel never had that time and they also suffered massive casualties among their best in the early months of the war.
We never sent them modern fighter bombers to achieve at least local air superiority and wear down enemy integrated defense networks as well as entrenched positions.
All we did and give, which was plenty and really a lot - though not always in time, maybe - still came not quick enough to prevent Russian Armed Forces to entrench deeply and in multiple, often formidable, layers.


Especially the last item, the deep and multi-echelon defense networks are something that modern or even peak of their time (think: Desert Storm) Western militaries would struggle with, especially on such a long front. It's just an insane amount of mines and trenches to cover. I think, Desert Storm showed what was possible, but we have neither the troops nor the spare issues of AFVs, MICLICs, personnel and frankly: corps, to do it ourselves.

This war must be fought and Ukraine must win, but it's not something that will come this year. At least not on the battlefield alone.

[Raellus]

Here's a revealing quote from a senior intelligence sergeant from the UAF's 41st Mechanized Brigade. He goes by the nom de guerre, "Dutchman".

'"For the most part, [Western instructors] have fought wars in cities and towns – urban settings. We are on flat ground a lot of the time,' said Dutchman.

The tactics that Ukrainian officers and commanders badly want their troops to learn while being trained abroad are either only part of the syllabus or not featured at all.

'We need people to understand how to effectively clear trenches, enter them, how to throw grenades effectively, how not to trip on booby traps, to understand what grenades the [Russians] throw – essentially to understand the enemy,' explained Dutchman."

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-kharkiv-oblast-city-planning-evacuation-as-russians-approach

So it's not just the duration of training that's been lacking, it's the type of training.

“'It would be better if either [the instructors] came here to see what we’re facing or we went there to train their instructors to train our troops,” Dutchman told openDemocracy, adding that he recognizes that NATO preclusions about putting boots on the ground would not allow them to visit Ukraine.

Members of the 41st Brigade told the publication that their instructors often used examples of NATO operations in the Middle East, where the objective is to clear houses and identify potential insurgents among the local population.

But “that’s not really relevant to us,” said Dutchman.'

-

[Vespers War]

It's a Russian line-charge vehicle that appears to have been abandoned, but this article (https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-mine-clearing-vehicle-detonates-170219699.html) (and the video in the linked Twitter thread) shows why you want to be extremely careful about exposing MICLICs to incoming fire.

[Raellus]

We called it weeks ago. I'm surprised he lasted this long.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66599733

I'm also a little surprised at how non-subtle the method of assassination was. I would have expected something that Putin could blame on the Ukrainians or NATO. At least Putin can claim that the Motherland's air defenses are working.

-

[Heffe]

We called it weeks ago. I'm surprised he lasted this long.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66599733

I'm also a little surprised at how non-subtle the method of assassination was. I would have expected something that Putin could blame on the Ukrainians or NATO. At least Putin can claim that the Motherland's air defenses are working.

-

Kill Prigozhin and help rein in other oligarchs by publicly showing what happens to those that betray you at the same time? It was a two for one special.

[Vespers War]

The most recent Perun (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ctrtAwT2sgs) has an interesting look at Russian tank losses by family, grouped into three-month time periods since the start of the Ukrainian invasion.

Feb-Apr 2022
T-90: 3%
T-80: 23%
T-72: 71%
Older: 3%

May-Jul 2022
T-90: 1%
T-80: 22%
T-72: 68%
Older: 9%

Aug-Oct 2022
T-90: 3%
T-80: 33%
T-72: 53%
Older: 11%

Nov-Jan 2023
T-90: 5%
T-80: 34%
T-72: 49%
Older: 13%

Feb-Apr 2023
T-90: 8%
T-80: 40%
T-72: 46%
Older: 7%

May-Aug 2023:
T-90: 5%
T-80: 53%
T-72: 36%
Older: 6%

There are a few interesting things here.

The older tanks (T-55, T-62, T-64) had a spike after the first three months of the war and have slowly declined since, probably because ones that could be refurbished quickly were thrown into combat while better tanks in deeper storage made their way to the factories for rebuilds. As the refurbishment system has worked out its early kinks, those tanks are less numerous at the front.

The T-72 and T-80 have flipped in importance. T-72 losses as a proportion of total losses have basically halved, from 71% to 36%, while T-80 losses have gone from 23% to 53%.

T-80 losses also aren't particularly new T-80s. Russia has three-ish main models, the T-80B/BV (1978/1985), T-80U (1985) and T-80BVM (2017). The BV is a B with Kontakt-1 ERA. The U has a more powerful engine, revised turret armor, Kontakt-5 ERA, and an upgraded gun and fire control. BVM has Relikt ERA and upgraded gun, fire control, and optics.

Early on (in the first three-month period) T-80 losses were 23% B/BV, 59% U, and 18% BVM. For the most recent four-month period, they were 82% B/BV, 2% U, and 17% BVM (equals 101% due to rounding). The BVM has remained pretty constant as a percent of T-80s lost even as the T-80 losses have grown, but the U has been steadily replaced by the less capable B/BV. Basically, they're upgrading as many as they can to BVM standard and then shoveling the rest of the B/BV to the front without upgrades to maintain numbers.

[Heffe]

Thanks for sharing, Vespers. Really interesting data and analysis in that video - I thoroughly enjoyed watching it.

If I had a single critique, I wish he had included the overall numbers of losses of certain categories of vehicles on top of just the ratios. For example, understanding if T-80Bs were becoming much more prevalent as a part of the makeup of Russian tank forces, but also that the overall trend in MBT losses over time was shifting downward, or upward, or oscillating, that would have provided a lot more insight into exactly what's happening. It would also give us a better idea of the delta between what Oryx has reported as visually confirmed losses vs. what Ukraine typically reports on their daily losses stat roundup.

[Vespers War]

Back in March I had used the Wayback Machine to pull the last Oryx report for each month and track losses, although there are a few caveats:
1. Some losses ascribed to a particular month could be older Unidentified Losses that became Identified during that month.
2. I grouped tanks by relative age, so the T-80B, T-80BV, and T-80U were all grouped as "old T-80" and the T-80BVM as "new T-80." In general, a Soviet upgrade is "old" and a post-Soviet upgrade is "new."
3. In September 2022 Oryx changed from just listing tanks as Unidentified to listing them as an Unidentified type if possible (e.g. Unidentified T-80). This makes the numbers for Unidentified tanks in that quarter weird.

Using the same time groupings that Perun used:
Feb-Apr 2022
595 total losses
0 T-62, 16 T-64, 175 Old T-72, 187 New T-72, 94 Old T-80, 19 New T-80, 19 Old T-90, 0 New T-90, 85 Unidentified

May-Jul 2022
325 total losses
1 T-62, 19 T-64, 73 Old T-72, 62 New T-72, 47 Old T-80, 10 New T-80, 1 Old T-90, 2 New T-90, 110 Unidentified

Aug-Oct 2022
507 total losses
39 T-62, 8 T-64, 87 Old T-72, 157 New T-72, 72 Unknown T-72, 118 Old T-80, 25 New T-80, 6 Unknown T-80, 5 Old T-90, 3 New T-90, -33 Unidentified

Nov-Jan 2023
240 total losses
24 T-62, 7 T-64, 34 Old T-72, 64 New T-72, 10 Unknown T-72, 50 Old T-80, 14 New T-80, -2 Unknown T-80, 11 Old T-90, 5 New T-90, 23 Unidentified

At some point I need to go through and scrape the rest of 2023.

Even in this shorter period, the T-62 losses show a huge change, with 1 positively identified as lost out of the first 920 tank losses, and then a full 10% of losses in the last time period being identified as T-62.

T-72 losses are cyclical, being 60-67% of total losses in the first and third quarters and 42-45% in the second and fourth quarters. They may have been used to spearhead assaults during the good weather months and hoarded away for unit reconstruction during the bad weather months.

[Heffe]

Thanks again for the data. I went ahead and graphed it out to get a more visual representation of the tank losses over time. Not sure if this is helpful/useful or not, but I thought it was interesting to see how the assortment changed over time. I find it interesting to note how much the tank losses slowed during the second quarter, only to increase again with the Russian summer offensive before petering out during winter. I'm definitely super curious to see how it's further changed during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Q2 and Q3 of '23.

*disclaimer - this is only based on the data Vespers provided, meaning that it's Oryx's visually confirmed tank losses.

[kato13]

https://apnews.com/article/atacms-ukraine-longrange-missiles-5fd95f32449d14da22b82d57d6ccab22

ATACMS which will always be “Assault Breaker” in my heart, have arrived and made a splash. 5 units taking out at least 9 helicopters.

What would be an estimate of what the US could provide in terms models available? The cluster versions seem like a given given that the US would not want the bad press of being a major power using them. Ukraine gets a pass as the plucky underdog.

[kcdusk]

The boards been as quite as i can ever remember for a number of weeks now.

If not Ukraine as a plucky underdog, i'll take Israel as the flavour of the month re cluster munitions.

Just devastating news re wars around the world (Ukraine and Israel). This may/may not be why its been quite here.

My own T2K work has progressed a bit in the last few weeks, having been made redundant again. Mixed feelings. Being out of work is never good. No longer working at my last place of work has been such a relief. There are great job prospects on the horizon so i am positive i will be employed again soon. In the mean time, my own solo T2K campaign is progressing using the FL rules, which i am enjoying.

[Vespers War]

https://apnews.com/article/atacms-ukraine-longrange-missiles-5fd95f32449d14da22b82d57d6ccab22

ATACMS which will always be “Assault Breaker” in my heart, have arrived and made a splash. 5 units taking out at least 9 helicopters.

What would be an estimate of what the US could provide in terms models available? The cluster versions seem like a given given that the US would not want the bad press of being a major power using them. Ukraine gets a pass as the plucky underdog.

The best numbers I've seen:

M39 - 1,650 built for US, 411 expended
M39A1 - 610 built for US, 74 expended
M48 - 176 built for US, 58 expended
M57 - 513 built for US, 57 expended
M57A1 - 220 converted from M39/M39A1, 7 expended

There are another 900 M57A1 that have been purchased by international customers that would be converted, so out of 2,260 M39/M39A1 produced for the United States, 485 have been expended and 1,120 (at least) are scheduled to be converted, so at most 655 of those two models would be available for transfer to Ukraine.

With PrSM having entered LRIP, I would hope all the ATACMS could be considered available for transfer if needed.

[Raellus]

It's hard not to conclude that the Ukraine's summer 2023 counter-offensive might have been much more successful to date if ATACMS had been provided to the UAF prior to its commencement.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-atacms-may-spur-russian-force-relocations-u-k-intel-says

Russian rotary combat airpower was often cited as a key factor behind heavy early UAF AFV losses during said counter-offensive. Russian attack helos were able to engage successfully engage UAF AFVs from beyond the range of most available AAA and MANPADs. In most sources, the impact of Russian attack helos was assessed as second only to that of massive Russian AT mine belts. Heavy AFV losses resulted in a slower, more methodical scale, scope, and pace of UAF offensive operations.

ATACMS could have largely degraded the effectiveness of Russian attack helicopters, both by destroying them on the ground where they were based, and by pushing those rotary aviation bases further from the front lines, thereby reducing the combat range of their helos.

I'm peeved that the US didn't provide Ukraine with ATACMS much earlier.

-

[Heffe]

I'm peeved that the US didn't provide Ukraine with ATACMS much earlier.

-

Same. I feel similarly about just about everything we've provided so far. It's a damned shame that Abrams are only just now getting to the theater. And we should have been training their pilots on Falcons starting right when Russia crossed the border.

[Raellus]

Even the wisest cannot see all ends, but it looks like the war in Ukraine might be headed towards a strategic stalemate.

Apart from Javelin (and other ATGMs), various MANPADs, and HIMARS, the West has failed to supply Ukraine with the weaponry that could have had decisive effect on the battlefield in a timely fashion (MBTs, ATCMS, modern tactical fighters- the latter the UAF is still waiting on). Instead, it's usually been a case of too little, too late. I wonder if the strategic situation today would be markedly more in favor of Ukraine if those weapon systems had been provided to the UAF much earlier.

Perhaps most alarming is the growing reluctance of USA and a couple of its NATO partners to continue supporting Ukraine materially. It appears that the flow of foreign-supplied weapons and ammunition to the UAF will soon slow.

By the same token, reports of Russia running out of essentially weaponry and ammunition appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. Yes, attrition has been heavy, but Russia still retains enough firepower to prevent a decisive Ukrainian victory on the ground. Furthermore, although recent Russian offensive operations have been very wasteful (see Bakhmut and Avdiivka), the Russian military is still strong enough to simultaneously defend its territorial gains while support continued attacks on multiple fronts.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-we-did-not-achieve-the-desired-results-zelensky-says

I was surprised to read that the younger end of the current UAF draft age is 27, and that plans to lower it to 25 have been held up by the congress. IIRC, 27 was the average age of all US servicemen in WW2.

Meanwhile, Russia shows no signs of running out of military manpower (however poor the quality thereof). Unlike the Ukrainian gov't, Putin shows very little reluctance to resort to conscription to backfill the Russian army in Ukraine.

I really hope the West doesn't lose its nerve. Despite years of hardship and loss, Ukraine doesn't have the luxury of doing so.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[LoneCollector1987]

While I agree with some of your points Raellus, I think that ONE point is now painfully clear.

The West is weak.

I went to Wikipedia: Cold War tank formations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War_tank_formations

Germany alone
1.200 M48
2.437 Leopard 1
500 Leopard 2
770 Kanonenjagdpanzer (cannon armed tank destroyer)
350 Raketenjagdpanzer (Missile armed tank destroyer)

We had ammunition for a world war.
We had a food reserve to feed the people of Germany in the event of a war.

And where did it go?

I can still hear the politicians saying after 1990: We are surrounded by friends.

What were they thinking?
Have they learned nothing?
A state has no friends, only shared interests. (Attributed to Bismarck and Charles de Gaulle)
Between states there is no friendship, just alliances. (Attributed to Charles de Gaulle)

We downgraded our armies (Germany from 500.000 West + 200.000 East to less thean 190.000 and about 225 MBT).
We believed McKinsey and Just-in-Time production and got rid of stockpiles.
The Emergency food reserve was shipped to Africa.

The last I heard that Germany has enough ammo for TWO days of fighting (World War style) and then the german manufacturers need SIX months to refill this stockpile.
Can you imagine that? Germany fights two days, then six months of cease fire, two days of fighting, ad infinitum.

What we need is to rebuild our industrial power to produce enough war material, ammo, etc. We have to go back to 1985.
We have to stop outsourcing because if we are dependent on another state (hint China, Taiwan) and they dont like us or go to war, then we are like the fish after the water went away.

[Heffe]

Rae: Things have definitely taken a pause for a while, and I think that a "strategic stalemate" is the correct moniker for what's happening right now.

There have been some recent items of note though -

Ukraine getting ahold of ATACMs has forced Russia to pull helicopters back further away from the front, resulting in longer flight times and less loitering on the battlefield. This should result in fewer losses of Ukrainian heavy equipment (especially with those valuable western tanks).
On the left bank of the Dnipro, Ukraine is continuing to force Russia into an untenable situation. Russia doesn't have the manpower to force Ukrainians out, and recently some Russian units are flat out refusing orders to engage.
Recent polling has shown an increase in the number of Russians wanting out of Ukraine. I'd say this would effect the upcoming election, but let's be real, Putin won't allow himself to lose even if the vote is against him.
The two major rail lines from China being taken out in the last week will slow things domestically for Russia, even when it comes to domestic industry, which will start to have more of an impact on the Russian day to day.
The ruble, despite clawing back some value in the last month, has been on a downward slide for a year now, increasing pressure on the Russian citizenry.


The longer the war drags on...I'm not sure if it benefits Russia due to Russia's ability to lean on its higher population, or if it benefits Ukraine due to the continuing attrition of Russian heavy equipment. I imagine a lot will hinge on the west continuing to provide more tanks and equipment to Ukraine. And I do think that the upcoming elections in the states will likely have a pretty big impact on American financial and material support for Ukraine, which is a damned shame (we should be supportive no matter which party is in power).

[Raellus]

I am sorry to be disabused of the notion that Ukraine was achieving success on the left bank of the Dnipro...

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-troops-question-dnipro-river-assault

Everything I'd seen up to today was decidedly more sanguine.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[Ursus Maior]

Similar reports have been coming in for some time now. I get the impression that this operation was some sort of coup de main, but there was no actual plan in place to exploit the landing, once it had taken place successfully. It seems to me now that there are no follow on forces available, making this a costly stinging attack at best.

[Heffe]

Through the course of the war, Ukraine's general pattern seems to be attempting to put Russia into as many untenable positions as possible - the attack across the Dnipro seems to be just another of those attempts.

By inserting forces on the left bank, Russia's has to continue committing forces to that region to guard against a breakout - forces that otherwise would have been fighting likely closer to Robotyne during the counteroffensive. It also makes Russia behave more cautiously with the deployment of reserves. I have a feeling that's all the attack was intended to accomplish, despite the high Ukrainian losses.

[Raellus]

By inserting forces on the left bank, Russia's has to continue committing forces to that region to guard against a breakout - forces that otherwise would have been fighting likely closer to Robotyne during the counteroffensive. It also makes Russia behave more cautiously with the deployment of reserves. I have a feeling that's all the attack was intended to accomplish, despite the high Ukrainian losses.

Strategically and/or operationally, that makes a lot of sense. What strikes me, though, is that the Ukrainians have never really even threatened a breakout on the left bank. A breakout would require a mechanized spearhead and the logistical infrastructure to support it. They simply haven't been able to amass strong mobile forces in the bridgehead- it doesn't seem like they've really even tried. AFAIK, there's been no attempt to put a pontoon bridge or AFV ferry in place. In all fairness, whether the Ukrainians would have been able to defend said effectively from Russians airstrikes and artillery is quite another matter. The bridgehead was formed and, up to this point, totally supported by small boats. There's no way a modern breakout force can be sustained by small boat.

As a result of the Ukrainians' failure to expand the bridgehead and threaten a breakthrough, the Russians haven't really had to divert strong forces to contain it. My impression is that during the first couple of weeks of the UAF bridgehead, it really freaked the Russians out, and they took heavy losses trying to dislodge it by direct assault. That played right into the Ukrainians' hands. It appears that the Russians have learned that this approach is wasteful and counterproductive. Now, they seem content to cordon off the beachhead and batter it with artillery and airstrikes. Ukrainian troops are stuck on the left bank getting pounded on the daily for little appreciable operational/strategic gains. This was lamented by several of the UAF personnel quoted in the piece.

Why the UAF insists on reinforcing failure with this operation is less clear. Perhaps they have fallen prey to the sunk-cost fallacy?

-

[Heffe]

Strategically and/or operationally, that makes a lot of sense. What strikes me, though, is that the Ukrainians have never really even threatened a breakout on the left bank. A breakout would require a mechanized spearhead and the logistical infrastructure to support it. They simply haven't been able to amass strong mobile forces in the bridgehead- it doesn't seem like they've really even tried. AFAIK, there's been no attempt to put a pontoon bridge or AFV ferry in place. In all fairness, whether the Ukrainians would have been able to defend said effectively from Russians airstrikes and artillery is quite another matter. The bridgehead was formed and, up to this point, totally supported by small boats. There's no way a modern breakout force can be sustained by small boat.

As a result of the Ukrainians' failure to expand the bridgehead and threaten a breakthrough, the Russians haven't really had to divert strong forces to contain it. My impression is that during the first couple of weeks of the UAF bridgehead, it really freaked the Russians out, and they took heavy losses trying to dislodge it by direct assault. That played right into the Ukrainians' hands. It appears that the Russians have learned that this approach is wasteful and counterproductive. Now, they seem content to cordon off the beachhead and batter it with artillery and airstrikes. Ukrainian troops are stuck on the left bank getting pounded on the daily for little appreciable operational/strategic gains. This was lamented by several of the UAF personnel quoted in the piece.

Why the UAF insists on reinforcing failure with this operation is less clear. Perhaps they have fallen prey to the sunk-cost fallacy?

-

Perhaps "breakout" was the wrong word there. More just that there was a risk of Ukraine taking more land unless Russia spent resources trying to defend it, which reduced their capability of doing lateral reinforcements from the Kherson region back over to near Robotyne.

As for why they're continuing to reinforce the area? Your guess is as good as mine - it doesn't make much sense to me either. I heard that domestically, it made a splash in Russian news and upset their milbloggers that Russia couldn't dislodge the Ukrainians...but that doesn't seem like a good enough reason to continue to throw soldiers into the operation.

[Raellus]

This is not good news. Here's an abstract:

“Russia will be materially advantaged in 2024 in artillery ammunition, in production of drones and likely long-range drones and cruise missiles, too,” Kofman said. “If the West just assumes that it’s a stalemate and can reduce its commitment to Ukraine, Russian advantages will compound because Russia doesn’t accept the stalemate.”

https://apnews.com/article/russia-war-ukraine-putin-election-db92b9da309a97c4fc2585e626a8b5db

-

[Targan]

It's pretty obvious that the biggest mistake Ukraine made wasn't in 2013, or 2014, or at any time during the current hot phase of their conflict with Russia. Ukraine's biggest mistake was in 1994 when it believed that the security assurances given by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States were worth any more than the paper they were written on.

Giving Ukraine just enough equipment and ordnance to keep the conflict at a stalemate isn't doing anyone any good. Soldiers on both sides keep dying in appalling numbers, the Russians continue to engage in war crimes and crimes against humanity on a daily basis while the western world watches on and makes "tut-tut" noises, and Putin knows with almost total certainty that given time, the rest of the world will stop caring enough and he'll get what he wants.

If the west wasn't going to intervene properly at the start, with a Ukraine-wide no-fly zone and even better, boots on the ground, then we should have given the Ukrainians everything they needed, from day one. What's the point of helping someone fight a war if you know the help isn't sufficient to guarantee they'll win? At this point I genuinely can't judge whether or not Ukraine would be better off capitulating.

Many of us are Cold War kids. Teenaged me would be utterly horrified and totally confused if I was brought forward in time and saw this travesty underway today. It's like testosterone levels dropped by 80% over the last 30 years.

[kato13]

As for why they're continuing to reinforce the area? Your guess is as good as mine - it doesn't make much sense to me either. I heard that domestically, it made a splash in Russian news and upset their milbloggers that Russia couldn't dislodge the Ukrainians...but that doesn't seem like a good enough reason to continue to throw soldiers into the operation.

Saw an interesting theory. The airfields in the south west of Ukraine are the best fit for the moment for F-16s. They are also on average the greatest distance from secure Russian and Belorussian territory. So not unsurprisingly the first units deployed are going to go there. Having something in the area to "prod the bear" will lead to greater exposure of forces and logistical elements for potential engagements.

This area has seen quite a bit of whittling down of Russian Airforces in the past few weeks (patriots taking out 4 x SU-34s in the past four days alone) so this might be part of that larger plan.

[castlebravo92]

It's pretty obvious that the biggest mistake Ukraine made wasn't in 2013, or 2014, or at any time during the current hot phase of their conflict with Russia. Ukraine's biggest mistake was in 1994 when it believed that the security assurances given by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States were worth any more than the paper they were written on.

Giving Ukraine just enough equipment and ordnance to keep the conflict at a stalemate isn't doing anyone any good. Soldiers on both sides keep dying in appalling numbers, the Russians continue to engage in war crimes and crimes against humanity on a daily basis while the western world watches on and makes "tut-tut" noises, and Putin knows with almost total certainty that given time, the rest of the world will stop caring enough and he'll get what he wants.

If the west wasn't going to intervene properly at the start, with a Ukraine-wide no-fly zone and even better, boots on the ground, then we should have given the Ukrainians everything they needed, from day one. What's the point of helping someone fight a war if you know the help isn't sufficient to guarantee they'll win? At this point I genuinely can't judge whether or not Ukraine would be better off capitulating.

Many of us are Cold War kids. Teenaged me would be utterly horrified and totally confused if I was brought forward in time and saw this travesty underway today. It's like testosterone levels dropped by 80% over the last 30 years.

Funny you mention that. I saw somewhere that the average testosterone levels for 18 year old men now is at the same level as 65 year old men 23 years ago, so maybe there is something to that theory.

In grand geopolitical terms, I think we are seeing the death of the Westphalian nation-state. Most countries, especially non-nuclear armed countries, are actually incapable of defending themselves against any serious aggressor. Ukraine almost certainly would have fallen by now without Western aid, even as inept as the Russians have proven to be in military combat and logistics. The nation-state status quo was stabilized by shifting alliances through the end of colonialism, and then through the Cold War by the two-pole geopolitical system, but now all that is dead. So what's to stop Venezuela from invading Guyana if they want to and the United States chooses to do nothing? Brazil? The UK? And let's say the UK does decide to do something - is it a sure thing that the UK will prevail in a conventional conflict half a hemisphere away when their entire army now numbers only 75,000 men and women in active duty?

I remember when NATO decided to support the Libyan rebels, and the combined combat forces of Germany, Italy, and the UK (and maybe France) were completely dependent on the US for munitions to bomb Libya with.

If Ukraine was guilty of something, then most of the world was guilty of it as well, as they demobilized not only their military, but their infrastructure to support a military. When Russia originally invaded the Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine only had around a brigade of active duty soldiers to resist with. A lot of the initial combat against the Russians was by legit citizen militias. I think the mistake a lot of people made (including Biden) was thinking that Russia would be content with a minor land grab. It's apparent that Putin really does bemoan the collapse of the USSR and is looking to rekindle it, or at least rekindle the Russian empire as his legacy.

[ToughOmbres]

Even the wisest cannot see all ends, but it looks like the war in Ukraine might be headed towards a strategic stalemate.

Apart from Javelin (and other ATGMs), various MANPADs, and HIMARS, the West has failed to supply Ukraine with the weaponry that could have had decisive effect on the battlefield in a timely fashion (MBTs, ATCMS, modern tactical fighters- the latter the UAF is still waiting on). Instead, it's usually been a case of too little, too late. I wonder if the strategic situation today would be markedly more in favor of Ukraine if those weapon systems had been provided to the UAF much earlier.

Perhaps most alarming is the growing reluctance of USA and a couple of its NATO partners to continue supporting Ukraine materially. It appears that the flow of foreign-supplied weapons and ammunition to the UAF will soon slow.

By the same token, reports of Russia running out of essentially weaponry and ammunition appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. Yes, attrition has been heavy, but Russia still retains enough firepower to prevent a decisive Ukrainian victory on the ground. Furthermore, although recent Russian offensive operations have been very wasteful (see Bakhmut and Avdiivka), the Russian military is still strong enough to simultaneously defend its territorial gains while support continued attacks on multiple fronts.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-we-did-not-achieve-the-desired-results-zelensky-says

I was surprised to read that the younger end of the current UAF draft age is 27, and that plans to lower it to 25 have been held up by the congress. IIRC, 27 was the average age of all US servicemen in WW2.

Meanwhile, Russia shows no signs of running out of military manpower (however poor the quality thereof). Unlike the Ukrainian gov't, Putin shows very little reluctance to resort to conscription to backfill the Russian army in Ukraine.

I really hope the West doesn't lose its nerve. Despite years of hardship and loss, Ukraine doesn't have the luxury of doing so.

Slava Ukraini!

-

I'm afraid that's exactly what it's shaping up to be-a terrible bloody stalemate where Putin waits for the West to lose interest or at best a de facto ceasefire and each side adopts a policy of watchful waiting.

[ToughOmbres]

Even the wisest cannot see all ends, but it looks like the war in Ukraine might be headed towards a strategic stalemate.

Apart from Javelin (and other ATGMs), various MANPADs, and HIMARS, the West has failed to supply Ukraine with the weaponry that could have had decisive effect on the battlefield in a timely fashion (MBTs, ATCMS, modern tactical fighters- the latter the UAF is still waiting on). Instead, it's usually been a case of too little, too late. I wonder if the strategic situation today would be markedly more in favor of Ukraine if those weapon systems had been provided to the UAF much earlier.

Perhaps most alarming is the growing reluctance of USA and a couple of its NATO partners to continue supporting Ukraine materially. It appears that the flow of foreign-supplied weapons and ammunition to the UAF will soon slow.

By the same token, reports of Russia running out of essentially weaponry and ammunition appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. Yes, attrition has been heavy, but Russia still retains enough firepower to prevent a decisive Ukrainian victory on the ground. Furthermore, although recent Russian offensive operations have been very wasteful (see Bakhmut and Avdiivka), the Russian military is still strong enough to simultaneously defend its territorial gains while support continued attacks on multiple fronts.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-we-did-not-achieve-the-desired-results-zelensky-says

I was surprised to read that the younger end of the current UAF draft age is 27, and that plans to lower it to 25 have been held up by the congress. IIRC, 27 was the average age of all US servicemen in WW2.

Meanwhile, Russia shows no signs of running out of military manpower (however poor the quality thereof). Unlike the Ukrainian gov't, Putin shows very little reluctance to resort to conscription to backfill the Russian army in Ukraine.

I really hope the West doesn't lose its nerve. Despite years of hardship and loss, Ukraine doesn't have the luxury of doing so.

Slava Ukraini!

-

Indeed. I wonder if parceling out 50 Abrams, 20 Challengers and so on doesn't make the already chaotic Ukrainian supply/logistics worse while only marginally improving a small portion of their Armed Forces.
I've also wondered if instead of penny packets of Western MBT's and MICV's if instead the West had "acquired" or shipped from dwindling stocks Warsaw Pact/East Bloc equipment AND ratcheted up Polish, Slovak and Romanian repair facilities who would still have older specialists who could repair Ukraine's largely Eastern Bloc/WP equipment?

[Heffe]

I know we've looked at Russian tank losses in this thread previously, but does anyone have information about Ukrainian tank losses beyond Oryx's data?

I ask because we know that Russian heavy equipment bases are emptying at an alarming rate, with them emptying entirely being likely in the next 12-18 months (recent attrition rates would indicate closer to 12). And as those bases empty, Russian tank forces are going to be of worse and worse quality.

I'm confident Ukraine is losing tanks as well, albeit likely at nowhere near this pace. Granted, they didn't have anywhere even close to as many to begin with, and the west as noted hasn't really provided many tanks either. But at some point, Russia will run out of tanks, which will "tank" their ability to conduct mechanized assaults, effectively ending their offensive operations further into Ukraine. That is, unless they want to send more waves of infantry and APCs into fortified defenses, which may be the case. At that point, Russia will be someone forced to either operationally pause and reassess their offensive operations, or attempt to broker a treaty by which they'd keep the land they've already taken.

If Ukraine has the tank capacity to outlast the Russian tank supply, that may open up some significant options for them. Or if nothing else, so long as the west continues to provide additional tank forces to them after Russia runs dry, that will impact any possible future negotiations.

*edit: This is also assuming Russia isn't able to begin sourcing tanks from elsewhere - namely Iran and the DPRK.

[kcdusk]

What if Putins health failed before the end of the war, would whomever ended up in power continue the war or respectfully withdrawer?

[castlebravo92]

I know we've looked at Russian tank losses in this thread previously, but does anyone have information about Ukrainian tank losses beyond Oryx's data?

I ask because we know that Russian heavy equipment bases are emptying at an alarming rate, with them emptying entirely being likely in the next 12-18 months (recent attrition rates would indicate closer to 12). And as those bases empty, Russian tank forces are going to be of worse and worse quality.

I'm confident Ukraine is losing tanks as well, albeit likely at nowhere near this pace. Granted, they didn't have anywhere even close to as many to begin with, and the west as noted hasn't really provided many tanks either. But at some point, Russia will run out of tanks, which will "tank" their ability to conduct mechanized assaults, effectively ending their offensive operations further into Ukraine. That is, unless they want to send more waves of infantry and APCs into fortified defenses, which may be the case. At that point, Russia will be someone forced to either operationally pause and reassess their offensive operations, or attempt to broker a treaty by which they'd keep the land they've already taken.

If Ukraine has the tank capacity to outlast the Russian tank supply, that may open up some significant options for them. Or if nothing else, so long as the west continues to provide additional tank forces to them after Russia runs dry, that will impact any possible future negotiations.

*edit: This is also assuming Russia isn't able to begin sourcing tanks from elsewhere - namely Iran and the DPRK.

From what I've been able to observe, both the Russians and Ukraines have been using tanks more as mobile pill boxes than their traditional role as breakout and maneuver elements. There have been some exceptions, but those ended very poorly for the massed formations. It may be that the current generation of guided and fire and forget anti-tank weapons is just too deadly for Gulf War and earlier tank tactics to be effective against peer / near peer opponents any more, especially without air dominance.

Probably some observation bias at play here, but what we see on a lot of the released videos is squad and platoon sized infantry probes that get wrecked by artillery, and then mopped up by drones, with some occasional close in trench fighting (which is nonetheless probably a lot more common than caught on go-pro).

In one sense, this war reminds me a lot of a WW1 trench style trench warfare with much lower troop densities manning the trenches (partly due to the greater accuracy of artillery and drones, partly due to the fewer numbers of men).

Long term though, an attrition war definitely favors Russia.

[Heffe]

From what I've been able to observe, both the Russians and Ukraines have been using tanks more as mobile pill boxes than their traditional role as breakout and maneuver elements. There have been some exceptions, but those ended very poorly for the massed formations. It may be that the current generation of guided and fire and forget anti-tank weapons is just too deadly for Gulf War and earlier tank tactics to be effective against peer / near peer opponents any more, especially without air dominance.

Probably some observation bias at play here, but what we see on a lot of the released videos is squad and platoon sized infantry probes that get wrecked by artillery, and then mopped up by drones, with some occasional close in trench fighting (which is nonetheless probably a lot more common than caught on go-pro).

In one sense, this war reminds me a lot of a WW1 trench style trench warfare with much lower troop densities manning the trenches (partly due to the greater accuracy of artillery and drones, partly due to the fewer numbers of men).

Long term though, an attrition war definitely favors Russia.

I have the feeling the issue comes down more to minefields and drones, with regard to tank operations. Even still, it's hard to beat direct fire support from tank guns. I do wonder how things will progress in this area - if we see tanks start to disappear from the battlefield entirely due to drone usage, or if counter-drone capabilities get advanced to the point where tanks will re-emerge as a dominating force.

The other piece I wanted to call out was regarding platoon and squad sized probes. Outside of major offensives, you're right that the majority of movement seems to be pretty small in nature. I imagine that this is also the result of drones and better battlefield communications. It seems to have gotten significantly more difficult for sides to build up adequate masses of armor for a large push without the other side knowing about it.

In short, drones and artillery have made it so that neither side can properly amass a force large enough to be able to break through the enormous minefields.

[bash]

With respect to massing forces for pushes/breakouts I think the ratio of forces available to width of the front is playing a major role. The front in huge and just occupying it is difficult. It's challenging to mass armor because it requires pulling armor reinforcements from other parts of the line weakening them. With neither side enjoying air superiority they can't shore up a lack of armor with air support or make air assaults.

[Raellus]

Is Ukraine losing its will to fight? I am troubled more by this development in the war than any other over the past two years. Russia's main advantage is in military manpower. The Ukrainian parliament's refusal to expand the draft plays right into Putin's hands. He's already shown that he's willing to bleed his own country dry to win the long game.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-kyivs-mobilization-plan-stalled-by-parliament

-

[kato13]

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GD1REsZXMAAZm_c?format=jpg&name=small

https://twitter.com/albafella1/status/1746641376660406730

The Ukrainian Armed Forces shot down two russian aircraft over the Sea of Azov.
This happened an hour and a half ago. The A-50 was shot down and the IL-22 was shot down, but was in the air and trying to get to the nearest airfield. Disappeared from radar in the Kerch area.

This rumor seems to have solidified, but even taking into account longer range assets (Patriot, AMRAAM) getting two hits this deep behind the front lines > (150km) is puzzling.


EDIT 1 & 2
From analyzing satellite images of contrails it looks Like something was tracking much further north than the above image and within patriot range.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GD1vp6pXgAAA_E2?format=jpg&name=small

Also the IL-22 looks like it made it back to base
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GD5ChZzXsAAdSvx?format=jpg&name=small

Source for both here.
https://twitter.com/HamWa07


Edit 3 Added Patriot Range that covers the circuit tracks.

[Ursus Maior]

Here is a preliminary analysis by author David Axe on how that could have went down on the Ukrainian side. Of course details on such an operation are scarce and likely will remain so for the time being, but he sounds reasonable and in the past has written other well received articles.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/01/16/ukrainian-crews-set-a-complex-missile-trap-for-russias-best-radar-plane/?sh=601256603566

[bash]

Here is a preliminary analysis by author David Axe on how that could have went down on the Ukrainian side. Of course details on such an operation are scarce and likely will remain so for the time being, but he sounds reasonable and in the past has written other well received articles.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/01/16/ukrainian-crews-set-a-complex-missile-trap-for-russias-best-radar-plane/?sh=601256603566

If accurate (even partially) that's a great operation by Ukraine. Russia has lots of old AFVs and mobiks but precious few high tech force multipliers like AWACS. Taking those out is a huge benefit to their operations, especially at a time of year where ground forces have limited mobility.

Now breaking a hole in ground based radar means they can conduct long cruise missile and drone attacks on locked down ground assets.

[Heffe]

It doesn't elude me that the AWACS targeting happened almost directly after the first F-16s were allegedly delivered into Ukraine's hands. I have to imagine that delivery was one of the reasons behind the operation.

[bash]

It doesn't elude me that the AWACS targeting happened almost directly after the first F-16s were allegedly delivered into Ukraine's hands. I have to imagine that delivery was one of the reasons behind the operation.

Excellent point.

[Vespers War]

Ukraine has introduced a new UGV, the Ironclad. It's surprisingly small for the name, at 1,800 kilograms dry with a 400 kilogram payload capacity. Standard armament so far seems to be an M2 machine gun in a rotating mount with a thermal optic. The mount (Shablya/Sabre) has also been fitted with PKT and M240 machine guns in other uses. Back in 2018 there was talk of mounting a 40mm grenade launcher instead of the machine gun and a pair of Karl Gustav tubes in addition to the machine gun, but I don't know if those have been developed to the point of entering service.

The optic allegedly has a maximum viewing range of 5 kilometers and will pick up a human at 1800 meters. Control range is supposed to be 5 kilometers as well, with the vehicle having a maximum road speed of 20 km/h, a rough terrain speed of 10-15 km/h, a range of 130 kilometers, and protection from 7.62mm rifle fire.

It looks a lot like an ATV, but with an articulated center joint so that the front and rear can pivot independently (both sections have electric motors powered by a diesel engine), reducing the turn radius. It appears that it can be directly driven in non-combat situations, as the rear section has a seat with controls.

[Raellus]

Speaking of unmanned vehicles, UAF "drone boats" sank a Russian Tarantul III Class corvette (it's sometimes classified as a missile FAB, instead).

https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-sinks-russian-navy-missile-corvette-in-drone-boat-attack

On the ground, Ukrainian forces are really feeling Russia's marked advantage in artillery ammunition.

I really hope the US Congress gets its act together and authorizes another aid package for Ukraine. ATM, it's not looking good.

-

[Ursus Maior]

It doesn't elude me that the AWACS targeting happened almost directly after the first F-16s were allegedly delivered into Ukraine's hands. I have to imagine that delivery was one of the reasons behind the operation.

I'm not sure on the status of that, but personally I haven't seen any videos about Ukrainian F-16s in action. So, I remain hesitant to draw conclusions.

[Heffe]

I'm not sure on the status of that, but personally I haven't seen any videos about Ukrainian F-16s in action. So, I remain hesitant to draw conclusions.

That's entirely fair. I tend to be a bit of an optimist regarding the war, but I understand the hesitancy to want to speculate about what's actually happening.

I will say that the situation in Avdiivka unfortunately seems to be deteriorating at a poor rate at the moment, but what can be expected when Russia seems comfortable with the current insane attrition rates.

[Raellus]

David Axe at Forbes reported Saturday that the Russians have massed, "Five hundred tanks. More than 600 fighting vehicles. Hundreds of howitzers. Forty thousand troops. According to Ukraine’s eastern command, Russia has assembled a huge field army in eastern Ukraine opposite the free Ukrainian city of Kupyansk.

"Some or part of around 10 Ukrainian brigades, anchored in the north by the 3rd Tank Brigade and south by the 4th Tank Brigade, defends Kupyansk and surrounding settlements. It’s a significant forces with perhaps 20,000 troops and hundreds of tanks, fighting vehicles and howitzers.

"But people and vehicles aren’t the problem for the Ukrainians. The problem is ammunition. The United States was one of the biggest donors of 155-millimeter shells for Ukraine’s best big guns—and pro-Russia Republicans in the U.S. Congress cut off aid to Ukraine last fall.

"Since then, Ukrainian forces’ daily allotment of shells has fallen by two-thirds to just 2,000 rounds. Russian forces meanwhile fire as many as 10,000 shells a day, thanks to a steady supply of ammo from North Korea."

-

[Drgonzo2011]

Apparently, Ukrainian naval drones (MaguraV5s) have taken out the Caezar Kunikov, a Project 775 landing craft. This is an older class of ships (the CK was commissioned in 1986) but it still highlights the vulnerability the Russians have vis a vis surface drone swarms. It will also be interesting to see how other navies learn (or fail to learn) the lessons of the Russo-Ukraine War. https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-updates-kyiv-says-russian-warship-destroyed/live-68251728

[kato13]

Always a nice surprise when this chart gets updated.

Full Size (https://i.redd.it/glu7swmc0jic1.jpeg)

[Vespers War]

Apparently, Ukrainian naval drones (MaguraV5s) have taken out the Caezar Kunikov, a Project 775 landing craft. This is an older class of ships (the CK was commissioned in 1986) but it still highlights the vulnerability the Russians have vis a vis surface drone swarms. It will also be interesting to see how other navies learn (or fail to learn) the lessons of the Russo-Ukraine War. https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-updates-kyiv-says-russian-warship-destroyed/live-68251728

The only newer large landing ships in the Black Sea Fleet are Yamal and Azov, also Project 775 landing ships (Azov is the improved 775M sub-class). The only newer class is Project 11711, and the two examples of that class are both in the Northern Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet still uses a pair of Project 1171 landing ships, a type which entered service in 1965 (they had three, but Saratov was sunk in 2022).

[Heffe]

I've heard that some of these ships were also tasked to help move equipment and cargo to Crimea when the Kerch Bridge suffered a strike a while back. I imagine they're probably still used in that capacity to some extent.

[Raellus]

More disappointing and troubling stories from Ukraine these last few weeks.

Without getting too political, the US Congress is still dragging its feet on, if not downright blocking, legislation to provide Ukraine with more military aid. This boggles my mind. The party that used to be the most Hawkish vis-a-vis Containment and international intervention is fast becoming isolationist, if not pro-Russian. I imagine Nixon and Reagan spinning in their graves right now.

By all accounts, the Ukrainians are running very low on artillery ammunition. European manufacturing, despite efforts to gear up closer to wartime production levels, can't keep up with demand. On the other side, the Russians have received fresh infusions of North Korean and Iranian shells, rockets, and guided ballistic missiles.

The latter have been found to contain numerous essential, Western components. The same is true of Iranian drones and Russian missiles. Either the DPRK and Iranians have gotten really good at finding ways around sanctions that have been in place for decades, or unscrupulous Western firms are colluding with dangerous dictatorships, or both. Whatever the case, it's deeply disappointing news.

I'm also troubled by reports of Ukraine's continuing difficulties in recruiting soldiers.

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-draft-b2ca1d0ecd72019be2217a653989fbc2

On the one hand, I totally get not wanting to fight in a war. After seeing photos and video of conditions on the front lines, I'd be in no hurry to enlist. On the other hand, this isn't some foreign adventure- this is a war for national survival. With Russia continuing to indiscriminately lob missiles at Ukrainian popular centers, this is an existential struggle. That said, the average age of replacement soldiers is reportedly in the 40s (WTF?!?). No amount of Western aid is going to save Ukraine if Ukrainians aren't willing to save their own country. That's easy for me to say, safe behind my keyboard, but I'm really struggling with the psychology of the average Ukrainian 18-35 year-old.

Now, an observation. I check in on the r/UkraineWarVideoReport Subreddit every few days. In the first year-and-a-half of the war, over half the videos showed ATGMs (Saint Javelin et al) taking out Russian vehicles. Over the last 6 months, those types of videos have all but disappeared. I haven't read anything about shortages of ATGMs, but pretty much every Russian-tank-getting-killed video stars a small drone as the killer. Have I missed a story about dwindling supplies of ATGMs? Also, the number of Ukrainian artillery strike videos has gone way down over the past three months- this, of course, reinforces my first point re worsening shortages re shells and rockets.

Anyway, it's looking like Putin will win this war. The Donbass will remain under Russian occupation, and a land-bridge to Crimea (stolen in 2014) has been established. Will he go for more? It's hard to say, at this point. If Ukrainians have the will and Western materiel support to continue to grind down Russian military power, then Russian probably won't make any more significant territorial gains. It's hard to see a better outcome than stalemate for Ukraine at this point. On the other hand, if Ukrainian will continues to wane, this could be the beginning of the end of Ukrainian nationhood.

I can't end on a sour note, so here's a positive: Ukraine somehow managed to shoot down at least six Sukhoi fighter-bombers in the last week or so.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[Vespers War]

That said, the average age of replacement soldiers is reportedly in the 40s (WTF?!?). No amount of Western aid is going to save Ukraine if Ukrainians aren't willing to save their own country. That's easy for me to say, safe behind my keyboard, but I'm really struggling with the psychology of the average Ukrainian 18-35 year-old. -

One factor is probably that the age limits for conscription are 27 to 60, I believe in part because Ukraine is trying to avoid future demographic issues if men who are statistically unlikely to have had children are killed in combat. There is talk of lowering the lower limit to 25, but one of the things they're trying to avoid is not having a workforce in 20-25 years because too many young men got killed and there were no children to grow up to become workers. There's a need to balance immediate needs against long-term needs, and while I have no doubt they'd drop that conscription age if there was significant advancement by the Russians, as long as things are mostly static I don't expect much change.

[Heffe]

Something else to consider that I don't think has been mentioned - Ukraine seems to be doing their damndest to actually give their soldiers rotations from the front. From what I've been reading, this is in contrast to a lot of the Russian units which have been mobilized, and stuck at the front far beyond how a more reasonable military would handle them.

[Raellus]

One factor is probably that the age limits for conscription are 27 to 60, I believe in part because Ukraine is trying to avoid future demographic issues if men who are statistically unlikely to have had children are killed in combat. There is talk of lowering the lower limit to 25, but one of the things they're trying to avoid is not having a workforce in 20-25 years because too many young men got killed and there were no children to grow up to become workers. There's a need to balance immediate needs against long-term needs, and while I have no doubt they'd drop that conscription age if there was significant advancement by the Russians, as long as things are mostly static I don't expect much change.

That's remarkable foresight. I don't envy the Ukrainians this sort of lesser-of-two-evils calculus, but if the younger generation doesn't start pulling its weight here soon, there's a good chance they'll be enjoying their middle age in Russia's westernmost province.

Speaking of Russia, at least one Russian army seems to be evolving- or remembering, since the Soviet general staff developed 'Deep Battle' doctrine prior to WW2- their operational-level warfighting, launching an offensive on multiple, mutually-supporting axes. Why they've waited two years to launch an attack like this is pretty mind-boggling.

If you don't mind rather dry reading, the ISW does some really detailed analysis of the war on a fairly regular basis. See February 22 for the article mentioned above.

https://www.understandingwar.org/

In good news, the Ukrainians are claiming another A-50 Mainstay AWACS. That makes two destroyed, at least one damaged (on the ground, by a small drone).

Slava Ukraini!

-

[kcdusk]

Something that surprises me is. With all the economic sanctions in place against Russia, how is it that they are able to continue to fund the war - but the USA looks to be reducing their spend?

Its almost as if Russia is winning the economic war as well as the war on the ground, which isn't what i expected.

[Vespers War]

Something that surprises me is. With all the economic sanctions in place against Russia, how is it that they are able to continue to fund the war - but the USA looks to be reducing their spend?

Its almost as if Russia is winning the economic war as well as the war on the ground, which isn't what i expected.

Deficit spending. Their federal budget went from a 2022 surplus of 1.4 trillion rubles to a 2023 deficit of 2.9 trillion rubles. The forecast 2024 deficit is 1.6 trillion rubles, but that forecast includes selling oil for ~20% more than the $60/bbl cap that's been placed on Ural crude via sanctions.

[kato13]

Air Force: Ukraine shoots down another Russian A-50 aircraft over Azov Sea (https://kyivindependent.com/russian-a50-plane-shot-down-over-azov-sea-military-says/)

AGAIN!??????


Incredibly, The Russian Air Force Has Lost Another Rare A-50 Radar Plane (https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/23/incredibly-the-russian-air-force-has-lost-another-one-of-its-rare-a-50-radar-planes/?sh=734ece192ac4)

This is reminding me of "Debt of Honor" with the comment about the Japanese AEW-767s. "first about how invincible they were, and more recently about how there were only a few left."


Maybe when the F-16s are finally active (with well trained pilots) they will be able to do better that we all expected.

[Ursus Maior]

Yes, again and it could have been an upgraded A-50U, though that's neither confirmed nor is the exact method of the shoot-down known. What we know is that it happened in the Krasnodar region, which is south of Rostov on the Don and quite far away from the front lines. So we can rule out any of the large premium AA missile systems Ukraine has. Logic follows that infiltrated sabotage/commando type units with drones and or MANPADs are most likely as method for the destruction of this second or third A-50 Russia has now lost. One A-50 was previously shot down and another one earlier possibly sabotaged on ground by an explosive drone attack.

To put it mildly: Russia is losing the war on controlling the skies as it keeps losing data collection, distribution and early-warning methods. Their C³ISTAR capabilites are really thin now, although EW planes with some C²ISTAR capabilites remain. It's unknown how many servicable and especially fly-worthy A-50 remain in Russian service. Before the war nine or twelve A-50 were in service, but their status was unknown in detail.

The successor to the A-50, the A-100, has faced multiple delays in its program and has yet to be introduced into service. This is allegedly planned for this year. However, losing two experienced crews within two months will certainly degrade the Russian AEW&C capabilites in total. This would certainly benefit any military operation against Russia in the foreseeable future.

[Heffe]

Yes, again and it could have been an upgraded A-50U, though that's neither confirmed nor is the exact method of the shoot-down known. What we know is that it happened in the Krasnodar region, which is south of Rostov on the Don and quite far away from the front lines. So we can rule out any of the large premium AA missile systems Ukraine has. Logic follows that infiltrated sabotage/commando type units with drones and or MANPADs are most likely as method for the destruction of this second or third A-50 Russia has now lost. One A-50 was previously shot down and another one earlier possibly sabotaged on ground by an explosive drone attack.

To put it mildly: Russia is losing the war on controlling the skies as it keeps losing data collection, distribution and early-warning methods. Their C³ISTAR capabilites are really thin now, although EW planes with some C²ISTAR capabilites remain. It's unknown how many servicable and especially fly-worthy A-50 remain in Russian service. Before the war nine or twelve A-50 were in service, but their status was unknown in detail.

The successor to the A-50, the A-100, has faced multiple delays in its program and has yet to be introduced into service. This is allegedly planned for this year. However, losing two experienced crews within two months will certainly degrade the Russian AEW&C capabilites in total. This would certainly benefit any military operation against Russia in the foreseeable future.

I suppose it depends on whether or not you want to believe the Ukrainian MOD, but they're apparently claiming it was an S-200 that shot down the most recent A-50.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/24/big-fat-missiles-to-take-down-big-fat-russian-planes-how-ukraine-brought-back-its-massive-s-200s/?sh=51f6c0bc4743

This would make sense, at least in my mind, as the S-200 has some missiles with a longer range than the Patriot missiles provided to Ukraine thus far.

[Vespers War]

This may also have been a bit of a trap by the Ukrainian forces. They retired the S-200 in 2013, and brought it back during the current conflict with modifications (probably including an improved seeker) to act as a surface-to-surface missile. The speculation I've seen is that the A-50 called it in as an S-200 fired as an SSM, not realizing they were the target for an S-200 SAM.

The S-200 has to make some sacrifices for that range - it's an 8-tonne missile where PAC-2 is 0.9 tonnes and PAC-3 is around 0.3 tonnes, so an entire Patriot TEL with sixteen PAC-3 is only a little more than half the mass of a single S-200. This leads to a situation where its launchers are portable but not mobile; that is they can be transported by vehicles, but they can't move themselves and the set-up and teardown are long by modern standards. This was a smart use of a system that's not very flexible by (assuming the stories are correct) taking advantage of complacency on the other side, where they saw what they expected to see rather than what was actually happening.

[Ursus Maior]

I suppose it depends on whether or not you want to believe the Ukrainian MOD, but they're apparently claiming it was an S-200 that shot down the most recent A-50.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/24/big-fat-missiles-to-take-down-big-fat-russian-planes-how-ukraine-brought-back-its-massive-s-200s/?sh=51f6c0bc4743

This would make sense, at least in my mind, as the S-200 has some missiles with a longer range than the Patriot missiles provided to Ukraine thus far.

Yes, they seem to claim that's what happened. From what I read by the more credible experts, this seems to be credible, too. I had not thought of that, since the system had been retired 2013 and while it was reactivated some time ago, I think Ukrainian S-200 never possessed the range necessary for such an intercept.

However, there were variants since the 1970s that could reach out to 300 km, namely the S-200M Vega-M (NATO code SA-5b) as well as S-200D "Dubna" (SA-5c). I don't know, if Ukraine purchased or otherwise obtained any of these improved missiles or if an indigenous improvement was developed and deployed. If the former is the case, Bulgaria could be a donor. As a neighboring country with a donor history, it's a likely candidate, but I don't have any knowledge of their inventory.

Another option would be Poland with their indigenous S-200C "Vega" variant. Though the original Soviet SA-200V "Vega" (NATO code SA-5b) could only reach out to 250 km, the Polish variant might be able to surpass this.

[Heffe]

I've been seeing some analysis on the recent batch of Russian planes going down. The gist seems to suggest the following:


Russia's been making heavy use of glide bombs lately, which they largely credit with their recent success in Avdiivka. These glide bombs can only be dropped currently from Su-34s and Su-35s, and require those planes to increase altitude up to a few thousand meters, during which time they're vulnerable to AA.
While the A50 was shot down allegedly using an S200 missile variant, those missiles aren't really suitable for hitting fighters at extended range due to lack of maneuverability.
Germany recently delivered on a second MIM-104 system in December with accompanying advanced radar system. The first one of these systems is allegedly stationed outside Kiev, while the second seems a good candidate for the types of hits being delivered over the last month. My understanding is that Ukraine is up to at least 4 batteries with 6 launchers total (2 systems from the US, 2 systems from Germany now, and 2 launchers from the Dutch).

[Vespers War]

I've been seeing some analysis on the recent batch of Russian planes going down. The gist seems to suggest the following:


Russia's been making heavy use of glide bombs lately, which they largely credit with their recent success in Avdiivka. These glide bombs can only be dropped currently from Su-34s and Su-35s, and require those planes to increase altitude up to a few thousand meters, during which time they're vulnerable to AA.
While the A50 was shot down allegedly using an S200 missile variant, those missiles aren't really suitable for hitting fighters at extended range due to lack of maneuverability.
Germany recently delivered on a second MIM-104 system in December with accompanying advanced radar system. The first one of these systems is allegedly stationed outside Kiev, while the second seems a good candidate for the types of hits being delivered over the last month. My understanding is that Ukraine is up to at least 4 batteries with 6 launchers total (2 systems from the US, 2 systems from Germany now, and 2 launchers from the Dutch).


Yeah, the S-200 is definitely not a fighter-killer. It's an 7-tonne whale of a missile whose warhead alone is 2/3 the weight of an entire PAC-3 missile. It was intended to knock down strategic bombers at very long range; they're perfectly fine against those or cargo aircraft or tankers or AWACS, things which tend to fly high, relatively slow, and don't maneuver well. Against a fighter or attack aircraft that is smaller, faster, and can pull more extreme maneuvers, it's outclassed. Square Pair (the ground-based tracking radar) can track those sorts of targets, but AFAIK the missile has never successfully engaged a small target. It's not a bad system, especially for the era in which it was developed, just specialized.

[Raellus]

The Russian navy has involuntarily converted another surface ship into a submarine.

https://www.twz.com/sea/ukrainian-drone-boats-sink-russian-navy-patrol-ship

Commissioned in July 2022, the Sergei Kotov was one of four Project 22160 patrol ships, all based in the Black Sea, and each costing roughly $65m.

The Ukrainians had claimed to have hit Project 22160 with either an SSM or shore-launched rocket during the first year of the war, but that turned out to be false.

The loss of the Sergei Kotov has been confirmed by Russian sources.

-

[Heffe]

The Russian navy has involuntarily converted another surface ship into a submarine.

https://www.twz.com/sea/ukrainian-drone-boats-sink-russian-navy-patrol-ship

Commissioned in July 2022, the Sergei Kotov was one of four Project 22160 patrol ships, all based in the Black Sea, and each costing roughly $65m.

The Ukrainians had claimed to have hit Project 22160 with either an SSM or shore-launched rocket during the first year of the war, but that turned out to be false.

The loss of the Sergei Kotov has been confirmed by Russian sources.

-

There's a solid nighttime video of the sinking available online for anyone interested in seeing it. It appears as though the naval drone fires a forward facing rocket at the Sergey Kotov just prior to impact, opening up the hull prior to its own impact - it's very impressive. It also seems that the Sergey Kotov was one of the Russian craft in the Black Sea capable of launching Kalibr cruise missiles. A worthwhile target.

I keep reflecting on how drones are radically changing the face of warfare in future engagements. I'm sure every branch of the US and European militaries right now are deeply examining the new risks to their own equipment as those risks are being put in the limelight in Ukraine. It also presents some wild opportunities for new equipment, and the militaries that are able to properly capitalize on the new technologies are going to have a decided edge in future conflicts. As but one example, naval drones likely have a more limited capacity at the moment due to radio waves being unable to penetrate as far under the water. I'm sure folks are already looking at implementing AI onto new naval drones that would allow them to be more of a "launch and forget" system, which would remove the need for radio guidance entirely.

[Vespers War]

Playing devil's advocate, it's worth noting a few things about the Project 22160 patrol boats.
1. They're tiny. The US Coast Guard's Legend-class cutters are almost triple the displacement of a 22160.
2. Their armament is a bit funky, consisting of a 76mm dual-purpose gun, a pair of 14.5mm machine guns, modular missile/torpedo launchers, and anti-personnel grenade launchers. After Moskva was promoted from ship to reef they received a Tor-M2 SAM launcher vehicle to park on their rear deck to provide air defense. Notably they don't have any of the 30mm CIWS or any light missile launchers other than the jerry-rigged Tor system.

They're oriented towards an anti-big ship or surface bombardment role, with Kalibr or Uran missiles or Paket torpedoes, with relatively little weaponry dedicated to self-defense from either surface combatants or aircraft. If I had to compare them to something Western, it would be the dedicated anti-submarine frigates from the Cold War that relied on the rest of their battle group for protection from anything else. They fill a useful role, but they are rather vulnerable on their own.

Allegedly this was an attack by MAGURA V5 drones, which are the same type that sank Tsezar Kunikov on Valentine's Day. Since November they've destroyed three landing craft (1 Serna, 1 Akula, 1 Ropucha) a Tarantul missile corvette, and now the Project 22160 patrol ship.

[Vespers War]

Something new that came up in one of my discussions recently is that Russia appears to be getting more active in tasking long-range fires, using relatively high-flying drones to identify targets and quickly getting surface-to-surface missiles on them. This ties into some of the earlier posts here about the cost of defeating drones. These are generally too high for a Gepard or other small autocannon SPAAG to reach, so right now the only option is an expensive missile. The ubiquity of drones may call for resuming development of larger-caliber SPAAGs, like the 76mm Otomatic and Draco that were prototyped but never purchased. Otomatic was supposed to be fitted to Leopard 1 and/or M60 tanks, and Draco on the Centauro 8x8 armored car. Developing a turret with radars and a high-angle mount for a large autocannon for obsolescent (but still usable) tank hulls and/or the various LAV/Piranha/Stryker type armored cars would provide another layer of air defense between missiles and the small-caliber autocannon SPAAGs that is looking more necessary as drone warfare rapidly evolves.

[castlebravo92]

There's a solid nighttime video of the sinking available online for anyone interested in seeing it. It appears as though the naval drone fires a forward facing rocket at the Sergey Kotov just prior to impact, opening up the hull prior to its own impact - it's very impressive. It also seems that the Sergey Kotov was one of the Russian craft in the Black Sea capable of launching Kalibr cruise missiles. A worthwhile target.

I keep reflecting on how drones are radically changing the face of warfare in future engagements. I'm sure every branch of the US and European militaries right now are deeply examining the new risks to their own equipment as those risks are being put in the limelight in Ukraine. It also presents some wild opportunities for new equipment, and the militaries that are able to properly capitalize on the new technologies are going to have a decided edge in future conflicts. As but one example, naval drones likely have a more limited capacity at the moment due to radio waves being unable to penetrate as far under the water. I'm sure folks are already looking at implementing AI onto new naval drones that would allow them to be more of a "launch and forget" system, which would remove the need for radio guidance entirely.

IMHO, commoditized drone tech represents a true "revolution in military affairs."

The cost/benefit ratio is completely out of whack with other weapons platforms. You basically have, roughly speaking $200 to $10k platforms (from the grenade dropping hobby FPV drones to the longer range military suicide drones with thermal and semi-autonomous capabilities) able take out material and personnel much more cost effectively than almost any other option.

For example, the M982 Excalibur 155mm guided projectile costs $68,000 to $250k per round. A JDAM kit $30k - but has to be deployed via a $30 million+ piece of equipment, and a non-permissive environment raises the cost of delivery significantly.

But drones excel in non-permissive environments because they are cheap, the AAA counter-measures are themselves ideal high priority targets for the drones, and no one has really come up with a great strategy to deal with them yet in a near-peer contest like in the Ukraine (in Gaza, Hamas basically just ran out of drones rather than Israel completely nullifying them tactically). Missiles aren't cost effective, and no one has apparently deployed a gun system that works all that great.

The net net is you have a situation where maneuver forces are extremely vulnerable, infantry forces are extremely vulnerable, and Russia's strategy of deploying poorly trained and equipped Mobiks to soak up drones may actually not be the worst strategy out there. Better, from a Russian point of view, to lose a conscript with an AK-74 and some recycled fatigues and boots, than a T-90.

[Heffe]

I'm somewhat reminded of this scene from Angel has Fallen (absolutely terrible movie btw, would not recommend):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbGxYoxpPdI

But that scene with drones, in hindsight, seems a bit prescient. Perhaps not in the delivery of the drones, but at least in the tactic. As individual drone countermeasures become the norm, I have a feeling we're going to start seeing more "swarming" techniques being used against high value targets. Even a purpose built gun system is going to struggle against 20-50 grenade-sized drones, which each cost $100, all attacking in unison.

[kato13]

Well this is going to be a big deal.

Gunmen open fire at people at concert hall near Moscow, (MASS) casualties reported. (Mass added to be accurate)
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/shooting-blast-reported-concert-hall-near-moscow-agencies-2024-03-22/

The US warned citizens not to go to public places about 2 weeks ago,
https://ru.usembassy.gov/security-alert-avoid-large-gatherings-over-the-next-48-hours/

The embassy’s warning came on the same day that Russia’s Federal Security Service said it foiled a plot by an Islamic State-linked group to attack a synagogue in Moscow.
https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/international/2024/03/08/u-s--warning-attack-large-gatherings-moscow

If I had to guess I would bet on Islamic separatists or a Russian false flag. But the US warning alone will be enough for this to be spun as a Ukrainian operation necessitating full mobilization.

If you have any new information or opinions always happy to get another perspective.

[Vespers War]

Well this is going to be a big deal.

Gunmen open fire at people at concert hall near Moscow, (MASS) casualties reported. (Mass added to be accurate)
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/shooting-blast-reported-concert-hall-near-moscow-agencies-2024-03-22/

The US warned citizens not to go to public places about 2 weeks ago,
https://ru.usembassy.gov/security-alert-avoid-large-gatherings-over-the-next-48-hours/

The embassy’s warning came on the same day that Russia’s Federal Security Service said it foiled a plot by an Islamic State-linked group to attack a synagogue in Moscow.
https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/international/2024/03/08/u-s--warning-attack-large-gatherings-moscow

If I had to guess I would bet on Islamic separatists or a Russian false flag. But the US warning alone will be enough for this to be spun as a Ukrainian operation necessitating full mobilization.

If you have any new information or opinions always happy to get another perspective.

ISIS-Khorasan (the branch active in Afghanistan and proximate areas) is claiming responsibility for the attack.

[Raellus]

It's still too early to reach any definitive conclusions. This whole effed-up situation is even more difficult to parse given that two of its lead actors- Putin and the IS- are incredibly unreliable narrators.

The Associated Press and the BBC are both reporting that the US shared intelligence about a planned IS operation against Russian soft targets at around the same time the State Department issued its public warning to US citizens living abroad, despite frosty relations between the two nations.

Undoubtedly, Putin will seek to use this horrific event to further demonize Ukraine and the US with the Russian people. He's already claiming that four of the attackers were apprehended whilst trying to reach Ukraine, and that the Ukrainians had prepared a "window of escape" for them.

Unfortunately, since Putin controls all media in Russia, this is the only story that the Russian people will hear, regardless of its dubious veracity.

IMHO, NATO really needs to step up its information warfare efforts in Russia. I wonder if Radio Free Europe broadcasts reach Moscow.

-

[LoneCollector1987]

According to the webpage of the Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk of September 16th, 2023 there are about 203.640 male Ukrainians between 18 and 60 who therefore could be called up to serve.

Germany will not sent them back and they could only be returned by force if Ukraine would open criminal proceedings against them (and then it must be not one procedure against them all but it must be an individual procedure).

Since the beginning of the war you cannot claim to be a conscientious objector in Ukraine.

Links
https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/ukraine-wehrdienstverweigerer-auslieferung-100.html

[Raellus]

Regarding Ukraine's military manpower, the draft age was lowered this week to 25. I hope that doesn't end up being too little and too late.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-conscription-mobilization-251058a942a253f3eaec2c53373adf03#:~:text=KYIV%2C%2 0Ukraine%20(AP)%20%E2%80%94,depleted%20ranks%20wit h%20new%20conscripts.

Because, apparently, Russia has somehow managed to reconstitute its military.

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/04/03/russian-military-almost-completely-reconstituted-us-official-says/

I'm taking this with a grain of salt. A refurbished T-55 is not a new-production T-90, and a poorly trained conscript is not a veteran VDV Paratrooper. It's also worth noting that several NATO/EU officials have publicly disagreed with the US Deputy Secretary of State's assessment.

That said, Russia's still somehow managed to overcome international sanctions and keep substantial quantities of troops and weaponry in the field without breaking its economy or mobilizing for total war. The assistance that Russia is receiving from its allies could prove decisive. I've seen Russian advantage over Ukraine in artillery shells reported anywhere from 3 to 1 to 7 to 1.

Overall, it's looking like the Ukrainian military is really starting to bend under Russia's continuing material and manpower advantages. I hope that it doesn't break, and I also hope that its allies step up and give them the support that they so desperately need.

-

[Raellus]

"God favours the side with the best artillery." - Napoleon Bonaparte

The artillery ammunition situation appears to be rather dire for the UAF.

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-ammunition-military-b263dfaceef57fb2c1f74c53861734da

Every few days, there's a headline about how one European partner or another has "found" more artillery shells for Ukraine, but they never seem to materialize. There are also regular headlines about how a handful of US Congresspeople are standing in the way of more US military aid for Ukraine.

It's sooooo hard not to bring US politics into this, but I'm going to abide by the forum rules.

To circle back to T2k, I think the correlation of artillery forces between the Soviets and NATO would favor the former. Advantage: Warsaw Pact.

-

[kato13]

Russian TU-22M Bomber Downed Over Russia

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAwIVMfs3GM

wAwIVMfs3GM

Well this is something I never expected to actually see real life video of, even though I have read about, thought about, and even gamed many scenarios where such a thing would happen.

Probably friendly fire, but maybe spec ops working near an airfield?

[Vespers War]

Russian TU-22M Bomber Downed Over Russia

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAwIVMfs3GM

wAwIVMfs3GM

Well this is something I never expected to actually see real life video of, even though I have read about, thought about, and even gamed many scenarios where such a thing would happen.

Probably friendly fire, but maybe spec ops working near an airfield?

Allegedly our old friend the Ukrainian S-200. According to Ukrainian Intelligence, they were waiting for a week for the bombers to get close enough to an emplaced launcher, and they got a hit at 308 kilometers. An anonymous Ukrainian defense official told The War Zone that they've received "help from partners" upgrading the S-200's guidance system.

Personal speculation is they may have gotten assistance from Poland, who upgraded their monkey model S-200 missiles between 1999-2002, replacing tubes with transistors. I also suspect they may have slipped in an active radar seeker with the saved space/mass to help improve long-range accuracy over the semi-active radar seeker originally fitted - there was speculation right before the war that they had developed an active seeker for the S-125 and were trying to fit it to the S-200. If that improved accuracy sufficiently, they could also shrink the warhead and program the updated electronics to modify the flight profile to eke out some extra range with a slightly lighter missile. It would also let them shut off the ground radar much earlier if it wasn't having to illuminate the target for SARH, reducing the ground units' vulnerability to SEAD.

[kato13]

US Ukraine bill passed - \o/ yay!

I found it interesting an ATACMS transfer was coded into the text

Sec. 505. (a) Transfer of Long-Range ATACMS Required.—As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall transfer long range Army Tactical Missile Systems to the Government of Ukraine to assist the Government of Ukraine in defending itself and achieving victory against the Russian Federation.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8035/text?s=2&r=4

While I am pretty sure we have already delivered some, I have been waiting for the time when there would be substantial delivery. Hopefully it will be soon.

While ATACMS may not be the final straw, along with F-16s (and Nato specific ordinance) arriving I am feeling more confident the Kerch bridge will not see new years day.

[kcdusk]

I'm a long time reader of The War Zone. But in the last two or three days i have not been able to read the articles when i click on them. I get a message that reads

"Application error: a client-side exception has occurred (see the browser console for more information)."

Any ideas if this is a problem my end? Or their end? Anyone else having a problem?

[Raellus]

I haven't had any issues. I'm not a tech-savvy guy, but try clearing your cache and see if that doesn't clear up the issue.

-

[kato13]

Ukrainian USV armed with a twin rail launcher for R-73 all-aspect IR homing air-to-air missiles.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GM5pitLXQAAxZGG?format=png&name=small

I have been waiting for something like this to show up. The missile capability probably limits it to low flying and slow speed targets (helicopters) but still a nice addition to the Black sea.

[Raellus]

Ukrainian USV armed with a twin rail launcher for R-73 all-aspect IR homing air-to-air missiles.

War Zone dropped an article about this today.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukrainian-drone-boats-now-armed-with-adapted-air-to-air-missiles

The contrast in styles is somewhat humorous.

Ukrainian innovation: Drone attack boat with IR homing AAMs.

Russian innovation: Build a metal shed around an MBT to protect it from FPV attack drones.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[Raellus]

The Ukrainians are using their new, longer-range ATACMS to hit SAM sites and Russian-held airfields in Crimea. I wonder what their long-game is. I'm guessing that it's a shaping operation, to prepare for entry of the incoming F-16s from Netherlands and Denmark. That said, I'm not sure what the point is, strategically, as, at this point, I don't think Ukraine has any realistic chance of regaining Crimea by force-of-arms. So why expend their finite stock of long-range ATACMS in pursuit of that goal? It seems like they could be better spent shaping the battlefield in Donetsk and/or around Kharkiv, where UAF ground and- soon- air forces have a much better (but still not great, sadly) chance of regaining territory.

Thoughts?

-

[Vespers War]

The Ukrainians are using their new, longer-range ATACMS to hit SAM sites and Russian-held airfields in Crimea. I wonder what their long-game is. I'm guessing that it's a shaping operation, to prepare for entry of the incoming F-16s from Netherlands and Denmark. That said, I'm not sure what the point is, strategically, as, at this point, I don't think Ukraine has any realistic chance of regaining Crimea by force-of-arms. So why expend their finite stock of long-range ATACMS in pursuit of that goal? It seems like they could be better spent shaping the battlefield in Donetsk and/or around Kharkiv, where UAF ground and- soon- air forces have a much better (but still not great, sadly) chance of regaining territory.

Thoughts?

-

Russia has been using those sites to launch missiles at civilian targets within Ukraine, both converted SAMs and hypersonics carried by aircraft flying from Crimean airbases. Knocking those out would reduce Russia's ability to target Odessa in particular, allowing more grain to be exported.

[ToughOmbres]

The Ukrainians are using their new, longer-range ATACMS to hit SAM sites and Russian-held airfields in Crimea. I wonder what their long-game is. I'm guessing that it's a shaping operation, to prepare for entry of the incoming F-16s from Netherlands and Denmark. That said, I'm not sure what the point is, strategically, as, at this point, I don't think Ukraine has any realistic chance of regaining Crimea by force-of-arms. So why expend their finite stock of long-range ATACMS in pursuit of that goal? It seems like they could be better spent shaping the battlefield in Donetsk and/or around Kharkiv, where UAF ground and- soon- air forces have a much better (but still not great, sadly) chance of regaining territory.

Thoughts?

-

A feint? Concentrate some effort in Crimea with ATACMS to draw off Russian resources then deploy the newly arrived F-16s en masse to achieve temporary air superiority in one of the sectors being threatened by recent Russian advances?

[Heffe]

Russia has been using those sites to launch missiles at civilian targets within Ukraine, both converted SAMs and hypersonics carried by aircraft flying from Crimean airbases. Knocking those out would reduce Russia's ability to target Odessa in particular, allowing more grain to be exported.

It also forces Russia to shift more AA equipment away from other parts of the front, as Russia can't afford to leave Crimea defenseless against air attacks.

Ultimately, if Russia loses the Kerch bridge, it puts most of the southern part of Ukraine at risk of becoming out of supply. To be clear, I don't see Ukraine pushing into Crimea with ground forces (ever, as historically that never seems to work out well for attackers), but if the Kerch bridge goes down and Ukraine takes control of the isthmus or close to the isthmus, they may not need to. I imagine this may also partially explain Ukrainian attacks on Russian landing ships in the Black Sea. Crimea becoming unlivable for Russians would put extreme political pressure on Putin domestically.

[Vespers War]

Another potential justification for suppressing Russian anti-air assets in Crimea popped up as part of Sweden's airplane donation - in addition to 30 F-16s, they're donating a pair of Saab 340 AEW aircraft. The problem is going to be operating those somewhere where they can get a view of the airspace without being shot down by long-range SAMs or R-37 missiles. Reducing the AA defenses of Crimea could give them some breathing room to operate over the western Black Sea, since fighters trying to engage them there would have to get within range of Ukrainian SAMs or take a widely circuitous route that would give the radar plane time to leave the area.

[Raellus]

It's being reported that Ukraine plans to base a portion of its new F-16 fighters outside of Ukraine. A few reasons have been sited for this: to maintain an active training cadre on the type, to provide a source of replacement aircraft and parts, and, probably most importantly, to maintain a reserve outside the reach of the Russians (as Putin has already put a bounty on Ukrainian Falcons). Apparently, Putin has responded publicly to Ukraine's intentions by stating that Ukrainian F-16s outside of Ukraine are legitimate military targets, and that the Russians reserve the right to target and attack them. This may just be bluster, but it raises an interesting possibility: if Putin follows through on the threat and orders an attack of some sort on Ukrainian Falcons based in a NATO country, does this trigger Article 5 of the NATO charter? If so, would NATO respond with force? Worst case scenario, this is yet another way that WWIII could start in our day.

-

[ToughOmbres]

It's being reported that Ukraine plans to base a portion of its new F-16 fighters outside of Ukraine. A few reasons have been sited for this: to maintain an active training cadre on the type, to provide a source of replacement aircraft and parts, and, probably most importantly, to maintain a reserve outside the reach of the Russians (as Putin has already put a bounty on Ukrainian Falcons). Apparently, Putin has responded publicly to Ukraine's intentions by stating that Ukrainian F-16s outside of Ukraine are legitimate military targets, and that the Russians reserve the right to target and attack them. This may just be bluster, but it raises an interesting possibility: if Putin follows through on the threat and orders an attack of some sort on Ukrainian Falcons based in a NATO country, does this trigger Article 5 of the NATO charter? If so, would NATO respond with force? Worst case scenario, this is yet another way that WWIII could start in our day.

-

Probably bluster in my view but I don't put anything past Bad Vlad at this point. What, if anything, Brussels would do IF there were to be a strike on Ukrainian F-16's based in a NATO country? Anything goes, with my guess leaning toward either a modest proportional response or a finger wagging warning. Just my .02.

[Vespers War]

The Dutch have already delivered 8 Falcons to Romania for pan-European training (including Ukrainian pilots), which is supposed to increase to 12-18 aircraft on top of the 24 they're delivering to Ukraine for combat use. The Romanian F-16s are not Ukrainian, so despite being used to train Ukrainian pilots a strike on Romania would seem to be a more extreme escalation than I'd expect from Russia.

There has been talk of some of the 24 donated to Ukraine being retained in Denmark for pilot training, since right now Ukraine has more pilots awaiting training than there are available slots to train them. Those would match Putin's threat more closely, but Russia striking Denmark seems unlikely to me. I'll admit that Kremlinology is always a bit iffy, but this feels like an empty threat intended to make Denmark rethink their training program rather than the sort of thing that leads to an actual attack. At most I would expect sabotage efforts, rather than an overt military strike.

[Targan]

Putin is all talk. He will never order Russian forces to directly strike a NATO member while the alliance remains strong. That may change if something dramatic in NATO occurs, such as the US walking away from the alliance. Under such circumstances I could imagine Putin trying something just to see what the reaction would be. But for now I think his worst nightmare would be a full-scale NATO intervention in Ukraine. If that happened I'd expect his adult diaper delivery schedule to dramatically increase.

[Raellus]

WTF?

https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-situation-report-north-korea-may-send-forces-to-occupied-territories

Is this going to encourage or discourage South Korea from providing lethal military aid to Ukraine?

-

[kato13]

I had very little doubt Korea was going to step up on tech deliveries and now with DPRK committing to send troops within a month, I have close to zero doubts.

I heard someone say Putin at the moment is reactionary and not strategic. Pissing off the worlds 5th largest arms exporter and the largest generator of western artillery ammunition (with remaining untapped capacity), seems to fit that assessment.

Korea now has the opportunity to test their weapons and kill North Korean soldiers 4000 miles from their borders.

[Vespers War]

Even if South Korea decides to stick to "defensive" weaponry, they license-built over a thousand Vulcan Air Defense Systems. A couple hundred were vehicle-mounted as the K263, based on the K200 IFV, and around a thousand were left as towed anti-aircraft guns. The K263 uses the same turret as the M163 that the Americans built based on the M113.

Any that South Korea isn't planning on using for their own SHORAD needs would likely be very welcome in Ukraine as supplements to existing systems, and they've been largely replaced by 35mm Skyguard systems, both towed and mounted on the K30 Biho. The Houthi in Yemen have fitted VADS into the beds of pickup trucks, and I have to imagine Ukraine would be capable of doing the same.

On the missile side of air defense, Korea is replacing a combination of Stinger, Igla, Mistral, and (UK) Javelin systems with the indigenous K-SAM, so any or all of those could be considered for transfer. I don't think they have enough of their larger SAM systems to consider transferring any of those.

If they're willing to provide offensive weapons, the K9 Thunder is probably too new, but it's replacing around a thousand of the K55/K55A1 self-propelled artillery system, which is based on the M109A2 Paladin. There are also around 100 of the K136 130/131mm MLRS in reserves that were originally going to be sold to the Philippines, but they backed out of the deal last year. Moving away from vehicles, there are a couple hundred ATACMS missiles that Korea might or might not be willing to send, along with a couple hundred obsolete Hyunmoo-1 short-ranged ballistic missiles that have allegedly been kept in reserve (which have around the same range as ATACMS, so they wouldn't be an escalation with regards to how far into Russia Ukraine could strike).

[Nowhere Man 1966]

WTF?

https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-situation-report-north-korea-may-send-forces-to-occupied-territories

Is this going to encourage or discourage South Korea from providing lethal military aid to Ukraine?

-

I would not be surprised if some of them fly the coop if they have no family or ties to home.

[kato13]

Again history coming really close to repeating itself.

https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-use-wwii-tactic-defend-against-ukrainian-drone-strikes-2024-7

Russia may resort to an old World War II tactic that had a key role in the D-Day landings to repel Ukrainian drone attacks -- (Barrage Balloons)

[TGirl Kelley]

Again history coming really close to repeating itself.

https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-use-wwii-tactic-defend-against-ukrainian-drone-strikes-2024-7

Russia may resort to an old World War II tactic that had a key role in the D-Day landings to repel Ukrainian drone attacks -- (Barrage Balloons)

As maneuverable as drones are and with the skill of Ukraine operators I don't foresee this being very effective.

[kato13]

New tool I just found out about.

A near real time indicator of active fires. (Used to track wild fires).

Apparently internet sleuths are using it to track air base fires.


This is Morozovsk_air_base
https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@41.87,48.28,12.62z

Attached a screen shot for when the fire is out later.

[Raellus]

The Ukrainian invasion of Russia's Kursk region is pretty bonkers, IMHO. I don't think anyone anticipated an operation of this scope or scale at this point in the conflict. It's particularly surprising given that Russians had been making incremental territorial gains in several areas along the front, even prompting very real fears of an operational breakthrough west of Avdiivka.

What is the UAF's main objective? Relieve pressure on beleaguered stretches of the front? Occupy Russian territory with the aim of eventually exchanging it for sovereign Ukrainian territory during anticipated peace negotiations?

Will this incursion force the Russians to withdraw forces from Ukrainian territory to meet the threat? Is this a foolish use of UAF forces that could be better used elsewhere? Will the Russians cut off and destroy this force?

What are your thoughts, opinions, or predictions about this operation?

-

[Heffe]

Agreed that the invasion of Kursk Oblast is a bold decision by Ukraine. Rumor has it that the UA has pushed numerous brigades into Russia proper, with numbers hovering somewhere around 2 divisions' worth. As for the goals here? There's a lot of possible benefits, with the obvious drawbacks being as you state - the eventual cutting off and piecemeal destruction of the UA units now in Russia.

Some of the benefits, IMO, include the following:

Territory to be used in future negotations.
Morale boost for the Ukrainian people.
Proof to Ukraine's allies that she's still in this fight and able to maneuver. And evidence that their support is being put to effective use.
Forcing everyday Russians to deal with the fact that Russia isn't safe in this war, either. Not only, but any RU soldiers killed in Kursk Oblast are likely conscripts, not volunteers. These are friends and family members of people living in St. Petersburg and Moscow, not a bunch of poor, asian-looking volunteer soldiers from the far east of the country.
Reductions of pressure from Kharkiv and Donetsk. Russia will be forced to pull troops away from other areas of the front to deal with this incursion.
And finally, the timing of the counter-invasion (is that a thing?) is of particular note to me. The Russian's offensive near Kharkiv has stalled, and as of a few days ago there was some leaked intel that the forces in Vovchansk may end up having to pull back to stronger positions. In Donetsk, the Russian summer offensive has been going strong for months now, and is probably somewhere between 4-8 weeks before it culminates. Ukraine's strategy for the last year has been entirely focused on defense, and punishing Russia with high attrition. I suspect someone in Ukrainian command asked the question - how can we keep Russia attacking in earnest after the culmination of Russia's summer offensive, so that they don't enjoy the fruits of an operational pause and possible negotiations for the loss of Ukrainian land? And the answer was clear - put Russia into a position where it HAS to keep attacking Ukraine due to internal political pressure.


That last one IMO is the key for the decision to invade Russia. All in all, you have a Russian army whose offensive is approaching culmination - they're surely reaching a point where units are exhausted, needing to pause to rearm and regroup, and suddenly Ukraine launches a major assault into Russia itself.

I don't think the attack will reach Kursk (unless Russia entirely fails to respond) or anything. I believe this is more about continuing the existing strategy of attriting Russian forces down.

[Targan]

Perhaps the Ukrainians are attempting to infuriate Putin to such an extent that he orders the use of WMDs? The Ukrainians may have decided that the way things are going, they can't "win" on the terms Zelenskyy has been demanding. So take a WMD hit or two and hope the West is so outraged that it actively intervenes?

[kato13]

I could see the chemical threshold having being tripped at the moment, due to the embarrassment, and the fact the Chinese would probably protest a lot less to chemical than nuclear.

The recent commitment of the Ukrainian 80th Air Assault Brigade (with the highest tooth to tail ratio in the Ukrainian army) seems to indicate, this is not a just a raid, and there is hopes for even more significant gains.

I know it is much more complicated, but man it is looking like they really only did need F-16s.

[Raellus]

I worry that this invasion will reinforce Putin's B.S. narrative with the Russian public.

Putin: "See, I told you that Ukraine is an existential threat to Russia! We must continue the fight this NATO-sponsored fascist aggression against us!"

From what I've read in recent months, the majority of the Russian public supported the war to some degree before the UAF's Kursk incursion. While some Russians in the affected region might change their minds and decide the whole thing isn't worth fighting, support for the war among those Russians far from the combat zone might actually increase.

I think that this operation could also play into the hands of the anti-Ukraine faction within the US government.

You-know-who: "The pro-Ukraine party claimed that all the American weapons we've given to Ukraine were for self-defense. This doesn't look like self-defense to me. My friend Vladimir assured me several years ago that Ukraine was a threat to Russia and this proves him right. To stop this fresh Ukrainian aggression, we should stop the flow of weapons to Ukraine immediately."

That all said, I really hope that this operations proves to be a great success for Ukraine.

Slava Ukraini!

-

[LoneCollector1987]

According to what I read the axis of Ukraines attack leads to a russian nuclear reactor and a station where russian gas is sent to Europe.
If they would fall into Ukraines hand that would be good cards for Ukraine.
On the other hand if this is true then I suspect there will be very intense battles with lots of casualties coming.
And thats without NBC weapons.

[ToughOmbres]

The Ukrainian invasion of Russia's Kursk region is pretty bonkers, IMHO. I don't think anyone anticipated an operation of this scope or scale at this point in the conflict. It's particularly surprising given that Russians had been making incremental territorial gains in several areas along the front, even prompting very real fears of an operational breakthrough west of Avdiivka.

What is the UAF's main objective? Relieve pressure on beleaguered stretches of the front? Occupy Russian territory with the aim of eventually exchanging it for sovereign Ukrainian territory during anticipated peace negotiations?

Will this incursion force the Russians to withdraw forces from Ukrainian territory to meet the threat? Is this a foolish use of UAF forces that could be better used elsewhere? Will the Russians cut off and destroy this force?

What are your thoughts, opinions, or predictions about this operation?

-

I believe this to be a feint given how hard pressed the UAF are elsewhere on the front lines. Another more remote possibility is this is a spoiling attack on Russian forces in that area (Russian force concentrations that we are not privy to in the West.)

Historically and in an odd coincidence a risky counter-thrust/offensive in the Kursk region is enough to give me pause on Ukraine's behalf (Citadel/Zitadelle 1943 anyone?)