In Defense of the Red Army

[kato13]

Originally Posted by sglancy12

First the economic boom would have to happen fairly early.. you suggest as early as the mid 1980s. That way there would be enough time for the newly discovered minerals and fossil fuels to be discovered, exploited and brought to market. But, if the newly discovered resources are the casus belli for the Sino-Soviet war, wouldn't that mean the war would happen earlier than the canon? Would ten years really pass before the situation came to a head?

I have the oil/gold discovered in - 1982

First profits from Gold in - 1984

First Sale of oil to Japan in - 1988

Economy fully stabilizes and expand rapidly - 1989

Japan expands Chinese investment by threefold 1993 (this happened in real life)

Japanese/Chinese Oil Exploration teams discover equivalent/larger oil fields on the Chinese side of a disputed border -1994

Faced with the reduction of their much needed profits in oil sales to Japan "disputed" borders become "conflicted" - 1995

I honestly never spent the time working out a location but given the 6 years to build a pipeline, that would probably be the limiting factor. The Alaskan Pipeline (800 miles / 1,287 km) was built in 4 years.

[Legbreaker]

Would discovery of a large amount of oil cause problems for the post nuke period?

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Would discovery of a large amount of oil cause problems for the post nuke period?

Might have to add a few nukes to the canon list, however the 150kt ones are missing already. I also expect the reserves to be in very remote and inhospitable areas given they had not found it before 1982.

[Legbreaker]

Do we need the oil or is ore enough?
I'm leaning towards the latter.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Do we need the oil or is ore enough?
I'm leaning towards the latter.

Of course it is your call, but I don't think the revenue would be enough.

Total gold production in 1985 was ~1500 metric tons.
http://goldnews.bullionvault.com/gol...rica_020620082

Lets say the Russians could add 30% of top of that (much more and they depress the price too much). Given 1985 Gold prices that comes out to about 3.8 billion dollars (450tones X 2200 lbs X 12 Troy Oz X 317 dollars per ounce).

Oil on the other hand had 22 billion barrels consumed (in 1985) at an average price of 20 dollars per barrel in 1988 (when they can start selling). If the soviets could get even 10% of the world market they get 44 billion dollars.

I kinda use the gold for the quick dough to build the infrastructure but the real income comes from oil.

Edit.
Just wanted to note that the above numbers reflect gross numbers and moving 450 tons of gold would incur no where near the expense of moving 2.2 billion barrels of oil. Net profits would not show the full disparity listed above.

Edit:
Just discovered that IRL in 1986 the USSR hard currency debt was around 30 billion dollars.
http://countrystudies.us/russia/67.htm

That actually makes me feel even better about my timeline with a full payoff being completed in mid 1989
1984 1.2 billion
1985 1.8 billion
1986 2.0 billion
1987 2.2 billion
1988 10.2 billion
1989 16.5 billion

[chico20854]

Another, related question on the Soviet Army:

How fast do you see the USSR being able to mobilize divisions?

I've seen declassified, post-Cold War discussions as to the planning norms for the Pact. Category A divisions could realistically enter the field in 3 days (the 30-minute rush the units out of garrison drills usually resulted in the units making it out of the garrison, but with limited combat capabilities - soldiers left most of their field gear in the barracks, no time to fuel and arm the tanks, etc.). Category B units in a week or two, Category C in a month or so, Mobilization-only units in 2-4 months.

I’ve also seen accounts of the actual experience in the late 20th century, most notably Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979-80. In both cases it took a few months to call up Category B and C units and, looking at things in perspective, they performed (barely) adequately although not looking pretty doing so.

As to the key military indicators: personnel and equipment. First, the personnel. In peacetime, the Soviet Army rotated nearly half of its enlisted force (since their NCO corps was overwhelmingly conscript). By recalling all those that had been discharged in the previous two years (20-22 year olds) the enlisted force would double in size. If you expand the callups to those under 30, you get another 200% of the enlisted strength, 250% in total. That should be sufficient enlisted men to both replace combat losses in China and bring the understrength divisions up to full strength. In addition, every year the draft brings in 18 year olds equal to 50% of the peacetime enlisted force. Officers are going to be more problematic; although the Category B and C units were usually set up so that all the units had most command and NCO positions full. (Example – if the tank regiment in a Category C division was at one third strength, it would have all the subunits established and understrength, so that a tank platoon would have a platoon leader and three tank commanders with no drivers and gunners (although the commanders would be able to act as drivers or gunners). The idea was that reservists would be recalled to fill the lower skill positions, and that someone who had trained as a commander 2 years before would fill the gunners position and someone who had been out for 4 years would drive). There were reserve officers too – it seems that regular male university students would undergo some training similar to US ROTC and be eligible for callup in time of war.

Ok, now to equipment. The mobilization-only divisions IRL were stocked with equipment sets from units that upgraded. For example, when the T-72 was fielded in Mongolia, the troops that had been operating the T-62 brought the T-62s to depots in Siberia for use by mobilization-only units. In the late 80s and 90s some truly ancient equipment, long thought retired, was pulled out of depots for scrapping. (The 1990 Victory Day parade in Red Square featured several battalions of T-34s, and T-10s from a tank division in Ukraine were scrapped in 1988). On the small arms side, US gun shows over the past years have been overrun at times with quantities of Nagant revolvers, SVT, SKS, Mosin Nagant and captured German Mauser rifles, not touching the mountains of early model AKs that couldn’t be imported. Some of the older equipment might have been exported to allies, such as the T-34s that were sent to Somalia and Ethiopia in the late 70s, but IMHO there seems to be ample combat equipment to equip the entirety of the Soviet Army on day one. Trucks obviously would be an issue, I’ll get to that. (I’m also not touching the issue of production – losses vs production, presumably at some point production could exceed losses, allowing divisions arriving at the front to field some equipment that wasn’t 40 years old! Taking a pessimistic view, I’ll discount that possibility, even given that the USSR maintained a considerable mobilization industrial infrastructure such that every heavy industrial plant had some sort of mobilization military production capability and the USSR had been at war for almost 18 months by the time the US enters the war)

That raises the issue of timing. To meet the demands of the war in China, by late 1996 mobilization-only units are drilling. The war expands rapidly in intensity and scale from there. What I’m having a hard time grasping is why, given the strategic situation, does the USSR not mobilize the rest of its units simultaneously? In fact, it continues to call up divisions long after the nuclear exchange – the 117th MRD, according to the Soviet Vehicle Guide, is called up from the Kiev Military District in the Spring of 1999. Why wasn’t this division called up and sent to the front in the desperate days of July 1997, when NATO tank brigades so threatened Brest-Litovsk that the Soviet commander was forced to use tactical nuclear weapons to halt them?

A few ideas as to why. First, maybe the division’s allocated personnel and equipment were taken away to replace losses in other units. Second, maybe the output of the Ukraine’s war economy – providing masses of grain, ore, coal, steel, tanks (from Kharkov) and aircraft (from Kiev) would have been seriously hurt by calling up 10,000 men in their 20s.

But that raises the issue of why in 1999, and a secondary question of how. In 1999 the situation in Ukraine is much worse (from all perspectives), so the 10,000 men (likely far fewer would show up, and likely a bit younger or older and in worse health) would be an even greater burden. It also raises the question of how, over 18 months after a (limited) nuclear exchange, the Soviet central government is able to (no matter how poorly) organize, train and equip a division in one of its rebellious provinces.

I’d like to hear your thoughts as to the hows and why’s. For my T2k universe, I’m inclined to go with a more rapid mobilization in most theaters than that outlined in the Soviet Vehicle Guide, but I’d like your thoughts on it too.

[Raellus]

I admit that this is a somewhat simplistic and incomplete answer, but I think that Soviet military mobilization would speed up as the war progressed. I base this on the Red Army's performance in this aspect during WWII. The Red Army was incredibly adept at churning out massive numbers of poorly trained but relatively well equipped infantry and tankers.

I agree that moblilization would start off at a slower and more deliberate pace, likely producing, on the whole, fairly competent units. As the war began in Europe, a lot of the gears would already be turning and mobilization could likely be ramped up with only modestly negative effects on quality. As time passed- and especially after the nuclear exchanges began- the quality of newly mobilized and replacement units would probably drop off rather significantly.

As for trucks, I've posted before that I think that the Soviets would push the automotive industries in the WTO nations to support the war effort in China first with increased production of military trucks for the Soviet Military. IIRC, there already were STAR in Poland, TATRA in Czechoslovakia, and another company whose name escapes me in Hungary that were producing fairly good quality military trucks during the Cold War. It also stands to reason that military truck production in the USSR could also be sped up relatively easily (compared to say, AFV or combat aircraft production).