In Defense of the Red Army

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Raellus

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

Correct.

[Sanjuro]

Raellus pointed out:

AFAIK, T-80s were not sold to Iraq. Ever. It was probably a misidentified T-72E that your aquaintance saw.

In fact, I was trying to remember a conversation from the summer of 1991; I couldn't remember whether he said T-72 or T-80 and went online to find what tanks the Iraqis had on the front line: fancy the internet giving the wrong answer!
The mistake is mine; even at second hand, the clang! is the thing that sticks in the mind!

[Webstral]

Shirer's assertion that Hitler saved the Eastern Front by refusing to countenance retreat has some merit. The Army would have lost huge amounts of equipment that couldn't be moved. Who knows how many men would have been left behind for lack of transport. There were no established positions to fall back on, so the retreat could have gone right back to Poland.
We'll never know, of course; however, there is good reason to believe that a retreat would have finished the German Army on the Eastern Front during the winter.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to keep the campaign going despite the onset of a winter for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. If he saved the Eastern Front, he saved it from a blunder he made himself. I've never bought off on the idea that turning the panzers aside from Moscow to destroy Soviet forces in the Ukraine was a bad idea. However, I do believe that the rasputitsa should have marked the end of the campaign season on the Eastern Front. Small-scale offensives in lieu of Operation Typhoon could have continued to inflict losses on the Soviets west of Moscow while good winter positions were prepared. Of course, for me to say this flies in the face of Prussia military thinking and the lessons Hitler and his generation of Germans learned from WW1--namely, that only offensive warfare brings victory. Nonetheless, if Hitler saved the Eastern Front during that first terrible winter, he saved it from his own mindless adherence to the strategic offensive and his slavish devotion to the idea that the Russians, being inferior peoples, were just about finished from July, 1941 onward.


Webstral

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Shirer's assertion that Hitler saved the Eastern Front by refusing to countenance retreat has some merit. The Army would have lost huge amounts of equipment that couldn't be moved. Who knows how many men would have been left behind for lack of transport. There were no established positions to fall back on, so the retreat could have gone right back to Poland.
We'll never know, of course; however, there is good reason to believe that a retreat would have finished the German Army on the Eastern Front during the winter.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to keep the campaign going despite the onset of a winter for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. If he saved the Eastern Front, he saved it from a blunder he made himself. I've never bought off on the idea that turning the panzers aside from Moscow to destroy Soviet forces in the Ukraine was a bad idea. However, I do believe that the rasputitsa should have marked the end of the campaign season on the Eastern Front. Small-scale offensives in lieu of Operation Typhoon could have continued to inflict losses on the Soviets west of Moscow while good winter positions were prepared. Of course, for me to say this flies in the face of Prussia military thinking and the lessons Hitler and his generation of Germans learned from WW1--namely, that only offensive warfare brings victory. Nonetheless, if Hitler saved the Eastern Front during that first terrible winter, he saved it from his own mindless adherence to the strategic offensive and his slavish devotion to the idea that the Russians, being inferior peoples, were just about finished from July, 1941 onward.


Webstral

Yeah I think that the Germans didn't want to set up Static Line anywhere. They realize that it had cost them in WWI dearly. If they were able to set up Static Defensively line, then it would only lead on to believe the Soviet would do the much the same... Meaning the Germans would have much harder time restart their offensive and giving the Soviet breathing room that they need so desperately at that time.

[95th Rifleman]

PG 1 isn't a good example if you are trying to compare NATO/WP equipment.

The Iraqi's fell into the old trap of fighting the last war. They set up fixed, entrenched defensive positions in a similar fashion to how they fought the Iranians in the late 80's. Having a major armoured force drive around your flank tends to cause a few problems with such a defense.

In the late 90's the gap between Western and Russian kit was not as great as many are led to assume, also the tactics devised for fighting in Europe where designed to maximise advantage and minimise weakness of the Russian kit. The game winning card in iraq was total air superiority, this would be MUCH harder to achieve facing frontline Russian air defence systems.

The Russians where (and arguably still are) the world leaders in battlefield air defence, they had to be considering the NATO air threat. the Russians would of formed concentrations of Armour and spearheaded into NATO lines putting massive local superiorityin numbers to overwhelm NATO defensive positions.
Unless you could knock out these concentrations from the air the would just roll over a position and keep going before NATO forces cold respond in numbers sufficient to blunt the spearhead.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

PG 1 isn't a good example if you are trying to compare NATO/WP equipment.

The Iraqi's fell into the old trap of fighting the last war. They set up fixed, entrenched defensive positions in a similar fashion to how they fought the Iranians in the late 80's. Having a major armoured force drive around your flank tends to cause a few problems with such a defense.

In the late 90's the gap between Western and Russian kit was not as great as many are led to assume, also the tactics devised for fighting in Europe where designed to maximise advantage and minimise weakness of the Russian kit. The game winning card in iraq was total air superiority, this would be MUCH harder to achieve facing frontline Russian air defence systems.

The Russians where (and arguably still are) the world leaders in battlefield air defence, they had to be considering the NATO air threat. the Russians would of formed concentrations of Armour and spearheaded into NATO lines putting massive local superiorityin numbers to overwhelm NATO defensive positions.
Unless you could knock out these concentrations from the air the would just roll over a position and keep going before NATO forces cold respond in numbers sufficient to blunt the spearhead.

True war in Europe NATO would have to over come the Air Defense network, the sheer number of Aircrafts and Tanks that they had in forward positions.

I don't think anyone here is forgetting that PGW1 was very different from the type of war that the troops had trained for, that may have happen in such places as Germany, or Korea...

[dragoon500ly]

I think everyone here pretty much agrees that any NATO/WP fight would have seen bloodletting on a never before seen scale....and that would be prior to any nukes.

PG1 gave just a taste of just how deadly modern weapons can be. And that was, for the most part, directed against military targets. A free fire zone like Europe would become....