In Defense of the Red Army

[Southernap]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I humbly admit that you're more widely read on this particular topic than I am. I have a clarifying question: When you say NATO aircraft penetrated the edges of Soviet AD networks and survived, do you mean they did so completely undetected, or that the Soviets didn't launch SAMs at them?

If it's the former, that's an impressive feat by NATO. If it's the latter, thank God the Soviets showed restraint. By the same token, NATO showed similar restraint. Soviet aircraft routinely violated neutral and NATO airspace during the Cold War (and Russian aircraft continue to do so today). But there's a big difference between not knowing someone is there and deciding not to to shoot at them when you do.

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As I have read its both. FleetEx 83-1, a Task Force of 3 US carriers operated in the Bearing Sea and on over to near the Sea of Okhostk where they flew against NORAD and the JASDF pretending to be Soviet strike groups. Other times they flew strike packages up to the 12NM limit before turning away. In some cases, again according to write ups in various books and historical magazines. The Soviets didn't see the strike packages until they were at the limit or when someone broke radar silence. In some cases the strike aircraft were able to fly across Soviet military installations in the Kurils without being shot at by any of the air defense equipment and the systems only going into a fire control track well after the aircraft disappears over the radar horizon.

Along with that during parts of 1983 and even 1981 to 1982, again based on some readings of technical journals and historical reports at places like the US Naval War College or the US Air War College online reading libraries, the aggressive use of the EP-3 and RC-135s to fly and try to penetrate Soviet or even Soviet Client states like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Eastern Germany (over the Baltics), etc. Before either a radio command or fighters escorts approached to turn the aircraft away. All in attempts to get both up to date ELINT OrBATs and to get doctrinal assessments of how the air defense systems worked.

Similarly during Northern Wedding 1982, the USS America was able to shake her Soviet tails in a storm just off Scotland. Using some other neat tricks via the NSA and some recording emissions on a couple of destroyers. Get up near Spitsbergen doing flight ops without being seen by Soviet Naval intelligence assets. Then flew coordinated strikes in both conventional mission planning and what SIOP called for against NATO target ranges near Tormso and Bardufoss. As well as have their ASW aircraft start to track Soviet submarines, including their boomers as they entered the ice pack areas in international waters.
Again the Soviets didn't see the aircraft until radio transmissions occurred with either datalinks back to NATO or the carrier, if not verbal radio transmissions. At which the Soviets lost their minds and flushed a bunch of stuff. Then later filed diplomatic protests.

Read up about some of the exercises in Nellis and in Yuma (a USMC airbase in AZ with a huge target range). In both places there was a ton of practice not only doing Red Flags and the Marine Weapons and Tactics Instructor Courses. They practiced as if they had to penetrate the Soviet IADS in Europe or in one of the other spheres (like Norway or the Med). With tactics like NOE flying, coordinated strikes against command nodes for the air defenses systems, and the heavy use of EW assets (both in collecting and ECM/ECCM).

From what I have read the assumption in what was released unclassified in the early 80s exercises. That NATO Tactical Air Forces over Europe in a general war would be able to hack it for about 14 days before losses, supply issues, and battle fatigue would have driven them from the field. That is why the whole AirLand battle doctrine was created. Get in with the first 96 hours the good licks in the Soviets air defense systems (again command HQs, static radars and SAM sites, air bases). Then switch to supporting the ground forces while reserves from the US arrived. It was even gamed out that the US Navy once it had good control of the Western Mediterranean and Baltic approaches would have carrier aircraft fly strikes into Europe with whole air wings supporting ground offensives by the US Army or even the use of a Marine Amphibious Brigade landing on the Danish Coast or into Italy driving into PACT territory.

So I am not saying it would be easy, or a cake walk at all. I am just saying that post Vietnam, the US air forces learned a bunch and worked hard on what it would take to crack that hard nut of Soviet air defenses over central Europe. Yet, there was growing evidence by the 1980s and even more so by the late 1980s that the Soviets were not the insurmountable threat that some played them to be, nor would they have been push overs. Rather it was going to be ugly and it was going to be who broke first attrition wise.
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Originally Posted by StainlessSteelCynic

Oh definitely and I do not disagree with you. If anything, I think the Soviet layered AA network would have made life very difficult for NATO air forces. The whole rationale behind the A-10 design was that the air environment would be tough to survive so at the very least, that's a tacit acknowledgement from the USAF that the Soviets would not be so easily overcome.

Talking to friends who were in the USN aviation community and some of the Marines that were neighbors of mine in the time period. There was tactical doctrine for the tankers and anti-tank teams to not only kill the tanks, but their priority list was roughly this:

1. Command tanks or vehicles
2. Mobile air defense systems
3. Everything else on the battlefield

since killing the mobile air defense systems would not only allow for the A-10s to survive, but also the AH-1 and AH-64s to survive as well. The attack helos had the same target lists when working in conjunction with the A-10s.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Originally Posted by Southernap

Talking to friends who were in the USN aviation community and some of the Marines that were neighbors of mine in the time period. There was tactical doctrine for the tankers and anti-tank teams to not only kill the tanks, but their priority list was roughly this:

1. Command tanks or vehicles
2. Mobile air defense systems
3. Everything else on the battlefield

since killing the mobile air defense systems would not only allow for the A-10s to survive, but also the AH-1 and AH-64s to survive as well. The attack helos had the same target lists when working in conjunction with the A-10s.

Can't get air support until you control the air so yeah, I completely understand their priority list and again, it shows that the US (and presumably NATO in general) had a good idea of Soviet capabilities and did not treat them as though they would be a pushover (nor impossible to beat for that matter).

[Raellus]

Another challenge NATO would face during the Twilight War, especially in Europe, is the dynamic of coalition warfare. I think it would be a lot easier for the Soviets to operate a unified command, directing its WTO "allies" by dictate. I don't think the U.S. would find its NATO allies quite as compliant.

We saw this in WWII. There was a lot of politicking among the Western Allies- the tension between SHAEF Eisenhower and Montgomery caused all kinds of issues for the Western Allies between D-Day and VE Day. The Soviets, on the other hand, treated their allies as would a slave-driver; as a result, there was far less drama and much better unity of command.

With NATO already fractured by the outset of WWIII (in the v1 timeline, at least), the tension among allies would already be high.

This, I think, would be an advantage for the Soviets.

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[Legbreaker]

That can however also be a strength for the west - they've got the flexibility to come up with different ideas that wouldn't be allowed in the more authoritarian Pact.
The trick is balancing the two factors.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

That can however also be a strength for the west - they've got the flexibility to come up with different ideas that wouldn't be allowed in the more authoritarian Pact.
The trick is balancing the two factors.

That's a good point. A lot would depend on leadership. A team of good leaders could make coalition warfare into a significant strength. Of course, the opposite is also true.

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[Legbreaker]

Given leaders in the west generally get promoted due to ability rather than political reasons (yes, there are definitely exceptions), I'm thinking the west is probably a little better off than they otherwise could be.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Given leaders in the west generally get promoted due to ability rather than political reasons (yes, there are definitely exceptions), I'm thinking the west is probably a little better off than they otherwise could be.

Good point, but the Soviets have also been known to produce their fair share of top-shelf field leaders. In WW2, the Soviets had a lot of good field generals (Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovski, Vasilevski)- as good, if not better, than many of the Western Allies' storied leaders.

The West has traditionally been more patient with generals. They tend to get more chances before being sacked. This can be a good thing, because it allows them time to learn form their mistakes and grow. On the other hand, it allows ineffective generals to remain in place for longer, and that's almost always a bad thing.

The Soviets took a different route. Their generals knew that a lack of results could lead to a one-way ticket to the gulag, or a bullet in the back of the head. This tends to motivate, but it also creates leaders who are reckless or extremely averse to risk-taking. Either product can lead to disaster on the battlefield. I reckon that more than a few potentially brilliant Soviet generals never got past their first mistake.

I guess leadership is one of the biggest "intangibles" when it comes to predicting the outcome of a war.

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