In Defense of the Red Army

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I think that we can all agree that the Russian military hasn't performed well during Putin's War in Ukraine, especially during the first 1-2 years. Extrapolating from that, it would be easy to conclude that the Late Cold War Soviet military would have been handled rather easily by NATO in a general European War. Perhaps that's a mistake.

Russia's been able to sustain it's "Special Military Operation" for over two years, under broad economic sanctions, and without fully mobilizing the Russian economy for total war. Recently, Russian forces have seized the initiative and are threatening to push the UAF back on a broad front after achieving a significant penetration of UAF defensive lines west of Avdkiivka.

This speaks to Russian resiliency, doggedness, and resourcefulness.

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I'm not sure Russia's inability to break a stalemate with a country that had a pre-war army 20% its size, a GDP 10% as large, and 33% of its population is a particular testament to their capabilities.

Edit: the rough equivalent for the United States would be getting stalemated by Brazil.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Vespers War

I'm not sure Russia's inability to break a stalemate with a country that had a pre-war army 20% its size, a GDP 10% as large, and 33% of its population is a particular testament to their capabilities.

I'm not saying that the Russian military is good. My point is that, despite its many serious flaws, it's maybe not as bad as many analysts claimed it to be up until this year, or so. And, currently, there's growing concern that Russia may be about to break that stalemate, so the jury's still out on that point.

Originally Posted by Vespers War

Edit: the rough equivalent for the United States would be getting stalemated by Brazil.

To be fair, the USA has been definitively stalemated by two far less powerful countries during the last 50 years (essentially bracketing the Late Cold War period), so we're not the world-beaters the jingoists proclaim us to be either.

I'm very much aware that all of these comparisons are apples-to-oranges. There are simply too many variables at play in each case to draw any meaningful conclusions re a hypothetical WWIII. We're dealing with a lot of counterfactuals. Essentially, I've been playing devil's advocate in this thread, trying to find a bright side for those who want to believe that a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Late Cold War period would have been evenly matched, or at least competitive. IMHO, that's an essential premise of TWILIGHT:2000 in all of its iterations.

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[Raellus]

Originally Posted by HaplessOperator

I find it far more interesting that these depletion levels are coming from engaging a single country on their border under conditions generously described as air parity, with no NATO involvement, and with the thing starting off with some of the most modern ground branch equipment they had in stock, thrown against anti-armor systems that was new 25-30 years ago.

I mean, BMPs weren't any tougher 30 years ago than they are now, and you can still kill them with platforms throwing 40mm grenades or .50AP and SLAP. Hell, the Ukes logged a T-80U kill with a Carl Gustav, and volleyed AT-4 hits seem just as effective on the homegrown stuff as the "monkey models."

Given what we've seen of their hardware on live fire ranges, I think it's a lot more likely that we spent 75 years doing what we do best: overestimating our enemy and assuming the worst to ensure overmatch. We saw more or less the same thing in Chechnya; the only real success they managed was when they massed DIVARTY or corps-level artillery assets and delete entire settlements and called it square. First sign of significant, organized resistance using even equivalent hardware, and they melt about as quickly as the Republican Guard did.

Their problems (hardware and wetware both) seem to stem much further back than the Cold War ending with the collapse, and reached far deeper than poor warehousing of vehicle stocks; Cockburn had a fairly insightful look into this with The Threat: Inside The Soviet Military Machine as far back as 1985.

I get the feeling that thousands of Leopards, Challengers, Abrams, F-15s, F-16s, and F-22s wouldn't exactly help their situation much even if you were to somehow double the size of their military; you'd just harvest more meat, and faster.

For the most part, I agree. The Soviet... er, Russian army has always performed best when wielded like a blunt instrument. Since the fall of the USSR, they've tried to ape Western operational doctrine with little success. For example, its early-war attempts at decisive "thunder runs" against Grozny and Kiev were catastrophic failures.

Instead of bludgeoning away at a narrow segment of the front line with a tank army backed by entire regiments of heavy artillery like they did in WW2, the Russians attack piecemeal, across a broad front, in dribs and drabs. They throw a company of tanks or motorized infantry at a perceived soft spot in the Ukrainian defenses, get wrecked, then try again, and keep trying, until the Ukrainians are forced to pull back. Gains are often minimal, but the costs are still high. Since February 2022, I've been wondering why this has been the case. Yeah, by employing late-WW2 operational tactics, the Russians would be losing a regiment or division at a pop, but they'd much more likely force a significant breakthrough that would collapse Ukrainian defenses and lead to bigger, faster territorial gains. In the long run, though, the Russians don't seem too concerned about incurring casualties. It's weird.

In any case, what the Russians have succeeded at, once again, is absorbing massive manpower and materiel losses without significant negative political or economic consequences (at least, to date). The West has not demonstrated, since WW2, that it can do the same. And, despite decimating its own military in the process, as things stand, Russia will probably win a strategic victory over Ukraine (as it did v. Chechnya).

Originally Posted by HaplessOperator

I think it's a lot more likely that we spent 75 years doing what we do best: overestimating our enemy and assuming the worst to ensure overmatch.

History shows that the US did the exact opposite with both Vietnam and Afghanistan (and, nearly, Iraq). That is the purpose of this particular thread- to gird against underestimating an adversary.

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[HaplessOperator]

Originally Posted by Raellus

History shows that the US did the exact opposite with both Vietnam and Afghanistan (and, nearly, Iraq). That is the purpose of this particular thread- to gird against underestimating an adversary.
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I'm largely referring to our conventional buildup, focuses on strategic threats, and the military industrial complex.

Overestimating for downstream overmatch is what gives us F-22s and F-35s when the world's second army is installing wood screws and bare metal cockpit interiors on "stealth" aircraft.

Also, for what it's worth, I've never seen an adversary in Iraq that could match us in a stand-up fight. There was political and strategic underestimation of what would be required, and the simple fact is that unless we were prepared to kill every man, woman, and child in the country, the lack of a uniformed enemy more or less necessitates that the men in camouflage are eventually going to go home and life is going to continue - more or less - as it did before they came.

As for the actual enemy, there's a reason the most successful tactics largely centered around single shots taken followed by exfil, and roadside bombs; winning a standup fight was essentially impossible, due to the level of overmatch brought to the table even at the small unit level.

Engaging a squad of Marines in Karmah meant that you were attacking three to six machine guns, three grenade launchers, ten rifles, and anywhere between 13 and 26 rockets, and that's before QRF shows up; there's only so much that sandals and faith in Allah bring to the table against a baker's dozen guys that know how to leverage that.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by HaplessOperator

I'm largely referring to our conventional buildup, focuses on strategic threats, and the military industrial complex.

Overestimating for downstream overmatch is what gives us F-22s and F-35s when the world's second army is installing wood screws and bare metal cockpit interiors on "stealth" aircraft.

Also, for what it's worth, I've never seen an adversary in Iraq that could match us in a stand-up fight. There was political and strategic underestimation of what would be required, and the simple fact is that unless we were prepared to kill every man, woman, and child in the country, the lack of a uniformed enemy more or less necessitates that the men in camouflage are eventually going to go home and life is going to continue - more or less - as it did before they came.

I hope that I didn't offend with my comment re Iraq. I totally get what you're saying, and I understand very well how guerilla forces can win a strategic victory against a much stronger nation that's doing its best to follow the civilized laws of war. War becomes a lot more difficult when you're fighting with one hand tied behind your back against an enemy that refuses to follow any rules. What surprises and offends me is how US policy-makers haven't internalized and applied the lessons the country so painfully learned in Vietnam.

As for underestimating a near-peer adversary, the USA has made that mistake before. Even after its shocked-the-world victory over Russia in 1905, Japan's military capabilities and competence were sneered at by the USA and its western allies, much to their detriment in 1941-'42. Just a few years later, Douglas McArthur underestimated the Chinese* prior to their entry into the Korean Conflict and the result was a stalemate along the 38th parallel.

*To consider the PLA a near-peer adversary in 1951 is being very generous.

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[HaplessOperator]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I hope that I didn't offend with my comment re Iraq.

Oh, God, no, not at all. I was just highlighting the small unit-scale disparity. We saw much the same (but to a lesser degree, edging somewhat towards more parity) in Vietnam, and the Russians saw similar in Afghanistan in the 80s.

It was more engaging with the concept that we "lost to dirt farmers," a common refrain (not ascribed to you, or your words, but you get my meaning as shorthand). Dirt farmers don't win stand-up fights, because they very often literally can't. It's a much easier proposition, however, for that invading country to collectively get tired of spending money and trickling a few thousand lives over the course of ten or twenty years and decide to go home. This isn't to say it's not a victory for the occupied nation, because it absolutely is, but it's a victory derived from a wholly different mechanism than a battlefield defeat due to a lack of training, or faulty organization or doctrine, or hardware that simply cannot match the enemy's capability, or - I would contend - from underestimating the enemy tactically, operationally or even strategically, because there are such wildly different dynamics at play than in the conventional conflicts we organize militaries to engage. There's no way to put a bullet through an idea, or to drop a bomb and change hundreds or thousands of years of cultural gestalt, and this simple concept seems lost on in the minds of every leader who's ever had the thought to send soldiers to fight a population that can hide among civilians for the simple reason that they - for the most part - ARE civilians.

Originally Posted by Raellus

I totally get what you're saying, and I understand very well how guerilla forces can win a strategic victory against a much stronger nation that's doing its best to follow the civilized laws of war. War becomes a lot more difficult when you're fighting with one hand tied behind your back against an enemy that refuses to follow any rules. What surprises and offends me is how US policy-makers haven't internalized and applied the lessons the country so painfully learned in Vietnam.

As for underestimating a near-peer adversary, the USA has made that mistake before. Even after its shocked-the-world victory over Russia in 1905, Japan's military capabilities and competence were sneered at by the USA and its western allies, much to their detriment in 1941-'42. Just a few years later, Douglas McArthur underestimated the Chinese* prior to their entry into the Korean Conflict and the result was a stalemate along the 38th parallel.

*To consider the PLA a near-peer adversary in 1951 is being very generous.

I feel like it might be valid to point out that the era you're talking about, the beginning of the Cold War, as the world was creeping out of WWII and then sat and watched as the Korean War played out, is also where we began getting serious about R&D with the goal of overmatch, in a crawl progressing to a sprint culminating in the late 70s and early 80s where WP/Eastern hardware was definitively outclassed across more or less the full spectrum of systems.

I can't deny at all your points on the Russo-Japanese conflict, or the Chinese entry in Korea, but that's somewhat outside of the scope of the modern jet, nuclear, missile, and information ages of warfare, where we're looking at a case where a civilian company in one nation can cover an invaded country with satellites and provide non-jammable coverage against the efforts of what was supposedly the second army on the planet, and where sending last-generation hardware from one side can drag a three-day special military operation into a three-year slaughter without any feet, wheels, track, or tread on the ground.

[castlebravo92]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I hope that I didn't offend with my comment re Iraq. I totally get what you're saying, and I understand very well how guerilla forces can win a strategic victory against a much stronger nation that's doing its best to follow the civilized laws of war. War becomes a lot more difficult when you're fighting with one hand tied behind your back against an enemy that refuses to follow any rules. What surprises and offends me is how US policy-makers haven't internalized and applied the lessons the country so painfully learned in Vietnam.

As for underestimating a near-peer adversary, the USA has made that mistake before. Even after its shocked-the-world victory over Russia in 1905, Japan's military capabilities and competence were sneered at by the USA and its western allies, much to their detriment in 1941-'42. Just a few years later, Douglas McArthur underestimated the Chinese* prior to their entry into the Korean Conflict and the result was a stalemate along the 38th parallel.

*To consider the PLA a near-peer adversary in 1951 is being very generous.

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The purpose of a system is what the system produces, whatever the name or stated intent of the purpose. The US military, as an institution, knows how to successfully fight a counter insurgency war. The fact that we did not successfully fight a counter insurgency war is prima facia evidence that "winning" wasn't the goal. Cui bono?

[HaplessOperator]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

The purpose of a system is what the system produces, whatever the name or stated intent of the purpose. The US military, as an institution, knows how to successfully fight a counter insurgency war. The fact that we did not successfully fight a counter insurgency war is prima facia evidence that "winning" wasn't the goal. Cui bono?

You wouldn't believe some of the crazy-ass RoE we were dealing with at certain times and locations.

An example: In Al Anbar, 2005, for a significant part of the year in the vicinity of the city of Karmah, we were prohibited from pre-emptively engaging individuals carrying obvious heavy weapons with ammunition. PK machine gun, RPG, M69 or D-37 mortar, doesn't matter, can't shoot them, doesn't matter if they see you, start running, take up positions, can't shoot them, no firing until they engage you first.

Those might be poor farmers on their way to hand those weapons in for buybacks, you see.

Almost universally, they were simply transporting them to another location for hiding away, protected by the aegis of dumbass RoE.

I'd argue that no one benefits, really, but merely that it's next to impossible to militarily force a change of culture without undertaking utterly repugnant actions. It's also not really what a military is built to do, and certainly not with two hands tied behind your back and both balls taped to one leg.

[HaplessOperator]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I'm not saying that the Russian military is good. My point is that, despite its many serious flaws, it's maybe not as bad as many analysts claimed it to be up until this year, or so. And, currently, there's growing concern that Russia may be about to break that stalemate, so the jury's still out on that point.



To be fair, the USA has been definitively stalemated by two far less powerful countries during the last 50 years (essentially bracketing the Late Cold War period), so we're not the world-beaters the jingoists proclaim us to be either.
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We are when it comes to fighting a conventional conflict, wherein soldiers aren't expected to not fire at people carrying mortars and machine guns, and don't have to swab gunshot residue tests on the hands of people who were trying to kill them five minutes prior while bagging shell casings, tagging rifles, collecting IDs, and taking photos of suspects like they're conducting police raids after treating the combatants' wounds. Using a military to fight a war against ghosts is a difficult proposition that works out about as well as it does in Spectral, and it doesn't really matter that you have F-22s or some of the best infantry on the planet when your opponent is a pair of 155mm artillery shells buried two feet deep two days before a winter rain.

I assume the other one you're talking about is Vietnam, where similar political concerns essentially kept us fighting with our hands tied behind our backs, trickling soldiers in slowly so as not to be offensive to the sensibilities of a hand-wringing public or politicians afraid of getting their constituencies' mandates mussed, and where the political realities of fighting against a guerrilla force

When it comes to superpowers doing actual superpower things, you can't really find an example of a stalemate, because there aren't any. About the closest you can point to is the Korean War, with the entire military apparatus of China and North Korea fighting us before anything resembling modern American doctrine of technologically-enabled maneuver warfare or full spectrum dominance was even a sparkle in anyone's eye.

Those F-16s, F-15s, and F-22s come in awfully handy against an enemy that's stuck with duct-taping GPS receivers to their instrument panel, though, and I haven't met a BMP that can survive the ordnance equivalent of a gnat fart, and threat systems weren't any more advanced or better armored 25 years ago.

That you're talking about Russia potentially, possibly breaking a stalemate against such a weak adversary after three years is sort of telling in and of itself. The last time Russia had any real chance of winning a conventional war against the West was probably back around 1979-1983 or so. Sure, they're a wild nuclear threat, assuming they've been able to maintain their arsenal, but that's a fairly long shot, too. We have an arsenal somewhat smaller, and spend as much maintaining our nukes each year as they allocate for their entire military budget.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by HaplessOperator

I assume the other one you're talking about is Vietnam, where similar political concerns essentially kept us fighting with our hands tied behind our backs, trickling soldiers in slowly so as not to be offensive to the sensibilities of a hand-wringing public or politicians afraid of getting their constituencies' mandates mussed, and where the political realities of fighting against a guerrilla force.

You're right. Granted, it's apples to oranges, but "the politicians wouldn't let us win" narrative about the Vietnam War has been overplayed by American military apologists. Although the we didn't go so far as to invade North Vietnam or use nuclear weapons, the US did indeed try very hard to win. By 1968, we had half-a-million troops on the ground in South Vietnam, and US combat troops in Vietnam spent more time in active combat zones than they did in either world war. In addition, we dropped a greater tonnage of bombs on North Vietnam during the conflict than we did versus the combined Axis Powers in WWII (and with more accuracy, to boot).

Originally Posted by HaplessOperator

When it comes to superpowers doing actual superpower things, you can't really find an example of a stalemate, because there aren't any. About the closest you can point to is the Korean War, with the entire military apparatus of China and North Korea fighting us before anything resembling modern American doctrine of technologically-enabled maneuver warfare or full spectrum dominance was even a sparkle in anyone's eye.

I mentioned the Korean War upthread. Despite post-WW2 draw-downs, the US possessed the most technologically advanced military in the world at that time- at least a sparkle, as you put it. China, on the other hand, had recently emerged from decades of civil war and Japanese occupation. Still the US/UN couldn't decisively defeat the PLA. Given your point quoted above, this seems like a fair historical comparison vis-a-vis the hypothetical Twilight War.

I also posted the following:

The Cold War Soviet military was never tested against a near peer adversary, and neither was the US military. The lessons derived from the post-Soviet collapse period are informative, but by no means conclusive. We're making sweeping inferences from the poor performance of the rump Russian military in Chechnya and the USA's stellar performance in Desert Storm.

Therefore, whatever the conclusion one arrives at- the USSR as paper tiger or as formidable foe- we're essentially dealing in counterfactuals. The purpose of the OP was to support a plausible alternate reality where the Twilight War, as described in 1e or 2-2.2e canon (4e didn't exist yet), could have occurred.

...

In other words, the goal here is to make the game work. And, on principle, I want to hedge against succumbing to the twin traps of overconfidence in one's own side and underestimating the adversary.

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[HaplessOperator]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The Cold War Soviet military was never tested against a near peer adversary, and neither was the US military. The lessons derived from the post-Soviet collapse period are informative, but by no means conclusive. We're making sweeping inferences from the poor performance of the rump Russian military in Chechnya and the USA's stellar performance in Desert Storm.

Therefore, whatever the conclusion one arrives at- the USSR as paper tiger or as formidable foe- we're essentially dealing in counterfactuals. The purpose of the OP was to support a plausible alternate reality where the Twilight War, as described in 1e or 2-2.2e canon (4e didn't exist yet), could have occurred.

...

In other words, the goal here is to make the game work. And, on principle, I want to hedge against succumbing to the twin traps of overconfidence in one's own side and underestimating the adversary.
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At the risk of sounding more than a little cheeky, I'd hazard that there's more than a few reasons why the one was a campaign of horrific loss and a near-unbroken string of setbacks punctuated by slaughter against a military one fifth the size of our Marine Corps, while the other led to the near-total operational annihilation of the fourth-largest military on the planet, conducted across a distance of 3000 miles, separated by an ocean, and concluded within about four days, against half a million troops concentrated in an area 2/3 the size of Texas and against one of the densest AA networks then in existence.

Counterfactuals aren't always accurate, but they very well can be used to draw basic inferences. It's not as if we can't draw valid inferences or critiques from those two well-understand wars against multiple well-understood forces using well-understood equipment; the same can be said of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

It's not as if we all haven't seen two years of videos of an up-armored, modernized T-80 being killed by a single Carl Gustav hit, or a T-90AM worn the hell out by a bone stock ODS Bradley, or "hypersonic" missiles being shot down by Stingers and Iglas during terminal approach. No, these aren't engagements against NATO troops using NATO equipment, except in the cases where they're using gifted pld war stock that was too out of date to be modern by ten years even when I was serving, and I'd be retired this year, but that should tell anyone watching all this something in and of itself.

[Raellus]

I hear you. Again, i am playing devil's advocate. Why stop now?

Russia eventually reconquered Chechnya. I've written entire essays on how the Iraqi and Soviet armies are not synonymous earlier in this thread so if your curious, you know where to look.

We've also seen M1 tanks taken out by RPG-7s in Iraq and an F-117 shot down over Serbia by an SA-3 SAM so...

Out of curiosity, since you strongly believe that the Soviet Union was no match for NATO from the mid-1980s through... today, why are you a T2k fan, given its central premise and all?

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[HaplessOperator]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I hear you. Again, i am playing devil's advocate. Why stop now?

Russia eventually reconquered Chechnya. I've written entire essays on how the Iraqi and Soviet armies are not synonymous earlier in this thread so if your curious, you know where to look.

We've also seen M1 tanks taken out by RPG-7s in Iraq and an F-117 shot down over Serbia by an SA-3 SAM so...

Out of curiosity, since you strongly believe that the Soviet Union was no match for NATO from the mid-1980s through... today, why are you a T2k fan, given its central premise and all?

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Mostly because of the mechanics (of both 2.2 and 4), the military focus, and the depth of squad-level wargaming it lends itself to - without outright being a wargame. The post-war setting, aesthetic, and atmosphere is compelling as well, even if the premise itself for how it happened isn't all that believable.

I think a big part of what happened is just that time marched on, and we know a lot more than a couple of random guys from the 80s.

I personally find it a lot more believable to just assume the Soviets went a little more nuke-happy. I don't believe they weren't a match for NATO; a conventional one, no, but they posed (and Russia now poses) a credible nuclear threat.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Out of curiosity, since you strongly believe that the Soviet Union was no match for NATO from the mid-1980s through... today, why are you a T2k fan, given its central premise and all?

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I am guilty of this as well.

In the 80s I believed much more in the Soviets than I do now.

As time has moved on I feel the timeline must be changed earlier and earlier. Given you have to explain an alternate history now (rather than the projected future back in 1984) who cares if the alt history starts in 1989 or 1972.

Red Dawn threw like 7 Alt history sentences to us to set the stage for that conflict.

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I hear you. Again, i am playing devil's advocate. Why stop now?

Russia eventually reconquered Chechnya. I've written entire essays on how the Iraqi and Soviet armies are not synonymous earlier in this thread so if your curious, you know where to look.

We've also seen M1 tanks taken out by RPG-7s in Iraq and an F-117 shot down over Serbia by an SA-3 SAM so...

Out of curiosity, since you strongly believe that the Soviet Union was no match for NATO from the mid-1980s through... today, why are you a T2k fan, given its central premise and all?

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I was just discussing that Nighthawk shoot-down elsewhere, so the amazing circumstances surrounding it are still relatively fresh in my memory:

There were a bunch of mistakes on the American side that made the shootdown easier.

The airfield was being spied on by Serbs who were transmitting information back to the military about what was flying and when. Allegedly there was also a mole somewhere in Italy with access to operational information sending that to the Serbs as well.

On the night of the shootdown, weather had grounded the EA-6B Prowlers that had been escorting F-117s with radar jammers and HARM missiles to counter SAM batteries.

The Nighthawks were using the same ingress and egress routes they had used before, making them predictable.

The SAM battery had been told where to emplace to be able to engage the Nighthawks. This battery had previously tried to engage twice without being able to lock on to an aircraft.

The low frequency radar spotted the flight at a range of 15 miles (the normal range against a fighter was 200 miles). The tracking radar never saw the aircraft, and at first the guidance radar didn't either. They had been directed to only do short periods with the radar on to avoid getting a HARM fired at them, but since the battery CO had been told the Prowlers weren't firing, he lit off the guidance radar a second time.

By coincidence, that happened at the same time that one of the Nighthawks was dropping a bomb, and the radar saw the inside of the bomb bay at a range of 5 miles (normal range 50 miles). A pair of SA-3 were fired. Neither achieved a direct hit and the first detonated too far away to cause damage, but the second one detonated close enough to the Nighthawk to cause damage that led to its crash. The guidance radar never saw the other two Nighthawks that weren't open while it was emitting.

So yes, an SA-3 shot down an F-117, but it took a rather remarkable string of actions to get there - the air defense knew where the aircraft would be, when they would be arriving, may have known what the targets that night were, knew there was no SEAD escort, took advantage of that knowledge to make a second try that would have likely gotten them killed if there was a SEAD escort, and got lucky with the timing on the second try.

It ended up being a combination of complacency on the American side, good intelligence work and a gutsy battery commander on the Serb side, and a dollop of luck on top that allowed that shootdown to happen.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Raellus

You're right. Granted, it's apples to oranges, but "the politicians wouldn't let us win" narrative about the Vietnam War has been overplayed by American military apologists. Although the we didn't go so far as to invade North Vietnam or use nuclear weapons, the US did indeed try very hard to win. By 1968, we had half-a-million troops on the ground in South Vietnam, and US combat troops in Vietnam spent more time in active combat zones than they did in either world war. In addition, we dropped a greater tonnage of bombs on North Vietnam during the conflict than we did versus the combined Axis Powers in WWII (and with more accuracy, to boot).

With the benefit of long hindsight, I think the biggest factor in the US losing the Vietnam War was that US political leaders as well as the leaders of the military and intelligence services fundamentally misunderstood Indochina's history from the Vietnamese perspective. Ho Chi Minh was very much an "accidental communist". Literally the only reason he became a communist was that his repeated attempts to have a seat at the table at the Paris Peace Accords in 1919 and 1920 were ignored. It was the same after World War II. The US very much could have chosen a different path with respect to supporting France's continued colonialism in Indochina, but chose not to (and flying in the face of its own decades-long proclamations on the right of peoples to choose how to be governed in their own lands). The Viet Minh were patriots, flighting for self determination. In the end the only support they could get was from the Soviet Union and Maoist China.

I mention these events because taking into account the tendency for the US, the UK, my own country, to misunderstand the motivations of its adversaries can absolutely be used in our various attempts to devise alt-histories that would bring about the Twilight War. Likewise the tendencies of the Warsaw Pact nations and other belligerents to misunderstand the motivations of the US and the NATO countries. I really enjoy seeing those elements in T2K alt-histories, because that sort of thing has resulted in wars and the direction of conflicts countless times in human history.

[castlebravo92]

Originally Posted by Raellus

You're right. Granted, it's apples to oranges, but "the politicians wouldn't let us win" narrative about the Vietnam War has been overplayed by American military apologists. Although the we didn't go so far as to invade North Vietnam or use nuclear weapons, the US did indeed try very hard to win. By 1968, we had half-a-million troops on the ground in South Vietnam, and US combat troops in Vietnam spent more time in active combat zones than they did in either world war. In addition, we dropped a greater tonnage of bombs on North Vietnam during the conflict than we did versus the combined Axis Powers in WWII (and with more accuracy, to boot).

I mentioned the Korean War upthread. Despite post-WW2 draw-downs, the US possessed the most technologically advanced military in the world at that time- at least a sparkle, as you put it. China, on the other hand, had recently emerged from decades of civil war and Japanese occupation. Still the US/UN couldn't decisively defeat the PLA. Given your point quoted above, this seems like a fair historical comparison vis-a-vis the hypothetical Twilight War.

A couple of points. One, the US superiority in technology was marginal, at best. Mig 15 vs F-86 is basically a tossup (and Russian pilots were often in those Mig 15s). T-34/85 vs Shermans? Situationally a toss-up, with some advantages to the T-34 and vise versa. Artillery? Toss-up. Small arms? M1 Garand is better than the Mosin, but sub-machine guns probably equivalent.

Two, the US never really tried to decisively defeat the PLA. We never attacked mainland China, and once the Chinese got involved, never had enough troops to wage any sort of decisive offensive campaign (Chinese had 1.7x the troops the Americans and their allies did).

While in modern times US systems have advanced substantially compared to peer/near peer tech, another thing that sets the US apart is largely the level of training that troops get. Training like this would become a luxury as a Twilight level war would eat up troops as fast as you could deploy them, which is the real reason why I think you would see "parity" between the combatants (especially once nukes started flying and casualties really ramped up).

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

A couple of points. One, the US superiority in technology was marginal, at best. Mig 15 vs F-86 is basically a tossup (and Russian pilots were often in those Mig 15s). T-34/85 vs Shermans? Situationally a toss-up, with some advantages to the T-34 and vise versa. Artillery? Toss-up. Small arms? M1 Garand is better than the Mosin, but sub-machine guns probably equivalent.

Two, the US never really tried to decisively defeat the PLA. We never attacked mainland China, and once the Chinese got involved, never had enough troops to wage any sort of decisive offensive campaign (Chinese had 1.7x the troops the Americans and their allies did).

While in modern times US systems have advanced substantially compared to peer/near peer tech, another thing that sets the US apart is largely the level of training that troops get. Training like this would become a luxury as a Twilight level war would eat up troops as fast as you could deploy them, which is the real reason why I think you would see "parity" between the combatants (especially once nukes started flying and casualties really ramped up).

Speaking just of the tanks, by the end of 1950, only about half of the American tanks in Korea were Shermans (679 out of 1,326). There were 138 Chaffee light tanks, 309 M26 Pershings, and 200 M46 Patton. During 1951 the Pershings and most of the Shermans would be replaced by Pattons (Pershings were underpowered for the terrain, so despite their better armor and firepower they were disliked when compared to the Sherman). The T-34 was significantly inferior to the American tanks in use for the latter 75% of the war.

The Shermans alone outnumbered the entire T-34 force without counting any of the other American tanks in use, or the Churchill, Cromwell, and Centurion tanks of British forces in Korea. The 8th King's Royal Hussars had 6 Cromwell and 64 Centurion and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment had 20 Churchill in-country in November 1950).

With a small Canadian contingent of Shermans also serving, the UN forces had more than three times as many tanks as the North Koreans, and I'm pretty sure it was more than three times even excluding the Chaffees that were horribly outclassed by the T-34.

[castlebravo92]

Originally Posted by Vespers War

Speaking just of the tanks, by the end of 1950, only about half of the American tanks in Korea were Shermans (679 out of 1,326). There were 138 Chaffee light tanks, 309 M26 Pershings, and 200 M46 Patton. During 1951 the Pershings and most of the Shermans would be replaced by Pattons (Pershings were underpowered for the terrain, so despite their better armor and firepower they were disliked when compared to the Sherman). The T-34 was significantly inferior to the American tanks in use for the latter 75% of the war.

The Shermans alone outnumbered the entire T-34 force without counting any of the other American tanks in use, or the Churchill, Cromwell, and Centurion tanks of British forces in Korea. The 8th King's Royal Hussars had 6 Cromwell and 64 Centurion and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment had 20 Churchill in-country in November 1950).

With a small Canadian contingent of Shermans also serving, the UN forces had more than three times as many tanks as the North Koreans, and I'm pretty sure it was more than three times even excluding the Chaffees that were horribly outclassed by the T-34.

Korea north of the 38th parallel isn't super conducive to tank operations. Even the lowlands are pretty uneven terrain.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

A couple of points. One, the US superiority in technology was marginal, at best. Mig 15 vs F-86 is basically a tossup (and Russian pilots were often in those Mig 15s). T-34/85 vs Shermans? Situationally a toss-up, with some advantages to the T-34 and vise versa. Artillery? Toss-up. Small arms? M1 Garand is better than the Mosin, but sub-machine guns probably equivalent.

Those are fair comparisons, but the list is incomplete and belies the argument that US technical superiority was marginal, at best. In addition to Vesper's examples re MBTs, in the air, the USA used radar-equipped strategic bombers, to which the PLA had nothing comparable. Radar-equipped night fighters helped the UN rule the night sky. At sea, the USA employed aircraft carriers and battleships, neither of which the PLA had a single example (in fact, the Chinese had no navy to speak of). And American fighting men on land, at sea, and in the air, benefitted from relatively widespread radio communications equipment while the Chinese had to rely largely on field telephones and bugles. That's a marked technological advantage to the USA/UN.

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

Two, the US never really tried to decisively defeat the PLA. We never attacked mainland China*, and once the Chinese got involved, never had enough troops to wage any sort of decisive offensive campaign (Chinese had 1.7x the troops the Americans and their allies did).

This is the same argument made to excuse American failings in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and it misses the point, by ignoring the fact that in our system- in fact, in all democracies- military and government are inextricably linked. The Commander-in-Chief is a civilian. Congress (civilians all) holds the purse-strings. The voters have considerable indirect influence over strategic military decisions. The argument that "the American military could/would have won X, Y, Z if the politicians hadn't interfered" is like arguing that "I could swim a lot further under water if my body didn't require oxygen". It's a systemic issue, and the system is such that military decisions and political decisions cannot be separated. The US military doesn't operate in a vacuum.

Korea is a good example. It was not a popular war. The American public was especially war-weary after the preceding four years of total, world war. There was little political will to expand the war. Truman pursued a negotiated peace. Although this probably contributed to his defeat to Eisenhower in 1952, Ike (now a civilian) continued the policy.

This is, I believe, is actually an argument in defense of the Red Army. In WW2, the Soviet Union survived massive military casualties and still managed to defeat the German military. Although there were number of factors that contributed to this ultimate victory, a major one was the willpower and total control of the vicious Soviet dictator. Would the USA have continued to fight on two years into the war if it had been the ally to sustain millions of casualties? We'll never know, but I doubt it.

We're seeing something similar today in Ukraine. By many estimates, the Russians have already lost twice as many troops KIA (100,000 being a conservative estimate) in just under three years of combat in Ukraine than the USA lost in nearly ten years in Vietnam (58,000). We saw the American public largely turn against the war in Vietnam, in large part due to mounting casualties (with few strategic gains to show for them). Because of Putin's unchecked power, the Russian public has no choice but to accept rising casualties and economic costs, even without significant strategic success to show for them. The war in Ukraine grinds on.

To bring this back to WWIII/the Twilight War, NATO's strategic military decisions would be more impacted by the public's attitudes towards the war than would the Warsaw Pact's. This would give the latter more leeway in conducting military operations. This is a strategic advantage.

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

While in modern times US systems have advanced substantially compared to peer/near peer tech, another thing that sets the US apart is largely the level of training that troops get. Training like this would become a luxury as a Twilight level war would eat up troops as fast as you could deploy them, which is the real reason why I think you would see "parity" between the combatants (especially once nukes started flying and casualties really ramped up).

This is a very important point (with which I agree completely).


*Douglas MacArthur pushed hard for strategic bombing of mainland China, even advocating the use of nuclear weapons. This is one of the reasons Truman sacked him. It's also ironic because it was MacArthur's refusal to take seriously then copious available intelligence reports of China's imminent entry into the war that allowed the PLA to push UN forces back to the 38th Parallel in the first place.

To your point, given how North Vietnam withstood a greater tonnage of bombs than the entire Axis absorbed during WW2, I doubt that strategic bombing of China- a much larger country- would have made a decisive difference in the outcome of the Korean War.

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