In Defense of the Red Army

[Webstral]

I have enjoyed reading everyone's thoughts on the real world Soviet Army immensely. I want to offer a few specific items without writing my customary essay.

At the risk of sounding like a pundit for the Quartermaster Corps, modern warfare is an exercise in logistics to a degree that is truly difficult to comprehend. The sheer tonnage of fuel and large caliber ammunition to be moved from place to place is almost beyond imagining. Add in spares, and moving and organizing all of this gear requires an effort that is probably beyond that of any nation on Earth. Yes, even beyond the United States. More so than any other war, World War Three (the Twilight War) would be characterized by relatively brief periods of almost unimaginably intense mechanized combat separated by lengthier periods of moderate activity and near-quiescence. Logistics would drive these cycles.

The Soviet Army doesn't have enough trucks. There is the bottom line. The West doesn't have enough trucks, but the situation is closer to tolerable in the West. At the start of the Twilight War, the Soviets understand their limitations better than the West understands their own, and Soviet doctrine, equipment, and training are designed to operate with Soviet logistical limitations in mind. In 1995, the Soviets understand that they are going to surge ahead 200-300 kilometers, then stall. This is why all supply and support goes to the most successful subordinate formation at any level of command. The Soviets go into the war understanding that they cannot possibly support all of their forces equally; nor can they predict who is going to achieve success. (Obviously, they have a strong interest in trying to do so, but who doesn't?) Given that the offensive is going to stall due to lack of fuel, ammunition, and spares, whatever is available at any given moment must go to support whichever formation is achieving a breakthrough. Ideally, the Soviets will accomplish against the West or China what the Germans accomplished against the Soviets in 1941: the encirclement and annihilation of major commands. The fact that said encirclement and annihilation didn't end the war on favorable terms for the Germans doesn't mean the idea isn't worth trying. The Rhine is much closer to Berlin than Moscow is to Berlin. (I have my doubts that the capture of Moscow by the Wehrmacht would have ended the war in Eastern Europe, anyway.)

The Twilight War puts the Soviets in a bad position. The Soviet Army is set up to deliver a knockout blow. Support for combat formations is spartan by Western standards. This is fine in the short term, but over the long haul there will be real trouble. Granted, Soviet equipment can better tolerate periods of low or no maintenance, but sooner or later the machines with poor maintenance will break down. This is one reason the Soviets have so many tanks. Create a table showing how many tanks will break down over the course of a three-week campaign; see how many are available at the end of that time; adjust the number of tanks available at the start of the campaign to get the desirable number at the end. Basic and brutal math, but this is the thinking of people who used that pattern successfully in World War Two and who planned to upgrade it for the next big show.

The war in China puts the Soviet Union's entire basis for waging war off-balance. The army that has been set up for a lightning offensive finds itself bogged down in extended operations. Becoming bogged down is not merely an inconvenience for the Soviets. Bogging down exposes the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet Army and of the Soviet state.

Getting back to the trucks, the war in China requires more trucks than the Soviets want to commit. As the front line moves further into China, the supply line moves forward. Use of captured rail can help ease the logistical burden, but the rails are quite vulnerable to action by Chinese partisans, etc. The lion's share of stocks must go by truck. Soon, the triple whammy of extending supply lines, breakdowns, and losses to enemy action threatens to strand the Soviet forces in Manchuria on a hostile beach. Trucks must be drawn from elsewhere. The v1 chronology refers to this fact by mentioning that vehicles come out of the civilian pool.

The Soviets have trucks in reserve, true enough. These are going to be drawn upon. The Soviets can make more trucks. However, unfortunately for the Soviets their industry is already heavily committed to war production. It's safe to say that in the 1980's, the Soviet economy is on a war footing. There isn't much slack to take up in terms of war production. Adjustments can be made, of course; the Soviet people can be forced to live with yet less. However, the Soviet military already is consuming the lion's share of manufacturing, metals, fuels, and educated manpower. "Ramping up" production means something completely different to the Soviets vis-a -vis the West.

Consequently, the demand on trucks in the Far East is a tremendous problem for the Soviets. The logistical weaknesses serve to undo much of the maneuverability and firepower of the Soviets. The BMP-3, impressive as it seems, is not useful in its primary role with empty fuel tanks, empty ammo bins, or broken tracks. The Tiger was undone principally by its demands on an already badly weakened German logistical situation. The Soviet Army in China would find itself in much the same position.

As trucks come out of the reserve units to make good losses in the Far East, the Soviet reserve system is going to lose a good deal of its potency. Again, the trucks coming out of the reserve aren't going to be replaced. New trucks are going straight to the front. Therefore, combat formations called up aren't going to have the kind of mobility or logistical staying power called for by Soviet doctrine—itself not exactly a formula for abundance.

As an example of how serious this problem can be, one need look only at the two most recent wars in the Persian Gulf. In Desert Storm, the US Army was on the verge of running out of some key items after four days of intensive operations. The show would have rolled on anyway, but corners would have had to have been cut. Every day of operations thereafter would have exacerbated the problem. And let us never forget the operational pause in the race for Baghdad in 2003.

The Soviets will have certain advantages in Germany when the Bundeswehr commences operations. The Soviets will be fighting defensively, which will give them certain advantages. Also, the GSFG is the most likely of Soviet commands to retain the best part of its trucks. Stocks are close-at-hand. Nevertheless, losses in wheeled transport among the Soviets in Germany are going to be pretty darned serious. Were it not for the fact that the NATO offensive in April 1997 moves through Poland, where the Pact has had plenty of time to lay mines and can use rail to offset the weaknesses in trucks, the Western powers probably would have demolished the defenders. As it is, the West's own logistical problems, combined with what must have been a truly daunting series of obstacle belts running east from the Oder, combine to turn a potential war of maneuver in Poland into a war of moving attrition.

Okay, I said no essays and I meant it. I enjoyed reading all of your posts, gentlemen.

Webstral

[Raellus]

Interesting post, Webstral. What accounts for the dearth of trucks in the Red Army? Just to clarify, is this a problem that the Soviet army had, IRL (as of the late '80s, when the alternate history of the Twilight World diverges from our own) or is this shortate something that you've established as part of your game world? This strikes me as somewhere where the WTO nations could really help out. I can see Soviet calls for an increase in military truck production from Tatra (Cz) and STAR (Poland) as a way of supporting the war effort in China (before PACT troops were "requested") and thereafter.

I agree that logistics would be a huge problem on both sides. As folks have mentioned, the strain posed by the Soviets' war with China would be great, getting worse, of course, when the second front opens up in Europe.

You've gotten me thinking seriously about NATO's logistics issues. With France uncooperative (and Belgium, to a degree), all war shipping would have to come in through ports in Holland and Germany, which would be incredibly vulnerable to bombing (conventional and later, nuclear) and mining. With only a couple of major ports in operation, supply problems for the NATO armies would become greater and greater as their operations headed closer to the Soviet Union and further from those ports.

There's a direct historical parallel here. Part of the Western Allies' difficulty in advancing across western Europe during WWII was logistical. Before Antwerp was liberated and cleared, supplies could only come in through a couple of damaged ports in France. Since Allied bombing had wrecked most of the rail system in France, most of the supplies had to be trucked. Even with the American's considerable stock of trucks, there was an incredible strain on operations and some Allied armies had to be held back so that vital supplies could be delivered to others. There was a constant struggle between Montgomery and the American generals over whose army/corps would get supply precedence and therefore be able to continue its advance. Ike almost sacked Monty a couple of times because of his incessant and sometimes insubordinate calls for supply precedence.

This problem also existed, to a degree, on the Eastern Front. The Soviets were bound by some of the same limitations. The Soviets were still able to conduct sustained operations across a very broad front and over much greater distances than the Western Allies, though. Of course, there were seasonal limitations on offensive operations and some offensives did have to be stopped due to supply issues but, at least later in the war, the Soviets did a better job, on the whole, managing logistical problems than did the Western Allies. It helped that the Soviet soldier required much less in the way of supply tonage to operate than the British or American soldier did. This is one area in which the Twilight Red Army would have a distinct advantage over NATO armies.

It seems strange that the USSR would have forgotten these lessons from the past.

[chico20854]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Interesting post, Webstral. What accounts for the dearth of trucks in the Red Army? Is this a a problem that the Soviet army had, IRL (as of the late '80s, when the alternate history of the Twilight World diverges from our own) or is this shortate something that you've created as part of your game world?

I agree that logistics would be a huge problem on both sides. As folks have mentioned, the strain posed by the Soviets' war with China would be great, getting worse, of course, when the second front opens up in Europe.

You've gotten me thinking seriously about NATO's logistics issues. With France uncooperative (and Belgium, to a degree), all war shipping would have to come in through ports in Holland and Germany, which would be incredibly vulnerable to bombing (conventional and later, nuclear) and mining. With only a couple of major ports in operation, supply problems for the NATO armies would become greater and greater as their operations headed closer to the Soviet Union and further from those ports.

There's a direct historical parallel here. Part of the Western Allies' difficulty in advancing across western Europe during WWII was logistical. Before Antwerp was liberated and cleared, supplies could only come in through a couple of damaged ports in France. Since Allied bombing had wrecked most of the rail system in France, most of the supplies had to be trucked. Even with the American's considerable stock of trucks, there was an incredible strain on operations and some Allied armies had to be held back so that vital supplies could be delivered to others. There was a constant struggle between Montgomery and the American generals over whose army/corps would get supply precedence and therefore be able to continue its advance. Ike almost sacked Monty a couple of times because of his incessant and sometimes insubordinate calls for supply precedence.

This problem also existed, to a degree, on the Eastern Front. The Soviets were bound by some of the same limitations. The Soviets were still able to conduct sustained operations across a very broad front and over much greater distances than the Western Allies, though. Of course, there were seasonal limitations on offensive operations and some offensives did have to be stopped due to supply issues but, on the whole, the Soviets did a better job managing logistical problems than did the Western Allies. It helped that the Soviet soldier required much less in the way of supply tonage to operate than the British or American soldier did.

It seems strange that the USSR would have forgotten these lessons from the past.

The dearth of trucks was a problem their entire economy faced, even with the massive KAMAZ and other truck plants. This shortage extended to the army - the mobilization stockpiles of equipment frequently had near-complete equipment sets as far as AFVs, artillery and small arms, with no cargo trucks (they did have communications vans and similar specialized vehicles). Late-mobilizing and low-readiness divisions use trucks rounded up from collective farms and industrial facilities. (However, in the 80s, as a reaction to American 'deep strike' tactics, the Soviet Army in Europe established a number of heavy truck brigades to counteract some of the anticipated NATO interdiction of rail lines across Poland. Many of these were tank transporters to bring forward second and subsequent echelons from the Western USSR). The callup of trucks from the economy furthers the strain on the already struggling Soviet state, reducing crop yields and production of war material.

The Soviets planned to get around these limitations with massively agressive tactics - as Web explained, to win the war before they ran out of supplies. And they, like NATO, stockpiled massive quantities of supplies in theater. (Sometime read up on the disposal problems the Germans faced after unification - something like 300,000 tons of abandoned ammo!)

The logistic issues drive a lot of the campaigning. (And in many ways the analysis I do is focussed on these sort of issues - I'm a former supply sergeant that worked at a variety of levels, I did sealift planning for the U.S. government for a while and still work for the U.S. Department of Transportation in the maritime field). We've been very aware of the ports issues - NATO faces some serious problems by being limited to Dutch, German and Danish ports. (They are for a while able to bring in non-war material through Antwerp and French ports - bulk food, fuel, some raw materials). I've proposed that one of the reasons the Dutch and Danes join the war is as a reaction to Soviet conventional attacks that attempted to interdict the flow of supplies (see my site's document). The strategic pauses in operations in the European theater - such as between the ejection of Pact troops from East Germany and the advance across Poland - serve several purposes. First, they offer a new situation on the ground for the diplomats to attempt to work out an end to the war. Second, they give the air forces an opportunity to attrit and interdict enemy ground troops (similar to the U.S. air war in 1991), and finally they give the logisiticians time to allow units to replenish after the last action, build up supply dumps and improve some of the infrastructure that will be needed to support the next advance (repairing rail, strengthening bridges, etc.)

As to the parallels with WWII, I heartily agree! Patton was famous (notorious?) for his disregard for logistics issues - he was extremely upset when the umpires in pre-war manuevers announced that he had "lost" an engagement after his tanks ran out of fuel and ammo. To sustain the advance across France, the US Army stripped units (such as air defense and tank destroyers) of all trucks larger than jeeps to bolster the Red Ball Express. The situation on the Eastern Front was worse than you describe - while the Soviet soldier received less support, the tonnages of artillery ammunition were staggering, and the Red Army frequently had to halt offensive operations due to logistic issues (the failure to link up with the Warsaw uprising was partially due to real logistic issues.

As far as NATO's advance across Poland, it will be difficult to maintain. First, I imagine that the east bank of the Oder will be fortified in multiple layers, similar to the defenses arranged for Kursk in 1943. As Pact forces retreat. the devestation they leave behind will present NATO with significant obstacles. Much of the Polish road network will need extensive reconstruction work (and my post-Cold War experience with Polish roads is that they are pretty damn atrocious, I can't imagine how bad they were in the 80s), and the requisitioned Western European civilian trucks (that bring supplies forward to corps-level depots, where Army tactical trucks pick up the load) will have a lot of maintenance issues (setting aside the issue of finding drivers after former conscripts are called back to military service). There will be little riverine traffic, with most tonnage on the Oder damaged or destroyed during the December-March strategic pause, and the rail network thoroughly destroyed by the Soviets (over the objections of the Poles, who are torn between wanting to slow the NATO advance but also not wanting to destroy their nation's infrastructure).

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Raellus

What accounts for the dearth of trucks in the Red Army? Just to clarify, is this a problem that the Soviet army had, IRL (as of the late '80s, when the alternate history of the Twilight World diverges from our own) or is this shortate something that you've established as part of your game world?

In real life (in the 1990's) the Soviets don't have enough trucks to support their existing forces. They have a tremendous number of trucks, but they are insufficient for the task of supporting their enormous forces. No one has enough trucks to keep up with the demands of a mechanized army for very long, although the US Army has as favorable a truck-to-fighting vehicle ratio as any army in the world.

Originally Posted by Raellus

This strikes me as somewhere where the WTO nations could really help out. I can see Soviet calls for an increase in military truck production from Tatra (Cz) and STAR (Poland) as a way of supporting the war effort in China (before PACT troops were "requested") and thereafter.

A keen observation!

Originally Posted by Raellus

You've gotten me thinking seriously about NATO's logistics issues. With France uncooperative (and Belgium, to a degree), all war shipping would have to come in through ports in Holland and Germany, which would be incredibly vulnerable to bombing (conventional and later, nuclear) and mining. With only a couple of major ports in operation, supply problems for the NATO armies would become greater and greater as their operations headed closer to the Soviet Union and further from those ports.

There's a direct historical parallel here. Part of the Western Allies' difficulty in advancing across western Europe during WWII was logistical. Before Antwerp was liberated and cleared, supplies could only come in through a couple of damaged ports in France. Since Allied bombing had wrecked most of the rail system in France, most of the supplies had to be trucked. Even with the American's considerable stock of trucks, there was an incredible strain on operations and some Allied armies had to be held back so that vital supplies could be delivered to others. There was a constant struggle between Montgomery and the American generals over whose army/corps would get supply precedence and therefore be able to continue its advance. Ike almost sacked Monty a couple of times because of his incessant and sometimes insubordinate calls for supply precedence.

The v1 chronology has long pauses in the action which I believe can be explained by the logistical and manpower problems of both sides. Anglo-American forces reach the Oder within a short period of time after crossing the Inter-German Border in early December, 1996. Granted, the offensive doesn't take on the drive-by qualities of Operation Desert Storm, but four fresh Anglo-American mechanized corps slashing across northern East Germany is too great a force for the battle-weary Pact forces to hold back for long. We can explain away the pause from January to April politically: the NATO civilian leadership wanted to give the Soviets a chance to come to their senses and the bargaining table. However, it's quite likely as well that SACEUR and his subordinates were obliged to report to the US President that USAEUR and its corresponding Allied formations were incapable of continuing the offensive into Poland right away.

The NATO offensive into Poland "gains momentum"� in April. Warsaw isn't surrounded until June. This is not a lightning operation. I believe the combination of logistical pinch and well-prepared Soviet-doctrine obstacles employed in the greatest depth explain the apparent plodding nature of the NATO drive across Poland.

Originally Posted by Raellus

This problem also existed, to a degree, on the Eastern Front. The Soviets were bound by some of the same limitations. The Soviets were still able to conduct sustained operations across a very broad front and over much greater distances than the Western Allies, though. Of course, there were seasonal limitations on offensive operations and some offensives did have to be stopped due to supply issues but, at least later in the war, the Soviets did a better job, on the whole, managing logistical problems than did the Western Allies. It helped that the Soviet soldier required much less in the way of supply tonage to operate than the British or American soldier did. This is one area in which the Twilight Red Army would have a distinct advantage over NATO armies.

It seems strange that the USSR would have forgotten these lessons from the past.

I'm not sure the Soviets have forgotten the lessons of the past as much as they find themselves obliged to work within certain limitations. The degree of mechanization of the Red Army in 1944 is a mere fraction of the level of mechanization of the Soviet Army in 1996. At every level of the fighting, the ability of the troops to consume ammunition, fuel, and spare parts has grown geometrically in fifty years. Even in a command economy, it's hard to sell the purchase/manufacture of trucks versus tanks, artillery, and APC to civilian leaders. Soviet doctrine has acknowledgement of this problem built into it: all available support goes to the most successful command. Everyone else goes hungry.

Webstral

[natehale1971]

I think I had read somewhere that the East Germans had the smallest military forces in the Warsaw Pact, but where seen as the most professional military personnel... And they had seemed to be the most loyal to the Socialist / Communist ideals and where the strongest allies behind the Iron Curtain that the Soviets had. Or did i get that mixed up?

[chico20854]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

I think I had read somewhere that the East Germans had the smallest military forces in the Warsaw Pact, but where seen as the most professional military personnel... And they had seemed to be the most loyal to the Socialist / Communist ideals and where the strongest allies behind the Iron Curtain that the Soviets had. Or did i get that mixed up?

The East Germans were considered to have the best trained troops in the Pact, and one of the best equipped.

The Bulgarians take the cake for being the most loyal. When things started to fall apart in the late 80s Bulgaria was the one that the USSR had to pressure to liberalize. Their KGB was also even more out of control - its widely beelieved that they were behind the plot to assasinate the Pope. (I'm also aware of some attempted assasinations they tried to pull in the US).

Fully mobilized strength of Pact armies:

East Germany: 11 divisions
Bulgaria: 12 divisions + 5 tank brigades
Hungary: 3 corps, each slightly larger than a division (5 combat brigades each)
Czechoslovakia: 15 divisions
Poland: 20 divisions

So Hungary by far had the smallest army.

[natehale1971]

Wow.. I didn't know that Hungry has such a small military. I thought the soviets inate distrust for the Germans would have kept them the smallest armed force... I guess it kind of works for my idea that the Soviets allowing the East Germans to create two air assault brigades patterned on the Soviet model... (one of these brigades was part of the DDR Army that went to the Far East Front in my alternate timeline concept....

[Raellus]

I've also heard that the Cold War Polish military was considered pretty capable, in terms of both the quality of its troops and equipment. Given Chico's numbers (thanks, Chico), it was also the largest of the Pact armies.

Currently, they have quite an impressive little arms industry of their own and, by most reports, their GROM SF built up a pretty good rep while operating with other Coallition SF in Iraq.

I think Hungary also produced its own line of military trucks during the Cold War but I could be remembering incorrectly. I'll have to do a little research.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

I think I had read somewhere that the East Germans had the smallest military forces in the Warsaw Pact, but where seen as the most professional military personnel... And they had seemed to be the most loyal to the Socialist / Communist ideals and where the strongest allies behind the Iron Curtain that the Soviets had. Or did i get that mixed up?

The Germans had one of the larger Armies. Yes they had one of the most loyal one too. They Soviet exploited the same loyal traits that the Nazis exploited of the General Staff of the German Army.