T2K and the French & Indian War

[Raellus]

Targan, I know next to nothing about the Anglo-Maori wars but, from what you describe, there seem to be a couple of clear parallels with the FIW. I'm interested in learning more about this. Do you have any book recommendations on the subject (preferably something still in print)?

Medic, I hadn't thought to compare the FIW and the Winter War. Thanks for bringing this up. Now that I think of it, there are a quite a few similarities. Roger's Rangers and their French counterparts were much more mobile (using snowshoes, sleds, and primitive iceskates) and active during the harsh winters of NE North America than their respective shelter-bound conventional military brethren.

I guess that these two examples bring up a larger point and that is that unconventional forces and tactics, when properly used, can be successful against both other irregulars and larger, more conventional forces. They're not a panacea, per se, but they can be an important force multiplier, especially given difficult terrain which impedes the operation of conventional forces. I think that in the T2KU, with smaller population densities (and larger areas of "wilderness"), and far fewer vehicles (and much lessfuel to run them), you've got a recipe for unconventional forces to take on a much more pivotal role in military operations than they would have when the huge, mechanized armies of the first world contested the battlefields of the planet.

[Adm.Lee]

You can also read into the development of British light infantry after 1763, through 1815. The most famous, of course, would be Riflemen made famous by Bernard Cornwell's "Sharpe's" novels, made into movies with Sean Bean.

I'd still like to find a good book on Sir John Moore's creating his Light Brigade (Division?) before 1809.

But, yeah, 2000 in a lot of places is going to look like what George Washington called "a war of posts." Light infantry (horse) patrols made up of PCs, wandering between towns and firebases.

[WallShadow]

I lived within 10 miles of the line of forts and fortified houses set up to resist any attacks by the local tribes of Indians. Before I moved from the area, the walls and blockhouse of Fort Loudon had been recreated. Our local gun club and buckskinning group was called the Ft. McCord Militia. Also nearby were the sites in order heading north from the Mason-Dixon line, of Ft Marshall, Ft. Davis, Reverend Steele's Fort, Ft.McDonnell, Ft. Loudon ,Ft. Waddel, and the massacred Ft. McCord as mentioned below. These were designed to form rallying points for settlers to flee to in the event of an attack.

"By early 1756, the Pennsylvania General Assembly finally decided to take action and defend the settlers. Pennsylvania voted to build a chain of forts along the Blue Ridge Mountains from the Delaware River to the Mason-Dixon Line. These forts were to serve and protect communities from Indian attacks. William McCord and his brothers built Ft. McCord in 1756 as part of this line of Pennsylvania’s frontier forts. It is well known and memorialized in Pennsylvania history where 26 people lost their lives or were captured on April 1, 1756 in an attack by the Indians backed by the French."

[Webstral]

The drawback of light infantry is that they require qualities that line infantry don’t have to possess. I’m all in favor of light infantry; however, real light infantry (as opposed to line infantry who are lightly equipped) require something above and beyond men trained for conventional combat. Raising units like this from scratch is going to be a challenge for anyone who doesn’t have a few of these guys to teach new light infantry recruits. This is not to say it can’t be done. Just that the light infantry who conduct long range operations without substantial logistical support will represent an elite among the body of troops from which they are drawn. Also, as people accustomed to thinking for themselves, they won’t always be the favorites of the commanders over them.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The drawback of light infantry is that they require qualities that line infantry don’t have to possess. I’m all in favor of light infantry; however, real light infantry (as opposed to line infantry who are lightly equipped) require something above and beyond men trained for conventional combat. Raising units like this from scratch is going to be a challenge for anyone who doesn’t have a few of these guys to teach new light infantry recruits. This is not to say it can’t be done. Just that the light infantry who conduct long range operations without substantial logistical support will represent an elite among the body of troops from which they are drawn. Also, as people accustomed to thinking for themselves, they won’t always be the favorites of the commanders over them.

I agree with most of your assessment, Web. A commander couldn't just wave his magic wand and declare that such and such a company is now "ranger". I mean he could call them whatever he wants but it wouldn't necessarily mean anything. In the FIW, a couple of jingoistic, parochial British line officers tried to replace provincial rangers with their own British-born light infantry units, with minimal operational success. LRRP'ing requires skills not necessarily learned in basic or other line infantry training programs.

The Recondo school idea is basically an in-theater training facility/program where legitimate, tabbed Rangers and SF guys (perhaps guys that have been wounded and can't operate in the field anymore and/or guys who are convalescing), and probably local experts, would train selected line infantry in the finer arts of long range patrolling, ambush, etc. The 5th SFG ran a Recondo school in Vietnam during the war. Most early Recondo graduates were just volunteers from line units. They became the first LRRPs. If it worked then, for that war, it would probably work for the late Twilight War. If you're interested in how the program worked, you might want to pick up a copy of Recondo- LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, a decent firsthand account by Vietnam LRRP/Ranger vet Larry Chambers.

There would be more and longer periods of down-time later in the war, like when armies slow things down for the winter. There would be opportunities for classes to cycle through the Recondo programs. They could then form the cadre for "ranger" (little R) units for their parent divisions or whatever.

As for operating on their own without substantial logistical support, I think that by 2000, with large conventional units growing their own food and brewing their own fuel, travelling light and living off the land would come a lot more naturally to most troops than it would have in '96. Yes, rangers would take it to the next level, but it wouldn't be too much of a stretch. If anything, late-war ranger units would probably require less logistical support than line units.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Targan, I know next to nothing about the Anglo-Maori wars but, from what you describe, there seem to be a couple of clear parallels with the FIW. I'm interested in learning more about this. Do you have any book recommendations on the subject (preferably something still in print)?

Unfortunately it's such a niche subject that few books have been written on it and of those they are mostly New Zealand publications. None of the books I've read on the subject are still in print. The best book I've read on the subject was James Belich's The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Penguin Books, 1986). I'm looking at trying to find a copy on the internet of Edmund Bohan's Climates of War, New Zealand in Conflict 1859-69 (Hazard Press, 2005) as I've read good things about it.

[Webstral]

Rae, I agree that the nature of the conflict will provide a more uniformly satisfactory pool of candidates for rangers (lower case r) than the largely mechanized force that enters the Twilight War. The need for scrounging and improvising will produce a force that is more self-reliant than the force that entered the war, too. I wonder, though, whether the troops will be involved in distilling fuel and growing food. The transfer of administrative functions to civilians so that able-bodied troops can be freed for combat duties seems likely to extend itself throughout the CSS specialties and perhaps some CS specialties.

As always, my attention is more fixed on CONUS than Europe or other locations in the world. (Of course, I’m always eager to read what others are creating elsewhere in the world.) After a certain point in time, virtually every surviving body of armed men will have someone dedicated to light infantry operations. This function would entail recce at the minimum. More capable light forces would be able to ambush and raid. They might also serve to secure lines of communication for larger, less capable conventional forces that would be needed to tackle marauders in their dens.

I have tried to address this idea to some degree with the organization of forces in New England and SAMAD. The State of Vermont is served by the Green Jackets Regiment, which is a light infantry formation used extensively for patrolling inside and outside the area nominally under the control of the rump Vermont government. The Green Jackets operate in enhanced platoon-sized formations that can move by foot, truck, or skis. During the winter months, ski patrols aggressively move into other parts of Vermont, upstate New York, and New Hampshire to locate marauders for suitable attention when they are snowbound and most vulnerable to having their shelter burned down. Replacements come from the militia units also under the control of the state government. The existence of a body of much less capable troops as the foundation of the light fighters is an important component, I believe.

The Maritime Rifles of First District are light-ish infantry in that they conduct patrols well outside the boundaries of the District. However, they often fight in close coordination with truck-mounted mortars and with motorized resupply. Thus, the Maritime Rifles as a whole don’t really meet the definition of light infantry. The recon elements within the MR could be counted as rangers, though.

I don’t see the UBF Marines as being light infantry, though again they would have some recon elements that would count. Based on the very scanty evidence of The Last Submarine, I have the impression that the UBF Marines operate close to the water and close to whatever heavy weapons they have available. They probably would move by water very close to any target of a raid; and thus they would not be out of supply for an extended period. Without a doubt, the Marines are tough customers. I don’t see the majority of them being rangers in the sense we have been discussing.

The Granite Brigade of the State of New Hampshire definitely are not light infantry, though they too have a recon element that would count as light infantry. The graniteers are more like dismounted motorized infantry in that they fight with close support from one or more of their gun trucks. The Granite Brigade reflects a confidence in firepower over skill. Through early 2001, they have had the luxury of keeping a handful of gun trucks operable. What will happen when and if they can’t field their gun trucks anymore is an interesting question.

The 43rd MP Brigade seems to have some troops who can be classified as light infantry. In The Last Submarine, players may encounter a hunter-killer group of MPs in Boston. Boston and Springfield are not exactly adjacent—especially if you are taking the heel-and-toe express to move between them. While the majority of MPs may be line infantry, for all intents and purposes, the soldiers of the hunter-killer groups clearly are capable of doing all of the things a squad of rangers would do. (This begs an interesting question. Do the MPs move to Boston as a platoon, then send smaller groups out from the patrol base?)

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The need for scrounging and improvising will produce a force that is more self-reliant than the force that entered the war, too. I wonder, though, whether the troops will be involved in distilling fuel and growing food. The transfer of administrative functions to civilians so that able-bodied troops can be freed for combat duties seems likely to extend itself throughout the CSS specialties and perhaps some CS specialties.

I think local civies will take care of most food and fuel production, but I do believe that troops taking a break from combat ops would also be asked to shoulder some of the load whenever possible. The Red Army of WWII was routinely tasked with helping with the harvest and other agricultural jobs in areas liberated from the Germans. In many areas, due to German depredations, there just weren't enough civilians left to do all of the work that needed to be done. I think this would be the case in many parts of the world, Poland especially. Armies would have to pitch in out of sheer necessity.

Ranger companies would probably be exempted from this sort of duty since they would be conducting field operations pretty much year round.

Your Green Jackets sound very much like a modern iteration of Robert's Rangers (and perhaps Ethan Allen's Green Mountain Boys during the Revolutionary period, before Vermont got really uppity)- incidentally, Roger's Rangers' official uniform consisted of green jacket and breeches.

[mikeo80]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I think local civies will take care of most food and fuel production, but I do believe that troops taking a break from combat ops would also be asked to shoulder some of the load whenever possible. The Red Army of WWII was routinely tasked with helping with the harvest and other agricultural jobs in areas liberated from the Germans. In many areas, due to German depredations, there just weren't enough civilians left to do all of the work that needed to be done. I think this would be the case in many parts of the world, Poland especially. Armies would have to pitch in out of sheer necessity.

Ranger companies would probably be exempted from this sort of duty since they would be conducting field operations pretty much year round.

Your Green Jackets sound very much like a modern iteration of Robert's Rangers (and perhaps Ethan Allen's Green Mountain Boys during the Revolutionary period, before Vermont got really uppity)- incidentally, Roger's Rangers' official uniform consisted of green jacket and breeches.

I also think that the "regular's" will be tasked with the day to day of foraging, preparing defenses, cleaning weapons, maintenance on whatever equipment happens to be with the unit. It even says in both V1 and V2.2 that foraging and farming were the order of the day once the unit had set up its' fortified base of operations.

I think that the summer offensive of 2000 with the German III corp and the US V ID took the Russians, Poles, etc. by supprise. The Russian IV Army with it's gasoline was probably slated for a late fall/early winter offensive. Once the crops were in. I would imagine that the Spetnaz attached to IVth Army were conducting scouting/recon/road inspection for the tanks, that sort of task. They were probably looking at a drive to the west directed at the junction of the American and British Armies. This is the area the Spetnaz was concentrating on, vs the German III Corp.

The "Ranger" type of unit is probably the last of their kind. The best of the best after all these years of warfare. Any compitant commander would keep his "Rangers" as a strategic reserve, to be used in dire times or for dire missions.

My $0.02

Mike

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by Webstral

I wonder, though, whether the troops will be involved in distilling fuel and growing food. The transfer of administrative functions to civilians so that able-bodied troops can be freed for combat duties seems likely to extend itself throughout the CSS specialities and perhaps some CS specialities.

It does seem the logical thing to do, but it doesn't appear to have occurred in T2K, at least not on a wide scale. The 2000 offensive was after all delayed because the troops hadn't been able to sow their crops for the year because of the later than expected rains.
A unit on the move also needs it's administrative support networks to do exactly as they're told, when they're told - civilians aren't exactly reliable enough, especially when there's a chance of combat. What commander wants their support network to flee the area right when they're needed most?

Originally Posted by Webstral

(This begs an interesting question. Do the MPs move to Boston as a platoon, then send smaller groups out from the patrol base?)

My guess? Absolutely. There's strength in numbers, and it's beneficial to have a base, even just a temporary one, to return to between forays.

Originally Posted by mikeo80

I think that the summer offensive of 2000 with the German III corp and the US V ID took the Russians, Poles, etc. by surprise. The Russian IV Army with it's gasoline was probably slated for a late fall/early winter offensive. Once the crops were in. I would imagine that the Spetnaz attached to IVth Army were conducting scouting/recon/road inspection for the tanks, that sort of task. They were probably looking at a drive to the west directed at the junction of the American and British Armies. This is the area the Spetnaz was concentrating on, vs the German III Corp.

The evidence does seem to back up a planned Pact offensive, but I'm not so sure it would have waited until autumn/winter - harvesting has to be done before the crops simply rot in the fields.
What the evidence doesn't show us is whether or not the Pact was taken by surprise. It's certainly possible, but even without aerial and satellite surveillance they'd have to know something was on the cards. Nato hadn't carried out any significant action in the north of Germany for approximately two years and those units there had for the most part done nothing but train, reorganise and build up supplies during that period (down south it was a bit different).
It's possible the Pact 2000 offensive was delayed, either because of weather conditions preventing reinforcements being brought up in time, or because the commanders "smelt a rat" and decided to hold their units for the probable need for a counter attack.

[mikeo80]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

The evidence does seem to back up a planned Pact offensive, but I'm not so sure it would have waited until autumn/winter - harvesting has to be done before the crops simply rot in the fields.
What the evidence doesn't show us is whether or not the Pact was taken by surprise. It's certainly possible, but even without aerial and satellite surveillance they'd have to know something was on the cards. Nato hadn't carried out any significant action in the north of Germany for approximately two years and those units there had for the most part done nothing but train, reorganise and build up supplies during that period (down south it was a bit different).
It's possible the Pact 2000 offensive was delayed, either because of weather conditions preventing reinforcements being brought up in time, or because the commanders "smelt a rat" and decided to hold their units for the probable need for a counter attack.

There is also the possibility the the Soviet Military leaders were looking at history. The great winter offensives of 1942,1942, and 1943 during the Great Patriotic War all worked to one degree or another. The Russian Bear was always most dangerous during the winter. (Ask the Swedes, French and Germans!) What better way to drive that offensive then with the Russian IVth Army with it's gasoline (diesel?) powered tanks. The delay could have been pre-programmed to allow the Romanian Oil Fields more time to produce and refine gasoline/diesel!!

Obviously from the ORBAT of the Russian Army as presented by Allied Intellegence to Vth ID, the planners of the Allied offensive did NOT expect to run into IVth Russian.

I can see the commander of IVth Russian turning his entire "Ranger"/Spetnaz units loose on the Allied offensive as soon as the drive was anylized and plotted on the gaming table!

My $0.02

Mike