T2K and the French & Indian War

[Webstral]

The drawback of light infantry is that they require qualities that line infantry don’t have to possess. I’m all in favor of light infantry; however, real light infantry (as opposed to line infantry who are lightly equipped) require something above and beyond men trained for conventional combat. Raising units like this from scratch is going to be a challenge for anyone who doesn’t have a few of these guys to teach new light infantry recruits. This is not to say it can’t be done. Just that the light infantry who conduct long range operations without substantial logistical support will represent an elite among the body of troops from which they are drawn. Also, as people accustomed to thinking for themselves, they won’t always be the favorites of the commanders over them.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The drawback of light infantry is that they require qualities that line infantry don’t have to possess. I’m all in favor of light infantry; however, real light infantry (as opposed to line infantry who are lightly equipped) require something above and beyond men trained for conventional combat. Raising units like this from scratch is going to be a challenge for anyone who doesn’t have a few of these guys to teach new light infantry recruits. This is not to say it can’t be done. Just that the light infantry who conduct long range operations without substantial logistical support will represent an elite among the body of troops from which they are drawn. Also, as people accustomed to thinking for themselves, they won’t always be the favorites of the commanders over them.

I agree with most of your assessment, Web. A commander couldn't just wave his magic wand and declare that such and such a company is now "ranger". I mean he could call them whatever he wants but it wouldn't necessarily mean anything. In the FIW, a couple of jingoistic, parochial British line officers tried to replace provincial rangers with their own British-born light infantry units, with minimal operational success. LRRP'ing requires skills not necessarily learned in basic or other line infantry training programs.

The Recondo school idea is basically an in-theater training facility/program where legitimate, tabbed Rangers and SF guys (perhaps guys that have been wounded and can't operate in the field anymore and/or guys who are convalescing), and probably local experts, would train selected line infantry in the finer arts of long range patrolling, ambush, etc. The 5th SFG ran a Recondo school in Vietnam during the war. Most early Recondo graduates were just volunteers from line units. They became the first LRRPs. If it worked then, for that war, it would probably work for the late Twilight War. If you're interested in how the program worked, you might want to pick up a copy of Recondo- LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, a decent firsthand account by Vietnam LRRP/Ranger vet Larry Chambers.

There would be more and longer periods of down-time later in the war, like when armies slow things down for the winter. There would be opportunities for classes to cycle through the Recondo programs. They could then form the cadre for "ranger" (little R) units for their parent divisions or whatever.

As for operating on their own without substantial logistical support, I think that by 2000, with large conventional units growing their own food and brewing their own fuel, travelling light and living off the land would come a lot more naturally to most troops than it would have in '96. Yes, rangers would take it to the next level, but it wouldn't be too much of a stretch. If anything, late-war ranger units would probably require less logistical support than line units.