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#11
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Since the PRC is a topic in a thread here already, I was thinking, if some of the successes of the USSR could be explained by a sudden weakness of the US armed forces after the so called Third Taiwan Strait Crisis went hot, which in known history it of course has not?
In our version of history, the PRC backed down from possible conflict, when the US sent in two carrier strike groups (CSG 5 and CSG 7 respectively). If the PRC had not backed down from confrontation, but instead begun an invasion of Taiwan, the PLAN (the navy of the PRC) probably would have still lost the fight back in 1996, but might have mauled two USN carrier strike groups. Further escalation could have come from North Korea acting up. Kim Jong-il succeeded his father in 1994. Historically North Korea then was at its worst, since the dissolution of the USSR robbed North Korea of large funds of Soviet aid. Had the USSR not imploded, e. g. as it avoided in T2K 4th edition, North Korea might have been in much better shape during the mid-1990s, when Kim Jong-il took over. He would still have to prove his value to the USSR and the PRC, of course, likely making him a illing ally in upcoming conflicts. With border hostilities along the Korean DMZ and 7th Fleet badly mauled, a mid-1990s "Asian Pivot" might have weakened deterrence possible by NATO during peace time or at least prohibited REFORGER-like large scale troop movements in swift time. This might have been enough for the USSR to gain initial ground against NATO frontline forces in late 1997 and early 1998. As per FL's timeline, once the US fully implements its levée en masse and fields dozens of new light infantry brigades: 500,000 draftees easily makes 25 divisions (actually 28.9) modeled after late Cold War mechanized divisions, which had 17,300 personnel. This would leave plenty room for filling up other services.
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