4th ed T2K

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Originally Posted by mpipes

OK. I’ll bite and offer some constructive criticisms for FL.
<snip>

11) If you have France in NATO, then France is GOING to be present and playing a prominent role. 25% of France’s citizens nuked and the Force de Dissuasion sidelined? I don’t care what the civilian government says, EVERY nuke France owns is going someplace east. Don’t think for a second that France does not have the stomach for using nukes to retaliate for that level of carnage. As any Frenchman will tell you; France is Paris, and Paris is France. You destroy Paris; you die – period. The military will go rogue and either mutiny and launch or execute a coup and launch.

France sent agents to sink a Greenpeace ship in the harbour of a friendly nation to prevent the ship from protesting nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific - and this reboot timeline wants us to believe France would sit back and do nothing if someone dropped an actual nuclear warhead on them?
Ah yeah, NO!

Originally Posted by mpipes

12) I’m not fan of the mechanics at all. There is a reason why D6 was abandoned in the 80s. I think you would be well served to go to a percentile system (rolled with 2xD20) or D20. Your combat system looks too coarse; maybe over simplified is an accurate way to say it. Weapon and armor ratings appear to be wildly off in a lot of cases. You should stick with tracking ammo also as well as fuel and food. The WHOLE POINT of the campaign is resource management. The PCs need to be at least somewhat concerned with where they are going to get fuel, water, food, and ammo from the start. This drives them to having to deal with the devils in the area. This is WWIII and these guys are behind the lines on their own with little real chance of making it. The PC need to be painfully aware and motivated by that reality. Otherwise, this is just playing modern soldier lite in the wild with ruined cities here and there. Also, stick with kilos for weights. There is just no point making things that abstract.

Unfortunately that will not happen. None of the things you suggest fit with their other Year Zero games and because this reboot is very firmly based on the Year Zero rules, it will not be changed.
The Year Zero rules suit the dungeon crawl style of the FL games philosophy so they are not going to change the design to suit the more sandbox style that 1st & 2nd and 2013 have.

Originally Posted by 3catcircus

If 2000 is the lore, will it be given sufficient attention to detail? Part of the resource management is knowing what kit you have and what you need to keep it working.

That race through the countryside dodging an evemy tank? You absolutely need to keep track of fuel burned and bullets fired because the quest for resources drives the way a campaign unfolds. If resource management, encumbrance, and tending to the injured are hand-waved, what else is there to focus the players? This isn't the D&D dungeon crawl mindset...

In other words, how hard is it to develop ammo cards, weapon cards, vehicle cards, etc.? Or is the thinking that the rules set won't support that level of granularity?

As I mentioned above, the Year Zero games all appear to me, to be based around dungeon crawling and the most minimal book-keeping that they can get away with.
You could be forgiven for calling FL's reboot as "Twilight: 2000 lite" but I think even that fails to recognise just how stripped back the Year Zero system is compared to what we expect from a game that has a central theme of surviving & rebuilding in the post-apocalypse of a global war.

The Year Zero rules seem to work well for Tales From The Loop but your characters in that game are children and adolescents. They haven't had the life experience to accumulate special skills and training so the generalized approach to handling Skill tasks works. But for a game where the characters are adults or older adolescents? Characters who have had years of schooling or time in the workplace and have years of acquired experience & knowledge?
The Year Zero rules are basic and to paraphrase one of the designers of the T2k reboot, they want to replicate the thrill of gunfights & car chases you see in movies - the Year Zero rules will work for this purpose. They don't want rules that are more sophisticated because they seem to view that as bogging down the gameplay.
The Year Zero rules are for all intents and purposes here, pulp action rules and just like I do not believe Savage Worlds rules work for Twilight: 2000, I don't believe any other pulp action rules set will work either.

And FL do actually have weapon cards but they seem to have no clear direction on how and what to produce. To illustrate what I mean, they devote several pages to weapons cards but some could be easily combined. There is no functional or physical difference between the Soviet manufactured SVD and the Polish manufactured SWD.
The SWD is a Polish made SVD, the names are different because one is in Russian and the other is in Polish... so why have two different weapons cards, one for each?

This is true for a number of the Polish weapons because they choose to have Soviet weapons cards, Swedish weapons cards, Polish weapons cards, US weapons cards and so on.
This seems like a good idea but in reality it's unnecessary duplication of information and a total waste of page space & development time - but it does give the impression on first glance that they have a lot of weapons in the book.

[Silent Hunter UK]

They also missed out the OT-64.

[Raellus]

StainlessSteelCynic shared an interesting find in another thread, but it seems particularly germane to the v4 T2kU, so I'm reposting the link here. I encourage y'all to read it. It's worth your time. The author's strategic analysis is quite illuminating, and particularly germane to the v4 World At War controversy/debate. A particularly eye-opening quote follows:

"[The Soviet Union] Launching a conventional war with limited aims in Northern Europe (Seven Days to the Rhine) with an openly declared promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, would produce such a shock to our system it would have been economically catastrophic.

"Recovery from that would have put Russia and the USA on more equal financial terms as much of the Dollar economy is based on confidence and communication, while the Russian economy was captive. It may not be a plan to take over the world, but quite possibly enough coercion to get the world to pay them off - give them Germany, Denmark, Holland and back off from China to stop them [the Soviets] slapping us about.

"It was unlikely, but many historical pivots only needed a gentle push off the cliff. In August 1991 I sat in a tank shed in Hohne listing to the BBC news tell us about the Soviet coup in Moscow . Gorbachev was rumoured to have been killed, the Tamanskya Guards Division were rolling around the Kremlin, shady generals were in charge and unhappy with the imminent end of Soviet power. There were still millions of WarPac soldiers and tons of equipment within a day’s drive from our position.

It was genuinely the scariest couple of days of my career."

https://www.quora.com/Was-the-Soviet...-War-1945-1991

So perhaps the Soviet attack on Eastern Europe in the v4 timeline was a result of two pieces of Soviet strategic thinking. One, to bring some of its errant former republics and WTO members back into the Soviet fold, recreating the territorial buffer between Mother Russia and NATO (a top Soviet priority since its national inception). Two, to take control of some NATO territory to hold hostage, as it were, to be ransomed for massive financial compensation in hard currency (or gold, or energy), thereby resuscitating the moribund Soviet economy.

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[Raellus]

One of the main criticisms leveled at v4's setting- IMHO, a legitimate, very fair one- is that the Soviet Union, without major allies, nearly steamrolls NATO in the Twilight War and, at the Death of a Division starting point, is considerably stronger than its Euro-American enemies.

I'm not sure that this can be explained/justified to everyone's satisfaction but here are some ideas that I hope go some way to reconciling v4's setting with real world circumstances, geopolitics, and strategic military balance of forces.

The first two ideas don't really require any modifications to the v4 timeline. The others do.

NATO overconfidence stemming from the Gulf War
One could argue that this happened, IRL. Coalition forces had very little trouble smashing Iraqi units equipped with Soviet weapons and following- roughly- Soviet doctrine. This easy victory gives NATO the mistaken impression that it can handle a Soviet invasion of central Europe with much less trouble than was anticipated pre-1991*. This leads to institutional complacency and a draw-down of forces (not as dramatic as what happened after the IRL collapse of the Soviet Union, but still a RIF).
*If you're interested, I go into much more detail regarding the fallacy of this way of thinking in this thread:

https://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=897

Economic drain of the former Warsaw Pact on NATO
Again, IRL, this was an issue that Germany had to deal with- East Germany's moribund economy was a millstone around the neck of W. Germany for at least a decade following reunification. Trying to incorporate the similarly weak economies of the other former Warsaw Pact nations into the European Union and/or NATO would put a strain on the democratic, capitalistic economies of Western Europe. This would likely result in a decrease in defense spending, regardless of the continued threat of the still-extant USSR.

Combine NATO overconfidence in its conventional military forces vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the economic drain of trying to incorporate former WTO nations into the EU/NATO, and you have a recipe for a weaker NATO c.1995.

AFAIK, the following scenarios are not part of the v4 setting. In fact, very little mention is made of parts of the world outside of Europe in the current v4 materials.

North Korean Invasion of the ROK
If North Korea views rising tensions in Europe and the Middle East as an opportunity to make a play for forced reunification, it could take advantage by launching an attack on the South. This would undoubtedly draw away several US divisions that could otherwise be deployed to Europe. It is also likely that Asia-Pacific allies like Australia would also send forces to aid the ROK.

PRC Invasion of Taiwan
I see this as much less likely as a DPRK invasion of the ROK, given that the Chinese military was not nearly as strong c.1995 as it is today. However, if the US appears distracted by a major war in Europe and/or a war in Korea, the PRC regime may see an opportunity to regain its rebellious province by force. This too would likely draw US forces and perhaps those of its Asia-Pacific allies, to defend Taiwan.

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[Ursus Maior]

Thank you for the input and for sharing your ideas with us. I was wondering the same, though I have not, for now, come up with ideas that satisfy my understanding of the 1990s. My main critique with your points 1) and 2) is that the lack of a collapsing USSR and the (historically) desolate state of it in 1991 under your assumptions would have led to less vigilance and strength than historically, but a stronger USSR. That seems at least counter-intuitive to me.

Historically the dissolution of the USSR was something no-one expected to happen. It lead to a collapse of the military forces of Russia and the other successor states, but also billions of financial aid by Western countries. The former Eastern Bloc states were not integrated into NATO until the late 90s and into the EU until 2004 (Finland joined in 1995, but was not an Eastern Bloc nation). While we do not know about EU enlargement in FL's timeline, former Warsaw Pact countries were not admitted to NATO in that timeline. Because of that, a larger financial drain than happened historically is not likely.

Germany is a special case of course. Though, given the historical financial drain and the massive demobilization process that came with the complete elimination of GDR forces and equipment and the down-scaling of the active army as well as large parts of the territorial army (the latter was hit war worse than the actual field army), I do not see a heavier drain on FL's version of the Bundeswehr. Actually, that is quite unlikely, given the clear and present danger the USSR would still have played in FL's 1990s.

Maybe we should look at what makes the USSR such a formidable foe, instead of specific, as of yet not hinted to, weaknesses on NATO's side. With the Gang of Eight taking control and Gennady Yanayev dying under mysterious circumstances, one might think of internal strife or even struggle's for power and "active methods of consolidation" by surviving members of the junta. This reeks of a, maybe short but pronounced, period of internal cleansing, state terrorism and a generally shorter leash. Keeping some forms of liberalization, like small private businesses, but tightening the grip on the big state industry.

The nascent oligarchs of 1990/1991 might have to make the choice of falling in line or mysteriously dying, too, much earlier than in our history. Propaganda trials against "counter-revolutionary capitalists" and "imperialist agents" (i. e. uncovered NATO spies or their goons) might have been the only signs to the West that the USSR was trying to stay alive and using old methods. Other than that, freedom of press would have been reduced to levels not seen since 1968 and the Iron Curtain would have been simply moved back a little.

With the oligarchs never coming into being properly, the large sell-out of the Soviet economy does not happen. Since no republics, except the Baltics, leave the USSR, its industry and economy does not get torn up. This softens the blow to living standards, health care and, foremost, tax revenue, allowing for comparatively huge investments into the armed forces when compared to known history. This is basically what happened from 2000 onward under President Putin, but it saves the population ten years of grief and the economy the same time of total collapse and brain-drain from bright minded individuals and large swathes of the labour force to emigrate, drink themselves to death or simply being unemployed.

Avoiding the historical collapse would be the single most important factor in the USSR remaining a credible opponent. It does not, however, let the USSR actively close the huge gap in military prowess that existed by 1990 already. It merely saves it from total, historical downfall. But while the West will still move forward, avoiding collapse might still mean stagnation and thus (effectively) falling behind even more. That fact will be hard to compensate or write away by any publisher.

However, a few years after Desert Storm, the oil prices spike in 1994 and the USSR gets a huge increase in revenue, basically for free. This money can be spent on internal security, military hardware and further reforms. This is the first actual leap forward the USSR might be able to enjoy and since it comes right at the point when historical down-scaling in the West comes into full effect: Clinton is president for one year, all East German forces have been dissolved, the personnel of the Bundeswehr is reduced to ca. 360,000 soldiers (130,000 less than 1989), NATO forces have begun moving out of Central Europe for good.

Now, as mentioned, it's questionable all this will happen exactly the way it used to happen, especially, if NATO sniffs any huge sums of money being invested into the armed forces of the USSR. But if the Soviets play their hand well, they might look pretty weak and of course T2K NATO cannot know what "alternate history" it missed, when the August Coup succeeded. So scaling down will be the law of the land.

The USSR, of course, will have to deal with Chechnya, Nagorny-Karabakh and Transnistria (even, if Moldavia did non secede, though: did it?). However, these brush wars will give the armed forces a clear mission to safeguard the Union and it will give the KGB a chance to keep the army occupied. Also, new tactics and weapon systems can be tried out, the trauma of Afghanistan overcome and experience be won. This experience is something NATO will lack, at least as a cohesive structure, though parts of it will, of course, have participated in Desert Storm and peacekeeping the Balkans. That is not the same, though: The Gulf War might have led to overconfidence, I agree there, as we saw, when the USAF lost a F-117 Nighthawk over Serbia, because the F-117s used the same routes multiple times.

Do that against a near-peer enemy in the early days of "punitive air-strikes against an aggressor attacking a friendly, but neutral nation, and you might get eviscerated quickly. Though the obvious question would be, if NATO would treat the Soviet Army, that just surprise attacked Poland, treat like Serbia in 1999? I doubt this clear lack of military professionalism and I doubt even more it would happen more than once. Though one big screw-up might give the Soviets a sufficient edge for the initial clash.

My biggest problem here is that as per FL's timeline, the Soviet Union attacks Poland in a similar manner as it did attack the Ukraine in 2014 or Georgia in 2008: deception, propaganda warfare, instigation of riots and then an offensive thinly veiled as peacekeeping mission. The US answer that by conducting "a broad air bombing campaign against the advancing Soviet forces with stealth aircraft and cruise missiles". That's a unilateral approach by the USA which is stupid, but plays into the hands of the USSR: Poland is backed by a US air campaign, but there are no other belligerents. Now the USSR does the most idiotic thing it could do: It rips of it carefully donned mask of "coming in peace" and strikes against US installations in Germany, Turkey and the UK, triggering NATO Article 5; mutual defense. In order for that to make sense, there must have been a plan, even if it was dumb.

To put this into perspective, this is like Germany getting away with laying hands on Czechoslovakia in 1938 (equivalent to the USSR annexing the Baltic States), then attacking Poland and when France and the UK declare war, going on a killing spree against every other nation in Europe and America, drawing everybody into a war already in 1939. Why would the USSR do that? What's the plan here? By comparison, in Red Storm Rising the USSR starts a conventional war against NATO as a feint attack to have free hands in seizing Middle-Eastern oilfields. It's not a great plan and it fails, but it's a plan.

So, why would the USSR draw NATO into a war that until then had "only" been a punitive air-campaign by the USA and a ground-warfare campaign the Soviets certainly were winning. If the USSR had wanted a surprise attack against its former Bloc allies, strategic surprise could have been achieved better before NATO got involved than afterwards. But if it was not about Central or Eastern Europe, what is the goal of this war? A Clancyesque war for oil? Plundering Europe for revenue? Defense under the impression of an imminent attack?

I think that question needs an answer, before we can ask what went wrong on both sides. The question of the weakness of NATO is important, but it is likely connected to the reason of the war.

[Raellus]

All fair points, UM. I don't disagree with your assessment. I still think NATO weakness has to be a major factor in both the Soviet's calculations vis-a-vis launching a war and in explaining their early success when it got underway.

I didn't mention this earlier but I think another contributing factor to NATO weakness in the run-up to WWIII would be internal divisions in the former East Bloc countries (and, in particular, within reunified Germany). I think that communist fifth columns in Eastern Europe would be more troublesome in v4 timeline than they were IRL. Netflix did a doc on former DDR military and Stasi antigovernment activities in the days after reunification. There's a thread on that here:

https://forum.juhlin.com/showthread....=perfect+crime

To sum it up, I can see these efforts being much more sustained and disruptive with an extant Soviet Union (providing moral and perhaps covert material support). I can also see similar operations taking place in the other former-WTO countries.

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

My biggest problem here is that as per FL's timeline, the Soviet Union attacks Poland in a similar manner as it did attack the Ukraine in 2014 or Georgia in 2008: deception, propaganda warfare, instigation of riots and then an offensive thinly veiled as peacekeeping mission. The US answer that by conducting "a broad air bombing campaign against the advancing Soviet forces with stealth aircraft and cruise missiles". That's a unilateral approach by the USA which is stupid, but plays into the hands of the USSR: Poland is backed by a US air campaign, but there are no other belligerents. Now the USSR does the most idiotic thing it could do: It rips of it carefully donned mask of "coming in peace" and strikes against US installations in Germany, Turkey and the UK, triggering NATO Article 5; mutual defense. In order for that to make sense, there must have been a plan, even if it was dumb.

To put this into perspective, this is like Germany getting away with laying hands on Czechoslovakia in 1938 (equivalent to the USSR annexing the Baltic States), then attacking Poland and when France and the UK declare war, going on a killing spree against every other nation in Europe and America, drawing everybody into a war already in 1939. Why would the USSR do that? What's the plan here? By comparison, in Red Storm Rising the USSR starts a conventional war against NATO as a feint attack to have free hands in seizing Middle-Eastern oilfields. It's not a great plan and it fails, but it's a plan.

So, why would the USSR draw NATO into a war that until then had "only" been a punitive air-campaign by the USA and a ground-warfare campaign the Soviets certainly were winning. If the USSR had wanted a surprise attack against its former Bloc allies, strategic surprise could have been achieved better before NATO got involved than afterwards. But if it was not about Central or Eastern Europe, what is the goal of this war? A Clancyesque war for oil? Plundering Europe for revenue? Defense under the impression of an imminent attack?

I think that question needs an answer, before we can ask what went wrong on both sides. The question of the weakness of NATO is important, but it is likely connected to the reason of the war.

I agree with you that there's definitely something missing, as far as explanation goes. I have a hard time reconciling what v4 presents with real-world geo-political and military strategic considerations. I can't really explain it, but I'll try.

I did read the Soviet invasion of Poland as a fait accompli for a general offensive aimed at reconquering most, if not all, of the former WTO nations. In other words, the Soviets were planning on restoring a buffer between itself and the pre-'91 NATO nations by regaining control of the former WTO countries. The offensive's strategic objective was to do so, although its publicly stated objective was to save the Polish people from an oppressive military regime.

Maybe the Soviets didn't expect much resistance, given what happened in the Baltics (I have a hard time buying the tiny, poorly armed Baltics being allowed to break away in the first place). Maybe they figured that NATO wouldn't go to war to protect Poland, much like Britain and France didn't really go to war with Nazi Germany in 1939 (i.e. the Phony War/"Sitzkrieg").

Maybe the US airstrikes were too effective to be ignored and the Soviets were faced with the decision of calling off the offensive or starting the next, general offensive vs. NATO phase early?

I still very much prefer the v1 timeline, but I like trying to make things work, so this a fun thought exercise for me.

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[Ursus Maior]

I read your contribution on A Perfect Crime (which I did not know before, so thanks for that hint) and I could imagine a USSR-backed or at least USSR-tolerated anti-reunification campaign by former members of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, Ministry for State security, i. e. "Stasi"). However, I have three remarks, bear in mind that I have not watched the documentary yet.

1) I get the impression that the documentary proliferated a hyperbolic story of the amount of discontent in the early years of a reunified Germany. There were demonstrations against the Treuhand, the government agency that mostly ran the economic transformation of the former GDR, certainly. However, riots were - as far as I know - not happening. Strikes did happen numerous times, though.

2) The Stasi was dissolved in 1990, a couple of months before reunification. While an underground network certainly was a possibility and mostly likely a fact, including agents starting to work for Soviet and later Russian secret agencies, the main operational body of Stasi was so utterly wiped out in the last months of the GDR that any major operations would have been unthinkable. It is important to understand that, even before reunification, the Stasi lost its central headquarters, when it was stormed by anti-government protesters and the main archives were looted, as others had been (these incidents happened between December 1989 and January 1990). All members of Stasi were dismissed on March 31st 1990. A few hundred were hired on temporary contracts in order to dissolve the agency proper. A full set of files on Stasi employees even made it into the hands of the CIA (i. e. "Rosenholz files"), most likely being bought from KGB operatives, who were entrusted with these files by Stasi in order to safekeep Stasi secrets in Moscow, as collapse was evidently imminent. The two KGB agents in questions were soon found dead "under mysterious circumstances", which - as we learned in the past decades - seems to hint at KGB revenge killings. This shows however, in what a desolate state of affairs even KGB and Soviet secret agencies weree by early 1990. The USSR really is in a catastrophic mess by that date.

3) My main point here would be that any major spiel by late Cold War intelligence agencies would need to be a major theme for FL's 4th edition of T2K, were it to be easily accessible and credible for players. The historical USSR was weak, derelict and so immensely corrupt, that corruption - i. e. personal relations of individuals for the means of personal gains - were probably the only thing that kept the political system somewhat going. Whereas the hoipolloi were heading towards serious lacks of everything (in 1992 there was a notable decline in calorie intake within the Russian Federation), future oligarchs and the political elite were filling their pockets. Neither this nor the collapsing state of the USSR is a theme in FL's edition; nor is any large scale intelligence coup or counter-revolution.

To sum this up, what I find most baffling with this new edition is its lack of a concise theme for the well known setting of T2K. This leaves many questions open for players that would be highly relevant for many groups, some of which I was already asked, when giving a short introduction to one of my players, e. g.: Who started the war and why? How do Polish people feel about the war, i. e. what do they think of NATO, Americans, Germans, Soviets etc.? How do Swedish people feel? Is their a strong anti-American stance? [After all, Sweden was attacked by the US and then beaten into an alliance; which alone is dumb and contradicts pre-war arrangements, since Sweden was clearly to side with NATO in the event of a war.] And how do other NATO countries feel about the war, e. g. Germany had a strong anti-war stance both in politics and the masses, how does this interact with the US attacking the USSR first (yes, over the USSR attacking Poland)? Would Germans really support triggering Article 5 after US installations were hit in Germany? I could see this go both ways in the 1990s actually.

That none of this can be answered from the core rulebooks is a major drawback for this product. Especially since it's already "niche". I don't know about FL's other products, but they seem to be thematically strong (Coriolis and Alien come to mind), but from riffling through their books, deeper narratives do not seem to be part of their publication strategy. I might be wrong here, though, as I did not read to deep in any of their games.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I didn't mention this earlier but I think another contributing factor to NATO weakness in the run-up to WWIII would be internal divisions in the former East Bloc countries (and, in particular, within reunified Germany). I think that communist fifth columns in Eastern Europe would be more troublesome in v4 timeline than they were IRL.

As I mentioned before, none of the former Warsaw Pact nations was a NATO state historically by 1997 and FL agrees here. Keeping these states out of NATO might have been a major contributing factor for the USSR to attack, and they might have had help from within these states. But that is neither a theme or even mentioned, nor very likely: Poland was in open insurrection against communism before 1990, the CSFR had dissolved by the mid-nineties, but anti-communism was strong before and Romania had just shot its communist leader. The Czech Republic and Slovakia might have been easy targets, maybe Hungary and Bulgaria, too, and Romania would have been easy to beat militarily, but Poland had the the strongest and toughest army of all former Pact nations. In fact, during the August Coup of 1991 that army was mobilized against the Eastern Front, should the victors of that coup attempt an invasion. The Polish security apparatus actually expected exactly that, which FL describes.

Originally Posted by Raellus

I did read the Soviet invasion of Poland as a fait accompli for a general offensive aimed at reconquering most, if not all, of the former WTO nations. In other words, the Soviets were planning on restoring a buffer between itself and the pre-'91 NATO nations by regaining control of the former WTO countries. The offensive's strategic objective was to do so, although its publicly stated objective was to save the Polish people from an oppressive military regime.

Maybe the Soviets didn't expect much resistance, given what happened in the Baltics (I have a hard time buying the tiny, poorly armed Baltics being allowed to break away in the first place). Maybe they figured that NATO wouldn't go to war to protect Poland, much like Britain and France didn't really go to war with Nazi Germany in 1939 (i.e. the Phony War/"Sitzkrieg").

Maybe the US airstrikes were too effective to be ignored and the Soviets were faced with the decision of calling off the offensive or starting the next, general offensive vs. NATO phase early?

I could go with the USSR re-annexing the Baltics. It's not off the table today and certainly they would have been the first to suffer from a resurgent USSR in 1991. But an invasion by the USSR of its former allies, no matter how involuntary allies they were at times (e. g. Romania had basically stopped cooperating with Pact structures during the 1980s), would have been a stupid move. In 1945 these nations were not invaded, but liberated from German occupation and annexation. True, that difference was sometimes hard to notice, but it had credibility in the citizens of Poland and the other countries no being mass-murdered or declared sub-humans in the style Nazi Germany had done it. Certainly, there were atrocities committed by Soviets or local regimes, but in general life as better in several magnitudes after 1945 than between 1939 and 1945.

A military invasion and occupation would nullify that narrative and cost the USSR hundreds of thousands of troops to maintain occupation, cash to rebuilt and political goodwill; all of which would be lacking at home. That would doom all forms of gap-closing with the West or improving the economy. It would even make the situation of the USSR worse than before 1989. There's a reason after all, Russia never tried this, not even with former Soviet republics. As of now, Russia is only nibbling away from its neighbors what it can swallow. Or, almost.

The problem with such an alternate history clearly is that we know too much about that part of history for our imagination to trigger disbelieve. Certainly, no-one would have poked the Soviet Bear in the Nineties on purpose to cause a war. The USSR itself shouldn't be in a position to invade, so leaders wouldn't come up with a plan to do so. And the trope of the insane dictator and/or the hardline US president/general is feels stale at least.

Originally Posted by Raellus

I still very much prefer the v1 timeline, but I like trying to make things work, so this a fun thought exercise for me.

Yeah, v1 made the Germans the bad guys by having them attack the Soviet forces in Germany. That was one huge plot device that was totally out of the question and frankly got post-war Germany totally wrong. It's quite hard to write believable contra-factual history, as it turns out. In the 1980s this might have turned away a couple of German players, but coming up with a similar reason for war today, let's say a Polish
cabal of officers and their non-communist Ukrainian and Lithuanian co-conspirators who want to revive the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, would probably sound completely absurd or turn away a sizeable customer base.